
"%. 



WELLINGTON'S ARMY 



PLATE I. 




Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. 

From a portrait by Sir Thojuas Lawrence. 



WELLINGTON'S 
ARMY 



1809-1814 



BY 

C. W. C. OMAN 

M.A. OXON., HON. LL.D. EDIN. 
CHICHELE PROFESSOR OP MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 



NEW YORK 

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 

London: EDWAED ARNOLD 



^c^ 



^\ 



€)^ 



I 



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PREFACE 

Much has been written concerning Wellington and his 
famous Peninsular Army in the way of formal history : 
this volume, however, will I think contain somewhat that 
is new to most students concerning its organization, its 
day by day hfe, and its psychology. To understand the 
exploits of WeUington's men, it does not suffice to read a 
mere chronicle of their marches and battles. I have 
endeavoured to collect in these pages notices of those 
aspects of their Hfe with which no strategical or tactical 
work can deal, though tactics and even strategy will not 
be found unnoticed. 

My special thanks are due to my friend Mr. C. T. 
Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, for allowing 
me to use the admirable list of the brigade and divisional 
organization of the Peninsular Army which forms Appendix 
II. It is largely expanded from the article on the same 
topic which he printed eight years ago in the Historical 
Review, and enables the reader to find out the precise 
composition of every one of Wellington's units at any 
moment between April, 1808 and April, 1814. I have 
also to express my gratitude to the Hon. John Fortescue, 
the author of the great History of the British Army, for 
answering a good many queries which I should have found 
hard to solve without his aid. The index is by the same 
loving hand which has worked on so many of my earlier 
volumes. 



r?/ 



C. OMAN, 



17 



Oxford, 

September, 1912. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Inteoductoey— The Old Peninsulas Aemy . . 1 

II. SouECEs OP Infoemation — The Liteeatuee op the ■ 

Peninsulas Wae 9 

III. The Duke op Wellington— The Man and the 

Steategist 39 

IV. Wellington's Inpantey Tactics— Line versus Column 61 
V. Wellington's Tactics— The Cavaley and Aetilleey. 94 

VI. Wellington's Lieutenants — Hill, Beeesfoed, Geaham 115 

VII. Wellington's Lieutenants — Picton, Ceaufued, and 

Othees 129 

VIII. The Oeganization op the Aemy : Headquaetees . 153 

IX. The Oeganization op the Aemy : Beigades and 

Divisions . . . . . . . .163 

X. The Oeganization op the Aemy : The Eegiments . 178 

XI. Inteenal Oeganization op the Eegiment : The Oppicees 195 

XII. Inteenal Oeganization op the Eegiment : The Eank 

and File 208 

XIII. The Auxiliaeies: The Geemans and the Portuguese 220 

XIV. Discipline and Court-Martials . . . . , 237 

XV. The Army on the March 255 

XVI. Impedimenta : The Baggage : Ladies at the Front , 268 



viii Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVII. A Note on Sieges . ^ 279 

XVIII. Uniforms and Weapons 292 

XIX. The Commissariat 307 

XX. A Note on the Spiritual Life . . . .320 

Appendix I. Establishment and Stations of the British 

Army in 1809 ?>33 

„ II. The Divisions and Brigades op the Peninsular 
Army, 1809—1814, by C. T. Atkinson, M.A., 
Fellow op Exeter College, Oxford . . 343 

,, III. Bibliography op English Diaries, Journals 

AND Memoirs op the Peninsular War . 375 

Index 385 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Plate I.— Arthur Wellesley, Duke op Wellington Frontispiece 

From a portrait bij Sir Thomas Laivrence 

FACIKG PAGE 

„ II.— Lord Hill, G.G.B 118 

„ III.— General Thomas Graham, Baron Lynedoch, G.C.B., 

G.C.M.G 126 

Frovi the picture by Sir George Hayter 

„ IV.— General Sir Thomas Picton, K.C.B. . . .138 
„ v.— Officer op Rifles, 1809 ...... 188 

Private, Infantry op the Line, 1809 . . . 188 

„ VI. Officer op Light Dragoons, Uniform of 1809 . 194 

Officer op Light Dragoons, Uniform of 1813 . 194 

„ VII.— Private of Heavy Dragoons, 1809 . . .284 

Officer of Field Artillery, 1809 . . . 284 

,, VIII. — Sergeant and Private op Infantry in Winter 

Marching Order, 1813 296 



EREATA. 

Page 15, line 2S, for " Stewart " read " Stuart." 
„ 19, „ 10, for " Stuart " read " Stewart." 
„ 28, „ 2, for " 84tli " read " 85th." 
„ 43, footnote line 1, for " 42nd " read " 92nd." 
„ 48, „ „ 2,/or "R.A."reafZ"R.E." 

,, 54, line 30, for " east " read " west." 
„ 81, „ 8, /or " aid " read " aim." 
„ 92, footnote, /or " Armie " read " Armee." 
„ 118, line 2, for " left " read '' right." 
„ 150, „ 23, /or " predicted " reac? " predicated." 
„ 167, footnote line 2, for " 2/50th " read " 2/58th." 
„ 177, line 13, /or *' two " read " one or two." 
„ 182, ,, 19, /or "two regiments" reafZ "four." 
„ 296, ,, 7,/or "were" reacZ" who." 
„ 312, last line of 1st par., /or " was " read " were." 
„ 336, line 11, for " Loyal Lanes." read "Loyal Lincoln." 
„ 348, „ 22, for " had not " read " had just." 
„ 392, 1st column, last line but 5, for "Edmund" read 

" Edward." 
The portrait of Lord Hill should be Plate II. and that of 

Lord Lynedoch Plate III. 



WELLINGTON'S ARMY 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY — THE OLD PENINSULAR ARMY 

While working for the last nine years at the History of 
the Peninsular War, I have (as was inevitable) been com- 
pelled to accumulate many notes, and much miscellaneous 
information which does not bear upon the actual chronicle 
of events in the various campaigns that lie between 1808 
and 1814, but yet possesses high interest in itself, and 
throws many a side-light on the general course of the war. 
Roughly speaking, these notes relate either to the personal 
characteristics of that famous old army of Wellington, 
which, as he himself said, " could go anywhere and do any- 
thing," or to its inner mechanism — the details of its manage- 
ment. I purpose to speak in these pages of the leaders 
and the led ; of the daily life, manners, and customs of 
the Peninsular Army, as much as of its composition and its 
organization. I shall be dealing with the rank and file 
no less than with the officers, and must even find space for a 
few pages on that curious and polyglot horde of camp \ 
followers which trailed at the heels of the army, and fre- 
quently raised problems which worried not only colonels 
and adjutants, but even the Great Duke himself. 

There is an immense amount of interesting material 
to be collected, concerning the inner life of the Peninsular 
Army, from public documents, such as despatches, general 
orders, and regimental reports, and records of courts martial. 
But I shall be utilizing to a much greater extent non-official 



2 The Old Peninsulae Army 

information, collected from the countless diaries, memoirs, 
and series of contemporary letters, which have come 
down to us from the men who took part in the great war. 
Nor are the controversial pamphlets to be neglected, which 
kept appearing for many a year, when one survivor of the 
old army found, in the writings of another, statements 
which he considered injurious to himself, his friends, his 
regiment, or his division. The best known and most 
copious of these discussions is that which centres round the 
pubHcation of Napier's Peninsular War ; the successive 
appearance of its volumes led to the printing of many 
protests, in which some of the most prominent officers of 
WeUington's army took part— not only Lord Beresford, 
who was Napier's especial butt and hete noir, and rephed 
to the historian in terms sometimes not too dignified — but 
Cole, Hardinge, D'Urban, and many more. This set of 
" strictures ", as they were called, mainly relate to the 
Albuera campaign. But there are smaller, but not less 
interesting, series of controversial pamphlets relating to 
the Convention of Cintra, to Moore's retreat, to the cam- 
paign of 1810 (Bussaco), the storm of Badajoz, and other 
topics. 

The memoirs and autobiographies, of course, possess 
the greatest share of interest. And it may be noted as a 
remarkable fact that those coming from the rank and file 
are not very much less numerous than those which come 
from the commissioned ranks. If there are scores of 
diaries and reminiscences of colonels, captains, and subal- 
terns, there are at least dozens of little books by sergeants, 
corporals, and privates. Many of these are very quaint 
productions indeed, printed at local presses — at Perth, 
Coventry, Cirencester, Louth, Ashford — even at Corfu. 
Very frequently some knot of mihtary or civihan friends 
induced a much-travelled veteran to commit to paper the 
tales which had been the delight of the canteen, or of the 
fireside of some village inn. They are generally very 
good reading, but often give rather the spirit of the time 



Memoirs of the Rank and File 3 

and the regiment than an accurate record of its long-past 
exploits. One or two of these veterans' artless tales show- 
all the characteristics of the memoirs of the prince of their 
tribe — the delightful but autolatrous Marbot. I have 
thought it worth while to give in an appendix the names and 
titles of the best of them. One or two, above all the little 
book of " Rifleman Harris " of the 95th, well deserve to be ''- 
republished, but still await that honour. Perhaps regi- 
mental patriotism may some day provide us with a series 
of reprints of the best Soldiers' Tales.* 

It is a very notable fact, which requires (but has never 
hitherto received) an explanation, that it is precisely with 
the coming in of the nineteenth century that British 
soldiers and officers alike began to write diaries and re- 
miniscences on a large scale, and in great numbers. I do 
not, of course, mean to say that there were none such pro- 
duced in the eighteenth century. Besides serious military 
histories like those of Kane, Stedman, or Tarleton, there 
do exist a certain number of narratives of personal adventure 
written by officers, such as Major Rogers the Scout, or 
the garrulous and often amusing diarist (unfortunately 
anonymous) who made the campaign of Culloden with the 
Duke of Cumberland — not to speak of the semi-apochryphal 
Captain Carleton. But they are few, and the writings from 
the ranks are fewer still, though there are certain soldiers' 
letters which go back as far as Marlborough's time, and 
one or two small books like Bristow's and Scurry's Indian 
reminiscences, and Sergeant Lamb's Journal in the American.^ 
War of Independence, which are worth mentioning. But 
it is quite certain that there was more writing going on in 
the army during the ten years 1805-1815 than in the whole 
eighteenth century. 

What was the explanation of the phenomenon ? There 

are, I think, two main causes to be borne in mind : the 

* John Shipp's is the only book from the ranks which has been 
reprinted within the last ten years, I believe. Mr. Fitchett repro- 
duced a few chapters of Anton and others in his rather disappointing 
Wellington's Men. 



4 The Old Peninsular Army 

first was the glorious and inspiring character of WeUington's 
campaigns, which made both officers and men justifiably 
proud of themselves, and more anxious than any previous 
generation had been to put on paper the tale of their own 
exploits. It must have been a man of particularly cheerful 
disposition who cared to compile the personal narrative of 
his adventures during the Old American War, which was 
largely a record of disaster, or even in the ups and downs 
of the Seven Years' War, when for every Minden or Quebec 
there had been an evil memory Hke Ticonderoga or Kloster- 
Kampen. It is to this instinctive dislike to open up old 
memories of misfortune that we may attribute the fact that 
the first British campaigns of the French Revolutionary 
War, the unhappy marches and battles of the Duke of 
York's army in 1793, 1794, 1795 are recorded in singularly 
few books of reminiscences — there are only (to my know- 
ledge) the doggerel verse of the " Officer of the Guards," 
with its valuable foot-notes, and the simple memoirs of 
Sergeant Stevenson of the Scots Fusilier Guards, and 
Corporal Brown of the Coldstream. This is an extra- 
ordinarily small output for a long series of campaigns, in 
which some 30,000 British troops were in the field, and 
where gallant exploits like those of Famars and Villers- 
en-Cauchies took place. But the general tale was not one 
on wiiicli any participant could look back with pleasure. 
Hence, no doubt, the want of books of reminiscences. 

But I fancy that there is another and a quite distinct 
cause for the extraordinary outburst of interesting military 
literature with which the nineteenth century begins, and we 
may note that this outburst certainly commences a little 
before the Peninsular War. There exist several very good 
personal narratives both of the Conquest of Egypt in 1801, 
of the Indian Wars during the Viceroyalty of Lord Wel- 
lesley, and of the short campaign of Maida. And this cause 
I take to be the fact that the generation which grew up 
under the stress of the long Revolutionary War with France 
was far more serious and intelligent than that which saw 



The Sword and the Pen 5 

it begin, and realized the supreme importance of the ends 
for which Great Britain was contending, and the danger 
which threatened her national existence. The empire had 
been in danger before, both in the Seven Years' War, and 
in the War of American Independence, but the enemy had 
never been so terrifying and abhorrent as the Jacobins 
of the Eed Republic. The France of R-obespierre was 
loathed and feared as the France of Louis XV. or Louis XVI. 
had never been. To the greater part of the British nation 
the war against the Revolution soon became a kind of 
Crusade against the " triple-headed monster of Repub- 
licanism, Atheism, and Sedition." The feeling that Great 
Britain had to fight not so much for empire as for national 
existence, and for all that made life worth having — religion, ^ 
morality, constitution, laws, liberty — made men desper- ') 
ately keen for the fight, as their ancestors had never 
been. 

Among the many aspects which their keenness took, one 
was most certainly the desire to record their own personal 
part in the great strife. It is in some such way only that I 
can explain the fact that the actually contemporary diaries 
and journals become so good as the war wears on, compared 
to anything that had gone before. Memoirs and remini- 
scences written later do not count in the argument, because 
they were compiled and printed long after the French war 
was over, and its greatness was understood. But the abun- 
dance of good material written down (and often sent to the 
press) during the continuance of the war is astounding. 
In some cases we can be sure that we owe the record to the 
reason that I have just suggested. For example, we certainly 
owe to it the long and interesting military diaries of Lord 
Lynedoch (the Sir Thomas Graham of Barrosa), who most 
decidedly went into the Revolutionary War as a Crusader 
and nothing less. As I shall explain when dealing with his 
remarkable career, he started military life at forty-four, 
mortgaging his estates to raise a battalion, and suddenly 
from a Whig M.P. of the normal type developed into a 



6 The Old Peninsular Aemy 

persistent and conscientious fighter against France and 
French ideas — whether they were expressed (as when first 
he drew the sword) in the frenzied antics of the Jacobins, 
or (as during his latter years) in the grinding despotism 
of Bonaparte. His diary from first to last is the record of 
one who feels that he is discharging the elementary duty 
of a good citizen, by doing his best to beat the French 
wherever they may be found. 

I take it that the same idea was at the bottom of the 
heart of many a man of lesser note, who kept his pen busy 
during those twenty eventful years. Some frankly say that 
they went into the service, contrary to the original scheme 
of their life, because they saw the danger to the state, 
and were ready to take their part in meeting it. " The 
threat of invasion fired every loyal pair of shoulders for a 
red coat." * 

Of the men whose memoirs and letters I have read, 
some would have been lawyers (like Sir Hussey Vivian), 
others politicians, others doctors, others civil servants, 
others merchants, if the Great War had not broken out. 
I should imagine that the proportion of officers who had 
taken their commission for other reasons than that they 
had an old family connection with the army, or loved 
adventure, was infinitely higher during this period than it 
had ever been before. A very appreciable number of them 
were men with a strong religious turn — a thing I imagine 
to have been most unusual in the army of the eighteenth 
century (though we must not forget Colonel Gardiner). 
One young diarist heads the journal of his first campaign 
with a long prayer, f Another starts for the front with a 
final letter to his relatives to the effect that " while striving 
to discharge his military duties he will never forget his 
religious ones : he who observes the former and disregards 
the latter is no better than a civilized brute." J 

* Kincaid, Random Shots from a Rifleman, p. 8. 
I This was Woodberry of the 18th Hussars. 
X Sir William Gomm's Life, p. 31. 



The Men of Eeligion 7 

There were Peninsular officers who led prayer-meetings 
and founded religious societies — not entirely to the delight 
of the Duke of Wellington,* whose o^vn very dry and 
official view of religion was as intolerant of " enthusiasm " 
as that of any Whig bishop of ]\Iid-Georgian times. Some 
of the most interesting diaries of the war are those of men 
who like Gleig, Dallas, and Boothby, took Holy Orders 
when the strife came to an end. One or two of the authors 
from the ranks show the same tendencies. Quartermaster 
Surtees was undergoing the agonies of a very painful con- 
version, during the campaign of 1812, and found that the 
memories of his spiritual experiences had blunted and 
dulled his recollection of his regimental fortunes during 
that time.t A very curious book by an Irish sergeant of 
the 43rd devotes many more pages to religious reflections 
than to marches and bivouacs. J Another writer of the same 
type describes himself on his title-page as " Twenty-one 
years in the British Foot Guards, sixteen years a non- 
commissioned officer, forty years a Wesleyan class leader, 
once wounded, and two years a Prisoner." § 

On the whole I am inclined to attribute the great im- 
provement alike in the quantity and the quality of the in- 
formation which we possess as to the inner life of the army, 
during the second half of the great struggle with France, 
not only to the fact that the danger to the empire and the 
great interests at stake had fired the imagination of many 
a participant, but still more to the other fact that the body 
of officers contained a much larger proportion of thoughtful 
and serious men than it had ever done before. And the 
same was the case mutatis mutandis with the rank and file 

* See his curious dispatch from Cartaxo dated February 6th, 
1811, concerning preaching officers. 

t He describes himself as " rolUng on the floor like one distracted, 
with the pains of hell getting hold, and hope seeming to be for ever 
shut out of my mind." — Surtees, p. 172. 

X He calls his Httle book Memoir of a Sergeant late of the 4:3rd 
Light Infantry, previously to and during the Peninsular War, including 
an account of his Conversion frotn Popery to the Protestant Religion. 

§ John Stevenson of the Scots Fusilier Guards. 



8 The Old Peninsular Army 

also. Not but wliat — of course — some of the most interest- 
ing information is supplied to us by cheerful and garrulous 
rattlepates of a very different type, who had been 
attracted into the service by the adventure of the soldier's 
life, and record mainly its picturesque or its humorous 
side. 



CHAPTER II 

SOURCES OF INFORMATION — THE LITERATURE OF THE 
PENINSULAR WAR 

It will be well, perhaps, to give a short account of the main 
sources from which our knowledge of the Peninsular Army- 
is derived. The official ones must be cited first. The most 
important of all are, naturally enough, the Welhngton 
Dispatches. Of these there are two series ; the first, in twelve 
volumes, was pubhshed during the Duke's lifetime by 
Colonel Gurwood between 1837 and 1839. The second, or 
supplementary series, in fifteen volumes, was published 
with copious notes by the second Duke of Welhngton 
between 1858 and 1872. 

The series edited by Gurwood is absolutely necessary 
to every student of the Peninsular War, but is most tire- 
some to handle, and is by no means complete. The Duke 
forbade the publication of a great number of his more con- 
fidential letters, and ordered portions of others to be omitted. 
He had a strong notion that a great deal of historical in- 
formation could be, and ought to be, suppressed ; this fact 
has caused much trouble to the modern historian, who 
wishes to obtain not a mere official and expurgated view of 
the war, but a full and complete survey of it. To show 
Wellington's attitude it may be sufficient to quote his 
answer to William Napier, who asked for leave to utilize 
all his papers. " He could not tell the whole truth without 
hurting the feelings of many worthy men, and without 
doing mischief. Expatiating on the subject, he related 
many anecdotes illustrating this observation, showing errors 



10 Literature of the Peninsular War 

committed by generals and others — especially at Waterloo 
— errors so materially affecting his operations that he could 
not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and yet 
by giving them publicity he would ungraciously affect 
the favour of many worthy men, whose only fault was 
dullness." * 

The Gurwood edition of the dispatches was published 
some fifteen years after Napier made his application, but 
numbers of the old Peninsular officers were still alive, and 
the Duke adhered to his already-expressed opinion that it 
would not be well to expose old quarrels and old blunders. 
Paragraphs, accordingly, are often omitted in the reprint, 
and in a large majority of cases, where blame was imputed 
or reproofs administered to any individual, the name was 
left blank. This makes the edition most tiresome to read. 
It is exasperating to find that e.g. " nothing has given me 
more concern in the late operations than the conduct of 

Lieut.-Colonel of the Pegt." j or that " no means 

exists of punishing military disorders and irregularities of 

the kind committed by Brigadier General and Colonel 

." Or again, when Wellington writes to the Patronage 

Secretary at the Horse Guards that " I am much obliged to 

you for relieving me from Major-General and Colonel 

. I have seen General and I think he will do 

very well, and so will " J ; or that " appears to be a 

kind of madman," and " is not very wise," the reader 

is reduced to despair. The only way of discovering the 
names, which are often those of officers of high rank, who 
figure repeatedly in any narrative of the Peninsular War, 
is to go to the original dispatches at the Record Office, or, 
when the communication is a private and not a public one, 
to the letters at Apsley House. Meanwhile, few have the 
leisure or the patience to do this, so that Wellington's 
judgments on his lieutenants are still practically inaccessible. 

It was, perhaps, still necessary to leave all these blanks 

* Life of Sir W. Napier, i. 235, 236. 
t Dispatches, vii. p. 559. $ Ibid. vi. p. 485. 



GUEWOOD AND THE DuKE'S DISPATCHES 11 

in 1837. And Gurwood was no doubt acting in strict 
obedience to the Duke's orders. But nothing can excuse 
his own slack editing of the massive tomes that he pubUshed. 
There are no tables of contents to the volumes, nor does 
the title page of each indicate the dates between which it 
runs. To find out which volume will contain a letter of 
November, 1810, we must take down Vols. VI. and VII., 
and see from the date of the last dispatch in one and the 
first in the other, when the break comes. Supposing we 
Avish to discover how many communications were sent to 
Graham or Spencer in 1811, there is no other way of achiev- 
ing our object than running through every page of the two 
volumes in which the correspondence of that year is con- 
tained ! There is a so-called index to the whole series, 
but it is practically useless, from the small number of 
headings given. The reader will look in it vainly for obvious 
places-names such as Chaves, Casal Novo, Castello Branco, 
Vera, St. Pierre, for personal names such as Lapisse, Latour 
Maubourg, Bonnet, Montbrun, Abadia, Penne-Villemur, 
O'Donnell, Del Par que, Erskine, Anson, Victor Alten, 
Barnard, Beckwith. On the other hand he will find silly 
headings such as under L, " Lies, encouragement of," or 
under I, " Invincibility of British Troops." Perhaps the 
most ridiculous entry in this absurd compilation is that of 
" Light Division," to which there is annexed just one 
note, " satisfactory conduct of, on April 6, 1811," as if that 
was the sole occasion on which it was necessary to mention 
that distinguished unit of the British army. There are no 
headings under regiments at all, so that if one wishes to 
see what the Duke said about the 52nd or the Black Watch, 
one simply gets no help. 

But there is another trick of Gurwood's which is even 
worse than his want of tables of contents or adequate 
index -entries. He omitted all the elaborate statistics 
which used to accompany the Duke's dispatches, without 
exception. The beautiful tables of casualties which 
explain the distribution of losses between regiments and 



12 Literature of the Peninsular War 

divisions, are in every case boiled down into three bald 
totals of " killed, wounded, and missing," for the whole 
army, no indication of units being left. Even Lord London- 
derry's modest two volumes, the first attempt at a general 
history of the Peninsular War, give far more useful in- 
formation on the all-important topics of strengths and 
losses than all Gurwood's tomes. For that sensible author 
rightly saw that nothing could be more serviceable to the 
reader than an occasional table of the organization and 
numbers of the whole allied army, and that the detailed 
casualty-list of such a fight as Talavera or Albuera is 
indispensable. The purblind Gurwood preferred to put in 
a note, " the detail of divisions, regiments, and battalions 
has been omitted, being too voluminous," * when he was 
dealing with an important return. The historian owes 
him small thanks for his precious opinion. 

It is an immense relief to pass from Gurwood's ill- 
arranged work to the volumes of the Wellington Supple- 
mentary Dispatches, which were published by the second 
Duke between 1858 and 1872. Though the mass of 
Peninsular material contained in this series is comparatively 
small, it comprises a great quantity of familiar and private 
correspondence, which had been deliberately omitted from 
the earlier publication. And, moreover, it is admirably 
edited ; the second Duke knew what was important and 
what required explanation, appended valuable and 
copious notes, and was able (since the elder generation was 
now practically extinct) to abandon the exasperating 
reticence used by Gurwood. Moreover, he added a vast 
quantity of letters written not by, but to, his father, which 
serve to explain the old Duke's sometime cryptic replies 
to his correspondents. Even a few necessary French 
documents have been added. Altogether these volumes 
are excellent, and make one wish that the editing of the 
whole of the Wellington papers had fallen into the same 
hands. 

* This preposterous remark may be found on p. 28 of vol. vi. 



Wellington's "Geneeal Orders'' 13 

There is a third series of Official publications which 
though not so " generally necessary for salvation " as the 
Dispatches, for any student of the Peninsular War, is very 
valuable and needs continually to be worked up. This is 
the seven volumes of General Orders, from 1809 to 1815, 
which are strictly contemporary documents, as they were 
collected and issued while the war was in progress — the 
1809-10 volumes were printed in 1811, the 1811 volume 
in 1812, and so on. The last, or Waterloo volume, had the 
distinction of being issued by the British Military Press in 
Paris, " by Sergeant Buchan, 3rd Guards," as printer. 
The General Orders contain not only all the documents 
strictly so called, the notices issued by the commander- 
in-chief for the army, but an invaluable ^precis of all courts- 
martial other than regimental ones, and a record of pro- 
motions, gazettings of officers to regiments, rules as to issue 
of pay and rations, and directions as to all matters of detail 
relating to organization, hospitals, depots, stores, routes, 
etc. If any one wishes to know on what day the 42nd was 
moved from the first to the second division, when precisely 
General Craufurd got leave to go home on private business, 
what was the accepted value of the Spanish dollar or the 
Portuguese Cruzado Novo at different dates, when expressed 
in English money, or what was the bounty given when a 
time-expired man consented to renew his service for a 
limited period, these are the volumes in which he will find 
his curiosity satisfied. They cannot be called interesting 
reading — but they contain facts not elsewhere to be 
found. 

There is an exactly corresponding series of General 
Orders for the Portuguese Army, in six yearly volumes, 
called Or dens do Dia : it was issued by Marshal Beresford, 
and contains all the documents signed by him. W^henever 
a student is interested in the career of one of the numerous 
British officers in the Portuguese service, he must seek 
out the records of his doings in these volumes. They are 
not easy to work in, as they have no yearly indices, and 



14 LiTEEATURE OF THE PENINSULAR WaR 

much patience is required to discover isolated notices of 
individuals. These volumes are practically inaccessible in 
England. It was with the greatest difficulty that a Lisbon 
friend hunted me up a copy after long search, and I am not 
aware that there is another on this side of the sea. But by 
its use only can we trace the service of any Anglo-Portu- 
guese officer. There was supposed to be an " Ordem " 
every morning, and when nothing was forthcoming in the 
way of promotions, court-martial reports, or decrees, Beres- 
f ord's chief of the staff used to publish a solemn statement 
that there was no news, as thus — 

Quartel-General de Chamusca, 7. 1. 1811. 

Nada de novo. 

Adjudante-General Mosinho. 

This happened on an average about twice a week. 

In addition to these printed series there is an immense 
amount of unprinted official correspondence in the Record 
Office which bears on the Peninsular War. It will be found 
not only in the War Office section, but in those belonging 
to the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. As an example 
of the mysteries of official classification, I may mention 
that all documents relating to French prisoners will have 
to be looked for among the Admiralty records, under the 
sub-headings Transport and Medical. If, as occasionally 
happens, one wishes to find out the names and regiments 
of French officers captured on some particular occasion, 
e.g. Soult's retreat from Oporto, or the storm of Badajoz, 
it is to the Admiralty records that one must go ! Officers 
can always be identified, but it is a herculean task to deal 
with the rank and file, for they used to be shot into one of 
the great prisons, Norman's Cross, Porchester, Stapleton, 
etc., in arbitrary batches, with no regard to their regimental 
numbers. It would take a week to hunt through the 
prison records with the object of identifying the number 
of privates of the 34th Leger captured at Rodrigo, since 
they may have gone in small parties to any one of a dozen 



The Kecord Office and its Wealth 15 

destinations. Many of the prison registers have lost one 
or other of their outer-boards, and the handling of them 
is a grimy business for the fingers, since they are practically 
never consulted. 

While nearly the whole of the Wellington dispatches 
have been printed, it is only a small part of the Duke's " en- 
closures ", added to each dispatch, that have had the same 
good fortune. These always repay a cursory inspection, 
and are often highly important. The greater part of Sir 
John Moore's correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, and 
many dispatches of Moore's subordinates — Baird, Leith, and 
Lord W. Bentinck — with a number of valuable returns 
and statistics, — ^are printed in a large volume entitled Papers 
Relative to Spain and Portugal^ Presented to Parliament 
in 1809." There are, to the best of my knowledge, no 
similar volumes relating to Graham's campaign from Cadiz 
in 1811, or Maitland's and Murray's operations on the east 
side of Spain in 1813-14. A good deal of information 
about the latter, however, may be got from the enormous 
report of the court-martial on Murray, for his wretched 
fiasco at the siege of Tarragona, which is full of valuable 
facts. The details of the other minor British enterprises 
in the Peninsula — such as those of Doyle, Skerret, Sir 
Home Popham, and Lord Blayney, all remain in manuscript, 
— readily accessible to the searcher, but not too often con- 
sulted. The Foreign Office section at the Record Office 
is highly valuable not only to the historian of diplomacy, 
but to the purely military historian, because Stewart, 
Vaughan, Henry Wellesley, and the other representatives 
of the British Government at Madrid, Seville, and Cadiz, 
used to send home, along with their own dispatches, number- 
less Spanish documents. These include not only official 
papers from the Regency, but private documents of great 
value, letters from generals and statesmen who wish to 
keep the British agent informed as to their views, when they 
have clashed with the resolves of their own government. 
There are quite a number of military narratives by Spanish 



16 Literature of the Peninsular War 

officers, who are set on excusing themselves from respon- 
sibility for the disasters of their colleagues. And the 
politicians sometimes propose, in private and confidential 
minutes, very curious plans and intrigues. Sir Charles 
Vaughan kept a certain number of these confidential papers 
in his own possession when he left Cadiz, and did not turn 
them over to the Foreign Office. They lie, along with 
his private correspondence, in the Library of All Souls' 
College, Oxford. 

Since we are dealing with the British army, not with 
the general history of the Peninsular War, I need only 
mention that unpublished documents by the thousand, 
relating to the French, Spanish, and Portuguese armies, 
may be found at Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, and that the 
researcher is invariably welcomed and courteously treated. 
It may be worth while to make a note, for the benefit of 
beginners, to the effect that the French mihtary documents 
are not concentrated in one mass, but are divided between 
the Archives NationaleSj and the Archives de la Guerre at 
the Ministry of War. If a return or a dispatch is not to 
be found in one of these repositories, it may yet turn up 
in the other. The Spanish records are very " patchy," 
full on some campaigns, almost non-existent on others. 
For example, the documents on the luckless Ocaiia cam- 
paign of 1809 are marvellously few ; there does not exist 
a single complete " morning state ", by regiments and 
divisions, of Areizaga's unhappy army. I fancy that the 
whole of the official papers of his staff were captured in the 
rout, and destroyed by ignorant plunderers — they did not 
get into the French collections. Hence there have only 
survived the few dispatches which Areizaga and some of 
his subordinates sent to the Spanish Ministry of War. 

So much for Official Records. Passing on to the publi- 
cations of individual actors in the war, we must draw a 
sharp line between those which were issued during or imme- 
diately after the campaigns with which they deal, and those 



CONTEMPOEARY JOURNALS 17 

which were written down, with or without the aid of con- 
temporary notes or journals, many years after. The former, 
of course, possess a pecuHar interest, because the writers' 
narrative is not coloured by any knowledge of what is yet 
to come. An officer writing of Corunna or Talavera with 
the memory of Vittoria and Waterloo upon him, necessarily 
took up a different view of the war from the man who set 
down his early campaign without any idea of what was to 
follow. Early checks and hardships loom larger in the 
hour of doubt and disappointment, than when the recol- 
lection of them has been dimmed by subsequent hours of 
triumph. The early material, therefore, is very valuable, 
but it is not so copious as that which was written down 
later, and it largely exists in the form of letters and diaries, 
both of which are less readable than formal narratives. 
As good types of this sort of material we may name Ormsby's 
and Ker-Porter's Journals of the Campaign of 1808-09, 
Hawkers' Journal of the Talavera Campaign, Stothert's 
Diary of 1809-11, and General MacKinnon's Journal of 
the same three years, all of which were published within a 
few months of the last entry which each contains. Next 
to* these come the books which consist of contemporary 
material, published without alteration from the original 
manuscripts, but only many years after they had been 
written. The best of these for hard facts, often facts not 
to be found elsewhere, is the diary of Tomkinson of the 
16th Light Dragoons : * with it may be mentioned the 
Journal of George Simmons of the 95th, published in 1899 
with the title, " A British Rifle Man," f the Journals of Sir 
William Gomm, 1808-15, J Sir George Warre's Letters 
of 1808-12, § which only saw the light two years ago, and 
Larpent's Private Journal, printed in 1852. || These volumes 

* Only printed in 1894. 
t Edited by Col. Willoughby Verner. 

j Published 1881. Invaluable as a private record for the staff. 
§ Edited by his kinsman, the present Provost of Eton. 
II Larpent was a lawyer who acted as Wellington's Judge Advo- 
cate. 

C 



18 Literature of the Peninsular War 

all have short notes by the editors, but the text is the writing 
of the Peninsular time, untampered with and unaltered. 

These books and their minor contemporaries stand in 
a class by themselves, as contemporary material reflecting 
accurately the spirit of the times. Much more numerous, 
however, are the books which, though produced by actors 
in the Great War, appeared at dates more or less remote 
from the years whose events they narrate. The formal 
histories are comparatively few, the reason being that 
Napier's magnificent (if somewhat prejudiced and biassed) 
volumes completely put off other possible authors, who 
felt that they lacked his genius and his power of expression, 
from the idea of writing a long narrative of the war as a 
whole. This was a misfortune, since the one book which 
all students of mihtary history are thereby driven to read, 
was composed by a bitter political partisan, who is set on 
maligning the Tory government, has an altogether ex- 
aggerated admiration for Napoleon, and owned many 
personal enemies in the British army, who receive scant 
justice at his hands. At the same time we must be grateful 
that the work was written by one who was an actual 
witness of many of the campaigns that he relates, con- 
scientiously strove to get at all other first-hand witnesses, 
and ransacked the French as well as the British official 
papers, so far as he could obtain access to them. The merits 
of his style are all his own, and will cause the History of 
the Peninsular War to be read as an English classic, as 
Clarendon's History of the Great Behellion is read, even 
when research has shown (as in Clarendon's case) that 
much of the narrative needs reconstruction, and that the 
general thesis on which it is constructed lacks impartiality. 

The only other general histories of the war which 
appeared were Southey's (three vols, pubhshed 1832) and 
Lord Londonderry's.* The former was written by a literary 
man without any military experience, who had seen nothing 

* It is hardly necessary to mention Jones's slight Sketch (1818) 
or Goddard's mass of imdigested contemporary material (1814). 



Napier, Southey, and Lord Londonderry 19 

of the Peninsula during the years of the struggle, and had 
as almost his only merit, a good knowledge of the Spanish 
sources, of which he was too uncritical. The book fell 
dead, being unable to compete with Napier, and lacking all 
the authority of personal knowledge which was the latter's 
strong point. The smaller book of Lord Londonderry 
(two volumes, published 1829) is by no means without merit, 
but has many faults, always hovering on the edge between 
formal history and personal reminiscences. Wherever 
Charles Stuart had not been present, he passes lightly over 
the episodes of war, and obviously had taken no very great 
pains to collect first-hand material. At the same time the 
book has value, as giving the views of a highly-placed staff 
officer, who had the opportunity of seeing every episode 
from the point of view of Head Quarters, and had strong 
convictions and theories of his own. He had also the saving 
grace of loving statistics, and printed many valuable 
appendices of " morning states " and casualty -lists, things 
of which Napier was far too sparing, and which Gurwood 
suppressed altogether. As a general record the book could 
not cope with Napier, and has been forgotten — somewhat 
undeservedly — no less than Southey's vast quartos. There 
is absolutely no other general history by a contemporary 
which needs mention. Of course I omit foreign sources, 
which help us little with regard to the British army, though 
they are indispensable for a general study of the war. Foy's 
unfinished Guerre de la Peninsule, if we may judge from the 
volumes which appeared before his death, would have been 
a very prejudiced affair — ^his account of the British troops 
in Vol. I. is a bitter satire, contrasting oddly enough with 
his confessions concerning their merits in his Journal, of 
which a large portion was published a few years ago by 
Girod de I'Ain under the title Vie Militaire du General Foy. 
After all the detraction in his formal history, it is interesting 
to read the frank letter which says, in 1811, that for a set 
battle on a limited front he acknowledges the superiority 
of the English infantry to the French, " I keep this opinion 



20 Literature of the Peninsular War 

to myself," he adds, " and have never divulged it, for it 
is necessary that the soldier in the ranks should not only 
hate his enemy, but also despise him." * Foy kept the 
opinion so closely to himself, that no one would have 
suspected it who had read only his formal history of the 
Peninsular War. 

Another French general history is Marshal Jourdan's 
Guerre d'Espagne, issued only ten years ago by the Vicomte 
de Grouchy, though large parts of it had been utilized in 
Ducasse's Life and Correspondence of King Joseph Bona- 
parte. This covers the whole war down to Vittoria, and 
is notable for its acute and often unanswerable criticism of 
Soult and Massena, Marmont, and, not least, of Napoleon 
himself. It is less satisfactory as a vindication of Jourdan's 
own doings. Marmont's autobiography only covers his fifteen 
months of command from May, 1811, to July, 1812 : while 
St. Cyr's and Suchet's very interesting accounts of their 
own periods of activity relate entirely to Catalonia and the 
eastern side of the Peninsula. St. Cyr does not touch 
British affairs at all ; Suchet treats his campaigns against 
Maitland and Murray in a much more cursory style than 
his previous successes against the Spanish armies, f The 
other French formal narratives by contemporaries and 
eye-witnesses are for the most part monographs on particular 
campaigns in which the writers took part — such as Thie- 
bault's work on Junot in Portugal — full of deliberate 
inaccuracies — which was published in 1817, and Lapene's 
Conquete d'Andalousie, en 181 0-12 , and Gampagnes de 
1818-14 (both pubhshed in 1823 in volumes of different 
size) which deal only with the army of Soult. There are, 
however, two general histories by German officers — Schepeler 
(who served with the Spaniards), and Riegel (who served 
with the French) — which both require mention. The former 
is especially valuable.! 

* Journal in Girod de TAin, p. 98. 

t His well-written two volumes (issued 1829) are said to have 
been very largely the work of his aide-de-camp, St. Cyr-Nugues. 
X Vacani's Italian general history of the war is very slight on the 



ToRENo, Belmas, John Jones 21 

Among Peninsular historians two deserve special notice. 
The Conde de Toreno, a Spanish statesman who had taken 
part in the war as a young man, produced in 1838 three 
massive volumes which are, next to Napier, the greatest 
book that makes this war its subject. He is a first-hand 
authority of great merit; and should always be consulted 
for the Spanish version of events. He was a great master 
of detail, and yet could paint with a broad brush. It is 
sometimes necessary to remember that he is a partisan, 
and has his favourites and his enemies (especially La 
Romana) among the generals and statesmen of Spain. 
But on the whole he is a historian of high merit and 
judgment. With Toreno's work must be mentioned the 
five small volumes of the Portuguese Jose Accursio das 
Neves, published in 1811, when Massena had but just 
retreated from before the Lines of Torres Vedras. This is 
a very fuU and interesting description of Junot's invasion 
of Portugal, and of the sufferings of that realm which 
came to an end with the Convention of Cintra. It is 
the only detailed picture of Portugal in 1808. Unfortu- 
nately the author did not complete the story of 1809-10. 

At the end of this note on historical works, as distin- 
guished from memoirs or diaries of adventure, we must 
name two excellent books, one English and one French, 
on the special subject of siege operations. These two 
monographs by specialists, both distinguished engineer 
officers — Sir John Jones' Journal of the Sieges in Spain 
1811-13, and Colonel Belmas' Journaux des Sieges dans 
la Peninsule 1808-lS, published respectively in 1827 and 
1837 — are among the most valuable books dealing with the 
Peninsular War, both containing a wealth of detail and 
explanatory notes. The work of Belmas is especially rich 
in reprints of original documents bearing on the sieges, and 
in statistics of garrisons, losses, ammunition expended, etc. 
They were so complete, and supplemented each other so 

English side, being mainly devoted to the doings of the Italians in 
Catalonia. 



22 Literature of the Peninsular War 

well, that little was done to add to the information that they 
give, till Major J. Leslie's admirable edition of the Dickson 
Papers began to appear a few years ago, and appreciably 
increased our knowledge of the English side of the siege 
operations. 

Having made an end of the formal histories written 
by contemporaries and eye-witnesses, it remains that we 
should speak of a class of literature much larger in bulk, 
and generally much more interesting, considered in the light 
of reading for the general student — the books of autobio- 
graphies and personal reminiscences which were written 
by participants in the war some time after it had come to 
an end — at any time from ten to forty years after 1814. 
Their name is legion. I am continually discovering more 
of them, many of them printed obscurely in small editions 
and from local presses, so that the very knowledge of 
their existence has perished. And so many unpublished 
manuscripts of the sort exist, in France no less than in 
England, that it is clear that we have not even yet got to 
the end of the stock of original material bearing on the war. 
Some of the most interesting, e.g. the lively autobiography 
of Blakeney of the 28th,* and that of Ney's aide-de-camp 
Spriinglin,t have only appeared during the last few years. 

These volumes of personal adventures differ greatly 
in value : some were written up conscientiously from con- 
temporary diaries : others contain only fragments, the most 
striking or the most typical incidents of campaigns whose 
less interesting every-day work had been forgotten, or at 
least had grown dim. Unfortunately in old age the memory 
often finds it hard to distinguish between things seen and 
things heard. It is not uncommon to find a writer who 
represents himself as having been present at scenes where 
he cannot have been assisting, and still more frequent to 

* Published under the rather romantic title of A Boy in the 
Peninsular War (which suggests a work of fiction), by Julian Cor- 
bett, in 1899. 

•j- Published in the Bevue Hispanique in 1907. 



Inaccueacies of Memoir-writers 23 

detect him applying to one date perfectly genuine anecdotes 
which belong to another. One or two of the most readable 
narratives frankly mix up the sequence of events, with a 
note that the exact dating can not be reconstructed. This 
is notoriously the case with the most vivid of all the books 
of reminiscences from the ranks — the little volume of 
" Rifleman Harris," whose tales about General Robert 
Craufurd and the Light Division flow on in a string, in which 
chronology has to take its chance, and often fails to find it. 

Another source of blurred or falsified reminiscences is 
that an author, writing many years after the events which 
he has to record, has generally read printed books about 
them, and mixes up this secondary knowledge with the 
first-hand tale of his adventures. Napier's Peninsular War 
came out so comparatively early, and was so universally 
read, that screeds from it have crept into a very great 
number of the books written after 1830. Indeed, some 
simple veterans betray the source of their tales, concerning 
events which they cannot possibly have witnessed them- 
selves, by repeating phrases or epigrams of Napier's which 
are unmistakeable. Some even fill up a blank patch in 
their own memory by a precis of a page or a chapter from 
the great history. It is always necessary to take care 
that we are not accepting as a corroboration of some tale, 
that which is really only a repetition of it. The diary of 
a sergeant of the 43rd mentioned above,* contains an 
intolerable amount of boiled-down Napier. It is far more 
curious to find traces of him in the famous Marbot, who 
had clearly read Mathieu Dumas' translation when it came 
out in French. 

The books of personal adventure, as we may call the 
whole class, may roughly be divided into three sections, 
of decreasing value in the way of authority. The first and 
most important consists of works written upon the base of 
an old diary or journal, where the memory is kept straight 
as to the sequence of events by the contemporary record, 

* See p. 7. 



24 LiTERATUEE OF THE PENINSULAR WaR 

and the author is ampUfying and writing up real first-hand 
material. Favourable examples of this are Leach's Rough 
Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier,^ Leslie of Balquhain's 
Military JournaLIf which in spite of its title is not in journal 
shape, but reads as a continuous narrative, and Sir George 
Bell's Bough Notes of Fifty Years' Service,% all of which are 
definitely stated by the authors to have been founded on 
their note-books of the war time, and therefore can as a 
rule be treated as first-hand evidence. They can generally 
be trusted as authorities against any divergent tales based 
on the narratives of writers who wrote their reminiscences 
without any such foundation, and where they get off the 
lines of contemporary evidence they usually give the reader 
warning. For example. Leach gives valuable material to 
show the inaccuracy of Napier's exaggerated estimate of 
^ the length and pace of the Light Division's march to 
Talavera, whose erroneous figures have been repeated in so 
many subsequent books. And yet Leach was not conscious 
of the fact that the data which he gives were incompatible 
with Napier's story, and repeats it in a general way — 
because he published his book several years after the 
appearance of Napier's second volume, and had (like many 
other members of the Light Division) absorbed the legend 
as a matter of faith on Napier's authority. It was reserved 
for Sir John Bell,§ who had served under Craufurd but 
joined too late for Talavera, to explode the story. But his 
demonstration of its inaccuracy has not travelled far, 
while the original legend has gone all round the world, 
and is still reproduced, as an example of unparalleled rapidity 
of movement, in serious military works. 

Infinitely less valuable than the books founded on 
private diaries or letters of contemporary date, are those 
which were written down long after the war, from unaided 

* Published 1831. A first-rate authority for Rifle Brigade and 
Light Division matters. 

t Of the 29th Regt. Published only in 1887. 

X Published 1867. 

§ Not to be confused with Sir George Bell. 



Gleig, Blakeney, Hennegan 25 

memory only. They are, of course, progressively less 
valuable for evidence according as the date at which they 
were indited recedes from the period with which they deal. 
Gleig's charming The Subaltern, printed as early as 1825, 
may be better trusted for matters of detail than Blakeney's 
equally vivid narrative written in the remote island of 
Paxos about 1835, and Blakeney is more valuable than 
Hennegan's highly romantic Seven Years of Campaigning, 
published only in 1847, when thirty winters had blurred 
reminiscence, and allowed of the accretion of much second- 
hand and doubtful material round the original story. The 
strength of men's memories differs, so does their apprecia- 
tion of the relative value of a dramatic narrative as compared 
with a photographic record of personal experiences. But 
in a general way we must allow that every year that elapses 
between the event and the setting down of its narrative 
on paper decreases progressively the value of the record. 
As an example of the way in which the failing powers of 
old age can confuse even a powerful memory, we may men- 
tion the curious fact that Wellington himself, twenty years 
after his last campaign, seems to have told two auditors 
that he had visited Bliicher's camp on the very eve of 
Waterloo, the night between the 17th and 18th of June, 
1815, a statement quite incredible.* It was apparently 
a blurred memory of his real visit to the Prussian head- 
quarters on the early afternoon of the 16th, of which ample 
details are known. 

Failing memory, the love of a well-rounded tale, a spice 
of autolatry, and an appreciation of the picturesque, have 
impaired the value of many a veteran's reminiscences. 
Especially if he is a well-known raconteur, and has repeated 
his narrative many times before he sets it down on paper, 
does it tend to assume a romantic form. The classical 
example, of course, is Marbot, whose memoirs contain 

* See for a dissection and disproof of this story Ropes's Waterloo, 
pp. 238-242, 3rd edition. Mr. Horsburgh (p. 138) and others accept 
the story. But despite Lady Shelley's note it is really incredible. 



26 LiTEEATUEE OF THE PENINSULAR WaR 

many things demonstrably false, e.g. that he brought the 
news of the Dos Mayo insurrection at Madrid to Napoleon, 
or that in 1812 he took his regiment from Moscow to the 
neighbourhood of Poltava, and brought it back (400 miles !) 
in less than a fortnight with a convoy of provisions, or that 
he saw 6000 men drowned on the broken ice of the lake of 
Satschan at the end of the battle of Austerlitz.* Marbot 
is, of course, an extreme example of amusing egotism, but 
parallels on a minor scale could be quoted from many of 
his contemporaries, who wrote their tale too late. We 
may mention Thiebault's account of the combat of Aldea 
da Ponte, when he declares that he fought 17,000 Anglo- 
Portuguese and produced 500 casualties in their ranks, 
when he was really opposed by one British brigade and two 
Portuguese battalions, who lost precisely 100 men between 
them. Yet the account is so lengthy and detailed, that if 
we had not the British sources before us, we should be 
inclined to think that we were reading an accurate narrative 
of a real fight, instead of a romantic invention recon- 
structed from a blurred memory. It was the only Penin- 
sular fight in which Thiebault exercised an independent 
command — and every year added to its beauties as the 
general grew old. 

While, therefore, we read the later-written Peninsular 
narratives with interest, and often with profit, as reflections 
of the spirit of the time and the army, we must always be 
cautious in accepting their evidence. And we must begin 
by trying to obtain a judgment on the " personal equation " 
— was the author a hard-headed observer, or a lover of 
romantic anecdotes ? What proportion, if any, of the facts 
which he gives can be proved incompatible with contem- 
porary records ? Or again, what proportion (though not de- 
monstrably false) seem unlikely, in face of other authorities ? 
Had he been reading other men's books on a large scale ? 
Of this the usual proof is elaborate narrative concerning 

* For a dissection of Marbot's blunders see the essay on his 
methods in Holland Rose's Pitt and Napoleon^ pp. 156-166. 



Books of Regimental Adventure 27 

events at which he cannot possibly have been present, 
with or without citation of the source from which he has 
obtained the information. It is only when the author has 
passed his examination with credit on these points, that we 
can begin to treat him as a serious authority, and to trust 
him as evidence for scenes at which we know that he was 
actually present. Many a writer of personal adventures 
may finally be given his certificate as good authority for 
the annals of his own battalion, but for nothing more. 
It is even possible that we may have to make the further 
restriction that he may be trusted on the lucky days, but not 
on the less happy ones, in the history of his own beloved 
corps. Reticence as to " untoward incidents " is not un- 
common. As to things outside the regiment, there was 
often a good deal of untrustworthy gossip abroad, which 
stuck in the memory even after long years had passed. 

Among all the books of regimental adventure, I should 
give the first place for interest and good writing to Lieut. 
Grattan's With the Connaught Rangers. It is not too much 
to say that if the author had taken to formal history, his 
style, which is vivid without exaggeration, and often 
dignified without pomposity, would have made him a 
worthy rival of Napier as an English classic. His descrip- 
tions of the aspect and psychology of the stormers marching 
down to the advanced trenches at Ciudad Rodrigo, and of 
the crisis of the battle of Salamanca, are as good as anything 
that Napier ever wrote. A reader presented with many of 
his paragraphs would say without hesitation that they were 
excerpts from the great historian. Unfortunately G rattan 
suffered from one of the faults which I have named above 
- — ^he will give untrustworthy information about episodes 
at which he was not present — it is at best superfluous and 
sometimes misleading. But for what the 88th did at 
Bussaco and Fuentes, at Badajoz and Salamanca, he is 
very good authority. And he is always a pleasure to read. 
Two good books — Gleig's The Subaltern, and Moyle Sherer's 
Recollections of the Peninsula — have a share of the literary 



28 Literature of the Peninsular War 

merit of Grattan's work, but lack his power. They give 
respectively the day-by-day camp life of the 84th in 1813-14, 
and of the 48th in 1811-13, in a pleasant and life-like 
fashion, and since both were published within ten years 
of the end of the war — Gleig's in 1825, Sherer'sin 1824 — the 
writers' memories were still strong, and their statements 
of fact may be relied upon. Both have the merit of sticking 
closely to personal experience, and of avoiding second-hand 
stories. 

Those lively tales of adventure — ^Kincaid's Adventures 
in the Bifle Brigade, Sir Harry Smith's Autobiograjjhy, 
and Blakeney's memoir (which its editor called A Boy in 
the Peninsular War) * — were all written at a much later date, 
from twenty to thirty years after Waterloo, and show their 
remoteness from the time that they describe not so much 
by want of detail, nor of picturesque power of description, 
— all three authors were good wielders of the pen — as by the 
selection of the facts that they record. Much of the every- 
day life of the regiment has been forgotten or grown dim, 
and only the great days, or the most striking personal ex- 
periences, or quaint and grotesque incidents, are recorded. 
This very fact makes them all very good reading — they 
contain (so to speak) all the plums of the cake and com- 
paratively little of the less appetizing crust. Harry Smith's 
chapters are practically the tale of his Odyssey in the cam- 
paigns of 1812-13 along with the heroic little Spanish 
wife whom he had picked up and married at the storm of 
Badajoz. Kincaid is a humourist — he remembers all the 
grotesque incidents, ludicrous situations, practical jokes, 
and misadventures, in which he and his comrades were 
concerned, and pours them out in a string of anecdotes, 
loosely connected by a narrative of which he says that he 
refuses to be responsible for the exact sequence or dating. 
It is very amusing, and some of the more striking stories 
can be verified from other and better authorities. But 

* Blakeney wrote about 1835, at Paxos in the Ionian Isles ; 
Smith in 1844, in India ; Kincaid in 1847. 



Eeminiscences fkom the Ranks 29 

the general effect is often as if we were reading a chapter 
out of Lever's Charles O'Malley, or some such old-fashioned 
Pensinsular romance. Blakeney's book gives a better im- 
pression for solidity, and he fills up many an incident, other- 
wise known to us only in outline, with picturesque detail 
which bears every appearance of truth. But I have once 
or twice found his narrative refusing to square in with 
contemporary documents, and when this is the case the 
story written twenty -five years after the event must go to 
the wall.* He must be used with caution, though he is 
giving a genuine record to the best of his ability. 

Nearly all the reminiscences from the ranks are subject 
to these same disabilities. With hardly an exception they 
were written down long years after the events recorded. 
Usually the narrator had no books or notes to help him, 
and we get a genuine tale, uninfluenced by outer sources, 
but blurred and foreshortened by the lapse of time. The 
details of personal adventure are perfectly authentic to the 
best of the veteran's memory ; incidents of battle, of camp 
hardships, of some famous court-martial and subsequent 
punishment-parade, come out in a clear-cut fashion. But 
there are long gaps of forgotten months, frequent errors 
of dating, and often mistakes in the persons to whom an 
exploit, an epigram, or a misadventure are attributed. 
Yet these little volumes give the spirit of the rank and file 
in the most admirable fashion, and enable us to realize the 
inner life of the battalion as no official document can do. 
There are a few cases where the author has got hold of a 
book, generally Napier's great history, and to a great 
extent spoils his work by letting in passages of incongruous 
eloquence, or strategical disquisition, into the homely 
stuff of his real reminiscences. f 

* His extraordinarily vivid narrative of the fortunes of Browne's 
provisional battalion at Barrosa conflicts in detail with contemporary 
evidence which there is no reason to doubt, e.g. as to the numbers of 
the battalion, and as to the exact behaviour of General Whittingham. 

t A strong case is that of the sergeant of the 43rd, mentioned 
above, on p. 7, who lets in scraps of Napier into his patchwork 
with the most unhappy effect. 



30 Literature of the Peninsular War 

One soldier's little volume stands out from all the rest 
for its literary merit — it is the work of a man of superior 
education, who had enlisted in a moment of pique and 
humiliation to avoid facing at home the consequences of 
his own conceit and folly. This short story of 150 pages 
called Journal of T. S.,a Soldier of the list Highland Light 
Infantry, 1806-16, was written down as early as 1818,* 
when memory was still fresh. Its value lies in the fact 
that the author wrote from the ranks, yet was so different 
in education and mental equipment from his comrades, 
that he does not take their views and habits for granted, 
but proceeds to explain and comment on them. " I could 
get," as he notes, " no pleasure from their amusements, but 
found it necessary to humour them in many things, and to 
be obliging to all. I was thought saucy, and little courted 
by them, they not liking my dry manner as they called it." 
His narrative is that of an intelligent observer of the be- 
haviour of the regiment, in whose psychology he is deeply 
interested, rather than that of a typical soldier. Having 
a ready pen and a keen observant eye, he produced a little 
book of extraordinary interest. The chronicle of his 
marches, and the details of the actions which he relates, 
seem very accurate when compared with official documents. 

Sergeant Donaldson of the 94th was another notable 
Scot whose book. The Eventful Life of a Soldier, is well worth 
reading. He was not so well educated as T. S., nor had 
he the same vivid literary style. But he was an intelli- 
gent man, and possessed a wider set of interests than was 
common in the ranks, so that it is always worth while to 
look up his notes and observations. His description of 
the horrors of Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1811 is 
a very striking piece of lurid writing. After him may be 
mentioned a quartermaster and a sergeant — Surtees and 
Costello — ^both of the Rifle Brigade, — whose reminiscences 
are full of typical stories reflecting the virtues and failings 

* But only published by Constable & Co. in 1828. For more of 
his story, see the chapter on " The Rank and File." 



Memoirs of French Veterans 31 

of the famous Light Division. For the views and ways of 
thought of the ordinary private of the better sort, the httle 
books of " Rifleman Harris," already cited above, Lawrence 
of the 40th, and Cooper of the 7th FusiUers,* are valuable 
authority. They are admirable evidence for the way in 
which the rank and file looked on a battle, a forced march, 
or a prolonged shortage of rations. But we must not 
trust them overmuch as authorities on the greater matter 
of war. 

There is a considerable bulk of French remini- 
scences dealing with the purely British side of the Penin- 
sular War. Beside Marbot's and Thiebault's memoirs, of 
which I have already made mention, three or four more 
must not be neglected by any one who wishes to see Wel- 
lington's army from the outside. By far the most vivid 
and lively of them is Lemonnier-Delaf osse of the SlstLeger, 
whose Souvenirs Militaires were published at Havre in 1850. 
He is a bitter enemy, and wants to prove that Wellington 
was a mediocre general, and ought always to have been 
beaten. But he does his best to tell a true tale, and 
acknowledges his defeats handsomely — though he thinks 
that with better luck they might have been victories. 
Failing memory can be detected in one or two places, where 
he makes an officer fall at the wrong battle, or misnames 
a village. Fantin des Odoards, also (oddly enough) of the 
31st Leger, kept a journal, so that his reminiscences of 
1808-11 are very accurate. He is specially valuable 
for Moore's retreat and Soult's Oporto campaign. A far 
more fair-minded man than Delafosse, he is full of acknow- 
ledgments of the merit of his British adversaries, and makes 
no secret of his disgust for the Spanish war, — a nightmare 
of plunder and military executions naturally resulting from 
an unjust aggression. A third valuable author is Colonel St. 
Chamans, an aide-de-camp of Soult, whom he cordially 

* Sergeant Lawrence's Autobiography was not published till 
1886. Cooper's Seven Campaigns in Portugal, etc., came out in 
1869. 



32 LiTERATUEE OF THE PENINSULAR WaR 

detested, and whose meanness and spirit of intrigue he is 
fond of exposing. He is of a light and humorous spirit — 
very different from another aide-de-camp, Ney's Swiss 
follower, Spriinglin, whose journal * is a most solid and heavy 
production, of value for minute facts and figures but not 
lively. Unlike St. Chamans in another respect, he is devoted 
to his chief, the Marshal, of whom he was the most loyal 
admirer. But I imagine that Ney was a much more 
generous and loveable master than the wily Soult. 

Other useful French volumes of reminiscences are those 
of Guingret of the 6th corps, full of horrible details of 
Massena's Portuguese misfortunes ; of D'lllens, a cavalry 
officer who served against Moore and Wellesley in 1808-09 ; 
and of Vigo-Roussillon, of the 8th Line, who gives the only 
good French narrative of Barrosa. Parquin is a mere 
sabreur, who wrote his memoir too late, and whose anecdotes 
cannot be trusted. He survived to be one of the followers 
of Napoleon III. in his early and unhappy adventures at 
Boulogne and elsewhere. Other French writers, such as 
Rocca and Gonneville, were long in Spain, but little in con- 
tact with the British, being employed on the Catalan coast, 
or with the army of the South on the Granada side. So 
much for the works of actors in the Great War, who relate 
what they have themselves seen. We need spend but a 
much smaller space on the books of the later generations, 
which are but second-hand information, however carefully 
they may have been compiled. 

The British regimental histories ought to be of great 
value, since the series compiled by the order of the Horse 
Guards, under the general editorship of Richard Cannon, in 
the 1830's, might have been enriched by the information 
obtainable from hundreds of Peninsular veterans, who were 
still surviving. Unfortunately nearly every volume of it 
is no more than bad hack-work. In the majority of the 
volumes we find nothing more than copious extracts from 
Napier, eked out with reprints of the formal reports 
* Only printed quite lately in the Revue Hispanique for 1907. 



Eegimental Histories 33 

taken from the London Gazette. It is quite exceptional to 
find even regimental statistics, such as might have been 
obtained with ease from the pay-lists and other documents 
in possession of the battalion, or stored at the Record Office. 
Details obtained through enquiry from veteran officers who 
had served through the war are quite exceptional. Some 
of his volumes are less arid and jejune than others — and 
this is about all that can be said in favour of even the best 
of them. 

All the good regimental histories, without exception, 
are outside the official " Cannon " series. Some are excel- 
lent ; it may be said that, as a general rule, those written 
latest are the best : the standard of accuracy and original 
research has been rising ever since 1860. Among those 
which deserve a special word of praise are Colonel Gardyne's I 
admirable The Life of a Regiment (the Gordon Highlanders), 
published in 1901 ; Cope's History of the Rifle Brigade 
(full of excerpts from first-hand authorities) which came out 
in 1877 ; Moorsom's History of the 52nd Oxfordshire Light 
Infantry (the first really good regimental history which was 
written), published in 1860 ; Davis's History of the 2nd Foot 
(Queen's West Surrey), and Colonel Hamilton's I4:th Hussars. 
By the time that these began to appear, the level of research 
was beginning to rise, and it was no longer considered 
superfluous to visit the Record Office, or to make enquiries 
for unpublished papers among the families of old officers. 
All those mentioned above are large volumes, but even the 
smaller histories are now compiled with care, and their 
size is generally the result not of scamped work (as of old), 
but of the fact that some regiments have, by the chance of 
their stations, seen less service than others, and therefore 
have less to record. I may mention as books on the smaller 
scale which have proved useful to me, Hay den's historj^ 
of the 76th, Smyth's of the 20th, and Purdon's of the 47th. 
A rare example of the annals of a smaller unit, a battery 
not a battalion, is Colonel Whinyates' story of C Troop, 
R.H.A., which he called From Corunna to Sebastopol, in 



34 LiTERATUEE OF THE PENINSULAR WaR 

which much loyal and conscientious work may be found. 
But the history of the whole of the Artillery of the Peninsular 
Army, Portuguese as well as English, is now being worked 
out in admirable detail in the Dickson Papers, edited by 
Major John Leslie, R.A., who knows everything that can 
be known about the units of his corps which served under 
Wellington. Sir Alexander Dickson, it may be remarked, 
was Commanding Officer of the Artillery in the later 
campaigns of 1813 and in 1814, and before he obtained that 
post had been in charge of all the three sieges of Badajoz, 
as well as those of Olivenza and Ciudad Rodrigo. Since he 
had been lent to the Portuguese artillery, his papers give 
copious information as to the auxiliary batteries of that 
nation which were attached to the Peninsular Army. It 
is devoutly to be wished that some officer would take up 
a corresponding task by compiling the annals of the Royal 
Engineers in the Peninsular War. Connolly's History of 
the Royal Sappers and Miners (published so far back as 
1857), has much good information, but infinitely more 
could be compiled by searching the Record Office, and 
collating the memoirs of Boothby, Burgoyne, Landmann, 
and other engineer officers who have left journals or 
reminiscences. 

Along with the British regimental histories should be 
named two sets of volumes which are of the same type, 
though they relate to larger units than a regiment, and do 
not deal with our own troops. The first class deals with 
our German auxiliaries, and is headed by Major Ludlow 
Beamish's valuable and conscientious History of the King's 
German Legion. This was written in 1832, but is a very 
favourable example of research for a book of the date, when 
Cannon's miserable series represented the level of English 
regimental history. The two volumes contain many original 
letters and documents, and some excellent plates of uni- 
forms. In 1907 Captain Schwertfeger went over the same 
ground in his Geschichte der Kmiglich Deutschen Legion,^ 
* Hanover, 1907, 2 vols. 



Portuguese Authorities 35 

and added appreciably to Beamish's store of facts. The 
Brunswick Oels regiment, which served WelHngton from 
1811 to 1814, has also a German biographer in Colonel Kort- 
fleisch, who has served in the 88th German Infantry, which 
now represents that ancient corps. There is no similar 
history for the Chasseurs Brittaniques, the last of the old 
Peninsular foreign corps. 

For the Portuguese Army a good description of the 
state of affairs in 1810, when it had just been reorganized, 
is contained in Halliday's Present State of Portugal, published 
in 1812. Chaby's Excerptos Historicos * contains a good deal 
of valuable material for its subsequent history, but is sadly 
ill-arranged and patchy. Only the Portuguese artillery in 
the Peninsular War has been dealt with in Major Teixeira 
Botelho's Suhsidios para aHistoria da Artilheria Portegueza, 
which is very full and well documented. The life of a 
British officer serving with a Portuguese regiment can be 
studied in the Memoirs of Bunhury (20th Line),! ^^^ 
Blakiston (5th Cagadores).! 

After regimental histories, the next most important 
source of information, in the way of books not written by 
those who served under Wellington, is personal biographies. 
Captain Delavoye's Life of Lord Lynedoch (Sir Thomas 
Graham) § is perhaps the most useful among them, not so 
much for any merit of style or arrangement, as for the 
excellent use of contemporary documents not available 
elsewhere. A large portion of the volume consists of 
excerpts from Graham's long and interesting military 
journal, and letters from and to him are printed in extenso. 
Thus we get first-hand information on many events at 
which no other British witness was present, e.g. Castaiios' 
campaign on the Ebro in 1808, as well as comments on 
better known operations, such as Sir John Moore's Corunna 

* Published at Lisbon in 4 vols., 1862-80. 

t His book is called Reminiscences of a Veteran, and was published 
so late as 1861. 

X Twelve Years of Military Adventure, published 1829. 
^ Published in 1880, 



36 Literature of the Peninsular War 

retreat, and the Barrosa expedition of 1 8 11 . Unfortunately 
both journal and letters fail for the campaign of 1813, in 
which Graham took such a distinguished part. 

H. B. Robinson's Memoirs of Sir Thomas Piclon * was 
a book of which Napier fell foul — there are many caustic 
comments on it in his controversial appendices. But it 
is not nearly so bad a work as might have been expected 
from his way of treating it. Indeed I fancy that Napier 
was paying off an old Light Division grudge against Picton 
himself, whom he personally disliked. The narrative is 
fair, and the quantity of contemporary letters inserted give 
the compilation some value. Sidney's Life of Lord Hill t 
is far inferior to Robinson's book : the author did not know 
his Peninsular War well enough to justify the task which 
he took in hand, and the letters, of which he fortunately 
prints a good many, are the only valuable material in it. It 
is curious that both Picton and Hill had their lives written 
by clergymen, when there were still a good many old Penin- 
sular officers surviving who might have undertaken the 
task. 

Of the other chief lieutenants of Wellington, Beresford 
has never found a biographer, though the part which he 
played in the war was so important. There must be an 
immense accumulation of his papers somewhere, in private 
hands, but I do not know where they lie. The only account 
of him consists of a few pages in a useful but rather formal 
and patchy little book by J. W. Cole, entitled, Memoirs of 
British Generals Distinguished during the Peninsular War,% 
Lord Combermere (Stapleton Cotton) was in high command 
throughout Wellington's campaigns, but was hardly up 
to his position, though he earned his chief's tolerance by 
strict obedience to orders, a greater merit in the Duke's 
eyes than military genius or initiative. There is a biography 
of him by Lady Combermere and Captain W. KnoUys (1866), 
but the Peninsular chapters are short. Of Sir Lowry Cole, Sir 

* Published 1835, 2 vols. f Published 1845. 

% Two vols., published 1856. 



/ 

Biographies of Gough, Colborne, etc. 37 

John Gaspard Le Marchant, and several other prominent 
divisional generals and brigadiers, the only biographies are 
those in J. W. Cole's book mentioned above. Sir James 
Leith, more fortunate, had a small volume dedicated to 
his memory by an anonymous admirer in 1818, but it 
was written without sufficient material, Leith's private 
correspondence not (as it seems) being in the author's hands, 
while official documents were not for the most part avail- 
able at such an early date. There is a good deal, however, 
concerning this hard-fighting general's personality and 
adventures to be gleaned from the memoirs of his nephew 
and aide-de-camp, Leith Hay. 

Of officers who did not attain to the highest rank under 
Wellington, but who in later years made a great career for 
themselves, there are two biographies which devote a large 
section to Peninsular matters, those of Lord Gough by 
R. S. Rait (two vols., 1903), and of Lord Seaton (Colborne 
of the 52nd) by Moore Smith. These are both excellent 
productions, which give much private correspondence of 
the time, and have been constructed on modern lines, with 
full attention to all possible sources first- and second-hand. 
They are both indispensable for any one who wishes to make 
a detailed study of the Peninsular campaigns. There are 
also short memoirs of Sir Denis Pack * and Lord Vivian, f 
each produced by a grandson of the general, and giving 
useful extracts from journals and correspondence. The 
campaign of Sir John Moore can, perhaps, hardly be con- 
sidered as falling into the story of Wellington's army, but 
it is impossible to avoid mentioning the full (and highly 
controversial) biography of the hero of Corunna by Sir 
J. F. Maurice, t which contains an invaluable diary, and 
much correspondence. It is an indispensable volume, at 
any rate, for those who wish to study the first year of the 
Peninsular War, and to mark the difference between the 
personalities and military theories of Moore and Wellington. 

* By D. Beresford-Pack, 1905. 
t By Hon. Claud Vivian, 1897. t Two vols., 1904. 



38 Literature of the Peninsular War 

Of formal and detailed histories of the Peninsular War 
written in recent years there is one in Spanish by General 
Arteche, a very conscientious and thorough-going worker 
at original documents, who got up a good many English 
authorities, but by no means all. For the Spanish version 
of the whole war he is absolutely necessary. So, for the 
Portuguese version, is the immense work of Soriano da 
Luz, which is largely founded on Napier, but often differs 
from him, and brings manj^ unpublished documents to light. 
Colonel Balagny has started a history of the war in French 
on a very large scale, delightfully documented, and showing 
admirable research. In five volumes he has only just got 
into 1809, so the whole book vv^ill be a large one. Mr. For- 
tescue's fine history of the British Army has just started 
on the Peninsular campaign in its last volume. To my 
own four volumes, soon I hope to be five, I need only allude 
in passing. There is one immense monograph on Dupont's 
Campaign by a French author. Colonel Titeux, which does 
not touch English military affairs at all. Two smaller but 
good works of the same type by Colonel Dumas and Com- 
mandant Clerc are both, oddly enough, dedicated to the 
same campaign, — Soult's defence of the Pyrenean frontier 
in 1813-14 : the former is the better of the two : both have 
endeavoured, in the modern fashion, to use the reports of 
both sides, not to write from the documents of one only ; 
but Dumas has a better knowledge of his English sources 
than Clerc. 

It is beyond my power to guess why similar monographs 
on separate campaigns of the war do not appear in English 
also. But the few brocJiures purporting to treat of such 
which have appeared of late on this side of the channel, 
are mostly cram-books for examinations, resting on no wide 
knowledge of sources, and often consisting of little more 
than an analysis of Napier, with some supplementary com- 
ments hazarded. They contrast very unfavourably with a 
book such as that of Colonel Dumas. 



CHAPTER III 

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON — THE MAN AND THE STRATEGIST 

So much for our sources. We may now proceed to discover 
what we can deduce from them. And we must inevitably 
begin with a consideration of the great leader of the British 
army. I am not writing a life of Wellington, still less a 
commentary on his campaigns — with which I am trying 
to deal elsewhere. My object is rather to paint him as he 
appeared to his own army, and as his acts and his writings 
reveal him during the course of his Peninsular campaigns. 
The Arthur Wellesley of 1809 is difficult to disentangle in 
our own memories from the familiar figure of Victorian 
reminiscences. We think of him as the " Great Duke," 
the first and most honoured subject of the crown, round 
whom centre so many stories, more or less well founded, 
illustrating his disinterestedness, his hatred of phrases, 
insincerities, sentiment, and humbug generally, his puncti- 
liousness, his bleak frugality, and his occasional scathing 
directness of speech — for he could never " suffer fools 
gladly." He had become a legend long before he died, 
and it takes an effort of mind to differentiate the old man 
of 1850 from the general of 1809, who had still, in the eyes 
of most men, his reputation to make. For those who under- 
stood the greatness of his Indian exploits were few. It 
was not Napoleon only who thought that to call Wellesley 
a " sepoy general " was sufficient to reduce his reputation 
to that of a facile victor over contemptible enemies. 

When he took command of the Peninsular Army in the 
April of that year, Arthur Wellesley was thirty -nine : he 



40 Wellington — ^Man and Strategist 

had just reached early middle age. He was a slight but 
wiry man of middle stature, well built and erect, with a 
long face, an aquiUne nose, and a keen but cold grey eye. 
His reputation as a soldier was already high ; but few save 
those who had served under him in India understood the 
full scope of his abilities. Many undervalued him, because 
he was a member of a well-known, but ill-loved family 
and political group, and had owed his early promotion and 
opportunities of distinguishing himself to that fact. It 
was still open to critics to say that the man who had com- 
manded a battalion in the old Revolutionary War at the 
age of twenty-three, and who had headed an army in India 
before he was quite thirty, had got further to the front 
than he deserved by political influence. And it was true 
(though the fact is so often forgotten), that in his early 
years he had got much help from his connections, that he 
had obtained his unique chance in India because he was 
the brother of a viceroy, and that since his return from the 
East he had been more of a politician than a general. Was 
he not, even when he won Vimeiro, Secretary for Ireland in 
the Tory government of the day ? It was a post whose 
holder had to dabble in much dirty work, when dealing 
with the needy peers, the grovelling place-mongers, and 
the intriguing lawyers of Dublin. Wellesley went through 
with it all, and not by any means in a conciliatory way. 
He passed the necessary jobs, but did not hide from the 
jobbers his scorn for them. When the Secretary for Ireland 
had to deal with any one whom he disliked, he showed a 
happy mixture of aristocratic hauteur and cold intellectual 
contempt, which sent the petitioner away in a bitter frame 
of mind, whether his petition had been granted or no. 
Unfortunately, he carried this manner from the Irish 
Secretaryship on to the Headquarters of the Peninsular 
Army. It did not tend to make him loved. 

Fortunately for Great Britain, it does not always follow 
that, because a man has been pushed rapidly to the front 
by pohtical influence, he is therefore incompetent or 



Wellington and the Whigs 41 

unworthy of the place given him. Every one who came into 
personal contact with Arthur Wellesley soon recognized 
that Castlereagh and the other ministers had not erred 
when they sent the " Sepoy General " to Portugal in 1808, 
and when they, despite of all the clamour following the 
Convention of Cintra, despatched him a second time to 
Lisbon in 1809, this time with full control of the Peninsular 
Army. From the first opening of his Vimeiro campaign 
the troops that he led had the firmest confidence in him — 
they saw the skill with which he handled them, and criticism 
very soon died away. It was left for Whig politicians at 
home, carpers with not the slightest knowledge of war, to 
go on asserting for a couple of years more that he was an 
over-rated officer, that he was rash and reckless, and that 
his leadership would end, on some not very distant day, 
with the expulsion of the British army from the Peninsula. 
At the front there were very few such doubters — though 
contemporary letters have proved to me that one or two 
were to be found.* 

To say that Wellington from the first was trusted alike 
by his officers and his men, is by no means to say that he 
was loved by them. He did everything that could win 
confidence, but little that could attract affection. They 
recognized that he was marvellously capable, but that he 
was without the supreme gift of sympathy for others. 
" The sight of his long nose among us," wrote one of his 
veterans, " was worth ten thousand men any day of the 
week. I will venture to say that there was not a heart in 
the army which did not beat more lightly when we heard 
the joyful news of his arrival." f But this does not mean 
that he was regarded with an enthusiasm of the emotional 

* E.g. the cavalry general Long, who was writing in the spring 
of 1810 that " the next campaign in the Peninsula will close the 
eventful scene in the Peninsula, as far as we are concerned. I am 
strongly of opinion that neither ' Marshal ' Wellington nor ' Marshal ' 
Beresford will prevent the approaching subjugation of Portugal." 
And, again, " Wellington, I suspect, feels himself tottering on his 
throne, and wishes to conciliate at any sacrifice." 

t Kincaid, chap, v., May, 1811. 



42 Wellington — ^Man and Strategist 

and affectionate sort. Another Light Division officer 
sums up the position in the coldest words that I have ever 
seen apphed to the relations of a great general with his 
victorious army. " I know that it has been said that 
Wellington was unpopular with the army. Now I can 
assert with respect to the Light Division that the troops 
rather liked him than otherwise. . . . Although Wellington 
was not what may be called popular, still the troops pos- 
sessed great confidence in him, nor did I ever hear a single 
individual express an opinion to the contrary." * 

There must, indeed, have been something to repel 
enthusiasm and affection in the leader of whom, after five 
years of victories won and hardships suffered in common, 
it could be said that his troops " rather liked him than 
otherwise." But they found that he was a hard master, 
slow to praise and swift to blame and to punish. Though 
he knew the military virtues of his rank and file, and 
acknowledged that they had more than once " got him out 
of a scrape " by performing the almost impossible, he did 
not love them. He has left on record unpardonable words 
concerning his men. " They are the scum of the earth. 
English soldiers are fellows who have enlisted for drink — 
that is the plain fact : they have all enhsted for drink." t 
Quite as bad in spirit is one of his sayings before a Royal 
Commission on the Army. " I have no idea of any great 
effect being produced on British soldiers by anything but 
the fear of immediate corporal punishment." Naturally 
enough a leader with such views never appealed to the 
better side of his men : he never spoke or wrote about 
honour or patriotism to them, but frequently reminded 
them of the lash and the firing-party, that were the 
inevitable penalty for the straggler, the drunkard, the 
plunderer, and the deserter. Nothing cooled the spirits of 
officers and men alike more than the strength and vigour 
of his rebukes, as compared with the official formality of 

* Cooke's Narrative of events in the South of France, pp. 47, 48. 
t Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 14. 



Wellington and his Men 43 

his terms of praise. It was possible to have a full apprecia- 
tion of his marvellous powers of brain, and a complete 
confidence in him as a leader, without feeling the least 
touch of affection for this hard and unsympathetic figure. 

The distressing point in all this is that the Peninsular 
Army, though it had its proportion of hardened sots and 
criminals, was full of good soldiers who knew what honour 
and loyalty meant, and were perfectly capable of answering 
any stirring appeal to their heart or their brain. There 
are dozens of diaries and autobiographies written in the 
ranks which show the existence of a vast class of well-con- 
ditioned intelligent, sober, even religious men, who were 
doing their work conscientiously, and would have valued 
a word of praise — they often got it from their regimental 
officers — seldom from their commander-in-chief. And we 
may add that if anything was calculated to brutalize an 
army it was the wicked cruelty of the British military 
punishment code, which Wellington to the end of his life 
supported. There is plenty of authority for the fact that 
the man who had once received his 500 lashes for a fault 
which was small, or which involved no moral guilt, was 
often turned thereby from a good into a bad soldier, by 
losing his self-respect and having his sense of justice seared 
out. Good officers knew this well enough, and did their 
best to avoid the cat-of-nine-tails, and to try more rational 
means — more often than not with success.* 

It might have been expected that Wellington would at 
least show more regard for the feelings of his officers, how- 
ever much he might contemn his rank and file. As a rule 
he did not. He had some few intimates whom he treated 
Avith a certain familiarity, and it is clear that he showed 
consideration and even kindness to his aides-de-camp 
and other personal retainers. But to the great majority 
of his officers, even to many of his generals and heads of 

* For a curious instance of this sort in the 42nd, see Hope's 
Military Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, T^-g. 449-451. Cf. Sir George 
Napier's Autobiography, pp. 125-128. 



44 Wellington — ^Man and Strategist 

departments, he bore himself very stiffly : he would adminis- 
ter to them humiliating snubs or reproofs before others, and 
ignore their remarks or proffered counsel in the most marked 
way. A few examples may serve. Sir Thomas Picton 
was one of his most distinguished lieutenants, and was 
specially summoned by him to come over to Brussels to 
take his part in the campaign of 1815. The moment that 
he arrived in the Belgian capital he sought the Duke, who 
was walking m the Great Park. We have the witness of 
Picton's aide-de-camp for the following reception. " The 
general's manner was always more familiar than the Duke 
liked in his lieutenants, and on this occasion he approached 
him in a careless sort of way, just as he might have greeted 
an equal. The Duke bowed coldly to him, and said, ' I 
am glad you are come, Sir Thomas. The sooner you get 
on horseback the better : no time to be lost. You will 
take the command of the troops in advance.' That was all. 
Picton appeared not to like the Duke's manner, and when 
he had bowed and left, he muttered words which convinced 
those who were with him that he was not much pleased 
with his interview." * Such was the welcome vouchsafed 
to one of the best officers in the army, whom Wellington 
had specially sent for, and whom he had not seen for a long 
space of time. Another picture of Wellington's manners 
may be taken from the memoir of one of his departmental 
chiefs. Sir James McGrigor. " One morning I was in his 
lordship's small room, when two officers came to request 
leave to go home to England. An engineer captain first 
made his request : he had received letters informing him that 
his wife was dangerously ill, and that the whole of his family 
were sick. His lordship quickly replied, ' No, no, sir. I 
cannot spare you at this moment.' The captain, with a 
mournful face, drew back. Then a general officer, of noble 
family, commanding a brigade, advanced saying, ' My 
lord, I have lately been suffering much from rheumatism 

'. Without allowing him time to complete his sentence, 

* Gronow's Recollections, p. 66. 



Wellington and his Officers 45 

Lord Wellington rapidly said, ' and you want to go to 
England to be cured. By all means. Go there imme- 
diately.' The general, surprised at his lordship's tone and 
manner, looked abashed, but to prevent his saying anything 
more, his lordship turned and began to address me, en- 
quiring aboat the casualty-returns of the preceding night, 
and the nature of them." * An interview with the com- 
mander-in-chief was such a trying thing for the nerves 
that some officers went away from it in a flood of tears — as 
did Charles Stewart after one famous reproof — and others 
suffocating from suppressed maledictions. 

Wellington's temper was tried by having to deal with 
some inefficient and slack officers — foisted upon him from 
home — for never till the end of the war (as he bitterly com- 
plained) was he allowed complete liberty in choosing his 
subordinates. But it was not on them alone that his 
thunders fell. He often raged at zealous and capable 
subordinates, who had done no more than think for them- 
selves in an urgent crisis, when the orders that they had 
received seemed no longer applicable. Sir James McGrigor, 
whom I have just quoted above, once moved some com- 
missariat stores to Salamanca, where there was a great 
accumulation of sick and wounded. " When I came to 
inform him his lordship started up, and in a violent manner 
began to repudiate what I had done. ' I shall be glad to 
know,' he asked, ' who commands this army — I or you ? 
I establish one route, one line of communication — you 
establish another by ordering up supplies by it. As long 
as you live, sir, never do that again. Never do anything 
without my orders.' I pleaded that there had been no 
time to consult him, and that I had to save lives. He 
peremptorily desired me ' never again to act without his 
orders.' " Three months afterwards McGrigor ventured to 
say, " My lord, you will remember how much you blamed 
me at Madrid, for the steps that I took when I could not 
consult your lordship, and acted for myself. Now, if I 
* McGrigor's Autobiography, pp. 304, 305. 



46 Wellington — Man and Strategist 

had not, what would the consequences have been ? " He 
answered, "It is all right as it has turned out, but still I 
recommend you to have my orders for what you do^ This 
was a singular feature in his lordship's character.' 

Anything that seemed to Wellington to partake of the 
nature of thinking for oneself was an unpardonable sin in 
a subordinate. This is why he preferred blind obedience 
in his lieutenants to zeal and energy which might lead to 
some contravention of his own intention. Thus it came 
that he preferred as lieutenants not only Hill, who was a 
man of first-class brain-power notwithstanding his docility, 
but Spencer and Beresford, who most certainly were not. 
Hence, too, his commission of the cavalry arm throughout 
the war to such a mediocre personage as Stapleton Cotton 
(of whom he used the most unflattering language).* These 
men could be trusted to obey without reasoning, while 
Robert Craufurd, the ablest general in the Peninsula, or 
Picton, could not, but were liable to think for themselves. 
It may be noted that Hill, Beresford, Graham and Crau- 
furd, were the only officers to whom Wellington ever con- 
descended in his correspondence to give the why and 
wherefore of a command that he issued : the others simply 
received orders without any commentary. There are 
instances known in which a word of reasonable explanation 
to a subordinate would have enabled him to understand a 
situation, and to comprehend why directions otherwise 
incomprehensible were given him. Tiresome results occa- 
sionally followed. This foible of refusing information to 
subordinates for no adequate reason has been shared by 
other great generals — e.g. by Stonewall Jackson, as Colonel 
Henderson's biography of that strange genius sufficiently 
shows. It is a trick of the autocratic mind. 

It hardly requires to be pointed out that this determina- 
tion to allow no liberty of action to his lieutenants, and to 
keep even small decisions in his own hands, effectually pre- 
vented Wellington from forming a school of generals capable 
* When sending him to command in India. 



Wellington's Dispatches 47 

of carrying out large independent operations. He trained 
admirable divisional commanders, but not leaders of armies. 
The springs of self-confidence were drained out of men who 
had for long been subjected to his regime. 

Probably the thing which irritated Wellington's sub- 
ordinates most was his habit of making his official mention 
of names in dispatches little more than a formal recital 
in order of the senior officers present. Where grave 
mistakes had been committed, he still stuck the names 
of the misdemeanants in the list, among those of the men 
who had really done the work. A complete mystification 
as to their relative merits would be produced, if we had only 
the dispatches to read, and no external commentary on 
them. He honourably mentioned Murray in his Oporto 
dispatch, Erskine in his dispatch concerning the actions 
during Massena's retreat in 1811, Trip in his Waterloo dis- 
patch, though each of these officers had done his best to spoil 
the operations in which he was concerned. On the other 
hand, he would make the most unaccountable omissions : 
his Fuentes de Onoro dispatch makes no mention of the 
British artillery, which had done most brilliant service in 
that battle, not merely in the matter of Norman Ramsay's 
well-known exploit, which Wellington might have thought 
too small a matter to mention, but in the decisive checking 
of the main French attack. There are extant heart-rending 
letters from the senior officers commanding the artillery, 
deploring the way in which they have been completely 
ignored : " to read the dispatch, there might have been no 
British artillery present at all." A similar inexplicable 
omission of any record of zealous service occurs in Wel- 
lington's dispatch recording the fall of Badajoz, where no 
special praise of the services of his engineer officers is made, 
though 50 per cent, of them had been killed or wounded 
during the siege. " You may suppose we all feel hurt at 
finding our exertions have not been deemed worthy of any 
sort of eulogium," writes John Jones, the historian of the 
sieges of the Peninsula, to one of his colleagues. And 



48 Wellington — ^Man and Stkategist 

Fletcher, the commanding engineer, writes to a friend : 
" You will observe that Lord W. has not mentioned the 
engineers in the late actions : how I hate such capricious- 
ness ! " * The cold phrase in which their desperate service 
was acknowledged is " the officers and men of the corps 
of engineers and artillery were equally distinguished during 
the operations of the siege and its close." Fletcher would 
gladly have exchanged the personal honour of a decoration, 
which was given him along with other senior officers, for 
three lines of warm praise of the exertions of his sub- 
ordinates. 

Perhaps, however, the most astounding instance of 
Wellington's ungracious omissions is that his famous 
Waterloo dispatch contains no mention whatever of the 
services of Colborne and the 52nd, the battalion which 
gave the decisive stroke against the flank of the Imperial 
Guard, during Napoleon's last desperate assault on the 
British line. Colborne, the most unselfish and generous 
of men, could never forget this slight. He tried to 
excuse it, saying, " dispatches are written in haste, and 
it is impossible for a general to do justice to his army." 
And when he heard his officers complaining that the 
British Guards had been given all the credit for the final 
repulse of the French column, he said, " For shame, 
gentlemen ! One would think that you forgot that the 
52nd had ever been in battle before." But there was 
a bitter comment in the table talk of his later years. 
" The Duke was occasionally not above writing in his 
dispatches to please the aristocracy. ... I don't mean 
to say that this was peculiar to him. It used to be a 
common thing with general officers." t Enough, however, 
of these illustrative anecdotes of the limitations of a very 
great soldier and a very honourable man. They have 

* These two letters are in the Rice-Jones Correspondence (this 
R.E. officer is not to be confounded with John Jones, R.A., the his- 
torian), lent to me by Hon. Henry Shore of Mount Elton, Clevedon. 

t See Colborne'' 8 Life and Letters, ed. Moore Smith, pp. 126, 127 ; 
235, 236. 



LoED Egberts on Wellinoton 49 

to be mentioned in order to explain how it came to pass 
that Wellington was implicitly trusted, and never loved. 
But they compel me to acquiesce in the hard judgment 
which Lord Roberts wrote in his Bise of Wellington — " the 
more we go into his actions and his ^Titings in detail, 
the more do we respect and admire him as a general, and the 
less do we like him as a man." I conclude this paragraph 
with two quotations from two eloquent writers who served 
through long years of the Peninsular campaigns. " Thus 
terminated the war, and with it all remembrances of the 
veteran's services " are the last words of William Napier's 
penultimate chapter.* Grattan of the 88th, a forgotten 
writer now, but one who wielded a descriptive pen no less 
vivid than Napier's, puts the complaint more bitterly. 
'' In his parting General Order to the Peninsular Army he 
told us that he would never cease to feel the warmest 
interest for our welfare and honour. How that promise 
has been kept every one knows. That the Duke of Wel- 
lington is one of the most remarkable (perhaps the greatest) 
men of the present age, few will deny. But that he 
neglected the interests and feelings of his Peninsular army, 
as a body, is beyond all question. And were he in his grave 
to-morrow, hundreds of voices that now are silent would 
echo what I write." f 

If I have dwelt perhaps at over-great length on the 
limitations of Wellington's heart, it is only fair that full credit 
should be given to his wonderful powers of brain. To com- 
prehend the actual merit of his military career, it is not 
sufficient to possess a mere knowledge of the details of his 
tactics and his strategy. The conditions under which he 
had to exercise his talents were exceptionally trying and 
difficult. When he assumed command at Lisbon on April 
22, 1809, the French were in possession of all Northern and 
Central Spain, and of no inconsiderable part of Northern 
Portugal also. The Spanish armies had all been dashed to 
pieces — there was no single one of them which had not 
* Napier, vi. p. 175. f Grattan, p. 332. 

E 



50 Wellington — ^Man and Steategist 

suffered a crushing defeat, and some of them (such as 
Cuesta's army of Estremadura, and La E-omana's army of 
Gahcia) were at the moment little better than wandering 
bands of fugitives. The British army of which Wellesley 
took command when he landed at Lisbon, though it only 
mustered 19,000 men present, or 21,000 including men in 
hospital, was the only solid force, in good order and intact 
in morale, on which the allies could count in the Iberian 
Peninsula. The task set before Wellesley Avas to see if 
he could defend Portugal, and co-operate in the protection 
of Southern Spain, it being obvious that the French were 
in vastly superior numbers, and well able to take the 
offensive if they should chose to do so. There were two 
armies threatening Lisbon. The one under Soult had 
already captured Oporto and overrun two Portuguese pro- 
vinces, shortly before Wellesley's landing. The other, under 
Victor, lay in Estremadura close to the Portuguese border, 
and had recently destroyed the largest surviving Spanish 
army at the battle of Medellin on March 28. Was it 
possible that 19,000 British trooi3S could save the Peninsula 
from conquest, or even that they could keep up the war 
in Central Portugal ? Never was a more unpromising task 
set to the commander of a small army. 

Fortunately we possess three documents from Wellesley's 
own hand, which show us the way in which he surveyed the 
position that was before him, and stated his views as to the 
future course of the Peninsular War. He recognized that 
it was about to be a very long business, and that his task 
was simply to keep the war going as long as possible, with 
the limited resources at his disposition. Ambitious schemes 
for the expulsion of the French from the whole Peninsula 
were in 1809 perfectly futile. The hypothesis which he 
sets forth in the first of the three documents to which I 
allude, his Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal, laid 
before Castlereagh on March 7, before he had taken ship 
for Lisbon, is a marvel of prophetic genius. No more 
prescient document was ever written. Rejecting the 



Wellington's Powers of Prescience 51 

decision of Sir John Moore, who had declared that Portugal 
was quite indefensible, Wellesley states that a British army 
of not less than 30,000 men, backed by the levies of Portugal, 
ought to be able to maintain itself for an almost indefinite 
period on the flank of the French army in Spain. Its pre- 
sence on the Tagus would paralyse all offensive movements 
of the enemy, and enable the Spaniards to make head in 
the unsubdued provinces of their realm, so long as Portugal 
should remain intact. The French ought, if they were 
wise, to turn aU their disposable forces against the British 
army and Portugal, but he believed that even then, when 
the geography of the country was taken into consideration, 
they would fail in their attempt to overrun it. They could 
not succeed, as he held, unless they were able to set aside 
100,000 men for the task, and he did not see how in the 
spring of 1809 they could spare such a large detachment, 
out of the forces which they then possessed in the Penin- 
sula. If they tried it with a smaller army, he thought 
that he could undertake to foil them. He believed that 
he could cope with Soult and Victor, the two enemies who 
immediately threatened Portugal.* 

Further forward it was impossible to look. If a war 
should break out between Napoleon and Austria, as seemed 
likely at the moment in March, 1809, to one who (like himself) 
was in the secrets of the British Cabinet, the Emperor 
would not be able to send reinforcements to Spain for 
many a day. But, even so, the position of the French in 
the Peninsula was so strong that it could only be en- 
dangered if a very large allied force, acting in unison under 
the guidance of a single general, should be brought to bear 
upon them. Of the collection of such a force, and still 
more of the possibility of its being entrusted to his own 
command, there was as yet no question. Wellesley was 
aware of the jealousy of foreign interference which the 
Spanish Junta nurtured : there was little probability that 

* The memorandum is on pp. 261-263 of vol* iv. of Wellington's 
Dispatches. 



52 Wellington — ^Man and Steategist 

they would entrust him with the supreme control over 
their armies. It was, indeed, only in 1812, when he had 
acquired for himself a much greater reputation than he 
owned in 1809, and when the Spanish Government had 
drunk the cup of humiliation to the dregs, that he was 
finally given the position of commander-in-chief of the 
Spanish armies. 

This memorandum is a truly inspired document, which 
shows Wellesley at his best. It is not too much to say that 
it predicts the whole course of the Peninsular War — whose 
central point was to be invasion of Portugal in 1810 by a 
French army of 65,000 instead of the required 100,000 men, 
and that army, as he had foreseen, Wellesley was able to 
check and foil. 

The second document of a prophetic sort that we have 
to notice is Wellesley's reply to Mr. Canning's question to 
him as regards the future general policy of the war, written 
on September 5, 1809. The whole aspect of affairs had 
been much changed since March, by the fact that Austria 
had tried her luck in a war against Napoleon, and had 
been beaten at Wagram and forced to make peace. It 
was therefore certain that the Emperor would now have 
his hands free again, and be able to reinforce his armies 
in the Peninsula. Wellesley replies that it is hopeless 
to attempt to defend both Southern Spain and Portugal 
also, even if the British army were raised to 40,000 men. 
But Portugal can still be defended.* He expresses the 
strongest objection to any attempt to cover Andalusia and 
Seville, for to endeavour to do so must mean that Lisbon 
would have to be given up. 

The third great prophetic despatch is the Memorandum 
of October 26, 1809, ordering the construction of the Lines 
of Torres Vedras. Wellesley looks a full year ahead. He 
sees that Napoleon can now reinforce his Spanish armies, 
but that the new troops cannot get up till the next spring. 
When they appear, the British army will have to retreat 
* Dispatches, vol. v. pp. 123, 124. 



The Lines of Torres Vedras 53 

on Lisbon, where lines of such strength can be planned 
that there is a good prospect of bringing the invaders 
to a stand. Meanwhile the countryside shall be cleared 
of population and provisions, so that the French, if they 
keep concentrated, must starve, and the allied army shall 
so conduct its operations that the enemy will be compelled 
to remain en masse. Then follow directions to Colonel 
Fletcher (commanding the engineers) to make his plans 
for an immense line of redoubts covering the Lisbon penin- 
sula from sea to sea. What was foreseen came to pass : the 
French reinforcements arrived : the invasion of Portugal 
under Massena took place in 1810. But the whole country- 
side was swept clear of food, and when the marshal reached 
the Lines with his half-starved army, he was completely 
blocked, refused to attack the formidable positions, and, 
after a few weeks of endurance in front of them, withdrew 
with his famished troops. It was on October 26, 1809, 
that Wellington ordered the Lines to be laid out. On 
October 14, 1910, Massena appeared in front of them and 
was foiled : Wellington had made his preparations exactly 
a year ahead ! 

Careful long-sighted calculation was perhaps the Duke's 
strongest point. He had an immense grasp of detail, 
kept intelligence officers of picked ability out on every 
front, and had compiled an almost exactly correct muster- 
roll of the forces opposed to him. Seldom had a general 
of his time such a complete knowledge of his adversaries, 
and this he owed to the pains that he took to obtain it. 
His great scouts Colquhoun Grant,* Waters, and Rumann 
were always far out to the front, often within the French 
lines, sending him daily information, which he filed and 
dissected. In addition he had many Spanish and Portu- 
guese correspondents, whose information would have been 
more valuable if it had not contained too much hearsay, 
and if they had been able to judge numbers with the trained 

* For an interesting chapter on the adventures of Colquhoun 
Grant see the autobiography of his brother-in-law. Sir J. McGrigor. 



54 Wellington- — Man and Strategist 

eye of a soldier. Once he complained that he and Marmont 
were almost equally handicapped as regards information 
from the natives — for if the Frenchmen got none, he himself 
got too much : the proportion of it which was inaccurate 
spoiled the value of the rest. But Grant or Waters never 
made mistakes. Part of his system was the cross-ques- 
tioning of every deserter and prisoner as to the number 
and brigading of his regiment, and the amount of battalions 
that it contained. By constant comparison of these reports 
he got to know the exact number of units in every French 
corps, and their average strength. 

But this was less important than his faculty for judging 
the individual characters of his opponents. After a few 
weeks he got his fixed opinion on Massena or Victor, Soult 
or Marmont, and would lay his plans with careful reference 
to their particular foibles. I think that this is what he 
meant when he once observed that his own merit was, per- 
haps, that he knew more of " what was going on upon 
the other side of the hill," — in the invisible ground occupied 
by the enemy and hidden by the fog of war — than most 
men. 

This insight into the enemy's probable move, when their 
strength, their object, and the personal tendencies of their 
leader were known, was a most valuable part of Wellesley's 
mental equipment. The best known instance where it 
c^me into play was on the day of Sorauren. In the midst 
of the battles of the Pyrenees, when the British army had 
taken up its fighting position, though its numbers were as 
yet by no means complete, and two divisions were still 
marching up, Wellington arrived from the east to assume 
command. He could see Soult on the opposite hill sur- 
rounded by his staff, and it was equally certain that Soult 
could see him, and knew the reason of the cheer which ran 
along the front of the allied army as he rode up. Wellington 
judged, and rightly, that the news of his arrival, and the 
sight of him in position, would cause the marshal to delay 
his attack till the last of the French reserves had come on 



Wellington's Insight into Character 55 

the field, " I had an excellent glass : I saw him spying 
at us — then write and send off a letter : I knew what he would 
be writing, and gave my orders accordingly." * Wellington 
judged Soult a cautious general, knew that his own presence 
would redouble his caution, and so judged that the order 
given by the marshal would be for the checking of a 
threatened attack, which would have been very dangerous 
at the moment, if it had been pressed. " The 6th Division 
will have time to come up, and we shall beat him," is said 
to have been his comment, when he saw Soult hurriedly 
write and dispatch an order to his front line. 

Wellington played off a similar piece of bluff on Mar- 
mont at Fuente Guinaldo in September, 1811, when he 
drew up in a position strong indeed, but over -great for the 
numbers that he had in hand, and seemed to offer battle. 
He was aware that his own reputation for caution was so 
great that, if the enemy saw him halt and take up his ground, 
they would judge that he had concentrated his whole force, 
and would not attack him till their own reserves were near. 
He absconded unmolested in the night, while Marmont's 
rear columns were toiling up for the expected battle of the 
next day. 

For a long time in 1809-10 Wellesley had to assume a de- 
fensive attitude. It was not till 1811 that it at last became 
possible for him to think of taking the offensive, nor was 
it till 1812, the glorious year of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, 
and Salamanca, that the dream reached its realization, 
Hence came it that for a long time he was regarded only as 
a cautious and calculating general, a master of defensive 
warfare. This conception of him was wrong ; as events 
showed, in 1812-1813, that he could be a very thunderbolt 
of war, when propitious chance gave him the opportunity, 
could strike the boldest bloAvs, and launch his army upon 
the enemy with the most ruthless energy. But, in the 
earlier years of his command, he was always hopelessly 
outnumbered, and forced to parry rather than to strike. 

* Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 19. 



56 Wellington — Man and Strategist 

He had to run no risks with his precious little army, the 
30,000 British troops on whom the whole defence of the 
Peninsula really depended : because if it were destroyed it 
could not be replaced. With these 30,000 men he had 
covenanted, in his agreement with Castlereagh, when first 
he sailed to take command at Lisbon, that he would keep 
up the war indefinitely. If by taking some great risk he 
had lost 15,000 or even 10,000 men, the government would 
have called him home, and would have given up the struggle. 
Thus he had to fight with the consciousness that a single 
disaster might ruin not only his own plans, but the whole 
cause of the allies in Spain. No wonder that his actions 
seem cautious ! Yet even in 1810-1811 he took some 
serious risks, such as the offering of battle at Bussaco and 
Fuentes de Onoro. When even a partial defeat would 
mean his own recall, and the evacuation of Portugal, it 
required no small resolution even to face such chances as 
these. But his serene and equable temper could draw the 
exact line between legitimate and over-rash enterprise, 
and never betrayed him. 

All the more striking, therefore, was the sudden de- 
velopment into a bold offensive policy which marked the 
commencement of that year of victories 1812. The chance 
had at last come : Napoleon was ceasing to pour rein- 
forcements into Spain — the R-ussian War was beginning to 
loom near at hand. The French no longer possessed their 
former overwhelming superiority : in order to hold in check 
Wellington's army, now at last increased by troops from 
home to 40,000 British sabres and bayonets, they had to 
concentrate from every quarter, and risk their hold on many 
provinces in order to collect a force so large that the British 
general could not dare to face it. At last, in the winter of 
1811-1812, Napoleon himself intervened as Wellington's 
helper, by dispersing his armies too broadcast. The actually 
fatal move was the sending of 15,000 of Marmont's " Army 
of Portugal," the immediate adversary of the Anglo-Portu- 
guese host, for a distant expedition to the coast of the 



Wellington on the Offensive 57 

Mediterranean in aid of Marshal Suchet. It was the absence 
of this great detachment, which could not return for many 
weeks, that emboldened Wellington to make his first great 
offensive stroke, the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo on January 
19, 1812, after a siege of only twelve days. 

Following on this first success came the dear-bought 
but decisive success of the storming of Badajoz on April 7 ; 
this was a costly business, because Wellington had to operate 
" against time," since, if he lingered over-long, the French 
armies from north and south would combine, outnumber 
him, and drive him back into Portugal. Badajoz had to 
be stormed by sheer force, before all the arts of the engineer 
and artillerist had worked their full effect. The fire of the 
besieged had not been subdued, nor had the approaches of 
the assailants been pushed close up to the walls, as science 
would have dictated. But by making three simultaneous 
attacks on different points of the fortress, and succeeding 
at two of them, Wellington achieved his object and solved 
his " time problem." He showed here, for the first time, 
that he could, if it was necessary, spend the lives of his 
men remorselessly, in order to finish in a few days a task 
which, if much longer delayed, would have had to be aban- 
doned. This was to his French enemies a revelation of 
a new side of his character. He had been esteemed one 
who refused risks and would not accept losses. If they had 
known of the details of his old Indian victory of Assaye, 
they would have judged his character more truly. 

But Salamanca was the real revelation of Wellington's 
full powers. It was a lightning stroke, a sudden offensive 
movement made at a crisis of momentary opportunity, 
which would have ceased if the hour had not been 
seized with all promptitude. Wellington hurled his army 
unexpectedly at the enemy, who was manoeuvring in full 
confidence and tranquillity in front of his line, thinking that 
he had to deal with an adversary who might accept a battle 
(as at Vimeiro, Talavera, or Bussaco), but might be trusted 
not to force one on. Salamanca surprised and dismayed 



5S Wellington— Man and Steategist 

the more sagacious of the French officers. Foy, the most 
intelligent observer among them, put down in his diary- 
six days later, " This battle is the most cleverly fought, 
the largest in scale, the most important in results, of any 
that the English have won in recent times. It brings up 
Lord Wellington's reputation almost to the level of that 
of Marlborough. Up to this day we knew his prudence, 
his eye for choosing good positions, and the skill with which 
he used them. But at Salamanca he has shown himself 
a great and able master of manoeuvring. He kept his dis- 
positions hidden nearly the whole day : he allowed us to 
develop our movement before he pronounced his own : he 
played a close game ; he utilized the " oblique order " in 
the style of Frederick the Great. . . . The catastrophe 
of the Spanish War has come — for six months we ought to 
have seen that it was quite probable " * 

This is one of the most striking and handsome compli- 
ments ever paid by a general of a beaten army to the com- 
mander of the victorious adversaries. It is perfectly true, 
and it reflects the greatest credit on Foy's fair-mindedness 
and readiness to see facts as they were. The conqueror of 
Salamanca was for the future a much more terrifying 
enemy than the victor of Bussaco or Talavera had been. 
It is one thing to be repulsed — that had often happened to 
the French before — another to be suddenly assailed, 
scattered, and driven off the field with crushing losses and 
in hopeless disorder, as happened to WeUington's enemies 
under the shadow of the Arapiles on July 22, 1812. 

Wellington as a great master of the offensive came into 
prominence in 1812, and for the rest of the war it is this side 
of him which is most frequently visible, though the retreat 
from Burgos shows that his prudence was as much alive 
as ever. During the few days that preceded that retreat 
there was very great temptation to try a hard stroke at 
one of the French armies that were converging on the two 
halves of his own force. Napoleon would undoubtedly 

* Foy's diary in Girod de I'Ain, p. 178. 



The Campaigns of 1813-1814 59 

have made the attempt. But, WeUington, knowing that 
his o\\Ti total numbers were much inferior to those of the 
enemy, and that to concentrate in front of either Soult or 
Souham would be to take a terrible risk on the other flank, 
preferred a concentric retreat towards his base on the 
frontier of Portugal, to a battle in the plains of Castille, 
where he was far from home and support, and where a 
defeat might lead to absolute ruin. 

This was the last time that he was outnumbered and 
forced back upon his old methods. In 1813, owing to 
Napoleon's drafts from the army of Spain, which were called 
off to replace the troops lost in the Moscow campaign, the 
allies had at last a superiority in numbers, though that 
superiority consisted entirely in Spanish troops of doubtful 
solidity. But even these were conditions far more favour- 
able than WeUington had ever enjoyed before — he knew 
how to use his newly joined Spanish divisions in a useful 
fashion, without placing them in the more dangerous and 
responsible positions. The campaigns of 1813 and 1814 
are both essentially offensive in character, though they 
contain one or two episodes when Wellington was, for the 
moment, on the defensive in his old style, notably the early 
part of the battles of the Pyrenees, where, till his reserves 
came up, he was fending off Soult by the use of his more 
advanced divisions. But the moment that his army was 
assembled he struck hard, and chased the enemy over the 
frontier, again in the series of operations that begun on the 
last day of Sorauren. There was a very similar episode 
during the operations that are generally known as the battle 
of the Nive, where Wellington had twice to stand for a 
movement in position, while one of his wings was assailed 
by Soult's main body. But this was distinctly what we 
may call defensive tactical detail, in a campaign that was 
essentially offensive on the whole. The main character 
of the operations of 1813-14 may be described as the 
clearing out of the enemy from a series of positions — gene- 
rally heavily fortified — by successful breaking through of the 



60 Wellington— Man and Strategist 

lines which Soult on each occasion failed to hold. Invariably 
the French army was nailed down to the position which it 
had taken up, by demonstrations all along its front, while 
the decisive blow was given at selected points by a mass 
of troops collected for the main stroke. 



CHAPTER IV 

Wellington's infantry tactics — line versus column 

Everyone who takes a serious interest in military history- 
is aware that, in a general way, the victories of Wellington 
over his French adversaries were due to a skilful use of the 
two-deep line against the massive column, which had become 
the usual fighting-formation for a French army acting on 
the offensive, during the later years of the great war that 
raged from 1792 till 1814. But I am not sure that the 
methods and limitations of Wellington's system are fully 
appreciated, and they are well worth explaining. And on 
the other hand it would not be true to imagine that all 
French fighting, without exception,was conducted in column, 
or that blows delivered by the solid masses whose aspect 
the English knew so well, were the only ideal of the Napo- 
leonic generals. It is not sufiicient to lay down the general 
thesis that Wellington found himself opposed by troops 
who invariably worked in column, and that he beat those 
troops by the simple expedient of meeting them, front to 
front, with other troops who as invariably fought in the 
two-deep battle line. The statement is true in a general 
way, but needs explanation and modification. 

The use of infantry in line was, of course, no invention 
of Welhngton's, nor is it a universal panacea for all crises 
of war. During the eighteenth century, from Marlborough 
to Frederic the Great, all European infantry was normally 
fighting in line, three or four deep, and looking for success 
in battle to the rapidity and accuracy of its fire, not to the 
impetus of advances in heavy masses such as had been 



62 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

practised by the pikemen of the sixteenth or seventeenth 
century, and were to be introduced again by the French 
generals of the Revolutionary period. Everyone knows 
how the victories of Frederic the Great were in part to be 
attributed to the careful fire-drill of his infantry, who, with 
their iron ramrods and rapid manual exercise, used to put 
in a far larger and more effective discharge of musket-balls 
per minute than their adversaries. But both parties were 
as a rule fighting in three-deep line, Austrians no less than 
Prussians. Armies had a stereotyped array, with infantry 
battalions deployed in long lines in the centre, and heavy 
masses of cavalry covering the wings. A glance at the 
battle-plans of the War of the Austrian Succession, or of 
the Seven Years' War, shows a marvellous similarity in the 
general tactical arrangements of the rival hosts, and front- 
to-front collisions of long parallel lines were quite common, 
though commanders of genius had their own ways of varying 
the tactics of the day. Frederic the Great's famous 
"oblique order," or advance in echelon, with the strong 
striking -wing brought forward, and the weaker " containing- 
wing"held back and refused, is sufficiently well known. 
Occasionally he was able to vary it, as at Kossbach and 
Leuthen, and to throw the greater part of his troops across 
the enemy's flank at right angles, so as to roll him up in 
detail. But these were " uncovenanted mercies " obtained 
owing to the abnormal sloth or unskilfulness of the opposing 
general. Torgau needs a special word of mention, as 
Frederic's only battle fought of choice in a thoroughly 
irregular formation. 

There were one or two cases in the old eighteenth- 
century wars of engagements won by the piercing of a 
hostile centre, such as Marshal Saxe's victory of Roucoux 
(1746), and we may find, in other operations of that great 
general, instances of the use of deep masses, battalion de- 
ployed behind battalion, for the attack of a chosen section 
of the hostile position, and others where a line of deployed 
infantry was flanked or supported by units practically in 



Frederic II. and Marshal Saxe 63 

column. But this was exceptional — as exceptional as the 
somewhat similar formation of Cumberland's mass of British 
and Hanoverian infantry at Fontenoy, which, though often 
described as a column, had originally consisted of three 
successive lines of deployed battalions, which were ultimately 
constricted into a mass by lateral pressure. Some of Mar- 
shal Broglie's and Ferdinand of Brunswick's fights during 
the Seven Years' War were also fought in a looser order of 
battle than was normal. 

Normally the tactics of the eighteenth century were 
directed to the smashing up of one of the enemy's wings, 
either by outflanking it, or by assailing it with very superior 
forces, while the rest of the enemy's army was " contained " 
by equal or inferior numbers, according as the assailant 
had more or less troops than his enemy. The decisive blow- 
was very frequently delivered by a superior force of cavalry 
concentrated upon the striking wing, which commenced 
the action by breaking down the inferior hostile cavalry, 
and then turned in upon the flank of the infantry of the 
wing which it had assailed. Such a type of battle may 
sometimes be found much later, even in the Peninsular War, 
where Ocana was a perfect example of it. 

Speaking roughly, however, the period of set battles 
fought by enemies advancing against each other in more 
or less parallel lines ended with the outbreak of the war of 
the French Revolution. There had been a fierce controversy 
in France from 1775 to 1791 between the advocates of the 
linear, or Frederician, battle-order — headed by General 
Guibert, and the officers who wished to introduce a deeper 
formation, which they claimed to have learnt from the 
instructions of Marshal Saxe — of whom the chief was General 
Menil-Durand. The former school had triumphed just before 
the war began, and the Eeglement d'Infanterie of 1791 
accepted all their views. It was on this drill-book that the 
French infantry stood to fight in the following year, when 
the war on the Rhine and in Belgium began.* 

* For an analysis of the controversy, see Dumolin's preface to his 



64 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

But the attempt of the first generals of Revolutionary 
France to fight on the old linear system was a failure. 
The troops of the Republic had been demoralized by the 
removal or desertion of the greater proportion of their 
commissioned officers, and their cadres had been hastily 
filled with half -trained recruits. At the same time hundreds 
of new units, the battalions of volunteers, had been formed 
on no old cadre at all, but, with officers and men alike little 
better than untrained civilians, took the field along with 
the reorganized remains of the old royal army. It is hardly 
necessary to remark, that these raw armies suffered a series 
of disgraceful defeats at the hands of the Austrian and 
other allied troops in 1792-93. They were beaten both in 
tactics, in manoeuvring, and in fire-discipline by the well- 
drilled veteran battalions to which they were opposed. 

The French Republic, when it came under the control 
of the Jacobins, tried to set matters right by accusing its 
generals of treason, and arrested and guillotined a consider- 
able proportion of the unfortunate commanders-in-chief to 
whom its armies had been entrusted. But neither this 
heroic device, nor the sending to the armies of the well 
known " representatives en mission " from the National 
Assembly, who were to stimulate the energy of the generals, 
had satisfactory results. As the representatives were 
generally as ignorant of military affairs as they were self- 
important and autocratic, they did no more than confuse 
and harass the unhappy generals on whom they were 
inflicted. 

One thing, however, the Jacobin government did accom- 
plish : it pushed into the field reinforcements in such 
myriads that the armies of the allies were hopelessly out- 
numbered on every frontier. The first successes of the 
Republican armies in the North were won by brute force, 
by heaping double and triple numbers upon the enemy. 
And the new tactics of the Revolutionary leaders were 

Precis des Guerres de la Revolution, and compare CoKn's Education 
Militaire de Napoleon. 



Tactics of the Feench Eevolution 65 

evolved from a consciousness of superiority in this respect, 
a determination to swamp troops that manoeuvred better 
than their own, by hurhng preponderant masses upon them, 
regardless of the losses that must necessarily be suffered. 
For they had inexhaustible reserves behind them, from the 
newly-decreed levies en masse, while the bases of the allies 
were far off, and their trained men, when destroyed, could 
only be replaced slowly and with difficulty. 

When the generals of the Revolution threw away the old 
linear tactics learned in the school of Frederic the Great, 
as inapplicable to troops that could not manoeuvre with 
the same speed and accuracy as their enemies, the impro- 
vised system that succeeded was a brutal and wasteful 
one, but had the merit of allowing them to utihze their 
superiority of numbers. It is possible that those of them 
who reasoned at all upon the topic — and reasoning was not 
easy in that strenuous time, when a commander's head sat 
lightly on his shoulders — saw that they were in a maimer 
utilizing the idea that had been tried in a tentative way 
by Maurice de Saxe, and by one or two other generals of 
the old wars — the idea that for collision in long line on a 
parallel front, partial attacks in heavy masses on designated 
points might be substituted. But it is probable that there 
was more of improvisation than of deliberate tactical theory 
in the manoeuvres of even the best of them. 

The usual method was to throw at the hostile front a 
very thick skirmishing line, which sheathed and concealed 
a mass of heavy columns, concentrated upon one or two 
critical points of the field. The idea was that the front line 
of tirailleurs would so engage the enemy, and keep him 
occupied all along his front, that at the crucial section of 
the combat the supporting columns would get up to striking 
distance with practically no loss, and could be hurled, 
while still intact, upon those points of the hostile array which 
it was intended to pierce ; they would go through by their 
mere impetus and weight, since they were only exposed to 
fire for a few minutes, and could endure the loss suffered 



66 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

in that time without losing their elan or their pace. The 
essential part of the system was the enormously thick and 
powerful skirmishing line : whole battalions were dispersed 
in chains of tirailleurs, who frankly abandoned any attempt 
at ordered movement, took refuge behind cover of all 
sorts, and were so numerous that they could always drive 
in the weak skirmishing line of the enemy, and get closely 
engaged with his whole front. The orderly battalion- 
volleys of the Austrian, or other allied troops opposed to 
them, did comparatively little harm to these swarms, who 
were taking cover as much as possible, and presented no 
closed body or solid mark for the musketry fire poured 
upon them. It looks as if the proper antidote against 
such a swarm-attack would have been local and partial 
cavalry charges, by squadrons judiciously inserted in the 
hostile line, for nothing could have been more vulnerable 
to a sudden cavalry onslaught than a disorderly chain of 
light troops. On many occasions in the campaigns of 
1792-93 the French infantry had shown itself very helpless 
against horsemen who pushed their charge home, not only 
in cases where it was caught unprepared, but even when 
it had succeeded in forming square with more or less prompti- 
tude.* But this particular remedy against the swarm- 
attack does not seem to have been duly employed, and 
indeed many parts of Flanders are so cut up by small 
enclosures, that the use of cavalry as a universal panacea 
might often have proved impossible. 

The masses which supported the thick lines of tirailleurs 
were formed either in columns of companies or columns of 
" divisions," i.e. double companies.! In the former case 
the eight companies, each three deep, were drawn up behind 
each other. In the latter the front was formed by a 
" division," and the depth was only twelve men. In either 

* See especially the record of the great English and Austrian 
charges against French infantry at Villers-en-Cauchies, Beaumont, 
and Willems (Fortescue's British Army, Iv. 240-56). 

t The French battalion then comprising nine companies, of 
which one, the Voltigeur company, would not be in the column. 



Tactics of the French Column 67 

case none but the two front ranks could use their firearms 
properly, and the rest were useless save for the impetus 
that they gave the rolling mass. But such a column, when 
properly sheathed by the skirmishing line till the last 
moment, generally came with a very effective rush against 
the allied line opposed to it, which would have been already 
engaged ^^dth the tirailleurs for some time, and had pro- 
bably been much depleted by their fire. It is equally 
clear that, without its protective sheath of skirmishers, 
such a heavy column Avould have been a very clumsy 
instrument of war, since it combined the minimum of 
shooting power with the maximum of vulnerability. But 
when so shielded, the columns which attacked in masses at 
a decisive spot, leaving the rest of the hostile line " con- 
tained " by an adequate force, had a fair chance of pene- 
trating, though the process of penetration might during the 
last two or three minutes be very costly to the troops 
forming the head of the column. 

The best early summary of this change in French tactics 
which I know occurs in an anonymous English pamphlet 
published in 1802, which puts the matter in a nutshell. 
" The French army was composed of troops of the line 
without order, and of raw and undisciplined volunteers. 
They experienced defeats in the beginning, but in the 
meantime war was forming both officers and soldiers. In an 
open country they took to forming their armies in columns 
instead of lines, which they could not preserve without 
difiiculty. They reduced battles to attacks on certain 
points, wiiere brigade succeeded brigade, and fresh troops 
supplied the places of those who were driven back, tiU they 
were enabled to force the post, and make the enemy give 
way. They were fully aware that they could not give 
battle in regular order, and sought to reduce engagements 
to important affairs of posts : this plan has succeeded. 
They look upon losses as nothing, provided they attain 
their end ; they set little store by their men, because they 
have the certainty of being able to replace them, and the 



68 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

customary superiority of their numbers affords them an 
advantage which can only be counterbalanced by great 
skill, conduct, and activity." * 

After 1794, when the Republican armies had won their 
first series of great successes, and had driven their enemies 
behind their own frontiers, there is a distinct change in 
the tactical conceptions of the French. The troops had im- 
proved immensely in morale and self-confidence : a new race 
of generals had appeared, who were neither obsessed by 
reminiscences of the system of Frederic the Great, like some 
of their predecessors, nor spurred to blind violence and the 
brutal expenditure of vast numbers of men like certain others. 
The new generals modified the gross and unscientific methods 
of the Jacobin armies of 1793-94, which had won victory 
indeed, but only by the force of numbers and with reckless 
loss of life. There remained as a permanent lesson, how- 
ever, from the earlier campaigns two principles — ^the 
avoidance of dispersion and extension, by which armies 
" cover everything and protect nothing," and the necessity 
of striking at crucial points rather than delivering " linear " 
battles, fought out at equal intensity along the whole front. 
In general French tactics became very supple, the units 
manoeuvring with a freedom which had been unknown to 
earlier generations. The system of parting an army into 
divisions, now introduced as a regular organization,f gave 
to the whole army a power of independent movement 
unknown in the days when a line of battle was considered 
a rigid thing, formed of brigades ranged elbow to elbow, 
none of which ought to move without the direct orders of 
the general-in-chief . A front might be composed of separate 
divisions coming on the field by different roads, and each 
adopting its OAvn formation, the only necessity being that 

* From an essay entitled Character of the Armies of the various 
European Powers, in a collection called Essays on the Theory and 
Practice of the Art of War. 3 vols. London : Philips & Co. 

t Though Marsiial Broglie had used something like an approach 
to permanent divisions in the Seven Years' War : see Colin's Trans- 
formations de la Guerre, p. 97. 



Disadvantages of the Column 69 

there should be no great gaps left between them. As a 
matter of fact this last necessary precaution was by no 
means always observed, and there are cases in the middle, 
and even the later, years of the Revolutionary War, in which 
French generals brought their armies upon the field in such 
disconnected bodies, and with such want of co-operation 
and good timing, that they were deservedly defeated in 
detail.* Bonaparte himself is liable to this charge for his 
order of attack at Marengo, where he committed himself 
to a general action before the column of Desaix was near 
enough to the field, and as nearly as possible suffered a 
crushing reverse for the want of a mass of troops whose 
action was absolutely necessary to him. Hoche, Jourdan, 
and Moreau (the last especially), all committed similar 
mistakes from time to time. But these errors were at least 
better than an adhesion to the stereotyped tactics of the 
older generation, where formal set orders of battle had 
been thought absolutely necessary. 

As a rule we find the French operating in the later years 
of the Republic with methods very different from those of 
1793, with skill and swiftness, no longer with the mere brute 
force of numerical superiority, winning by brilliant 
manoeuvring rather than by mere bludgeon work. Yet, 
oddly enough, there was no formal revision of official 
tactics ; the Reglement d'Infanterie which had been drawn 
up in 1791, whose base was the old three-deep line of 
Frederic the Great, had never been disowned, even when 
it was for the most part disregarded, in the period when 
swarm-attacks of tirailleurs, supported by monstrous heavy 
columns, had become, perforce, the practical method of the 
French armies. When that unsatisfactory time passed by, 
the same old drill-book continued to be used, and was no 
longer so remote from actual practice as it had been. For 

* Colin quotes as bad examples of French armies coming on the 
field dispersedly, without the proper timing and co-operation, 
Wattignies, Neresheim (1796), and all Moreau's operations beyond 
the Rhine in that year from Rastadt to Ettlingen {Transformations 
de la Guerre, p. 99). 



70 Wellington's Infantey Tactics 

the use of the deployed battaHon began to come up again, 
as the handiness of the troops increased, and their self- 
reliance was restored. Only the early Revolutionary War 
had left two marks upon French tactics — for hard and 
heavy work, such as the forcing of passes, or bridges, or 
defiles, or the breaking of a crucial point in the enemy's Hne, 
the deep column remained habitually employed : while the 
old idea of the orderly continuous line of battle was gone 
for ever, or almost gone, for (oddly enough) in Napoleon's 
last and least lucky fight, Waterloo, the order of the 
imperial host was more like the trim and symmetrical array 
of a Frederician army than any French line of battle that 
had been seen for many a year. Certainly it would have 
pleased the eye of the Prussian king much better than the 
apparently irregular, though carefully thought out, plans 
of battle on which Jena or Wagram, Borodino or Bautzen 
were won. 

It would be doing injustice to Napoleon to represent 
him as a general whose main tactical method rested solely 
on the employment of massive columns for the critical 
operation on each battlefield. He was quite aware that 
infantry ought to operate by its fire, and that every man 
in the rear ranks is a musket wasted. If the Emperor had 
any favourite formation it was the ordre mixte, recommended 
by Guibert far back before his own day, in which a certain 
combination of the advantages of line and column was 
obtained, by drawing up the brigade or regiment with 
alternate battalions in line three-deep and in column. This 
formation gave a fair amount of frontal fire from the 
alternate deployed battalions, while the columns dispersed 
among them gave sohdity, and immunity from a flank 
attack by cavalry, which might otherwise roll up the line. 
If, for example, a regiment of three battalions of 900 men 
each were drawn up in the ordre mixte, with one deployed 
battahon flanked by two battalions in column, it had 
about 730 men in the firing line, while if arranged in three 
columns, it would only have had about 200 able to use their 



The "Okdre Mixte'' 71 

muskets freely. Still, at the best, this formation was 
heavy, since all the serried back-ranks of the flanking 
battalions had no power to join in the fusillade. For 
simple fire-effect it was as inferior to the line as it was 
superior to the mere column. 

Napoleon, however, was certainly fond of it. From 
the crossing of the Tagliamento (1797), when he is first 
recorded to have used it, he made very frequent employ- 
ment of it. In a dispatch to Soult, sent him just before 
Austerhtz, he directed him to use it " autant que faire 
se pourraJ' It is curious, however, to note that the 
marshal, less than a week after, having to strike the 
decisive blow in that battle, did not, after all, use the ordre 
mixte, but fought in lines of battalions in " columns of 
divisions," as he particularly mentions in his report to 
the Emperor.* 

But the ordre mixte was certainly employed again and 
again, not only in those parts of the battle where Napoleon 
was simply " containing " his enemy, and where he was 
merely keeping up the fight and pinning the adversary to 
his position, but also on the crucial points, where he was 
endeavouring to deal his main blow. We have notes to 
the effect that Lannes' Corps at Jena, Augereau's at Eylau, 
and Victor's at Friedland, which were all " striking forces," 
not " containing forces," used this formation. Its supposed 
solidity did not always save it from disaster, as was seen 
in the second of the cases quoted above, where Augereau's 
whole corps, despite of its battalions in column, was ridden 
down by a flank attack of Russian cavalry, charging covered 
by a snowstorm. 

In spite, however, of Napoleon's theoretical preference 
for the ordre mixte, and his knowledge that the column was 
a costly formation to employ against an enemy whose fire 
was not subdued, it is certain that he used it frequently, 
not only for the forcing of bridges or defiles (as at Areola 

* See Dumolin's Prdcis d'Histoire Militaire, x. p. 263, and 
Colin's Tactique et Discipline, p. Ixxxv. 



72 Wellington's Infantey Tactics 

and Ebersberg *), but for giving the final blow at a point 
where he was determined to break through, and where the 
enemy was holding on with tiresome persistence. At 
Wagram the flank-guards of Macdonald's conquering 
advance were formed by 13 battalions in solid column, one 
behind the other, though its front consisted of eight deployed 
battalions. Friant's division on the right wing also 
attacked with three regiments formed " en colonne serree par 
bataillons.'' At Friedland, Ney's right division (Marchand) 
came to the front in a single file of ten battalions one behind 
the other, and never got deployed, but attacked in mass 
and was checked. In 1812 and 1813 advance in heavy 
masses was usual — whole regiments formed in " column of 
divisions," battalion behind battalion,! with only 200 yards' 
distance between regiment and regiment. 

Napoleon was quite aware of the disadvantages of such 
formations, " meme en plaine," he observed in a celebrated 
interview with Foy, " les colonnes n'enfoncent les lignes 
qu'autant qu'elles sont appuyees par le feu d'une artillerie 
tres superieure, qui prepare I'attaque." J And his advances 
in column were habitually prepared by a crushing artillery 
fire on the point which he was about to assail, a fire which 
he himself, as an old artillery officer, knew how to direct 
with the greatest accuracy and efficiency. It seems that 
he relied much more on such preparation by concentrated 
batteries for the shielding of his columns, than on sheathing 
them by a thick skirmishing line, the old device of the 
generals of the Republic. An enemy's firing line might be 
occupied and demoralized by shot and shell, as well as by 
a screen of skirmishers. Jena, indeed, seems to be about 
the only one of his battles in which a hostile line was 

* At Areola Augereau's division attacked the bridge over a 
raised road passing over a dyke only 30 feet broad, with marshes on 
each side. There were three regiments, one behind the other. 
Cohorn's column at Ebersburg was not so deep, only a brigade. 
But it had to defile over a bridge 200 yards long. 

t E.g. : this was the formation of the 3rd corps at Liitzen, see 
Fabry, Journal des 3'"^ et 5"*" Corps en 1813, p. 7. 

% Foy's Vie MiUtaire, ed. Girod de i'Ain, p. 107. 



Tactics of Napoleon's Generals 73 

masked and depleted by a heavy tirailleur attack, before 
the columns in support charged and routed it. Often 
the light infantry seems to have been practically non- 
existent, and it was artillery and formed battalions alone 
which fought out the engagement. French generals in the 
imperial campaigns appear habitually to have used for the 
skirmishing line no more than the Voltigeur company of 
each battalion, a force making one-ninth of the whole unit 
only, till the number of companies was cut down in 1808 
from nine to six, when the Voltigeurs became one-sixth of 
the total. We are very far, by 1805 or 1809, from the day 
of the great '' swarm-attacks " of the early Republican 
campaigns. 

It was the tactics of the Empire, not those of the Republic, 
which Wellington had to face, when he took command of 
the aUied army in the Peninsula in 1809. He had to take 
into consideration an enemy whose methods were essentially 
offensive, whose order of infantry fighting was at the best — 
in the ordre mixte — rather heavy, and in many cases, 
when the column of the battalion or the regiment was used, 
exceptionally gross and crowded. He knew that the enemy 
would have a far more numerous cavalry than was at his 
own disposition, and that it would be used with reckless 
boldness — the cavalry stroke in the Napoleonic battle 
accompanied, if it did not precede, the infantry stroke. 
Moreover, the French army would have a very powerful 
and effective artillery, trained to prepare the way for 
infantry attacks by the greatest artillerist in the world. 
His own proportion of guns to infantry was ridiculously 
low : there was not even one battery per division available 
in 1809. 

What was there to oppose to this dangerous enemy in 
the way of tactical efficiency ? Roughly speaking we may 
say that the one point of superiority on which Wellesley 
counted, and counted rightly, was the superiority of the 
English formation for infantry in the two -deep line to 
the heavier order of the enemy's battalions. For this 



74 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

formation he was, of course, not responsible himself : he 
took it over as an accepted thing, and thought that he 
knew how to turn it to the best account. 

The effects of the French War on British tactics had 
been notable and interesting. The first reflections pub- 
lished on the new type of war on this side of the Channel 
seem to have been mainly inspired by the experience of 
the Duke of York's army in 1793-94, when the thick 
chains of tirailleurs, which formed the protective screen, or 
first line, of the Republican armies, had done so much 
damage to troops which fought them in the old three-deep 
order, adopted from Frederic the Great, without any 
sufficient counter-provision of skirmishers. We find early 
in the war complaints that the British forces had no adequate 
proportion of light troops — that the one light company per 
battalion, normally used, was wholly unable to prevent the 
French tirailleur swarm from pressing up to the main line, 
and doing it much harm before the real attack was delivered. 
Two remedies were proposed — the first was that the pro- 
portion of light companies in a battalion should be increased 
from one to two,* or that in each regiment a certain number 
of men should be selected for good marksmanship, and 
taught light infantry drill, while still remaining attached 
to their companies. Of these proposals the first was never 
tried : the second was actually practised by certain colonels, 
who trained fifteen or twenty men per company as 
skirmishers : they were called " flankers," and were to go 
out along with the light company. The only British battle 
where I have found them specially mentioned is Maida, 
where their mention illustrates the danger of the system. 
Generals wanting more light troops habitually purloined 
the light companies of regiments to make " light battaHons "; 
but not only did they do this, but they sometimes even 
stole the " flankers " also from the centre companies. 

* Sir James Sinclair in his Observations on the Military System o/ 
Great Britain, so far as respects the formation of Infantry, deals with 
this idea at great length, and proposes to have 160 skirmishers to each 
battalion of 640 men. 



British use of Light Troops 75 

Stuart had at Maida not only the Ught companies, but also 
the " flankers " of regiments left behind in Sicily, which 
had therefore been deprived of every marksman that they 
possessed — an execrable device. The system, however, was 
only tentative ; it soon disappeared ; Wellington never 
skimmed the centre companies of their good shots, though 
he did occasionally create a light battalion of light com- 
panies — even this was exceptional. 

But there was a second alternative course open to the 
British : instead of developing more skirmishers in each 
battalion, they might create new light -infantry corps, or 
turn whole units of the line into light troops. For the 
former there was good precedent : in the War of the 
American Revolution the British generals had of necessity 
embodied corps of riflemen, to oppose to the deadly marks- 
men from the backwoods who formed the most efficient 
part of the American armies. Such were Simcoe's Rangers, 
and the dismounted part of Tarleton's famous Legion — 
whose remainder consisted of veritable mounted infantry — 
the first of their sort in the British army, since dragoons 
had forgotten their old trade and become cavalry of the 
line. But all the Rangers, etc., had been disbanded in 
1783, and their use seems to have been forgotten before the 
French War began ; the system had to begin again de novo. 
It was not till 1798 that the first British rifle battalion 
was created, to wit the 5th Battalion of the 60th Regiment, 
or Royal Americans, which was formed as a Jager unit out 
of the remains of many defunct foreign fight corps in British 
pay : it remained mainly German in composition even 
during the Peninsular War. This was the first green- 
coated battalion ; the second was Coote Manningham's 
" Experimental Rifle Corps," formed in January, 1800, 
and finally taken into the service after some vicissitudes, 
as the 95th — a name famous in Peninsular annals, though 
now almost obhterated by its new title of the " Rifle 
Brigade." The regiment was enlarged to three battafions 
before it came into Wellington's hands. Later on, though 



76 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

the number of rifle corps was not increased, yet an addition 
was made to the hght troops of the British army by turning 
certain picked battaUons into hght infantry. They were 
armed with a special musket of hght weight, not with a 
rifle, and all the companies equally were instructed in 
skirmishing work. The first corps so treated was the 90th 
or Perthshire Light Infantry, which received the title in 
1794. The precedent was not, however, acted on again 
till in 1803, the 43rd and 52nd, the famous regiments of the 
Peninsular Light Division, were honoured with the same 
designation. The last Additions during the period of the 
Napoleonic wars were the 68th and 85th in 1808, and the 
51st and 71st in 1809. Most of these corps had two bat- 
talions, but, even so, the provision of light infantry was not 
large for an army which had then nearly 200 battalions 
embodied. There were also some foreign corps to be taken 
into consideration, which stood on the British muster-rolls, 
such as the two Light Battalions of the King's German 
Legion, the Brunswick Oels Jagers, and the Chasseurs 
Britanniques, who all four served in the Peninsula. All 
these save the last were created after 1803 : but at least 
during the second period of the great French War, our 
armies were not practically destitute of light troops, as they 
were in 1793. We shall see that this had no small impor- 
tance in Wellington's tactical devices. 

The other lesson that might possibly have been deduced 
from the campaigns of the earlier years of the great war 
was the efficacy of columns for striking at the critical 
points of an enemy's line. The continental enemies of 
France were affected by what they had seen of this sort of 
success, and often copied the formation of their adversaries. 
But it is notable that the old and wholesome prejudice of 
the British in favour of the line was in no way disturbed 
by what had happened of late. The idea that the column 
was a clumsy and expensive formation was not shaken, 
and the theory that infantry ought to win by the rapidity 
and accuracy of its shooting, and that every musket not 



The British Two-deep Line 77 

in the firing-line was wasted, continued to prevail. The 
reply of the British to the ordre mixte was to reduce the 
depth of the deployed battalion from three ranks to two, 
because it had been discovered that the fire of the third 
rank was difficult, dangerous to those in front, and prac- 
tically ineffective. Sir David Dundas's drill-book of 1788 
\\ith its Prussian three ranks, which had been the official 
guide of the British infantry of late, was not formally 
cancelled at first, but it was practically disregarded, and the 
army went back to the two-rank array, which it had 
habitually used in the American War, and had abandoned 
with regret. Apparently the Duke of York did not alto- 
gether approve this change : he at least once issued a 
General Order, to remind colonels that the formation in 
three ranks was still officially recognized and ought not to 
be forgotten. But the permission given by an order in 
1801, that inspecting officers might allow regiments to 
appear " even at reviews " in the two ranks, probably 
marked the practical end of the Prussian system.* It had 
certainly been disused by many officers long before that 
date, and it is certain that in Abercrombie's Egyptian 
campaign the double instead of the triple rank was in general 
use.f British military opinion had decided that fire was 
everything, and that the correct answer to the French 
columnar attack was to put more men into the firing 
line. 

A conclusive proof of the efficacy of the double when 
opposed to the triple rank was very clearly given at the 
half -forgotten Calabrian battle of Maida, three years after 
the commencement of the second half of the great French 
War. At this fight the French General Reynier had de- 
ployed the whole, or the greater part, of his battalions, who 

* See Fortescue, British Army, iv. p. 921. 

t See the anecdote of the 28th regiment at Alexandria, whose 
rear rank faced about, and fought back-to-back with the front 
rank, when unexpectedly assailed from behind by French cavalry 
which had passed through a gap in the line. Hence the grant of the 
double shako -plate, before and behind, made to the regiment. 



78 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

were not as usual fighting either in ordre mixte or in battaHon 
column. The result was very decisive — 5000 British infantry 
in the thinner formation received the attack of 6000 French 
in the heavier, and inflicted on them, purely by superior 
fire-efficiency, one of the most crushing defeats on a small 
scale that was ever seen, disabling or taking 2000 men, 
with a total loss to themselves of only 320.* It is worth 
while remembering that some of the officers who were 
afterwards to be Wellington's trusted lieutenants were 
present at Maida, including Cole, Kempt, Oswald, and 
Colborne.* This was about the only instance that I know 
where English and French came into action both deployed, 
and on a more or less parallel front. Usually it was a case 
of '' column against line." 

Sir Arthur Wellesley had been nine years absent in 
India before he returned to England in 1805, so that he 
had to learn the difference between the Republican and the 
Imperial armies by new experience. The problem had 
long been interesting him. Before he left Calcutta he is 
said to have remarked to his confidants that the French 
were sweeping everything before them in Europe by the 
use of column formations, but that he was convinced that 
the column could, and would, be beaten by the line. What 
he heard after his return to England evidently confirmed 
him in this opinion. A conversation which he had with 
Croker, just before he set sail on the expedition which was 
to end at Vimeiro, chances to have been preserved in the 
latter's papers, under the date, June 14, 1808. Sitting 
silent, lost in reverie for a long time, he was asked by Croker 
the subject of his thoughts. " To say the truth," he replied, 
" I am thinking of the French I am going to fight. I have 
not seen them since the campaigns in Flanders [1793-94] 

* Till lately I had supposed that Reynier had at least his left 
wing, or striking Echelon, in columns of battalions, but evidence put 
before me seemis to prove that, despite of the fact that the French 
narratives do not show it, the majority at least of Reynier 's men were 
deployed. This is borne out by Bunbury's narrative, p. 244, where 
it is definitely stated, as well as by Booth by 's, p. 78. 



Wellington's System 79 

when they were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of 
victory under Bonaparte must have made them better still. 
'Tis enough to make one thoughtful. But though they 
may overwhelm me, I don't think that they will out- 
manoeuvre me. First, because I am not afraid of them, 
as every one else seems to be, and secondly, because (if all 
I hear about their system is true) I think it a false one 
against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies 
are half -beaten before the battle begins. I at least will 
not be frightened beforehand." 

Wellesley went out to Portugal, there to try what could 
be done with steady troops against the " French system." 
But it would be to convey a false impression of his meaning 
if we were to state that he simply went out to beat column 
with line — though the essential fact is sufficiently true. 
He went out to try his own conception of the proper way 
to use the line formation, which had its peculiarities and 
its Limitations. The chief of these were that — 

(1) The Hne must not be exposed before the moment 
of actual conflict : i.e. it must be kept under cover as much 
as possible. 

(2) That till the critical moment it must be screened 
by a line of skirmishers impenetrable to the enemy's 
tirailleurs. 

(3) That it must be properly covered on its flanks, 
either by the nature of the ground, or by cavalry and 
artillery. 

When we investigate all his earlier pitched battles, we 
shall see that each of these three requisites was as far as 
possible secured. 

(1) It was necessary for success that the line should be 
kept concealed from the enemy's distant fire of artillery 
and infantry as long as possible. Hence we find that one 
of the most marked features of Wellesley's many defensive 
battles was that he took up, whenever it was feasible, a 
position which would mask his main line, and show nothing 
to the enemy but his skirmishers and possibly his artillery, 



80 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

for the latter having to operate before the infantry fighting 
began, and being obUged to take up positions which would 
command the ground over which the enemy must advance, 
were often visible from the first. At Vimeiro, Wellesley 
so concealed his army that Junot, thinking to turn his left 
flank, found his turning column itself outflanked by troops 
moved under cover behind a skyline. At Bussaco, Massena, 
no mean general, mistook Wellington's centre for his extreme 
right, and found his attacking columns * well outflanked 
when the attack had been pressed to its issue. At Salamanca 
it was much the same ; the main part of the British line 
was well concealed behind a low ridge of hills, while 
Pakenham's division and its attendant cavalry, the force 
which executed the great stroke, were concealed in a wooded 
tract, far outside the French marching column that vainly 
thought to get round the allied right wing. At Waterloo, 
the clearest case of all, the whole of Wellington's infantry 
of the front line was so far drawn back from the edge of 
the slope that it was invisible, till the enemy had climbed 
to the brow of the plateau on which it was arrayed. Only 
the artillery, the skirmishing line, and the troops in the 
outlying posts of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte could 
be made out by Napoleon's eye. Talavera, as I shall 
mention below, is the only exception to this general rule in 
the Duke's defensive battles. 

Wellington's ideal position was a rising ground with a 
long glacis of slope in front, and a plateau or a dip behind 
it. The infantry was drawn back from the skyline, and 
placed behind the crest, if the hill were saddle-backed, or 
some hundreds of yards away from the edge, if it were 
flat-topped. There they stood or lay till they were wanted, 
secure from artillery fire : they moved forward to their 
actual fighting ground only when the fire-combat of 
infantry was to begin. Every one will remember Welling- 
ton's caustic comment on the Prussian order of battle at 
Ligny , where Bliicher had drawn out his army in a chequered 
* Those of Reynier. See my Peninsular War, Bussaco chapter. 



The Advantages of Cover 81 

array all along the declivity of a descending slope. " Damn- 
ably mauled these fellows will be — every man visible to 
the enemy." * Or in more solemn phrase, as he afterwards 
consigned it to paper : "I told the Prussian officers, in 
the presence of Colonel Hardinge, that according to my 
judgment, the exposure of the advanced columns, and 
indeed of the army, to cannonade, standing as they did 
displayed to the aid of the enemy's fire, was not prudent." | 

By the end of the Peninsular War, as I have already 
had occasion to observe, it had become so well known to 
the French that Wellington's army, ready for a battle, 
would be under cover, that he was able, as at Fuente 
Guinaldo in 1811, and at Sorauren in 1813, to play off on 
them the trick of offering to fight in a half -manned position, 
because he knew that they would take it for granted that 
the ground invisible to them was held by an adequate 
force. There is an interesting testimony to the same 
effect in the Waterloo campaign. On the morning before 
the battle of Quatre Bras began, General Reille, a veteran 
of the Spanish war, remained halted for some time before 
a position held by nothing but a single Dutch-Belgian 
division, because (as he expressed it), " Ce pourrait bien 
etre une bataille d'Espagne — les troupes Anglaises se 
montreraient quand il en serait temps." { This was the 
lesson taught by many years of Peninsular experience — but 
on this occasion it chanced to be singularly ill applied — 
since a vigorous push would have shown Reille that there 
were as yet no red-coats concealed behind the trees of the 
Bois de Bossu. 

It was only when absolute necessity compelled, owing 
to there being no cover available in some parts of his chosen 
position, that WelHngton very occasionally left troops in 
his battle-front visible to the enemy, and exposed to artillery 

* See Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 109. 
t The phrase comes from the De Bos Manuscript, quoted in 
Maxwell's Life of Wellington, ii. p. 20. 

J Foy's Vie Militaire, ed. Girod de I'Ain, pp. 270, 271. 

G 



82 Wellington's Infantey Tactics 

fire from a distance. The best known instance of this 
occurred with his centre brigades at Talavera, who were 
unmasked perforce, because between the strong hill which 
protected his left, and the olive groves which covered his 
right, there were many hundred yards of open ground, 
without any serviceable dips or undulations to conceal the 
line. And this was almost the only battle in which we find 
record of his troops having suffered heavily by artillery 
fire before the clash of infantry fighting began.* 

(2) The second postulate of Welhngton's system was, 
as I have remarked above, that the infantry of his battle- 
line must be covered by such a powerful screen of skirmishers, 
that the enemy's advanced line of tirailleurs should never 
be able to get near enough to it to cause any real molesta- 
tion, and that it should not be seriously engaged before 
the French supporting columns came up to deliver the 
main attack. His old experience in Flanders in 1794 had 
taught him that the line cannot contend at advantage with 
a swarm of light troops, who yield when charged, but 
return the moment that the charge has stopped and the 
line has drawn back to its original position. There were 
evil memories of this sort not only from Flanders, but from 
the Egyptian Expedition of 1801, when Abercrombie's less 
engaged brigades suffered severely at the battle of Alex- 
andria from the incessant fire of skirmishers at long range, 
to whom no proper opposition was madcj 

The device which Wellesley practised was to make sure 
that he should always have a skirmishing screen of his own, 
so strong that the French tirailleurs should never be able 
to force it in and to get close to the main line. The moment 
that he had assumed command in April, 1809, he set to 
work to secure this desideratum. His first measure was to 
add to every brigade in his army an extra company of 

* Donkin's Brigade, Wellington's last reserve, which was never 
engaged with infantry all day, lost 195 men without firing a shot — 
save by its skirmishers. 

t See Fortescue, iv. p. 841. 



Ample Provision of Light Troops 83 

trained riflemen, to reinforce the three light companies of 
the brigade.* In April, 1809, he broke up the oldest rifle 
battalion in the British army, the fifth of the 60th regiment, 
and began to distribute a company of it to each of his 
brigades, save to those of the King's German Legion, which 
were served by special rifle companies of their own.f Thus 
each of the brigades which fought at Talavera had a special 
extra provision of light troops. Furthermore, when the 
new Light Division was instituted on the 1st of March, 1810, 
each of its two brigades was given a number of companies 
of the 95th rifles : and of the other brigades formed in 1810-1 1 
most were provided with an extra light company by means 
of taking fractions from the 95th or the newly arrived 
Brunswick Oels Jagers, and those which were not, had light- 
infantry corps of their own inside them. But this was 
not all.t 

In the summer of 1810, Wellington began the system 
of incorporating a Portuguese brigade of five battalions in 
each British division. Of these five one was always § a 
Ca9ador or rifle battalion, specially trained for skirmishing. 

* Tho interesting circular to Brigadiers conveying this informa- 
tion runs, " The Commander of the Forces recommends the com- 
panies of the 5/60th regiment to the particular care of the officers 
commanding the brigades to which they are attached : they will 
find them to be most useful, active, and brave troops in the field, 
and they will add essentially to the strength of their brigades." — 
General Orders, p. 262. 

t These " independent rifle companies " of the Iv.G.L., which 
appear in so many " morning states," were isolated men left behind 
(mainly, no doubt, in hospital) by the two " Light Battalions " of 
the K.G.L. when they left Portugal in company with Sir John Moore. 

X To descend into detail, in May, 1811, the 5/60th supplied light 
companies to Stopford's, Nightingale's, Mackinnon's (3 companies), 
Myers', Hulse's, Colborne's, Hoghton's, and Abercrombie's brigades. 
The Brunswick Oels Jagers supplied the extra company to Hay's 
and Dunlop's brigades, while the rest of the battalion was in Sontag's 
brigade. The 3/95th gave a company to Howard's brigade, while the 
other battalions of this famous rifle corps were in the two brigades of 
the Light Division. The German brigade of Lowe had its own "inde- 
pendent light companies." Only Colville's and Burne's brigades had 
no such provision in the whole army. 

§ Save in Hamilton's Portuguese division, which did not get 
its Ca9ador battalions till 1812. 



84 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

The old Portuguese army had not included such battalions, 
which were all newly raised corps, intended entirely for light 
infantry work. There were originally only six of them, 
but WelUngton ordered a second six to be raised in 1811, 
utilizing as the cadre of the 7th, 8th, 9th the old Loyal 
Lusitanian Legion, which Sir Robert Wilson had formed 
early in the war. As the Portuguese army contained just 
twenty-four regiments of the line, in twelve brigades, the 
Cayador battalion gave precisely one unit to each brigade, 
save that two were incorporated in the Light Division, while 
none was left with the two regiments which remained behind 
in garrison at Abrantes and at Cadiz respectively. 

As the Ca9ador battalions were essentially light troops, 
and used wholly for skirmishing, it resulted that when an 
Anglo-Portuguese division of the normal strength of six 
British and five Portuguese battalions set itself in battle 
array, it sent out a skirmishing line of no less than eight 
British and ten Portuguese companies, viz. one each from 
the line battalions, two of British rifles, six of Cayadores, 
or a total of from 1200 to 1500 men to a total strength of 
5000 to 5500. This, as will be obvious, was a very powerful 
protective sheath to cover the front of the division. It 
was not always required — the French did not invariably 
send out a skirmishing line in advance of their main attack : 
but when they did, it would always be restrained and kept 
off from the main front of the divisional line. If the 
enemy wished to push it in, he had to bring up his formed 
battalions through his tirailleurs, and thus only could he 
reach the front of battle. The French regiments, whether 
formed in ordre mixte or (as was more common) in column, 
had to come to the front, and only so could reach the 
hitherto intact British line. It may be noted that the 
enemy rarely used for his skirmishing line more than the 
voltigeur company of each battaHon ; as his divisions 
averaged ten to twelve battalions* and the unit was a 

* In 1811 of the armies opposed to Wellington (Soult's and 
Marmont's) there was one division of 6 battalions, one of 9, two of 



Advantages of the Skirmishing Screen 85 

six-company battalion of 600 men or under, with only one 
voUigeur company, a French division would send out 1000 
to 1200 skirmishers, a force appreciably less than the light 
troops of a British division of approximately equal force. 
Hence Wellington never seems to have been seriously 
incommoded by the French skirmishers. 

So considerable was the British screen of Ught troops 
that the French not unfrequently mistook it for a front 
line, and speak of their column as piercing or thrusting 
back the first line of their opponents, when all that they 
had done was to drive in a powerful and obstinate body 
of skirmishers bickering in front of the real fighting forma- 
tion.* Invariably, we may say, they had to use their 
columns to attack the two-deep line while the latter was 
still intact, while their own masses had already been under 
fire for some time and were no longer fresh. 

It will be asked, perhaps, why the marshals and generals 
of Napoleon did not deploy their columns before the 
moment of contact. Why do we so seldom read of even the 
ordre mixte in use — Albuera is the only battle where we 
distinctly find it mentioned ? The answer to this objection 
is, firstly, that they were strongly convinced that the column 
was the better striking force to carry a given point, and 
that they were normally attacking not the whole British 
line but the particular section or sections where they intended 
to break through. But, secondly, we may add that they 
sometimes did attempt to deploy, but always too late, 
since they waited till they had driven in the British skirmish- 
ing line, and tried to assume the thinner formation when 

10, one of 11, seven of 12, one of 13. The battalions varied from 400 
apiece in the 5th corps to over 600 in the 1st corps. The average 
was about 500, not including men detached or in hospital. A voUi- 
geur company would have varied between 80 and 110 men. 

* Note especially Vigo-Roussillon's account of Barrosa, where 
he speaks of his regiment having pierced the first British line, when 
all that it really did was to thrust back four companies of the 95th 
rifles, and two of the 20th Portuguese. Similarly Reynier's report 
on Bussaco says that Merle's division broke the front line of Picton, 
and only failed before his second. But the " front line " was only 
five light companies. 



86 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

they were already under fire and heavily engaged. It was 
not always that the British noted this endeavour — so late 
was it begun, so instant was its failure. But there is 
evidence that it was tried by Kellermann's grenadiers at 
Vimeiro, by part at least of Leval's division at Barrosa, by 
Merle's column at Bussaco, when it had already reached the 
summit of the Serra, and was closely engaged with Picton's 
troops. At Albuera we have a good description of it from 
the British side. When Myers' fusiUer brigade marched 
against the flank of the 5th Corps, in the crisis of that battle, 
Soult launched against them his reserve, the three regiments 
of Werle, which became at once locked in combat at very 
short range with the fusihers. "During the close action," 
writes a British officer (Blakeney of the 7th), " I saw their 
officers endeavouring to deploy their columns, but all to 
no purpose. For as soon as the third of a company got 
out, they would immediately run back in order to be 
covered by the front of their column." The fact was, that 
the effect of the fire of a British regiment far exceeded any- 
thing that the enemy had been wont to cope with when 
engaged with continental troops, and was altogether 
devastating. Again and again French officers who came 
under it for the first time, made the miscalculation of trying 
the impossible. Nothing could be more inevitably pro- 
ductive of confusion and disorder than to attempt deploy- 
ment under such a heavy fire. Wherefore many French 
commanders never tried it at all, and thought it more safe 
to go on to the final shock with their battalions in the usual 
'' column of divisions," in which they had begun their 
attack. This was little better, and quite as costly in the 
end. " Really," wrote Wellington, in a moment of unwonted 
exhilaration, after the combat of Sabugal, " these attacks 
in column against our lines are very contemptible." * 
This was after he had viewed from the other bank of the 
Coa, "where I could see every movement on both sides," 
the 43rd regiment repulse in succession three attacks by 
* Wellington to Beresford, Dispatches^ vii. p. 427. 



Necessity of Flank Cover 87 

French columns which came up against it, one after the 
other. 

(3) We now come to the third postulate of Wellington's 
system — the two-deep fighting line must be covered on its 
flanks, either by the ground, or by cavalry and artillery 
support, or by infantry prolonging the front beyond the 
enemy's immediate point of action. At Talavera one of 
his flanks was covered by a precipitous hill, the other by 
thick olive plantations. At Bussaco both the French 
attacks were hopelessly outflanked by troops posted on 
high and inaccessible ground, and could only be pushed 
frontally. At Fuentes de Oiioro the final fighting position 
rested on a heavily occupied village at one end, and on 
the ravine of the Turon river upon the other. At Salamanca 
the 3rd DiAdsion, the striking-force which won the battle, 
had its line covered on its outer flank by a British and 
a Portuguese brigade of cavalry. At Vittoria the whole 
French army was enveloped by the concentric and con- 
verging attack of the much longer British line. At Waterloo 
flank protection was secured by the advanced post of 
Hougoumont and a " refused " right wing at one end of 
the position : by the group of fortified farms (Papelotte, 
La Haye, etc.), and a mass of cavalry at the other. Welling- 
ton, in short, was very careful of his flanks. Only once 
indeed, so far as I remember, did the French get round the 
outlying end of his army and cause him trouble. This was 
in the first episode of Fuentes de Oiioro, where the 7th 
Division, placed some way out, as a flank-guard, suffered 
some loss by being taken in rear by French cavalry which 
had made a great circuit, and only escaped worse disaster 
because two of its battalions, the 51st and Chasseurs Brit- 
anniques, had time to form front to flank, and adapt them- 
selves to the situation, and because a few British squadrons 
sacrificed themselves in checking, so long as was possible, 
the enemy's superior horse. 

There was one universally remembered instance during 
the war which demonstrated the terrible risk that the line 



88 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

might run if it were not properly protected on the flanks. 
At Albuera Colborne's brigade of the 2nd Division was 
thrown into the fight with its flank absolutely bare — ^there 
was no support within half a mile — by the recklessness of 
its divisional general, William Stewart. It was caught 
unprepared by two regiments of French cavalry, charging 
in at an angle, almost on its rear, and three battahons were 
literally cut to pieces, with a loss of 1200 men out of 1600 
present, and five colours. Wellington would never have 
sent it forward without the proper support on its wings, 
and it is noteworthy that, later on the same day. Cole took 
the 4th Division into action on the same hill, and against 
the same enemy, with perfect success, because he had 
guarded one flank with a battalion in column, and the other 
(the outer and more exposed one) with a battalion in square 
and a brigade of cavalry. 

These, then, were the necessary postulates required for 
the successful use of line against column, and when they 
were duly borne in mind, victory was secure with any 
reasonable balance in numbers. The essential fact that 
lay behind the oft-observed conclusion was simply that the 
two-deep line enabled a force to use every musket with 
effect, while the " column of divisions " put seven-ninths 
of the men forming it in a position where they could not 
shoot at all, and even the ordre mixte praised by Napoleon 
placed from seven-twelfths to two-thirds of the rank and 
file in the same unhappy condition.* But Albuera is the 
only fight in the war in which there is definite proof that the 
enemy fought in the ordre mixte with deployed battalions 
and battalions in column ranged alternately in his front. f 

* If the ordre mixte was formed by a regiment of three battalions 
of 600 men each, only 634 men out of 1800 were in the front two ranks. 
If by a regiment of four battalions (two deployed, two in column in 
the flanks), the slightly better result of 1034 men out of 2400 able to 
use their muskets would be produced. 

I This I have from a document in the archives of the Ministry of 
War at Paris, which says that " the line of attack was formed by a 
brigade in column of attack. To its right and left the front line was 
m a mixed formation ; that is to say, on each side of the central column 



Superior Fire of the Line 89 

Usually he came on with his units all in columns of divisions, 
and very frequently (as at Bussaco and in certain episodes 
at Talavera) he had battalion behind battalion in each 
regiment. It was a gross order of fighting, but D'Erlon 
invented a worse and a more clumsy formation at Waterloo, 
where he sent forward whole divisions with eight or nine 
battalions deployed one behind the other, so as to produce 
a front of only 200 men and a depth of twenty-four — with 
only one man in twelve able to use his musket. 

Clearly, however, the column of divisions (double com- 
panies) was the normal French order, i.e. in a battalion of 
600 men in six companies, we should get a front of 66 muskets 
and 132 men able to fire, while 468 were in the rear ranks, 
able to be shot but not to shoot. If an English battalion 
of equal strength lay in front, in its two-deep line, it could 
give a discharge of 600 muskets against one of 132, and 
this was not all. Its front was nearly five times that of 
the French battalion, so that its fire lapped round the 
flanks of the advancing mass, demoralizing it because 
there was no proper power to reply. Often the British fine, 
during the moments of fire-combat, somewhat threw 
forward its Avings in a shallow crescent, and blazed with 
three sides of the column at once. This was done by the 
43rd and 52nd at Bussaco, with great effect, against the 
French brigade, that of Simon, which came up the slope 
in front of them, with its leading regiment ranged three 
battalions deep, in a most vulnerable array. How could it 
be expected that the column would prevail ? Effective 
against an enemy who allowed himself to be cowed and 
beaten by the sight of the formidable advancing mass, it 
was helpless against steady troops, who stood their ground 
and emptied their muskets, as fast as they could load, into 
a mark which it was impossible to miss. This, probably, 

was a battalion deployed in line, and on each of the outer sides of 
the deployed battalions was a battahon or regiment in column, 
so that at each end the line was composed of a column ready to form 
square, in case hostile cavalry should attempt to fall upon one of 
our flanks." 



90 Wellington's Infantey Tactics 

is what Wellington meant when (as mentioned above) he 
stated to Croker, ere ever he sailed for Portugal, that " if 
all I hear about their system is true, I think it a false one 
against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies 
are half-beaten before the battle begins." That is to say, 
the column might win by the terror that its massive weight 
and impetus inspired ; but if the enemy refused to be 
terrorized, he would be able to hold his own, and to inflict 
enormous losses on the crowded formation. 

It only remains to be said that, with the battalion in 
column of divisions as unit, the French had two ways of 
drawing up their attacking line. They might either draw 
up the battalions of each regiment in a line of columns, or 
they might place them one behind the other, making the 
whole regiment into a single column. Both methods were 
from time to time employed. It was not details of arrange- 
ment like this which made the difference — the essential 
weakness was the " column of divisions " which formed the 
base of all the array — it was too helpless in fire-contest 
against the line. 

The physical aspect of the contest between line and 
column we have now sufficiently dealt with. What was 
the moral aspect ? Fortunately we can explain it with 
accuracy, because one of the many thousands of French 
officers who went through the Peninsular War has left us, 
not personal anecdotes or confused impressions like so many 
of his fellows, but a real account of the mental state of a 
battalion going forward in column to attack the British 
line. I make no excuse for quoting in full the paragraphs 
of Bugeaud, a chefde hataillon in 1812 — a marshal of African 
fame thirty years later — because they give us exactly what 
we want to know. It should be premised, however, that 
Bugeaud did not serve in the Army of Portugal, nor face 
Wellington's own troops. He served in Suchet's army, 
along the Mediterranean Coast of the Peninsula, and his 
personal observations must have been made at Castalla 
and other combats in the East. It is to be noted also that 



BuGEAUD ON Column versus Line 91 

lie gives no account of the clash of skirmishers which so 
often took place, and describes his column as going forward 
unsheathed to the main clash of battle. 

" I served seven years in the Peninsula," he says ; 
" during that time we sometimes beat the English in 
isolated encounters and raids [e.g. Ordal] which as a field 
ojBficer detached I was able to prepare and direct. But during 
that long period of war, it was my sorrow to see that only 
in a very small number of general actions did the British 
army fail to get the better of us. We almost invariably 
attacked our adversaries, without either taking into account 
our own past experience, or bearing in mind that the 
tactics which answered well enough when we had only 
Spaniards to deal with, almost invariably failed when an 
English force was in our front. 

" The English generally held good defensive positions, 
carefully selected and usually on rising ground, behind the 
crest of which they found cover for a good part of their 
men. The usual obligatory cannonade would commence 
the operation, then, in haste, without duly reconnoitring 
the position, without ascertaining whether the ground 
afforded any facilities for lateral or turning movements, 
we marched straight forward, ' taking the bull by the 
horns.' * 

" When we got to about a thousand yards from the 
English line the men would begin to get restless and excited : 
they exchanged ideas mth one another, their march began 
to be somewhat precipitate, and was already growing a 
little disorderly. Meanwhile the English, silent and im- 
passive, with grounded arms, loomed like a long red wall ; 
their aspect was imposing — it impressed novices not a little. 
Soon the distance began to groAV shorter : cries of ' Vive 
VEmpereur,' ' eii avant a la hmonnette,' broke from our mass. 
Some men hoisted their shakos on their muskets, the 
quick-step became a run : the ranks began to be mixed up : 
the men's agitation became tumultuous, many soldiers 
* A phrase used by a French marshal at Bussaco ! 



92 Wellington's Infantry Tactics 

began to fire as they ran. And all the while the red EngUsh 
line, still silent and motionless, even when we were only 
300 yards away, seemed to take no notice of the storm 
which was about to beat upon it. 

" The contrast was striking. More than one among us 
began to reflect that the enemy's fire, so long reserved, 
would be very unpleasant when it did break forth. Our 
ardour began to cool : the moral influence (irresistible in 
action) of a calm which seems undisturbed as opposed to 
disorder which strives to make up by noise what it lacks in 
firmness, weighed heavily on our hearts. 

" At this moment of painful expectation the English 
line would make a quarter-turn — the muskets were going 
up to the ' ready.' An indefinable sensation nailed to the 
spot many of our men, who halted and opened a wavering 
fire. The enemy's return, a volley of simultaneous pre- 
cision and deadly effect, crashed in upon us like a thunder- 
bolt. Decimated by it we reeled together, staggering under 
the blow and trying to recover our equilibrium. Then three 
formidable Hurrahs termined the long silence of our adver- 
saries. With the third they were down upon us, pressing 
us into a disorderly retreat. But to our great surprise, 
they did not pursue their advantage for more than some 
hundred yards, and went back with calm to their former 
lines, to await another attack. We rarely failed to deliver 
it when our reinforcements came up — with the same want 
of success and heavier losses." * 

This is the picture that we need to complete our study 
of the confhct of column with line. The psychology of the 
huddled mass going forward to inevitable defeat could not 
be better portrayed. The only thing that is hard for us 
to understand is the reason which induced capable men like 
Soult, D'Erlon, or Foy to continue to use the columnar 
formation all through the dark days of 1813-14, and even 
in the final campaign of Waterloo. All honour must be 

* Reprinted by General Trochu in his Armie frangaise en 
1867, pp. 239, 240. 



Helplessness of the Column 93 

paid, however, to the rank and file who, with five years 
of such experience behind them, were still steadfast and 
courageous enough to put up a good fight even in their 
last offensive battles in the Pyrenees, as well as in the 
defensive actions of Orthez and Toulouse. 



CHAPTER V 

Wellington's tactics — the cavalry and artillery 

Hitherto we have been confining our outlook on Welling- 
ton's tactics to his use of infantry. But a few words must 
be added as to his methods of handling the other two 
arms — cavalry and artillery. There are fortunately one 
or two memoranda of his own which enable us to interpret 
his views on the use of these arms, which were to him mainly 
auxiliary ; for the epigram that he was " essentially an 
infantry general " is in the main correct, though it needs 
some comment and explanation. In the early part of his 
Peninsular campaigning he was forced to be an " infantry 
general," since the home government kept him unreason- 
ably short in the matter of horsemen and guns till the 
year 1811 was far spent. Moreover, the ground over which 
he had to fight in 1809-10-11 must be considered. 

The Iberian Peninsula may from the point of view of 
the cavalry tactician be divided into two sets of regions, 
in the one of which the mounted arm is all-important, 
while in the other it may, almost without exaggeration, be 
described as well-nigh neghgible as an element of military 
strength, being only usable on a small scale, for exploration 
and observation, and not being able to be employed effec- 
tively in mass. 

To the first-named class of regions, the tracts eminently 
suitable for the employment of cavalry, belong the great 
plateau of Central Spain, the broad arable plains of Old 
Castile and Leon, from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo and 
from Astorga to Aranda. Here, in a gently undulating 



Cavalry and its Limitations 95 

upland, little enclosed, and mainly laid out in great common- 
fields, cavalry has one of the suitable terrains that can be 
found for it in Europe — as favourable as Champagne, or 
the lowlands of Northern Germany. This is also, almost 
to the same extent, the case with the loftier and less culti- 
vated plateau of New Castile, and with the melancholy 
thinly peopled moors of La Mancha and Estremadura, 
where the horseman may ride ahead for twenty or thirty 
miles without meeting any serious natural obstacle, save 
at long intervals the steep cleft of a ravine, dry in summer, 
full of a fierce stream in winter. Nor are the great central 
uplands the only tracts of Spain where cavalry finds an 
admirable field for operations : the central valley of the 
Ebro in Aragon, and the whole of the broad plain of 
the Guadalquivir in Andalusia, are equally suited for the 
employment of the mounted arm, on the largest scale. 
Napoleon, therefore, was entirely justified when he attached 
a very large proportion of horse to his Army of Spain, and 
when he uttered his dictum that great portions of it must 
inevitably be the possession of the general who owned the 
larger and the more efficient mass of squadrons. 

On the other hand, there are large tracts of the Peninsula 
where cavalry is almost as useless as in Switzerland or 
Calabria. Such are the whole Pyrenean tract on the north, 
extending from Catalonia, by Aragon and Navarre, to the 
Asturian and Gahcian lands along the southern shore of 
the Bay of Biscay. It will be remembered that, during 
the Pyrenean Campaign of 1813, Wellington sent back 
very nearly all his cavalry to the plain of the Ebro, while 
Soult left his in the plain of the Adour. Sir John Moore's 
small but fine cavalry force was useless to him in the 
Corunna retreat, when once Astorga had been passed, and 
the Gahcian mountains entered. He sent it on before 
him, with the exception of a squadron or two kept with the 
rear-guard. Soult's more numerous mounted force, in that 
same campaign, was only useful in picking up Moore's 
stragglers, and keeping the British continuously on the 



96 Cavalry and Artillery 

march — it was brought to a dead stop every time that the 
retreating army showed an infantry rear-guard, and stood 
at bay in one of the innumerable GaHcian defiles. 

There is another tract of the Peninsula almost as 
unsuited as the Pyrenean and Galician highlands for the 
use of cavalry — and that is Portugal, where so much of 
Welhngton's earlier campaigning took place. Deducting 
some coast plains of comparatively small extent, all Northern 
and Central Portugal is mountainous — ^not for the most 
part mountainous on a large scale, with high summits and 
broad valleys, but mountainous on a small scale with 
rugged hills of 2000 or 3000 feet, between which flow deeply- 
sunk torrents in narrow ravines — where roads are all uphill 
and downhill and a defile occurs every few miles. It was 
the character of this country-side which made Wellington's 
army of 1810-11, with its very small cavalry force — only 
seven British and four or five Portuguese regiments — 
safe against Massena's immensely preponderant number of 
squadrons. All through the long retreat from Almeida to 
the lines of Torres Vedras the allied army could never be 
caught, turned, or molested ; the cavalry on both sides was 
only employed in petty rear-guard actions, in which the 
small force brought the larger to a check in defiles, and 
generally gave back only when the invader brought up 
infantry to support his attack. For all the good that it 
did him, Massena might have left his 7000 cavalry behind 
him when he entered Portugal — a few squadrons for ex- 
ploration was all that he needed. Jammed in narrow defiles, 
where they were helpless, his mounted men were often 
more of an incumbrance than a help to him. 

On the other hand, when the slopes of the Portuguese 
mountains were once left behind, Wellington was forced 
to be most cautious, and to restrict his action to favourable 
ground (as at Talavera, and Fuentes d'Oiioro) so long as 
the enemy was hopelessly superior in his number of squadrons. 
It was only after 1811, when his cavalry regiments were 
about doubled in numbers, that he could venture down 



French Cavalry Tactics 97 

into the plains, and deliver great battles in the open like 
Salamanca — the first engagement which he ever fought 
in the Peninsula where his cavalry was not inferior by a 
third or even a half to that of the French. 

Beside the Pyrenean regions and Portugal, there are 
other districts of the Peninsula where the cavalry arm is 
handicapped by the terrain — Catalonia for example, where 
the inland is one mass of rugged valleys, the coastland of 
the kingdom of Granada, and the great ganglion of mountain 
lands where Aragon, Valencia, and New Castile meet. But 
as these were tracts where the British army was little 
engaged, I pass them over with a mention. But it must 
also be remembered that each of the great upland plateaux 
of Spain — Leon, New Castile, La Mancha, and Estremadura, 
is separated from the others by broad mountain belts, 
where the Spanish guerillero bands made their headquarters, 
and rendered communication between plain and plain 
difficult and perilous. 

In such a country of contrasts, hov/ did the various 
combatants use their mounted men during the six long 
years between Vimeiro and Toulouse ? What was the 
relative value of the different national cavalry, and what 
were its tactics for battle and for the equally important 
work of exploration, and of the covering and concealing 
the movements of the other arms ? 

French cavalry tactics had, by 1808, when the war 
began, developed into as definite a system as those of the 
infantry. Napoleon was fond of massing his horsemen in 
very large bodies, and launching them at the centre no 
less than at the flank of the army opposed to him. In the 
times of Marlborough and of Frederic the Great cavalry 
was almost always drawn up in long lines on the wings, 
and used first for the beating of the hostile containing 
cavalry, and then for turning against the unprotected flank 
of the enemy's infantry in the centre. A cavalry dash at 
a weak point in the middle of the hostile front was very 
rare indeed, and only tried by the very few generals of first 

H 



98 Cavalry and Artillery 

rate intelligence, who had emancipated themselves from 
the old routine which prescribed the regular drawing up of 
an army. Marlborough's cavalry charge at the French 
right-centre at Blenheim is almost the only first-rate 
example of such a stroke in the old wars of the eighteenth 
century. Frederic's great cavalry charge at Rossbach, 
which is sometimes quoted as a parallel, was after all no 
more than a sudden rush of the Prussian flank-cavalry at 
the exposed wing of an army which was unwisely trying to 
march around the position of its adversary. But Napoleon 
was the exponent of great frontal attacks of cavalry on 
chosen weak spots of the enemy's line, which had already 
been well pounded by artillery or weakened in some other 
way. He would use 6000, 8000, or (as at Waterloo) even 
12,000 men for one of these great strokes. At Austerlitz 
and Borodino these charges were made straight at the 
enemy's front : Marengo and Dresden were won by such 
rushes : Eylau was only saved from falling into a disaster 
by a blow of the same kind. But cavalry had to be used 
at precisely the right moment, to be most skilfully led, 
and to be pushed home without remorse and despite of all 
losses, if it was to be successful. Even then it might be 
beaten off by thoroughly cool and unshaken infantry, as 
at Waterloo. It was only against exhausted, distracted, 
or untrained battalions that it could count with a reasonable 
certainty of success. 

All through the war the raw and badly -drilled Spanish 
armies supplied the French squadrons with exactly this 
sort of opportunities. They were always being surprised 
before they had been formed by their generals in line of 
battle, or caught in confusion while they were executing 
some complicated manoeuvre. If attacked while they were 
in line or in column of march, they always fell victims to a 
cavalry charge, being from want of discipline extraordinarily 
slow to form square. As if this was not enough, they were 
often weak enough in morale to allow themselves to be 
broken even when they had time to form their squares. 



Successes of the French Cavalry 99 

The battles of Medellin, Ocana, the Gebora, and Saguntum, 
were good examples of the power of a comparatively small 
mass of cavalry skilfully handled, over a numerous but 
ill-disciplined infantry. But the little-mentioned combat 
of Margalef in 1810 is perhaps the strongest example of the 
kind, for there six squadrons of Suchet's cavalry (the 13th 
Cuirassiers supported by two squadrons of the 3rd Hussars) 
actually rode down in succession, a whole division of some 
4000 men, whom they caught while forming line of battle 
from column of march. This was done, too, despite of 
the fact that the Spanish infantry was accompanied by three 
squadrons of cavalry (who made the usual bolt at the 
commencement of the action), as well as by a half -battery 
of artillery. 

It was of course a very different matter when the French 
cavalry had to face the steady battalions of the British 
army. Looking down all the record of battles and skir- 
mishes from 1808 down to 1814, I can only remember two 
occasions when the enemy's cavalry really achieved a notable 
tactical success. Oddly enough both fell within the month 
of May, 1811. At Albuera there occurred that complete 
disaster to a British infantry brigade which has already 
been described in the preceding chapter. The other, and 
much smaller, success achieved by French cavalry over 
British infantry at Fuentes de Oiioro, a few days before 
the greater disaster at Albuera, has also been alluded to.* 
These two disasters were wholly exceptional ; usually 
the British infantry held its own, unless it was absolutely 
taken by surprise, and this even when attacked frontally 
by cavalry while it was deployed in the two deep Hne, with- 
out forming square. If the British had their flanks covered, 
they were perfectly safe, and turned back any charge with 
ease. 

Indeed the repulse of cavalry by British troops in Hne, 
who did not take the trouble to form square because their 
flanks were covered, was not infrequent in the Peninsular 
* See page 87 above. 



100 Gavaley and Artillery 

War. The classic instance is that of the 5th Northumber- 
land Fusiliers at El Bodon in 1811, who advanced in line 
firing against two French cavalry regiments and drove 
them off the heights, being able to do so because they had 
a squadron or two of British horse to protect them from 
being turned. A very similar feat was performed by the 
52nd at Sabugal in 1811 : and Harvey's Portuguese brigade 
did as much at Albuera. 

Much more, of course, was the square impregnable. 
Wlien once safely placed in that formation, British troops 
habitually not only withstood cavalry charges at a stand- 
still, but made long movements over a battlefield inun- 
dated by the hostile cavalry. At Fuentes de Onoro the 
Light Division, three British and two Portuguese squares, 
retreated at leisure for two miles while beset by four brigades 
of French cavalry, and reached the ground which they had 
been ordered to take up ^vith a total loss of one killed and 
thirty-four wounded. Similarly at El Bodon the square 
composed of the 5th and 77th retreated for six miles, in the 
face of two cavalry brigades which could never break 
into them.* 

Indeed it may be stated, as a rule almost without 
exception, that troops in square, whether British or French, 
were never broken during the Peninsular War even by 
very desperate and gallant charges. One of the best 
instances of this general rule was the case of the combat of 
Barquilla, where two grenadier companies of the French 
22nd, surprised while covering a foraging party by five 
squadrons of British cavalry, got away in a level country 
after having been charged successively by three squadrons 
of the 1st Hussars of the German Legion, the 16th and the 
14th Light Dragoons. One of these three squadron-charges, 
at least (that of the 14th), had been pushed home so hand- 
somely that an officer and nine men fell actually among 
the French front rank, and a French observer noted bayonets 

* For details see below, in the chapter dealing with General 
Pieton, p. 134. 



Cavalry Action against Squares 101 

broken, and musket barrels deeply cut into by the sweeping 
blows of the light dragoons, who yet failed entirely to 
break in. 

There was indeed only one extraordinary case of properly 
formed squares being broken during the whole war, a case 
as exceptional in one way as the disaster to Colborne's 
brigade at Albuera was in the other. This was at the 
combat of Garcia Hernandez, on the morning after the 
battle of Salamanca, where the heavy dragoons of the 
K. G. L. delivered what Foy (the French historian of 
the war) called the best charge that he had ever seen. The 
rear-guard of Marmont's army had been formed of the one 
division which had not been seriously engaged in the 
battle, so that it could not be said to have been composed 
of shaken or demoralized troops. Nevertheless, two of its 
squares were actually broken by the legionary dragoons, 
though drawn up v*dthout haste or hurry on a hillside 
favourable for defensive action. According to Beamish's 
History of the German Legion, a work composed a few years 
later from the testimony of eyewitnesses, the first square 
was broken by a mortally wounded horse, carrjdng a dead 
rider, leaping right upon the kneeling front rank of the 
square, and bearing down half a dozen men by its struggles 
and kicking. An officer. Captain Gleichen, spurred his 
horse into the gap thus created, his men followed, a wedge 
was thrust into the square, and it broke up, the large 
majority of the men surrendering. The second square, 
belonging to the same regiment, the 6th Leger, was a httle 
higher up the hillside than the first : it was a witness of 
the destruction of the sister-battalion, and seems to have 
been shaken by the sight : at any rate, when assailed a 
few minutes later by another squadron of the German 
Dragoons, it gave a rather wild though destructive volley, 
and wavered at the moment of receiving the attack, bulging 
in at the first charge. This was, of course, fataL The 
broken squares lost 1400 prisoners, beside some 200 killed 
and v/ounded. The victorious dragoons paid a fairly high 



102 Cav ALKY AND Artillery 

price for their success, losing 4 officers and 50 men killed, 
and 2 officers, and 60 men wounded: out of 700 present ; the 
extraordinary proportion of killed to wounded, 54 to 62, 
marking the deadly effect of musketry at the closest possible 
quarters. 

This (as I said before) was the exception that proved 
the rule : the invulnerabihty of a steady square was such 
a commonplace, that Foy and the other old officers of the 
Army of Spain, looked with dismay upon Napoleon's great 
attempt at Waterloo to break down the long line of British 
squares between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, by the 
charges of some ten or twelve thousand cavalry massed on 
a short front of less than a mile. The Emperor had not 
allowed for the superior resisting power of a thoroughly 
good infantry. 

Of fights between cavalry and cavalry, when the two 
sides were present in numbers so fairly equal as to make the 
struggle a fair test of their relative efficiency, there were 
comparatively few in the Peninsular War. In the early 
days of the war Wellington was too scantily provided with 
horsemen, and could never afiford to engage in a cavalry 
battle on a large scale. He had only six regiments at 
Talavera in 1809, only seven in the Bussaco campaign of 
1810. When he divided his army for the simultaneous 
campaign in Beira and in Estremadura in March, 1811, he 
could only give Beresford three regiments, and keep four 
for himself. Nor could the deficiency be supplied (as was 
done in the artillery arm) by using Portuguese auxiliaries. 
The cavalry of that nation was so weak and so badly 
mounted that it is doubtful whether there were ever so 
many as 2000 of them in the field at once. Many of the 
twelve regiments were never mounted, and did garrison 
duty as infantry throughout the war. 

It was not till the summer and autumn of 1811 that 
Wellington at last began to get large reinforcements of the 
mounted arm from England, which more than doubled his 
strength, for in the campaign of 1812 he had no less than 



Wellington AND his Cavalry 103 

fifteen regiments instead of seven. In the winter of 1812-13 
further reinforcements came out, and in the Vittoria cam- 
paign he had at last a powerful cavalry equal or superior 
to that of the French.* 

Yet even allowing for the weakness of Wellington's 
mounted strength in his earlier campaigns, we must acknow- 
ledge that they played a comparatively small part in his 
scheme of operations. Though his dragoons did good 
service in keeping his front covered, and performed many 
gallant exploits (we need only mention Talavera and 
Fuentes de Oiioro to instance good self-sacrificing work 
done), they were seldom used as part of the main striking 
force that won a victory. Indeed, the charge of Le Mar- 
chant's heavy brigade at Salamanca is about the only 
insta.nce that can be cited of really decisive action by cavalry 
in any of the Duke's battles. There were other notable 
successes to be remembered, but they were in side issues, 
and often not under the chief's own eye — as, for example. 
Bock's breaking of the squares at Garcia Hernandez on the 
day after Salamanca, and Lumley's very creditable victory 
over Latour Maubourg at Usagre on May 25, 1811. 

Even when WelUngton had at last a large cavalry force 
in 1812-14, it was seldom found massed, and I believe that 
more than three brigades were never found acting together. 
Such a force as six regiments was seldom seen in line and 
engaged. For the use of cavalry as a screen we may 
mention the combat of Venta del Pozo, during the retreat 
from Burgos in 1812. This was a skirmish fought by two 
brigades to cover the -withdrawal of the infantry, which 
had to hurry hard on the way toward Salamanca and 
safety. 

Something, no doubt, must be allowed for the fact that 
Welhngton never, till the Waterloo campaign, had an 
officer of proved ability in chief command of his cavalry. 

* Though a few depleted regiments also went home, so that the 
total strength never was over 18 regiments, 9000 horse or under, to 
70,000 men in all. See pages 192-3. 



104 Cavalry and Artillery 

Stapleton Cotton, who served so long in that capacity, was 
not a man of mark. Lumley, who had a short but dis- 
tinguished career as a divisional commander, went home 
sick in 1811, and Le Marchant, who came out from home 
with a high reputation, was most unfortunately killed in 
his first battle, Salamanca, where his brigade did so much 
to settle the fortunes of the day. But allowing for all 
this, it remains clear that Wellington made comparatively 
little use of the cavalry arm — which could hardly have been 
expected when we remember how effectively he had used 
his horse at Assaye, quite early in his career. Possibly the 
fact that he was so hopelessly outmatched in this arm in 
1809-11 sunk so much into his soul, that when he got his 
chance, later on, he was not ready to use it. Certainly several 
cases can be cited where it was not duly used to press a com- 
pleted victory — most particularly after Vittoria and Orthez. 
There is no concealing the fact that Wellington's reluctance 
to use great cavalry attacks was, at bottom, due to his 
doubts as to the tactical skill of his senior officers, and the 
power of his regiments to manoeuvre. He divulged his 
views on the subject, twelve years after the war was over, 
in a letter to Lord John Russell, dated July 31, 1826. " I 
considered our cavalry," he wrote, '' so inferior to the 
French from want of order, that although I considered one 
of our squadrons a match for two French, yet I did not 
care to see four British opposed to four French, and still 
more so as the numbers increased, and order (of course) 
became more necessary. They could gallop, but could not 
preserve their order." 

This seems a very hard judgment, when we examine 
in detail the cavalry annals of the Peninsular War. There 
were cases, no doubt, where Enghsh regiments threw 
aAvay their chances by their blind fury in charging, and 
either got cut up from pursuing an original advantage to 
a reckless length, or at any rate missed an opportunity by 
over-great dispersion or riding off the field. The earhest 
case was seen at Vimeiro just after Wellington's first 



Some Reckless Cavalry Charges 105 

landing in the Peninsula, when two squadrons of the 20th 
Light Dragoons, after successfully cutting up a beaten 
column of infantry, pushed on for half a mile in great dis- 
order, to charge Junot's cavalry reserves, and were horribly 
maltreated — losing about one man in four. An equally 
irrational exploit took place at Talavera, where the 23rd 
Light Dragoons, beaten off in a charge against a square 
which they had been ordered to attack, rushed on beyond 
it, against three successive lines of French cavalry, pierced 
the first, were stopped by the second, and had to cut their 
way back ^vith a loss of 105 prisoners and 102 kiUed and 
wounded — nearly half their strength. An equally headlong 
business was the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons at 
Campo Mayor on March 25, 181 1 , when that regiment, having 
beaten in fair fight the French 26th Dragoons, and captured 
eighteen siege-guns which were retreating on the road, 
galloped on for more than six miles, sabring the scattered 
fugitives, till they were actually brought up by the fire of 
the fortress of Badajoz, on to whose very glacis they had 
made their way. The captured guns, meanwhile, were 
picked up by the French infantry who had been retreating 
along the high-road behind their routed cavalry, and 
brought off in safety — the 13th not having left a single 
man to secure them. Here, at any rate, not much loss was 
suffered, though a great capture was missed, but similar 
galloping tactics on June 11, 1812, at the combat of Maguilla, 
led to a complete disaster. Slade's heavy brigade (1st 
Royals and 3rd Dragoon Guards) fell in with L'Allemand's 
French brigade, the 17tli and 27th Dragoons. Each drew 
up, but L'Allemand had placed one squadron in resferve far 
beyond the sky line, and out of sight. Slade charged, beat 
the five squadrons immediately opposed to him, and then 
(without reforming or setting aside any supports) galloped 
after the broken French brigade in complete disorder for 
a mile, till he came parallel to the unperceived reserve 
squadron, which charged him in flank and rear : the rest 
of the French halted and turned ; Slade could not stand, and 



106 Cavalry and Artillery 

was routed, having 40 casualties and 118 prisoners. Wel- 
lington wrote about this to Hill : " I have never been more 
annoyed than by Slade's affair. Our officers of cavalry- 
have acquired a trick of galloping at everything. They 
never consider the situation, never think of manoeuvring 
before an enemy, and never keep back or provide for a 
reserve. All cavalry should charge in two lines, and at 
least one-third should be ordered beforehand to pull up and 
reform, as soon as the charge has been delivered, and the 
enemy been broken." * 

In the first three of the cases mentioned above, the 
discredit of the rash and inconsiderate pressing on of the 
charge falls on the regimental officers — -in the last on 
the brigadier, Slade. It must be confessed that Wellington 
was not very happy in his senior cavalry officers — Erskine, 
Long, and Slade have all some bad marks against them — 
especially the last-named, whose proceedings seem nearly 
to have broken the heart of the lively and intelHgent 
diarist Tomkinson, of the 16th Light Dragoons, who had the 
misfortune to serve long under him. Stapleton Cotton, the 
commander of the whole cavalry, was but a mediocrity ; 
every one will remember his old chief's uncomplimentary 
remarks about him ajpro]pos of the siege of Bhurtpore. The 
man who ought to have been in charge of the British horse 
during the whole war was Lord Paget, who had handled 
Sir John Moore's five cavalry regiments with such admirable 
skill and daring during the Corunna campaign : his two 
little fights of Sahagun and Benevente were models in 
their way. But he was unhappily never employed again 
till Waterloo — where his doings, under his new name of 
Lord Uxbridge, are sufficiently well known. But a question 
of seniority, and an unhappy family quarrel with the 
Wellesleys (having absconded with the wife of Wellington's 
brother Henry, he fought a duel with her brother in conse- 
quence) prevented him from seeing service under the Duke in 
the eventful years 1809-14. Of the cavalry generals who took 
* See Dispatches, vol. viii. p. 112. 



Lumley's Victory at Usagee 107 

part in the great campaigns, after Paget the most successful 
\vas Lumley, who has two very fine achievements to his 
credit — the containing of Soult's superior cavalry during 
the crisis of the battle of Albuera, and the combat of Usagre, 
of May 25, 1811 , noted above. This was considered such an 
admirable piece of work by the enemy, that it is related at 
great length in Picard's Histoire de la Cavalerie, alone 
among all British successes of the Peninsular War. 

It needs a word of notice, as it is hardly mentioned in the 
Wellington dispatches, and very briefly by Napier. Latour- 
Maubourg had been sent by Soult to push back Beresford's 
advanced posts, and discover his position. He had a very 
large force — two brigades of dragoons and four regiments 
of fight cavalry, in all 3500 sabres. Lumley, who was 
screening Beresford's movements, had only three British 
regiments (3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, 13th Light 
Dragoons), 980 sabres, and Madden's and Otway's Portuguese 
brigades, 1000 sabres, with 300 of Penne ViUemur's Spanish 
horse. Wishing to contain the French advance as long as 
possible, he took up a position behind the bridge and viUage 
of Usagre, a defile through which the French must pass in 
order to reach him. Latour-Maubourg, relying on the 
immense superiority of numbers which he possessed, was 
reckless in his tactics. After sending off a brigade of light 
horse to turn Lumley 's position, by a very long detour and 
distant fords, he pushed his other three brigades into the 
village, with orders to cross the bridge and press the enemy 
in front. Lumley was showing nothing but a line of 
Portuguese vedettes, having withdrawn his squadrons 
behind the sky line. He was apprised of the turning 
movement, but, knomng the ground better than the 
French, was aware that it would take a very much longer 
time than the enemy expected, so resolved to hold his 
position to the last moment. He allowed the two leading 
regiments of Bron's dragoons to pass the bridge and form 
on the nearer side, and then, while the third regiment was 
crossing the river, and the second brigade was entering the 



108 Cavalry and Artillery 

long village, charged suddenly in upon the first brigade, 
with six English squadrons in front and six Portuguese 
squadrons on the right flank. The two deployed French 
regiments were thrown back on the third, which was jammed 
on the bridge. Hence they could not get away to reform and 
rally, the road behind them being entirely blocked, while 
the second brigade in the village could not get to the front 
to give assistance. All that Latour-Maubourg could do 
was to dismount its leading regiment and occupy with it the 
houses on each side of the bridge, from which they kept 
back the victorious British by their carbine fire. Lumley, 
meanwhile, dealt with the three routed regiments at his 
leisure, killing or wounding 250 men and capturing 80 
prisoners before the disordered wrecks succeeded in re- 
crossing the river. Latour-Maubourg, warned by this bloody 
check, showed for the future no anxiety to press in upon 
Beresford's cavalry screen. 

How not to deal with an exactly similar situation, it 
may be remarked, was shown on the 23rd October of the 
following year, 1812, by two British brigadiers, who, charged 
with the covering of the retreat of Wellington's army from 
Burgos, were holding a position behind the bridge of Venta 
del Pozo or Villadrigo, when the part of the French cavalry 
immediately opposed to them, the brigade of Faverot, ten 
squadrons strong, came down to the defile. Faverot, like 
Latour-Maubourg at Usagre, took the hazardous step of 
ordering his leading regiment to pass the bridge at a trot, 
and form on the other side. This Bock, the senior British 
brigadier, allowed it to do, and was right in so doing, for 
the proper moment to strike was^ when the enemy should 
have half or three-quarters of his men across the bridge, 
and the rest jammed upon it. But Bock allowed the psycho- 
logical moment to pass, and did not charge till the French 
brigade had almost entirely crossed, and could put very 
nearly equal numbers in line against him. Then, moving 
too late, with some squadrons of Anson's brigade in sup- 
port, he came to a desperate standing fight wdth the enemy, 



Surprise of Arroyo Dos Molinos 109 

in which both suffered very heavily. But when all the 
British and German Legion regiments were already engaged, 
the rearmost squadrons of the French, which had crossed 
the bridge under cover of the fighting line, fell upon Bock 
from the flank, and turned one of his wings ; the British 
cavalry had to give way and retreat; till it was covered by 
the infantry of the 7th Division. If Bock had charged 
five minutes earlier, he would have nipped the French 
column in the middle, and probably have destroyed the 
leading regiments. The French brigade, as it was, lost 
18 officers and 116 men, Anson and Bock about 200, among 
whom were four officers and 70 men prisoners. 

On the whole, I am inclined to think that Wellington 
was a little hard on his cavalry. There was, of course, con- 
siderable justification for his criticisms. There was a want 
of decision and intelligence among some of his brigadiers, 
and a tendency to headlong and reckless charging straight 
ahead among many of his regimental officers. But looking 
dispassionately at the cavalry work on both sides, it is im- 
possible to say that the French marshals were any better 
served. There is no striking instance in the annals of the 
British campaigns of 1809-14 of the army, or even a division, 
being surprised for want of vigilance on the part of its 
cavalry screen, while several such can be quoted on the 
French side — especially Ney's surprise at Foz d'Arouce on 
March 15, 1811 — caused by his light cavalry under Lamotte 
having completely failed to watch the roads, or the better- 
known rout of Girard at Arroyo dos Molinos later in the 
same year. On that occasion an infantry division, accom- 
panied by no less than two brigades of light cavalry, was 
attacked at dawn and dispersed with heavy loss, owing to 
the fact that the cavalry brigadiers, Bron and Briche, had 
taken no precautions v/hatever to feel for the enemy. They, 
like the infantry, were completely surprised, being caught 
with the horses unsaddled, and the men dispersed among 
houses ; hence the chasseurs were taken prisoners in large 
jiumbers by Hill's sudden rush, one of the brigadiers and a 



110 Cavalry and Artilleby 

cavalry colonel being among the 2000 unwounded prisoners 
taken. There is no such large-scale surprise as this among 
all the records of the British cavalry. The worst that I 
know were those of a squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons 
on April 6, 1811, near Elvas, and a very similar one of the 
11th Light Dragoons two months later, not far from the 
same place. In the last case the disaster is said to have 
happened because the regiment had only just landed from 
England after long home-service, and the captain in 
command lost his head from sheer inexperience. With 
regard to this I may quote the following pregnant sentence, 
from the Diary of Tomkinson, who wrote far the best 
detailed account of the life of a cavalry regiment during 
those eventful years. " To attempt giving men or officers 
any idea in England of outpost duty was considered absurd, 
and when they came abroad they had all to learn. The 
fact was that there was no one to teach them. Sir Stapleton 
Cotton (who afterwards commanded the cavalry in Spain) 
once tried an experiment with the 14th and 16th Light 
Dragoons near Woodbridge in Suffolk. In the end he got 
the supposed enemy's vedettes and his own all facing the 
same way. In England I never saw nor heard of cavalry 
taught to charge, disperse, and reform, Avhich of all things, 
before an enemy, is most essential. Inclining in line right 
or left is very useful, and that was scarcely ever practised." 
He adds in 1819 : "On return to EngHsh duty, after the 
peace, we all continued the old system, each regiment 
estimating its merit by mere celerity of movement. Not 
one idea suggested by our war experience was remembered, 
and after five years we shall have to commence all over 
again, if we are sent abroad." 

In short, the proper work of cavalry, apart from mere 
charging, had to be learnt on Spanish soil when any regiment 
landed. But it was in the end picked up by the better 
corps, and on the whole the outpost and reconnaissance work 
of the Peninsular Army seem to have been well done, though 
some regiments had a better reputation than others. Much 



Wellington's Cavalry Tactics 111 

of the work of this kind speaks for itself. The most admir- 
able achievement during the war was undoubtedly that of 
the 1st Hussars of the K.G.L., who, assisted afterwards by 
the Mth and 16th Light Dragoons, kept for four months 
(March to May, 1810) the Une of the Agueda and Azava, 
40 miles long, against a fourfold strength of French cavalry, 
without once letting a hostile reconnaissance through, 
losing a picket or even a vedette, or sending a piece of false 
information back to General Craufurd, whose front they 
were covering. 

Allusion has been made in the opening words of this 
chapter to Welhngton's memorandum for the tactical 
management of cavalry. It was only issued after Waterloo, 
in the form of "Instructions to Officers commanding Brigades 
of Cavalry in the Army of Occupation," but, no doubt, 
represents the tactics which he had evolved from his 
Peninsular experience.* Too long to give in entirety, it is 
worth analysing. The heads run as follows : — 

(1) A reserve must always be kept, to improve a success, 
or to cover an unsuccessful charge. This reserve should 
not be less than half the total number of sabres, and may 
occasionally be as much as two-thirds of it. 

(2) Normally a cavalry force should form in three 
lines : the first and second lines should be deployed, the 
reserve may be in column, but so formed as to be easily 
changed into line. 

(3) The second line should be 400 or 500 yards from the 
first, the reserve a similar distance from the second fine, if 
cavalry is about to act against cavalry. This is found not 
too great a distance to prevent the rear lines from improving 
an advantage gained by the front fine, nor too Httle to 
prevent a defeated front Une from passing between the 
intervals of its supports without disordering them. 

(4) When, however, cavalry is charging infantry, the 
second line should be only 200 yards behind the first, the 
object being that it should be able to dehver its charge 

* Qm^al Oriers (collected voliime), pp. 481, 482. 



112 Cavalry and Artillery 

without delay, against a battalion which has spent its 
fire against the first line, and will not be prepared for a 
second charge pushed in rapid succession to the first. 

(5) When the first fine delivers its attack at a gallop, the 
supports must follow at a walk only, lest they be carried 
forward by the rush, and get mingled with the line in 
front at the onset. For order in the supports must be 
rigidly kept — they are useless if they have got into con- 
fusion, when they are wanted to sustain and cover a checked 
first line. 

A note as to horses may finish our observations on the 
cavalry side of Wellington's tactics. In countless places, 
in diaries no less than dispatches, we find the complaint 
that the trooper of 1810 was, when not well looked after by 
his officers, a bad horse-master — careless as to feeding his 
mount, and still more so as to saddle-galls and such like. 
It is often remarked that the one German light cavalry 
regiment in the original Peninsular Army, the 1st Hussars 
of the King's German Legion, set an example which some 
other regiments might have copied with advantage, being 
far more conscientious and considerate to their beasts. It 
is interesting to find that the French cavalry reports have 
exactly the same complaints, and the number of dismounted 
men shown in French regimental states as a consequence of 
sick horses was as great as our own. Several times I have 
found the report that when a considerable number of French 
cavalry had been captured, quite a small proportion of 
their horses could be turned over to serve as remounts for 
their captors, because of the abominable condition in which 
they were found. The fact was that the climate and the 
food seem to have been equally deleterious to the English 
and French horses : a diet of chopped straw and green 
maize — often all that could be got— was deadly to horses 
accustomed to stable diet in England or France. Welling- 
ton sometimes actually imported hay and oats from 
England ; but they could not be got far up country, and 
only served for regiments that chanced to be put into winter 



Wellington's Artillery Tactics 113 

quarters near the sea. Practically all the remounts came 
from England — the Portuguese and Spanish horses having 
been tried and found wanting many times. In 1808 the 
20th Light Dragoons were embarked without horses, being 
ordered to mount themselves in Portugal ; but the experi- 
ment failed wholly. 

Only a short note is required as to Welhngton's use of 
artillery. In his early years of command he was almost as 
weak in this arm as in cavalry. There was not one British 
battery per division available in 1809. But the Portuguese 
artillery being numerous, and ere long very efficient, was 
largely used to supplement the British after 1810. Yet 
even when it had become proportioned to the number of his 
whole army, the Duke did not use it in the style of Bonaparte. 
He never worked with enormous masses of guns manoeuvr- 
ing in front line, and supporting an attack, such as the 
Emperor used. Only at Bussaco, Vittoria, and Waterloo 
do we find anything like a concentration of many batteries 
to play an important part in the line of battle. Usually the 
Duke preferred to work with small units — individual 
batteries— placed in well-chosen spots, and often kept 
concealed till the critical moment. They were dotted 
along the front of the position rather than massed, and in 
most cases must be regarded as valuable support for the 
infantry that was to win the battle, rather than as an arm 
intended to work for its independent aims and to take a 
special part in war. Of several of Napoleon's victories we 
may say that they were artilleryman's battles ; nothing of 
the kind can be predicated of any of Wellington's triumphs, 
though the guns were always well placed, and most usefully 
employed, as witness Bussaco, Fuentes de Onoro, and 
Waterloo. 

As to Wellington's use of siege artillery, we must speak 

in a later chapter.* It was, through no fault of his own, 

the weakest point in his army: indeed till 1811 he never 

had a British battering train, and in the early sieges of 

♦ See Chapter XVIIL, "A note on Sieges." 

I 



114 Cavaley and Artillery 

Badajoz he worked in forma pauperis, with improvised 
material, mainly Portuguese, and very deficient in quality. 
The record is not a cheerful one ; but it must be said that 
the home authorities, and not WeUington, were the re- 
sponsible parties for any checks that were suffered. A great 
general who is not an artillery or engineering specialist 
must trust to his scientific officers, and certainly cannot be 
made responsible for shortage of men and material due to 
the parsimony of his masters at home. 

So much for the great Duke's tactics. We shall presently 
be investigating his system of military organization — ^the 
inner machinery of his army. But before dealing with it, 
we shall have to spare some attention for his greater 
lieutenants, whose individuahties had an important share 
in the management of his army. 



CHAPTER VI 
Wellington's lieutenants — hill, beresford, 

GRAHAM 

There can be no stronger contrast than that between the 
impression which the Iron Duke left on his old followers, 
and that produced by his trusted and most responsible 
Heutenant, Sir Rowland Hill. Hill was blessed and kindly 
remembered wherever he went. He was a man brimming 
over with the milk of human kindness, and the mention 
of him in any diary is generally accompanied by some 
anecdote of an act of thoughtful consideration, some 
friendly word, or piece of unpremeditated, often homely 
charity. A wounded officer from Albuera, who is dragging 
himself painfully back to Lisbon, reports himself to Hill 
as he passes his headquarters. Next morning " the general 
himself attended me out on my road, to give me at parting 
a basket with tea, sugar, bread, butter, and a large venison 
pasty." * A grateful sergeant, who bore a letter to Hill in 
1813, remembers how he expected nothing but a nod and an 
answer from such a great man, and was surprised to find that 
the general ordered his servant to give the messenger a 
supper, arranged for his billet that night, and next morn 
had his haversack stuffed with bread and meat, presented 
him with a dollar, and advised him where to sleep on his 
return journey. t He would give an exhausted private a 
drink from the can that had just been brought for his 

* See the Diary of Major Brooke, in Blackwood for 1908, p. 448, 
which I edited. 

t Memoirs of Sergeant Donaldson (94f^), ii. p. 217, and cf. for a 
similar story, Rifleman Harris, pp. 30, 31. 



116 Wellington's Lieutenants 

personal use, or find time to bestow a piece of friendly advice 
on an unknown subaltern. This simple, pious, considerate 
old officer, whose later portraits show a decided resemblance 
to Mr. Pickwick, was known everywhere among the rank 
and file as " Daddy Hill." An officer of the 2nd Division 
sums up his character in a well-written letter as follows * : 
" The foundation of all his popularity with the troops was 
his sterhng worth and heroic spirit, but his popularity was 
strengthened and increased as soon as he was personally 
known. He was the very picture of an English country 
gentleman : to the soldiers who came from the rural districts 
of old England he represented home ; his fresh complexion, 
placid face, kind eyes, kind voice, the absence of all parade 
or noise in his manner delighted them. The displeasure of 
Sir Rowland was worse to them than the loudest anger of 
other generals. His attention to all their wants and com- 
forts, his visits to the sick in hospital, his vigilant protection 
of the poor peasantry, his just severity to marauders, his 
generous treatment of such French prisoners and wounded 
as fell into his hands, made for him a warm place in the hearts 
of his soldiery ; and where'er the survivors of that army 
are now scattered, assuredly Hill's name and image are 
dearly cherished still." 

The description sounds like that of a benevolent old 
squire, rather than that of a distinguished lieutenant- 
general. Nevertheless, Rowland Hill was a very great 
man of war. Wellington liked him as a subordinate 
because of his extraordinary punctuality in obedience, and 
the entire absence in him of that restless personal ambition 
which makes many able men think more of opportunities 
for distinguishing themselves than of exact performance 
of the orders given them. Wherever Hill was, it was certain 
that nothing would be risked, and nothing would be for- 
gotten. His beautiful combination of intelligence and 
executive power more than once brought relief to his chief's 
mind in a critical moment, most of all on the march to 
* See Sidney's Life of Lord Hill, p. 228. 



Merits of Sir Rowland Hill 117 

Bussaco in September, 1810, when it was all-important to 
Wellington's plans that his own detached force under Hill 
should join him as soon as Massena's similar detached force 
under Reynier should have reached the main French 
army. Hill executed a long and difficult march over a 
mountainous country with admirable speed, and was duly 
up in line on the day before the battle of Bussaco, which 
could not in common prudence have been fought if he had 
been late. 

This we might have expected from a man of Hill's 
character ; but what is more surprising is that when he 
was trusted — a thing that did not often occur under Welling- 
ton's regime — with a command in which he was alloAved to 
take the offensive on his own account, he displayed not 
only a power of organizing, but a fierce driving energy 
which none of Wellington's more eager and restless sub- 
ordinates could have surpassed. Speedy pursuit of an 
enemy on the move was not one of the great Duke's cha- 
racteristics ; he was often, and not unjustly, accused of 
not making the best profit out of his victories. But Hill's 
rapid following up of Girard, in November, 1811, ending 
wdth the complete surprise and dispersion or capture of 
the French force at Arroyo dos Mohnos, was a piece of work 
which for swift, continuous movement, over mountain 
roads, in vile rainy weather, could not have been surpassed 
by the best of Napoleon's lieutenants. Another blow of 
the most creditable swiftness and daring was the storming 
of the forts of Almaraz five months later, when Hill, with, a 
light force, plunged right into the middle of the French 
cantonments and broke the all-important bridge by which 
Soult and Marmont were wont to co-operate. The forts 
were stormed, the bridge thoroughly destroyed, and Hill 
was off, and out of reach, before the neighbouring French 
divisions were half concentrated. 

But the crowning glory of Hill's Peninsular service was 
the one general action in which he was fortunate enough to 
hold independent command. This was at the end of the 



118 Wellington's Lieutenants 

war, the battle of St. Pierre, near Bayonne. He was 
forming the left flank of Wellington's line when his 
communication with the main army was cut off by a rise 
in the river Nive, which carried away the bridges by which 
he communicated with the main host. Soult, transferring 
the bulk of his field force, then in front of Welhngton, by 
means of the bridges in Bayonne town, fell upon Hill with 
five divisions. Hill had only two, those which he had 
commanded for the last three years, the 2nd and Hamilton's 
(now Le Cor's) Portuguese. With 15,000 men he fought a 
defensive battle against 30,000 for the greater part of the 
short December day. His reserves were used up, every 
regiment had charged many times, the losses were heavy, 
and it seemed hardly possible to hold on against such odds. 
But Hill did so, and at last the reinforcements from the 
other side of the river Nive began to appear in the late 
afternoon, and Soult desisted from his attack and drew 
off beaten. This was one of the most desperate pieces of 
fighting in the Peninsular War, and HiU was the soul of 
the defence. He was seen at every point of danger, and 
repeatedly led up rallied regiments in person to save what 
seemed like a lost battle. Eye-witnesses speak of him as 
quite transformed from his ordinary placidity — a very 
picture of warlike energy. He was even heard to swear, 
a thing so rare that we are assured that this lapse from 
his accustomed habits only took place twice during the 
whole war. The first occasion was in the desperate melee 
in the night attack that began the battle of Talavera. 

It is clear that HiU was a man capable of the highest 
feats in war, who might have gone very far, if he had been 
given the chance of a completely independent command. 
But such was not his fortune, and in his last campaign, that 
of Waterloo, he was almost lost to sight, as a corps-com- 
mander whose troops were operating always under the 
immediate eye of Wellington. He survived to a good old 
age, was made Commander-in-Chief of the British Army 
when Wellington gave up the office on accepting the 



PLATE III. 




Lord Hill, G.C.B. 



Lord Beresford 119 

Premiership in 1827, and held it till within a few months 
of his death in 1842. Almost the last recorded words of 
the kindly old man upon his death-bed were, " I have a 
great deal to be thankful for ; I beheve I have not an enemy 
in the world." And this was literally true : to know 
" Daddy Hill " was to love him. 

The other Ueutenant to whom WeUington repeatedly 
entrusted a semi-independent command was one who was 
neither so blameless nor so capable as Rowland Hill. Yet 
WiUiam Carr Beresford was by no means to be despised 
as a soldier. The illegitimate son of a great Irish peer, he 
was put into a marching regiment at seventeen, and saw 
an immense amount of service even for those stirring days 
of the Revolutionary War, when a British officer was Hable 
to be sent to any of the four continents in rapid succession. 
This was literally the case with Beresford, who was engaged 
in India, Egypt, the Cape of Good Hope, Buenos Ayres, 
and Portugal in the eight years between 1800 and 1808. 

When the Portuguese Government asked for a British 
general to reorganize their dilapidated army in 1809, 
Beresford was the man selected — partly because he had the 
reputation of being a good disciplinarian, partly because he 
knew the Portuguese tongue, from having garrisoned 
Madeira for many months, but mostly (as we are told) 
because of pohtical influence. His father's family had never 
lost sight of him, and he was well " pushed " by the Beres- 
ford clan, who were a great power in Ireland, and had to be 
conciliated by all Governments. 

If this appointment to command the Portuguese Army 
was a job, we may say (with Gilbert's judge) that so far as 
organization went, it was " a good job too." For he 
did most eminent service in creating order out of chaos, 
and produced in the short space of a year a well-discipUned 
force that was capable of taking a creditable part in line 
with the British Army, and won well-deserved encomiums 
from Wellington and every other fair critic for the part 
that it took at Bussaco, its first engagement. The new 



120 Wellington's Lieutenants 

army had not been created mthout much friction and 
discontent : to clear out scores of incapable officers — many 
of them fidalgos with great court influence — to promote 
young and unknown men to their places, to enforce the 
rigour of the conscription in a land where it existed in 
theory but had always been evaded in practice, gained 
Beresford immense unpopularity, which he faced in the 
most stolid and unbending fashion. At last the Portuguese 
Army was up to strength, and had learnt to obey as well 
as to fight. The teaching had been by the most drastic 
methods : Beresford cashiered officers, and shot deserters 
or marauders in the rank and file, with a rigid disregard 
alike for personal and court influence, and for public 
opinion, which Wellington himself could not have surpassed. 
He was, indeed, an honest, inflexible, and hard-working 
administrator ; but with this and with a personal courage 
that ran almost to excess his capacities ended. His virtue 
in Wellington's eyes was that, after one short tussle of wills, 
he completely and very wisely submitted himself to be the 
mere instrument of his greater colleague, and did every- 
thing that he was told to do, working the Portuguese army 
to the best effect as an auxiliary force to the British, and 
making no attempt to assert an independent authority. 
Instead of being kept under his hand in a body, it was cut 
up into brigades, each of which, with few exceptions, was 
simply attached to a British division. 

It was no doubt because Beresford showed himself so 
obedient and loyal, and exhibited such complete self- 
abnegation, that Wellington, both in 1809 and 1811, en- 
trusted him with the command of large detached forces 
at a distance from the main army. But the marshal was 
by no means up to the task entrusted to him, and after 
the unhappy experiment of the first siege of Badajoz, and 
the ill-fought battle of Albuera, Wellington removed him 
from separate command, on the excuse that more organizing 
was needed at Lisbon, and kept him either there, or with the 
main army (where he had no opportunities of separate 



Beresford's Limitations 121 

command) till the last year of the war. In 1814 he was for 
a few weeks entrusted with the conduct of the expedition 
to Bordeaux, but as it was unopposed by the enemy — and 
was bound to be so, as Wellington well knew — this was 
giving him no great responsibility. During the three last 
years of the war he was really in a rather otiose and equivocal 
position, as titular Commander-in-Chief of an army which 
was not treated as a unit, but dispersed abroad among the 
British divisions. Occasionally he was used as a corps 
commander under Welhngton's own eye, as at Toulouse, 
where he led the turning column of the 4th and 6th Divisions 
which broke down Soult's flank defences. For such a task, 
when hard fighting and obedience to orders was all that 
was needed, he was a fully competent lieutenant. It was 
when throAvn on his own resources and forced to make 
decisions of his own that he showed himself so much inferior 
to his successor Hill. 

Beresford was a very tall and stalwart man of herculean 
strength — every one knows of his personal encounter with 
a Polish lancer at Albuera : he parried the Pole's thrust, 
caught him by the collar, and jerked him out of his saddle 
and under his horse's feet, with one twist of his powerful 
arm. His features were singularly rough-cast and irregular, 
and a sinister appearance was given to his face by a dis- 
coloured and useless left eye, which had been injured in a 
shooting accident when he was quite a young man. The 
glare of this injured optic is said to have been discomposing 
to culprits whom he had to upbraid and admonish, a task 
which he always executed with thoroughness. He had 
been forced to trample on so many misdemeanants, small 
and great, during his five years in command of the Portu- 
guese army, that he enjoyed a very general unpopularity. 
But I have never found any case in which he can be accused 
of injustice or oppression ; the fact was that he had a great 
many unsatisfactory subordinates to deal with. His own 
staff and the better officers of the Portuguese service Uked 
him well enough, and the value of his work cannot be too 



122 Wellington's Lieutenants 

highly praised. He came Httle into contact with the British 
part of the army, but I note that the 88th, whom he had 
commanded before the war in Spain began, much preferred 
him to their later chief, Picton, and had a kindly memory 
of him. There are singularly few tales or anecdotes con- 
nected with his name, from which I deduce that in British 
military circles he was neither much loved nor much 
hated. 

A far more picturesque figure is the third of the three 
generals to whom, at one time or another, Wellington 
committed the charge of a detached corps, Thomas Graham 
of Balgowan, later created Lord Lynedoch. I have already 
alluded to him in my preface, as in one way the most typical 
figure of the epoch — the personification of all that class of 
Britons who took arms against France when the Revolu- 
tionary War broke out, as a plain duty incumbent upon 
them in days when the country and Crown were in danger. 
He had seen the Jacobin mob face to face in its frenzy, in 
a sufficiently horrid fashion. In 1792 he had taken his 
invahd wife— the beautiful Mrs. Graham of Gainsborough's 
well-known picture — to the Riviera, in the vain hope that 
her consumption might be stayed. She died, nevertheless, 
and he started home towards Scotland with her coffin, to 
lay her in the grave of his ancestors. On the way he passed 
through a town where the crazy hunt after impossible royalist 
conspiracies was in full swing. A crowd of drunken National 
Guards were seized with the idea that he was an emissary 
in disguise, bearing arms to aristocrats. The coffin, they 
declared, was probably full of pistols and daggers, and 
while the unhappy husband struggled in vain to hold them 
off, they broke it open, and exposed his wife's long-dead 
corpse. After this incident Thomas Graham not un- 
naturally conceived the idea that his one duty in life was 
to shoot Jacobins. When he had buried his wife at Methven 
he was ready for that duty, and the war with France 
breaking out only five months after, his opportunity was 
at hand. Though a civilian, a Whig member of ParHament , 



Early Career of Graham 123 

and forty-four years of age, though he had no knowledge of 
military affairs, and had never heard a shot fired in anger, 
he went to the front at once, and fought through the siege 
of Toulon as a sort of volunteer aide-de-camp to Lord 
Mulgrave. It is odd that both Julius Caesar and Oliver 
Cromwell started at this same age as soldiers. This was 
the first of an endless series of campaigns against the 
French ; Graham got a quasi-mihtary status by raising 
at his own expense the 90th Foot, or Perthshire Volunteers, 
of which he was in reward made honorary colonel. With 
the curious rank of honorary colonel — he never held any 
lower — he went as British attache to the Austrian Army 
of Italy, getting the post because Englishmen who could 
speak both German and Italian were rare. He saw the 
unhappy campaigns of 1796-97 under Beaulieu, Wiirmser, 
and the Archduke Charles, being thus one of the few 
British observers who witnessed Bonaparte's first essays 
in strategy. Then he held staff appointments during the 
operations in Minorca and Malta, and again served with 
the Austrians in Italy in 1799. After much more service, 
the last of it as British attache with the army of Castanos 
in Spain, during the Tudela campaign, he was at last 
informed that — all precedents notwithstanding — ^from an 
honorary colonelcy he was promoted to be a major-general 
on the regular establishment, on account of his long and 
distinguished service. Down to 1809 he had seen more 
fighting than falls to most men, without owning any 
proper mihtary rank, for his colonelcy of 1794, which he 
had held for fifteen years, was only titular and tem- 
porary, and gave him no regular rank. He had techni- 
cally never been more than a civihan with an honorary- 
title ! 

Yet in 1810 he was entrusted with the important post 
of commander of the British troops in Cadiz, and com- 
menced to take an important part in the Peninsular War. 
He was now sixty-two years of age, and would have been 
counted past service according to eighteenth century 



124 Wellington's Lieutenants 

notions. But his iron frame gave no signs of approaching 
decay, no fatigue or privation could tire him, and he was 
one of the boldest riders in the army. His portrait shows 
a man with a regular oval face, a rather melancholy expres- 
sion — there is a sad droop in the eyelids — and abundant 
white hair, worn rather long. His mouth is firm and 
inflexible, his general expression very resolute, but a little 
tired — that of a man who has been for nearly twenty years 
crusading against an enemy with whom no peace must be 
made, and who does not yet see the end in sight, but 
proposes to fight on till he drops. He was a fine scholar, 
knew six languages, had travelled all over Europe, and 
was such a master of his pen that both his dispatches and 
his private letters and diary are among the best-written 
and most interesting original material that exists for this 
period. 

The crowning exploit of Graham's life was the victory 
which he won, with every chance against him, at Barrosa 
on March 7th, 1811, a wonderful instance of the triumph 
of a quick eye, and a sudden resolute blow over long odds. 
Caught on the march by a sudden flank attack of Marshal 
Victor, owing to the imbecile arrangements of the Spanish 
General La Pena, under whose orders he was serving, 
Graham, instead of waiting to be attacked, which would 
have been fatal, took the offensive himself. His troops 
were strung out on the line of march through a wood, and 
there was no time to form a regular order of battle, for the 
French were absolutely rushing in upon him. Victor 
thought that he had before him an easy victory, over a 
force surprised in an impossible posture. But Graham, 
throwing out a strong line of skirmishers to hold back the 
enemy for the few necessary minutes, aligned his men in 
the edge of the wood, without regard for brigade or even for 
battalion unity, and attacked the French with such sudden 
swiftness that it was Victor, and not he, who was really 
surprised. The enemy was assailed before he had formed 
any line of battle, or deployed a single battalion, and was 



Geaham at Bareosa 125 

driven off the field in an hour after a most bloody fight. 
Graham led the centre of his own left brigade like a general 
of the Middle Ages, riding ten yards ahead of the hne with 
his plumed hat waving in his right hand, and his white 
hair streaming in the wind. This was not the right place 
for a commanding officer ; but the moment was a 
desperate one, and all depended on the swiftness and sudden- 
ness of the stroke ; there was no manoeuvring possible, 
and no further orders save to go straight on. Improvising 
his battle-order in five minutes, with only 5000 men against 
7000, and attacking rather uphill, he won a magnificent 
victory, which would have ended in the complete destruc- 
tion of the French if the Spaniard La Pena had moved to 
his aid. But that wretched officer remained halted with 
his whole division only two miles from the field, and did 
not stir a man to aid his colleague. 

A few months after Barrosa, Graham was moved 
from Cadiz to join the main army in Portugal, at the request 
of Welhngton, who gave him the command of his left 
wing during the autumn campaign of 1811, and again 
through the whole of that of 1813. For the greater part of 
that of 1812 Graham was away on sick leave, for the first time 
in his life, his eyes having given out from long exposure to 
the southern sun. Unluckily for him, his promotion to 
command a wing of the grand army meant that he was 
generally under Wellington's own eye, with small oppor- 
tunity of acting for himself. But his chief chose him to 
take charge of the most critical operation of the Vittoria 
campaign, the long flank march through the mountains 
of the Tras-os-Montes, which turned the right wing of 
the French and forced them out of position after position 
in a running fight of 200 miles. Still outflanking the enemy, 
it was he who cut in across the high-road to France at Vit- 
toria, and forced the beaten army of Jourdan to retire 
across by-paths, with the loss of all its artillery, train, 
baggage, and stores. 

For the dramatic completeness of this splendid old 



126 Wellington's Lieutenants 

man's career, we could have wished that it had ended in 

1813. But the Home Government, seeking for a trust- 
worthy officer to command the expedition to Holland in 
the following winter, chose Graham to conduct it, and his 
last campaign was marred by a disaster. He drove, it is 
true, the remnants of the French army out of Holland, 
though his force was small — only 7000 men, and formed of 
raw second battalions hastily collected from English 
garrisons. But his daring attempt to escalade the great 
fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, the one stronghold still held 
by the enemy, was a sad failure. Taking advantage of a 
hard frost, which had made the marsh-defences of that 
strong town useless for the moment, Graham planned a 
midnight attack by four columns, of which two succeeded 
in crossing all obstacles and entering the place. But when 
all seemed won, the general's part of the scheme having 
succeeded to admiration, the officers in immediate charge 
of the attack ignored many of their orders, dispersed their 
men in unwise petty enterprises, and finally were attacked 
and driven out of the town piecemeal by the rallied 
garrison. The loss was terrible, fully 2000 men, of whom 
half were prisoners. But the bold conception of the 
enterprise rather than its failure should be put down 
to Graham's account. The mismanagement by his 
subordinates was incredible. Wellington, looking over 
the fortress a year later, is said to have observed 
that it must have been extremely difficult to get in. 
*' But," he added, " when once in, I wonder how the 
devil they ever suffered themselves to be beaten out 
again." 

Graham's last campaign was marred by this check. 
But, in the general distribution of rewards at the peace of 

1814, he was given a peerage, by the title of Lord Lynedoch, 
and shared in the other honours of the Peninsular Army. 
Though sixty -six years old when the war ended, he survived, 
till 1843, when he had reached the patriarchal age of ninety- 
>six. He did a good service to his old comrades by founding 



PLATE II, 




General Thomas Graham, Baron Lyneuoch, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. 

Frojn the picture by Sir George Hnyter. 



Graham and his Admirers 127 

the Senior United Service Club, originally designed as a 
place of rendezvous for old Peninsular officers, of whom he 
had noticed that many were lonely men without family 
ties, like himself, while others, stranded in London for a 
few days, had no central spot where they could count on 
meeting old friends.* His portrait hangs, as is right, in 
the most prominent place in the largest room of the insti- 
tution which he founded. 

I have never found one unkindly word about General 
Graham, in the numerous diaries and autobiographies of 
the officers and men who served under him. All comment 
on his stately presence, his thoughtful courtesy, and his 
unfaihng justice and benevolence. " I may truly say he 
lives in their affections ; they not only looked up to him 
with confidence as their commander, but they esteemed and 
respected him as their firm friend and protector, which, 
indeed, he always showed himself to be." | " What could 
not Britons do, when led by such a chief ? " asks another. J 
I might make a considerable list of the names of British 
officers who relate their personal obligation to his kind- 
ness ; § but perhaps the most convincing evidence of all is 
that of the French Colonel Vigo-Roussillon, one of the enemies 
whom he captured at Barrosa, who has no words strong 
enough to express the delicate generosity with which he 
was treated while a wounded prisoner at Cadiz. Graham 
came to visit him on his sick bed, sent his own physician 
to attend him, and made copious provision for his food and 
lodging. For a conscientious hatred for French influence, 
whether that of the red Jacobin republic, or that of the 

* He wanted, he wrote, " to have a place of meeting where they 
can enjoy social intercourse combined with economy, and cultivate 
old acquaintance formed on service." Hitherto " officers coming 
to town for a short period were driven into expensive and bad 
taverns and coffee-houses, without a chance of meeting their friends 
or any good society." 

t Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade, by Siu-tees of the 
95th. 

% CaddeU of the 28th, p. 99. 

§ Especially Bunbury, Dallas, and Blakeney. 



128 Wellington's Lieutenants 

Napoleonic despotism, did not prevent him from showing 
his benevolence to individual Frenchmen thrown upon 
his mercy.* 

* " Le general etait de haute stature," says Vigo-Roussillon ; 
" il avait les cheveux tous blancs, et etait encore alerts et tres vif, 
quoiqu'il avait soixante ans. Sa physionomie noble et ouverte 
m'avait inspir6 le respect, memo sur le champ de bataille." — Revue 
des deux Mondes, August, 1891. 



CHAPTER VII 

Wellington's lieutenants — picton, craufurd, 
and others 

If Graham had no enemies, and was loved by every one 
with whom he came in contact, the same cannot be said of 
the two distinguished officers with whom I have next to 
deal, General Robert Craufurd and Sir Thomas Picton. 
They were both men of mark, Craufurd even more so than 
Picton ; they both fell in action at the moment of victory ; 
they were both employed by Wellington for the most 
responsible services, and he owed much to their admirable 
executive powers ; but both of them were occasionally 
out of his good graces. Each of them had many admiring 
friends and many bitter enemies, whose reasons for liking 
and disliking them it is not hard to discover. Both of 
them were to a certain extent embittered and disappointed 
men, who thought that their work had never received 
adequate recognition, a view for which there was consider- 
able justification. In other respects they were wholly 
urdike ; their characters differed fundamentally, so much 
so that when they met it was not unfrequently to clash and 
quarrel. 

Picton, a Welsh country gentleman by birth, was a 
typical eighteenth century soldier, who had (after the old 
fashion) entered the army at thirteen years of age, and had 
gone on foreign service at fifteen. His manners, we gather, 
were those of the barrack-room ; he was a hard drinking, 
hard swearing, rough-and-ready customer. Wellington, 
who was not squeamish, called him '' a rough, foul-mouthed 



130 Wellington's Lieutenants 

devil as ever lived,* but he always behaved extremely 
well on service." The notorious Duke of Queensberry, 
" Old^Q," was his friend and admirer, and left him a good 
legacy of £5000 in his will. Old Q's model heroes were not 
of the Wesleyan Methodist type. One of the strongest 
impressions left on one's mind by the diaries of those who 
served under him is that of his astounding power of maledic- 
tion. Kincaid's account of the sack of Ciudad Rodrigo is 
dominated by " the voice of Sir Thomas Picton, with the 
power of twenty trumpets proclaiming damnation to all 
and sundry." f But if he was destitute of all the graces 
and some of the virtues, Picton was a very fine soldier, 
with a quick eye, unlimited self-confidence, and the courage 
of ten bulldogs. He had, when once the Revolutionary 
War commenced, made his way to the front with great 
rapidity. A captain in 1794, he had become a brigadier- 
general by 1799, and his promotion had been won by un- 
deniable good service. For his ultimate misfortune, he 
was made in 1797 governor of the newly conquered Spanish 
island of Trinidad in the West Indies, while still only a 
colonel. This was the beginning of his troubles ; the post 
was lucrative, dangerous, and difficult. The garrison was 
insufficient, and the island was swarming with disbanded 
Spanish soldiers, runaway negro slaves, French adventurers, 
and privateers and pirates of all nations from the Spanish 
Main. Picton had to create order from chaos, and then to 
keep it up ; his methods were drastic : the lash and the 
pillory, the branding -irons, and, where necessary, mihtary 
execution. It does not appear on impartial examination 
that he ever showed himself self-seeking, partial, or corrupt 
in his administration ; he merely tried, in his own rough 
way, to dragoon into order a very unruly and lawless 
community. The majority of the better classes approved 
his rule, which, as one of them said, " was of the sort 
required by the colony " where a governor " had to make 

* Stanhope's Conversations with Wellington, p. 69. 
t Kincaid, p. 116. 



PiCTON m Tkinidad 131 

himself feared as well as beloved." Naturally he made 
many enemies, white, black, and brown, English and 
Spanish, adventurers and officials. They kept up a rain 
of petitions against him at the Colonial Office, in which he 
was represented as a sort of Nero. The most acrid and 
ingenious of them, a Colonel FuUarton, succeeded in finding 
a method of attack which was certain to have a great 
vogue when tried in England. The old Spanish law still 
ran in Trinidad, and under it various forms of durance and 
torture were permitted against suspected persons under 
arrest. A case had happened in which a mulatto girl, who 
had been concerned in stealing 2000 dollars from a Spanish 
tobacco merchant, was put to the barbarous punishment 
of picketing (standing with the heels on a stake) by the local 
magistrates, to make her confess who had taken the money, 
and where it was hidden. After a few minutes she admitted 
that her lover had stolen it, with her aid and consent ; 
and this was proved to be the fact. Thus under Picton's 
rule, and (as it turned out) with his knowledge, a woman 
had been put to the torture, though the torture was slight 
and the woman guilty. 

Picton, on returning to England, was therefore accused 
by Colonel FuUarton of many tyrannical acts, but, above 
all, of having put a woman to the torture in order to extract 
a confession, a thing abhorrent alike to the laws of England 
and to the common sentiments of humanity. There fol- 
lowed a long pohtical trial, (for it became a matter of Whig 
and Tory partizanship), in which the Government finally 
dropped the prosecution, because it was amply proved that 
Spanish, not English, law was running in Trinidad in 1801, 
since the island had not been annexed tiU the peace of 
Amiens in the following year, and that the governor had 
simply allowed the local magistrates to act according to 
their usual practice. The other charges all fell through. 

Nevertheless, the mud stuck, as FuUarton had intended, 
and Picton was generaUy remembered as the man who had 
permitted a woman to be tortured. The trial had dragged 



132 Wellington's Lieutenants 

over several years, and had been most costly to the accused. 
Since there had been no verdict, owing to the prosecution 
having simply been dropped, he had not even the satisfac- 
tion of being able to say that he had been acquitted by a 
Jury of his countrymen. There was a sort of slur, however 
unjust, upon his name. 

It therefore argued considerable independence and dis- 
regard of public opinion on the part of Wellington, when 
he wrote home to ask that Picton might be sent out to him 
to command a division,* purely on his miUtary record as a 
hard fighter. The general came out to Portugal with a 
name unfavourably known, and to colleagues and sub- 
ordinates who were prepared to view him with a critical 
eye. " It is impossible to deny," writes an officer who 
served under him, " that a very strong dislike towards the 
general was prevalent. His conduct in the island of 
Trinidad . . . had impressed all ranks with an unfavourable 
opinion of the man. His first appearance was looked for 
with no little anxiety. When he reached the ground, 
accompanied by his staff, every eye was turned towards 
him, and his appearance and demeanour were closely 
observed. He looked to be a man between fifty and sixty, 
and I never saw a more perfect specimen of a splendid- 
looking soldier. In vain did those who had set him down 
as a cruel tyrant seek to find out such a delineation in his 
countenance. On the contrary, there was a manly open 
frankness in his appearance that gave a flat contradiction 
to the slander. And in truth Picton was Tiot a tyrant, nor 
did he ever act as such during the many years that he 
commanded the 3rd Division. But if his countenance did 
not depict him as cruel, there was a sarcastic severity 
about it, and a certain curl of the hp, that marked him as 
one who despised rather than courted applause. The 
stern countenance, robust frame, caustic speech, and 
austere demeanour told in legible characters that he was 

* That he made the request is definitely stated in Stanhope's 
Conversations, p. 69. 



PiCTON AND THE 88TH FoOT 133 

one not likely to say a thing and then not do as he had said. 
In a word, his appearance denoted him a man of strong 
mind and strong frame." * 

It was considered characteristic that he ended his first 
inspection of the division by holding a drum-head court- 
martial on two soldiers who had stolen a goat, and witnessing 
their punishment. He then rode up to the regiment to 
which the culprits belonged, the 88th, and " in language 
not of that bearing which an officer of his rank should use," 
said, " You are not known in the army by the name of 
Connaught Rangers, but by the name of Connaught foot- 
pads,'' with some unnecessary remarks on their country 
and their religion. 

This untoward incident was the commencement of a 
long feud between Pic ton and the 88th, which endured all 
through the war, and led, at the end of it, to the Rangers 
refusing to subscribe to the laudatory address and plate 
which the rest of the 3rd Division offered to their general, 
after nearly five years of glorious service. Yet the feud 
was not incompatible with a good deal of reluctant esteem 
on both sides. On the morning after the storm of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, in which the Rangers had taken a most gallant 
part, we are told that some of the men, more than usually 
elated in spirits, called out to their commander, " Well, 
general, we gave you a cheer last night : it's your turn now." 
Picton, smihng, took off his hat and said, " Here, then, 
you drunken set of brave rascals, hurrah ! And we'll soon 
be at Badajoz," to which scene of even greater glory for 
the 3rd Division he did conduct them within a few weeks. 

The considerable string of stories, true, half-true, or 
apocryphal, which cling round the name of Picton relate 
in about equal proportions, on the one hand, to his extreme 
intrepidity and coolness in action, and, on the other, to 
his vehemence alike of language and of action, which 
struck terror into the objects of his wrath. The best of 
the former with which I am acquainted comes from the 

* Grattan's Adventures with the Connaught Bangers, p. 16. 



134 Wellington's Lieutenants 

same diarist, Grattan, of the 88th, whom I have already 
been quoting. It relates to the day of El Bodon (September 
25, 1811), when the 3rd Division, caught in a somewhat 
isolated position owing to one of Wellington's few tactical 
shps, was retreating in column across a level upland, 
beset by Montbrun and three brigades of French cavalry. 
" For six miles across a perfect flat, without the slightest 
protection from any incident of the ground, without 
artillery, almost without cavalry, did the 3rd Division 
continue its march. During the whole time the French 
cavalry never quitted us, and six light guns, advancing with 
them and taking the division in flank and rear, poured in a 
frightful fire of grape and canister. General Picton con- 
ducted himself with his accustomed coolness. He rode on 
the left flank of the column, and repeatedly cautioned the 
different battalions to mind the quarter distance and the 
' tellings off.' At last we got within a mile of our entrenched 
camp at Fuente Guinaldo, when Montbrun, impatient lest 
his prey should escape from his grasp, ordered his troopers 
to bring up their right shoulders and incline towards our 
column. The movement was not exactly bringing up his 
squadrons into line, but it was the next thing to it. They 
were within half pistol-shot of us. Picton took off his hat, 
and holding it over his eyes as a shade from the sun, looked 
sternly but anxiously at the French. The clatter of the 
horses and the clanking of the scabbards were so great, as 
the right squadron moved up, that many thought it the 
forerunner of a general charge. Some mounted officer 
called out, ' Had we not better form square ? ' ' No,' 
replied Picton ; ' it is but a ruse to frighten us, and it won't 
do.' In half an hour more we were safe within our 
lines." * 

This was a fine example of cool resolution, and ended 
happily what had been a very anxious hour for WeUington. 
But I imagine that the occasion on which the Commander- 
in-Chief owed most to the commander of the 3rd Division 
* Grattan, pp. 116, 117. 



PiCTON AT BaDAJOZ 135 

was the storm of Badajoz. It will be remembered that 
on that bloody night the main attack on the breaches failed 
completely, despite of the desperate exertions of the 4th 
and Light Divisions. The attempt by escalade upon the 
towering walls of the castle, which proved successful and 
caused the fall of the fortress, had not been in Wellington's 
original plan, but was suggested to him by Picton, who had 
viewed the breaches, and had not been convinced that they 
could be carried. Picton pleaded that he might be 
allowed to try the castle with his own division as a sub- 
sidiary operation.* He succeeded triumphantly, and so 
saved the day. If he had not made his offer, the chance of 
the city's falling would have been infinitely less, even though 
a brigade of the 5th Division did succeed in entering Bada- 
joz at another point remote from the fatal breaches. Though 
Picton got plenty of praise for his courage on this night, it 
was not generally known that he ought to have been praised 
even more for his prescience. 

Numberless instances of Picton's skill and tenacity 
might be quoted, all through the six years of his service 
under Wellington. But the anecdote which best illustrates 
his Spartan courage is one which belongs to the last three 
days of his life. At Quatre Bras, where his division so 
long held back the vehement attacks of Ney, he received a 
musket ball in his left side, which, though it gave a some- 
what glancing blow and did not penetrate, broke two of 
his ribs. Believing that the battle would be continued 
next day, he resolved not to return himself as wounded, 
lest the surgeons should insist on sending him to the rear. 
He roughly bound up the wound with the assistance of 
his soldier servant, and was on his horse throughout June 
17, conducting the retreat of his division. On the 18th, as 
every one knows, he was killed — shot through the head — 
while leading the decisive charge which beat d'Erlon's 
corps from the heights of Mont St. Jean. Only when 

* See McCarthy's Siege of Badajoz, p. 35, and Robinson's Life of 
Picton, ii. p. 170. 



136 Wellington's Lieutenants 

his body was stripped, to be laid in the coffin, was it dis- 
covered that he had gone into action at Waterloo with a 
dangerous, perhaps mortal, wound two days old upon him. 
For his side was so swollen and blackened around the 
broken ribs, that the surgeons thought that the neglected 
wound might very possibly have caused his death, if he had 
come unharmed through the battle of June 18. 

Such virtues were not incompatible with grave faults. 
Picton's violent language and reckless disregard of common 
forms of propriety form the subject of many tales. When 
he thought that the assistant engineer who guided the 3rd 
Division at the storm of Badajoz had led them astray, he 
drew his sword, and with an oath said that he would cut the 
blind fool down if he had gone wrong. This we have on 
the first-hand evidence of that officer, who was fortunately 
able to demonstrate that the right path had been taken.* 
A better-known tale is that of Picton and the commissary, 
a story sometimes attributed in error to Craufurd, into 
whose character it does not fit so well. The commissary 
had been ordered, during one of Wellington's long marches, 
to have the rations of the 3rd Division ready at a certain 
spot at a certain hour. They were not forthcoming, but 
only a series of excuses, to account for their non-arrival. 
Picton grimly pointed to a neighbouring tree and said, 
" Well, sir, if you don't get the rations for my division to 
the place mentioned by twelve o'clock to-morrow, I will 
hang you on it at half -past." The commissary rode 
straight to Lord Wellington and complained, with much 
injured dignity, of the general's violent and ungentlemanly 
language. His lordship coolly remarked, " Oh, he said 
that he'd hang you, did he ? " " Yes, my lord." " Well, 
General Picton is a man of his word. I think you'd better 
get the rations up in time." Further advice was un- 
necessary ; the rations were there to the moment. t It is 
odd to find that many years after Picton's death a question 

* McCarthy's Siege of Badajoz^ p. 41. 
-j- Robinson's Life of Picton, ii. p. 390. 



PiCTON AND Wellington 137 

was asked in Parliament, and a controversy raged in the 
newspapers, as to which of three named commissaries was 
the object of Picton's anger. 

It would be wrong, however, to paint Picton as a mere 
vial of wrath, foaming into ungovernable rage in and out 
of season. When he was angry he generally had good 
cause ; it was only the over-vehemence of his language 
that caused him to become a centre of legends. Odd as it 
may seem, the rank and file did not consider him a tyrant ; 
it was acknowledged that he was very just, that he never 
punished without hearing the defence, that he was capable 
of pardoning, that when he hit hard he did so not without 
reason. A sergeant of the 45th wrote on him thus : " He 
was strict sometimes, especially about plunder, always 
talking about how wrong it was to plunder the poor people 
because countries happened to be at war. He used to 
flog the men when they were found out ; but where he 
flogged, many generals took life. Besides this, the men 
thought that he had their welfare at heart. Every soldier 
in the division knew that if he had anything to complain 
of, ' Old Picton ' would listen to his story, and set him 
right if he could. On the whole, our fellows always thought 
him a kind general, in spite of his strong language." 

This same sense of justice is brought out in the diaries 
of several officers, who speak in feeling terms of his en- 
deavours to get obscure merit rewarded, and to keep 
down jobbery in promotion,* or tyranny of senior officers 
over their juniors. He was very accessible, and even 
friendly and considerate, to his subordinates. This famili- 
arity, which endeared him to subalterns, was (as we have 
already noticed) not agreeable to Lord Wellington. Their 
intercourse was formal and not very frequent. Wellington 
once went out of his way to say that it was not true that he 
had ever had a quarrel with Picton, or been on anything 
but good terms with him. But while acknowledging his 

* See especially McCarthy, quoted above, and Macpherson (notes 
in Robinson, ii. pp. 394-397). 



138 Wellington's Lieutenants 

services, he never pretended that he had any personal liking 
for him. 

Picton always thought that he suffered grave injustice 
at the end of the war, by not being included in the Ust of 
five Peninsular officers who were made peers for their 
services. " If the coronet were lying on the crown of a 
breach, I should have as good a chance as any of them," 
was his caustic remark. The explanation formally given 
for his omission was that all the five generals honoured, 
Beresford, Hill, Graham, Hope, and Stapleton Cotton, 
had held for some time " distinct commands," and that 
Picton had not. But though this explanation held good 
for the first three, it did not really cover the cases of Hope 
and Cotton, whose independent commands had been little 
more than nominal ; and Picton had on several occasions — 
notably in the Pyrenees — exercised independent authority 
in a very similar way. The fact was that he was an un- 
popular man, and that the Ministry omitted him, while 
Wellington made no effort to push his claims. He showed 
his displeasure by announcing his intention to retire from 
the army in 1814, and would have done so in the next year, 
if Napoleon's return from Elba had not called him into the 
field, to die at Waterloo. 

To finish our sketch of this curious and contradictory 
character, we must mention that Picton was a profound 
despiser of all sorts of pomp and ceremony. His dress, 
except on gala days, was careless and often unmilitary. 
He fought Quatre-Bras, as several witnesses remarked, in 
a tall beaver hat, and in the Vittoria campaign, because he 
was suffering from his eyes, wore a very broad-brimmed 
variety of the same type. His aide-de-camps copied him, 
as was natural, in their disregard for appearance, and it is 
said that from their manners and dress they were known 
as *' the bear and ragged staff," * a term that has been 
applied on several more recent occasions to similar 
parties. 

* Cole's Peninsular Generals, ii. p. 84. 



PLATE IV. 




General Sir Thomas Picton, K.C.B. 



General Robeet Ceaufurd 139 

A very different man from Sir Thomas Picton was the 
last of the divisional generals whose character we have to 
deal with, Kobert Craufurd. They were both effective 
weapons in the hands of Wellington, but Picton's efficiency 
was rather that of the battering ram, while Craufurd's 
was rather that of the rapier. Robert Craufurd, like 
Picton, came to the Peninsular as rather a disappointed 
man, his grievance being that, despite much brilliant service, 
he had dropped behind in promotion, and found himself a 
junior brigadier general, when men several years his junior, 
Hke Hill, Beresford, and Welhngton himself, were holding 
posts of much greater importance. Craufurd was one of 
our few scientific soldiers ; he had studied so far back as 
1782 the tactics of the army of Frederic the Great at Berhn, 
and had translated into Enghsh the official Prussian treatise 
on the Art of War. His knowledge of German, which 
none other of Welfington's officers save Graham possessed, 
had caused him, in 1794, to be given the important i>ost of 
mihtary attache with the Austrian Army in the Netherlands, 
and afterwards on the Rhine, and he followed Coburg and 
the Archduke Charles for three years through a series of 
campaigns, in which failure was much more frequent than 
success. When the war broke out once more between 
Austria and the French republic, he was again sent in 1799 
to serve with his old friends, and accompanied the head- 
quarters of General Hotze's army in Smtzerland, till he was 
called off to share in the Duke of York's ill-managed in- 
vasion of Holland in the end of the same year. Like 
Graham, therefore, Craufurd had the sorrow of witnessing 
a long series of disasters, for which he was not in the least 
responsible. As his reports and dispatches show, he dis- 
charged his duty with zeal and excellent capacity ; but his 
sarcastic tongue and violent temper seem to have stood in the 
way of his promotion. A major in 1794, after thirteen years' 
service, he was still only a lieutenant -colonel in 1801, and 
during these years had seen numberless comrades cHmb 
over his head, though he had all the while been discharging 



140 Wellington's Lieutenants 

important duties in a fashion which won the admiration of 
all with whom he came into personal contact. It looks as 
if the constant reports of disaster, which he had to make, 
had connected his name in official circles with the notion 
of ill-luck. In 1801, disappointed of an official post in 
Ireland for which he had applied, he went on half-pay, 
and entered Parliament as member for a pocket-borough 
which chanced to be in his brother's gift.* For the next 
five years he was a constant speaker in Parliament on 
mihtary topics, and a very bitter critic of the policy of 
Pitt, Dundas, and Addington. His views as to the proper 
organization of the British forces, in first and second line, 
for the beating off of French invasion were set forth at 
vast length, and always clashed with those of ministers. 
It is only fair to say that he was in the main right, and they 
wrong ; he pleaded for the reduction of the numberless 
ill-disciplined volunteer corps, and wished to see in the 
first line a very large regular army raised for short service, 
and behind it the second line, levied by conscription, as a 
sort of levee en masse trained for irregular fighting, and not 
expected to manoeuvre or to take part in pitched battles. 
Craufurd's virulent criticism was very telling, but hardly 
likely to help his promotion as a military man, so long as 
the Addington and Pitt ministries were in power. When, 
however, Pitt died, and the Whig administration called 
" All the Talents " came into power, the new War Secretary, 
William Windham, was disposed to do everything possible 
for Craufurd, who was not only his personal friend, but 
often advised him on matters of organization and technical 
military subjects. 

At last, after five years spent in rather acrid parlia- 
mentary criticism, Craufurd was given an opportunity by 
his friend Windham to see service in a higher post than 
had ever before fallen to his lot. Though only just 

* His brother. Sir Charles Craufurd, had married the Dowager 
Duchess of Newcastle, and as the duke was a minor, his mother and 
her husband disposed of the Pelham pocket-boroughs and other 
patronage. 



Craufurd at Buenos Ayres 141 

promoted to a full colonelcy, he was given the command of 
a brigade of 4000 men, destined for a distant expedition. 
This adventure was one of the most hare-brained of the 
many futile schemes of the unlucky cabinet then in power. 
Crauf urd was to take in hand nothing less than a voyage round 
Cape Horn, for the conquest of Chili ! He never saw the 
straits of Magellan, however, for his force, after it had sailed, 
was distracted to form part of the unhappy armament 
under General Whitelocke, which made the disastrous 
attack on Buenos Ayres in 1807. Placed in the front, 
in command of Whitelocke's Light Brigade, and thrust 
forward into the tangle of streets among which the incapable 
general dispersed his troops in many small columns, Crau- 
furd fought his way so far on that he was surrounded, cut 
o£E from the main body, and compelled to capitulate with 
the remnants of his men. Thus his first chance of dis- 
tinction in the field, at the head of a considerable force, 
ended in absolute disaster. He was acquitted of all blame 
at Whitelocke's court-martial, but the thought that he was 
remembered as the officer who had surrendered a British 
brigade rankled in his mind, and sat heavy on his soul 
down to the end of his life. 

The fact that he was held blameless, however, was 
marked by his appointment to the command of a brigade 
in the Peninsular Army in 1808. But his usual ill-luck 
seemed at first to attend him. He arrived too late for 
Vimeiro ; Avhen serving under Moore he was detached 
from the main army, and did not fight at Corunna. In 
the next year, returning to serve under Wellesley, he was 
late for Talavera, though to reach the battlefield he 
made his well-remembered march of forty-three miles in 
twenty-six hours, which Napier, by a sHp of memory, 
has converted into an impossible achievement — a march 
of sixty-two miles in that time, which not even Craufurd 
and the famous 43rd, 52nd, and 95th could have ac- 
complished. 

From 1809 onward Craufurd at last got his chance, and 



142 Wellington's Lieutenants 

for the greater part of three years* was in command of 
WeUington's advance, his " Light Brigade" of 1809 becoming 
the " Light Division " in 1810. At length he got what Fate 
had denied him in all his earlier career, a post of great 
distinction and responsibility, and a sight of victory ; for 
fifteen years he had been witnessing nothing but retreats 
and disasters. On his happy days, and they were many, 
Craufurd was undoubtedly the most brilliant lieutenant 
that Wellington ever owned. Yet he was not trusted by 
his chief as Hill, for example, was trusted, because of 
his occasional lapses from caution, and from the bhnd 
obedience which his chief exacted. Occasionally he 
took risks, or ventured to modify the orders given 
him — the faults of an eager and ambitious spirit in an hour 
of excitement. 

His achievements were great and noble. The most 
splendid of them was the protection of the north-east 
frontier of Portugal throughout the whole spring and summer 
of 1810, when he was set with his own small division and 
two regiments of cavalry to lie out many miles in front of 
the main army, and to watch the assembling host of 
Massena, till the moment when it should make its forward 
move for serious invasion. For five months he guarded a 
long front against an enemy of sixfold force, without 
allowing his line to be pierced, or suffering the French to 
gain any information as to what was going on in his rear. 
This was a great feat, only accomplished by the most 
complete and minute organization of his very modest 
resources. There were fifteen fords along the Agueda, 
the river whose line he had to keep, all of which had to be 
watched in dry weather, and many even when the stream 
was high. The French had 3000 cavalry opposite him in 
March and April, 5000 in May and June, the latter a force 
exceeding in numbers the total of his whole division. 

* He was absent on leave from the winter of 1810 till May 
1811, and only just rejoined in time for the battle of Fuentes de 
Oiioro. 



Craufurd and the Light Division 143 

Behind the hostile cavalry screen he knew that there were 
two full army corps, or over 40,000 men ; and many 
detachments of this infantry lay only four or five miles from 
Craufurd's outposts, and might attack him at any moment. 
Yet he never suffered any surprise ; so well were his observa- 
tion-posts placed and managed, that the least movement of 
the enemy was reported to him in an incredibly short 
time. The whole web of communications quivered at the 
sUghtest touch, and the Light Division was concentrated 
ready to fight or to retreat, as prudence dictated, long 
before the attack could develop. So wonderfully had he 
trained his troops that any battalion, as Napier records, was 
ready under arms within seven minutes from the first alarm 
signal, and mthin a quarter of an hour could be in order of 
battle on its appointed post, with its baggage loaded and 
assembled ready for departure at a convenient distance 
to the rear. 

As his aide-de-camp, Shaw Kennedy, the historian of 
this summer, writes, " To understand Craufurd's operations 
the calculation must never be lost sight of, for it was on 
calculation that he acted all along." Special reports were 
made of the numerous fords of the Agueda every morning, 
and the rapidity of its rises was periodically marked. 
Beacons were placed on conspicuous heights, so as to 
communicate information as to the enemy's offensive 
movements. To ensure against mistakes in the night, 
pointers were kept at the stations of communication, 
directed to the beacons. The cavalry regiment at the 
outposts was the first Hussars of the King's German 
Legion, a veteran corps, chosen because its officers were 
considered superior in scouting power to that of any other 
Hght cavalry unit with the army. Craufurd, knowing 
German well, communicated with each of its squadron 
leaders directly ; each knew his own duty for the front that 
he covered, and each worked out his part admirably. The 
general was untiring, could remain on horseback unwearied 
for almost any length of time, and knew personally every 



144 Wellington's Lieutenants 

ford, dejaie, and by-path. Hence nothing was left to 
chance.* 

It was a pity that Craufurd ended this splendid piece 
of service, which lasted over five months of daily danger, 
by fighting the unnecessary " Combat of the Coa " on 
July 4, 1810. Staying a day too long beyond that stream, 
despite of Wellington's clear direction to retire the moment 
that he was hard pressed, he was suddenly attacked by the 
whole of Ney's corps, 20,000 men or more, and forced over 
the Coa, with loss which might have been great but for the 
excellence of the battalions he had trained and the cool- 
headed tactical skill of his regimental officers. He held the 
bridge of the Coa successfully when he had crossed it, and lost 
no more than 300 men ; but he had disobeyed orders and 
risked his division. Wellington was justly displeased, and 
let his lieutenant know it. But he did not rebuke him in 
his dispatches, and continued him in his command. He 
wrote home in a confidential letter, " You wiU say, ' Why 
not accuse Craufurd ? ' I answer, ' Because if I am to be 
hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man who meant well, and 
whose error was one of judgment, not of intention.' " 
But for the future he kept Craufurd nearer to himself, and 
did not place him so far away that he had much chance of 
trying strategical experiments on his own responsibihty. 
Even so, there were other occasions on which the general's 
proneness to think for himself got him into trouble. One 
was on September 25, 1811, on the day of the combat of 
El Bodon, when Craufurd, thrown forward into a hazardous 
position by his chief's orders, was twelve hours late in 
joining the main army. He had been told to make a night 
march, but waited till dawn, because he was moving in 
a difficult and broken country full of ravines and torrents, 
where he judged that movement in the dark was dangerous. 
By his delay the army was concentrated half a day later 

* All this comes from Shaw-Kennedy's Diary, which is printed 
at length in a most unlikely place, — the Appendix to Lord F. Fitz- 
"clarence's Manual of Outpost Duties, a book of the 1840's. 



Cbaufurd and Wellington 145 

than Wellington intended. " I am glad to see you safe," 
observed the Commander-in-Chief with some asperity, as 
the Light Division filed into the scantily manned position 
at Fuente Guinaldo. "Oh, I was in no danger, I assure 
you." " But / was, from your conduct," answered Wel- 
lington. Whereupon Craufurd remarked to his staff, " He's 
d— — d crusty to-day." * In this case it must be remarked, 
in justice to Craufurd, that it was his chief who had placed 
him in the hazardous position, not himself, and that his 
judgment that the night march was impracticable was very 
probably correct. But he had disobeyed an order, and it 
was remembered against him by the inflexible Wellington. 
Against these lapses must be set a long career of careful 
and scientific soldiering, with movements of brilliant 
manoeuvring, and sudden strokes, in which no other Peninsu- 
lar general could vie with him. The repulse of Ney's corps 
at Bussaco was perhaps the most glorious exploit of Crau- 
furd and his Light Division. The way in which the French 
on this occasion were detained and harassed by light 
troopsj and then, just as they reached the crest of the 
position, charged and swept downhill by the rush of a 
much inferior force, launched at the right moment, was a 
beautiful example of tactics. The most astonishing part 
of it was that, by his careful choice of a position, and 
judicious concealment of his line till the critical minute, 
Craufurd beat his enemy with hardly any loss ; he had 
only 177 casualties, the French opposed to him over 1200. 
Yet there was another feat which, though less showy, was 
probably an even greater example of tactical skill than the 
stroke at Bussaco. This was the advance and retreat of 
the Light Division at Fuentes de Onoro (May 5, 1811), 
when Craufurd was sent out of the main British position 
to rescue the 7th Division, which was cut off and nearly 
surrounded by an overwhelming force of French cavalry. 
Having disengaged the compromised division, Craufurd 

* See LarpenVs Journal, p. 85, and Alex. Craufurd's Life of 
General Robert Craufurd, pp. 184, 185. 

L 



146 Wellington's Lieutenants 

had to retreat back to the main body with five brigades 
of fine cavalry, aided by horse artillery, surging round him 
on all sides, and seeking for an opportunity to burst in. 
To retreat in square across two miles of open plateau, very 
well adapted for the action of horsemen, was a delicate 
and dangerous task. Yet Craufurd achieved it with perfect 
security, and brought in his whole division to Wellington's 
position with a loss of less than fifty men. As an exhibition 
of nerve and skill it even exceeded Picton's retreat at El 
Bodon, for the French horse on this occasion were more 
numerous, and flushed with previous success, and the Light 
Division was a smaller body than the 3rd division by 4000 
men to 5200. The distance covered, however, during the 
crisis of retreat at Fuentes was much shorter, only two miles 
to seven at El Bodon. 

Craufurd fell in action before 1812 was many days old, 
being killed by a chance shot while watching and directing 
the storm of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo from the 
further side of the glacis (January 19). Otherwise his 
pecuHar talents would no doubt have been exhibited in 
commanding the rear-guard during the retreat from Burgos, 
and the advance during the campaign of Vittoria. The 
character of the fighting in the Pyrenees would also have 
suited admirably his particular style of management. He 
v/as bitterly missed by his officers, Charles Alten, his 
successor in command of the Light Division being a general 
of much more pedestrian quafity,* who might never fail to 
make an attempt to obey Wellington's orders to the best 
of his ability, but could never supplement them by any 
improvisation of his own, of which he was incapable. The 
operations of the Light Division after Crauf urd's death were 
always admirable so far as the conduct of officers and men 
went, but there was no longer any genius in the way in which 
they were led. 

* William Napier refused to subscribe to a testimonial to Alten 
at the end of the war, openly saying that he saw no sufficient merit 
in him. 



Craufurd's Faults 147 

Craufurd, unlike Hill or Graham, and like his rival 
Picton, had many enemies. He was a strict disciplinarian, 
to his officers even more than to his men, and had a quick 
temper and a caustic tongue. His anger used to vent 
itself not in bursts of swearing, such as Picton would in- 
dulge in, but by well-framed and lucid speeches of bitter 
sarcasm, which probably gave more offence than any 
amount of oaths. Being a highly educated man, and a 
practised parhamentary speaker, he could put an amount 
of polished contempt into a rebuke which was not easily 
forgotten. It was probably this trick that made enemies 
of the Napiers, both of whom speak very bitterly of him 
in their diaries and other writings, though William Napier 
in his history gives him the due credit for his many briUiant 
achievements.* Several others of his officers speak bitterly 
of his intellectual arrogance ; one calls him a "tyrant " ; 
another says that he never forgot a grudge. But he had 
no fewer friends than enemies ; many of the best of his sub- 
ordinates, like Shaw Kennedy and Campbell, loved him well, 
and (what is more surprising) the rank and file, on whom 
his wrath often fell in the form of the lash, felt not only 
confidence but enthusiasm for him. The best of all his 
eulogies comes from a 95th man. Rifleman Harris, and is 
well worth quoting, for its simple manliness. 

*' I do not think I ever admired any man who wore the 
British uniform more than I did General Craufurd. I 
could fill a book ^dth descriptions of him, for I frequently 
had my eye upon him in the hurry of action. The Rifles 
liked him, but they feared him, for he could be terrible 
when insubordination showed itself in the ranks. ' You 
think because you are riflemen that you may do whatever 
you think proper,' said he one day to the miserable and 
savage crew around him on the retreat to Corunna ; ' but 

* For a bitter story of how his brigadiers, Barclay and Beckwith, 
spoke of him, see Moore-Smith's Life of Colborne, p. 174. Cf. too 
p. 35 of Hay's Reminiscences of 1808-15, for an anecdote of Crau- 
furd's occasional snubbing of his officers. Cf. also George Simm end's 
British Rifleman, pp. 26, 27. 



148 Wellhstgton's Lieutenants 

I'll teach you the difference before I have done with you.' 
I remember one evening during that retreat he detected 
two men straying away from the main body ; it was in 
an early stage of that disastrous flight, and Craufurd knew 
that he must keep his division together. He halted the 
brigade with a voice of thunder, ordered a drum-head 
court-martial on the instant, and they were sentenced to 
a hundred a-piece. While the hasty trial was taking place, 
Craufurd, dismounting from his horse, stood in the midst, 
looking stern and angry as a worried bulldog. He did not 
like retreating, that man. 

"When the trial was over, it was too dark to inflict 
the punishment. He marched all night on foot, and when 
morning dawned his hair, beard, and eyebrows were covered 
with the frost ; we were all in the same condition. Scarcely 
had dawn appeared when the general called a halt, among 
the snow on the hills. Ordering a square to be formed, he 
spoke to the brigade. 

" 'Although I shall obtain the good will neither of the 
officers nor of the men here by so doing, I am resolved to 
punish those men according to the sentence awarded, even 
though the French are at our heels. Begin with Daniel 
Howans.' 

" The men were brought out, and their Lieutenant- 
Colonel, Hamilton Wade, at the same time stepped forward, 
and lowering his sword, requested he would forgive these 
men, as they were both of them good soldiers, who had 
fought in all the battles of Portugal. ' I order you, sir,' 
said the general, * to do your duty. These men shall be 
punished. ' After seventy -iive lashes, Craufurd stopped the 
flogging. But before he put the brigade in motion again, 
he gave us another short address, pretty much after this 
style — 

" ' I give you all notice that I shall halt the brigade 
again the very first moment I perceive any man disobeying 
my orders, and try him by court-martial on the spot.' He 
then gave the word, and we resumed our march. 



Craufurd's Severity 149 

" Many who read this may suppose that it was a cruel 
and unnecessary severity, under the dreadful and harassing 
circumstances of that retreat : but I, who was there, a 
common soldier in the regiment to which these men belonged, 
say that it was quite necessary. No man but one formed 
of stuff like General Craufurd could have saved the brigade 
from perishing altogether. If he flogged two, he saved 
hundreds from death by his management." 

There was a curious anecdote concerning Craufurd's 
funeral pubhshed in the Saturday Review lately,* from the 
unpubhshed reminiscences of a contemporary, which illus- 
trates well enough the reverence with which the Light 
Division looked upon its old chief. One of his strongest 
principles had been that troops on the march must never 
make a detour to avoid fordable streams or deep mud, nor 
break their ranks to allow each man to pick shallow water, 
or hard stones among the wet. The delay so caused was, 
he held, such a hindrance to rapid movement that it must 
not be allowed. He had been known to flog men who 
straggled from the ranks in the water, in order to fill their 
bottles, or to stoop down to take a long drink, f He had 
even caused an officer, whom he caught evading a wetting 
by riding pick-a-back upon his soldier-servant, to be set 
down with a splash in the middle of a stream. | Coming 
back from Craufurd's funeral, the leading company of the 
Light Division passed by an excavation at the rear of the 
siege works, half -filled by mud and water. Instead of 
turning its end to avoid the wet, the men looked at the 
inundation, pulled themselves together, and marched 
straight through it, with great regularity and steadiness, 
as if they were passing before a general officer at a review. 
The whole division followed through the slush. It seemed 
to them that the best testimony to their old commander's 
memory was to honour his best-known foible, when he was 

* Jan. 20, 1912, in a letter from Colonel Willoughby Verner. 
t See Hay's Peninsvlar Eeminiscences, 1808-15. 
{See Rifleman Harris^ p. 206. 



150 Wellington's Lieutenants 

no longer there to enforce its acceptance by his usual 
drastic methods. 

I could write much more of this notable character, with 
all its faults and merits. But so much must suffice. Nor 
have I space to tell of the other senior generals of the 
Peninsular War, though some of them, such as Leith and 
Cole, were great fighting men, just the tools that suited 
WelUngton's hand. They were, however, never trusted 
with independent commands, so that it is impossible to 
judge of their full mental stature. I should be inclined to 
think very highly of Cole from his conduct at Albuera, for 
it was he who ordered, on his own responsibihty, without 
any permission from Beresford, the famous advance of the 
Fusiher Brigade and Harvey's Portuguese, which turned 
into a victory that most perilous battle.* But of most 
of WelUngton's divisional officers we can only say that they 
were competent for the task set them — the vigorous carry- 
ing out of orders which were given them, but in whose 
framing they had no part. At the most, tactical skill in 
execution can be attributed to them, and of this there 
was no lack, as witness details of Salamanca, Vittoria, and 
the scattered fighting in the Pyrenees. Almost as much 
can be predicted of some of the great brigadiers, who 
managed their details well, but never had the chance of 
showing their full powers. It would be easy to make a 
long list of them ; at least Kempt, Pack, Barns, Mackinnon, 
Colborne, Hay, Lumley, Ross, Halkett, Byng, Pakenham, 
Beckwith, and Barnard should be included in the list. 
Some of them died or were invalided early, others com- 
manded brigades at Waterloo again, but none, save Byng, 
of this string of names, was ever given permanent command 
of a division, though several of them had held the interim 
charge of one in the Peninsula, when their regular chiefs 
were sick or absent. Ross and Pakenham alone were 

* Hardinge advised the advance, but it was Cole who, being in 
responsible command, ordered and executed it. He it is who should 
have the credit both for the resolve and for the tactics. 



Some Unsatisfactory Subordinates 151 

promoted to a separate command, both in America. The 
former had charge of the expedition which went to the 
Potomac and Chesapeake in 1813-14 ; he took Washington 
by a vigorous stroke, but fell in action shortly after, while 
conducting an attack on Baltimore, which ceased when he 
fell. Pakenham's expedition to New Orleans was a series 
of misfortunes, of which some part at least must be attri- 
buted to his own fault. It is certain that Wellington never 
trained a general who proved himself a first-rate exponent 
of the art of war ; but his system (as we have said above) 
was not calculated to foster initiative or self-reliance among 
his Heutenants. 

Other subordinates Wellington possessed, of whom we 
can say that they were not up to their work, even in the 
carrying out of the orders given them with common self- 
reUance and clear-headedness. Such were Spencer and 
Slade, who were only capable of going forward to carry 
out a definite order ; it was necessary, so to speak, that 
they should simply be put like trams on a line, and shoved 
forward, or they would slacken the pace and come to a 
stop, from want of initiative and moving power. Some 
few, hke Sir Wilham Erskine, who was Wellington's pet 
aversion — yet irremovable because of the political influence 
that backed him — were positively dangerous from a com- 
bination of short-sightedness, carelessness, and self-will. 
In one dispatch WelHngton says that he thinks that he 
is a little v/rong in his head.* It is astounding that after 
Erskine's mistakes at Casal Novo and Sabugal, Welhngton 
did not get rid of him at all costs ; but he simply tried to 
shunt him on to commands where it was unlikely that he 
could do much harm, and continued solemnly to rehearse 
his name with approval in his dispatches, along with those 
of all other officers of his rank, till the unfortunate man 
committed suicide, in a moment of insanity, in the interval 
between the campaigns of 1812 and 1813. This was the 

* See Wellington to Torrens (the patronage secretary at the Horse 
Guards), August 4, 1810. 



152 Wellington's Lieutenants 

strongest case of difficulty which WelHngton, for reasons 
of pohtics and patronage at home, did not care to face by 
the decisive step of sending home the general in disgrace. 
But there were several brigadier-generals whom he had not 
asked for, whom he disliked, and whose departure from the 
Peninsula he saluted with a small psalm of thanksgiving in 
his private letters.* It is certainly astonishing that, even 
after 1811, he was not given a free hand to get rid of sub- 
ordinates whom he knew to be incompetent or recalcitrant, 
any more than he was given the power to promote officers 
without a tedious reference to the Horse Guards, It is 
true that in the later years of the war his recommendations 
were generally (but not always) carried out ; yet it took 
whole months for a request made in a letter from Salamanca 
or Madrid to reach London, to be there acceded to, and 
then to take effect by a pubHcation of the Gazette. The 
power to punish or reward with promptness was never 
granted ; there w^as always a long delay. And both 
punishment and reward lose much of their salutary effect 
when there is an interval of months between the act and its 
consequence. Napoleon had a unique advantage in being 
at once the commander-in-chief and the dispenser of 
favours and chastisement ; with him there v/as no time lost 
in lengthy reference to a home government. 

* See, e.gr., Wellington, Dispatches^ vi., under Oct. 4, 1810. 
Among the generals whose departure he \'ievred (for various reasons) 
with equanimity, were Sir Robert Wilson, Lightbume, Tilson, and 
Nightingale. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY : HEADQUARTERS 

HAViNa dealt with the greater personaUties among Welling- 
ton's lieutenants, it remains that we should speak of the 
organization by which his army was set in motion. 

Some great commanders have trusted much to their 
staff, and have kept their ablest subordinates about their 
person. This was pre-eminently not the case with Welling- 
ton : he was as averse to providing himself with a regular 
chiei-of-the-staff, as he was to allowing a formal second-in- 
command to accompany his army. The duties which 
would, according to modem ideas, fall to the chief-of-the- 
staff, were by him divided between three officers, one of 
whom was of quite junior standing, and only one of whom 
held a higher rank than that of colonel. These officers were 
the Mihtary Secretary, the Quartermaster-General, and the 
Adjutant-General. 

The Military Secretary was merely responsible for the 
correct drawing out, and the trrvusmission to the proper 
person or department, of the correspondence of the com- 
mander-in-chief. The post was held from April 27, 1809, 
to September 19, 1810, by Lieutenant -Colonel Bathurst, of 
the 60th. On the last-named date he went home on leave, 
and Captain Lord Fitzroy Somerset was given the status 
of acting-secretary, and confirmed as actual secretary three 
months later on January 1, 1811. This officer, better 
remembered by his later title as the Lord Raglan of the 
Crimean War, held the office till the end of the war — by 
which time he had reached tbe rank of colonel. He was 



154 Organization : Headquaeters 

one of Wellington's best-trusted subordinates, and his 
personal friend, but being very young, and junior in rank 
to all heads of departments, he was in no sense an appreciable 
factor in Wellington's conduct of the war. In fact, he was 
nothing more than his title of secretary indicated, and was 
in no way responsible for organization, or entitled to offer 
advice. 

Much more important were the two great heads of 
departments, the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant- 
General. The former was charged with all matters relating 
to the embarkation or disembarkation, the equipment, 
quartering, halting, encamping, and route -marching of the 
various units of the army. He had to convey to all generals 
in command of them the orders of the general-in-chief, 
and for this purpose had under his control a number of 
officers bearing the clumsy titles of assistant-quartermaster- 
generals, and deputy-assistant-quartermaster-generals. Of 
the former there were five, of the latter seven, when the 
army was first organized in April, 1809, but their numbers 
were continually increasing all through the war, for each unit 
had an assistant-quartermaster-general and a deputy- 
assistant -quartermaster-general attached to it, and as the 
divisions and brigades grew in number, so did the officers 
of the Quartermaster-General's department told off to them. 
There was also a parallel growth in the number of those who 
remained at headquarters, directly attached to their chief. 

There is an interesting minute by Wellington, laying 
down the relations between the divisional generals and the 
staff-officers of the department : he points out that, though 
the latter are the organs of headquarters in dealing with 
divisions, yet they are under the command of the divisional 
general : and the responsibility both for the orders given 
through them being carried out, and for their acts in 
general, lies with the division-commander. " Every staff 
officer," he says, " must be considered as acting under the 
direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer 
for whose assistance he is employed, and who is responsible 



The Quartermaster-General 155 

for his acts. To consider the relative situation of the 
general officer and the stafif officer in any other light, would 
tend to alter the nature of the Service, and, in fact, might 
give the command of the troops to a subaltern staff officer 
instead of to their general officer." * 

The officers of the Quartermaster-General's department, 
besides their duties with regard to the moving of the army, 
or the detachments of it, had often to undertake independent 
work at a distance from headquarters, and sometimes 
remote from the theatre of war. It was they who made 
topographical surveys, reports on roads and bridges, and 
on the resources of districts through which the army might 
have to move in the near or distant future. There was 
issued early in 1810 a little manual called Instructions for 
the officers in the department of the Quartermaster-General 
which was given to all its members : it contains a selection 
of orders and forms, relating to every possible duty with 
which its recipients might be entrusted. The most interest- 
ing section is that on topographical surveys, to which there 
is annexed a model report of the road from Truxillo to 
Merida, containing notes on everything which a staff officer 
ought to notice, — positions, defiles, size of villages, character 
of sections of the road, amount of corn-land as opposed 
to pasture or waste, warnings as to unhealthy spots, notes 
as to the depth of rivers and the practicabihty of fords, etc. 
So far as I can ascertain, WeUington had only two 
Quartermaster-Generals during the whole of the long period 
of his supreme command. Colonel George Murray of the 
3rd Guards held the post from April, 1809, to May 28, 
1812 : he must be carefuUy distinguished from two other 
Murray s, who sometimes turn up in the dispatches. One 
is Major-General John Murray, who commanded a brigade 
in the Oporto campaign, went home because he considered 
that Beresford had been unjustly promoted over his head, 
and came out later to the Peninsula on the Catalan side, 
where he was responsible for the mismanaged operations 
* Minute on p. 572 of the Collected General Orders. 



156 Organization ; Headquarters 

about Tarragona. The other is John Murray, the Com- 
missary-General. When Welhngton sometimes uses such 
a phrase in his dispatches as "Murray knows this," or "see 
that Murray is informed," it is often most difficult to be sure 
which of the three men is meant. Early in 1811 Colonel 
George Murray became a major-general, and in the following 
May he appears to have gone home. He was replaced as 
Quartermaster-General by Colonel James Gordon — who, 
again, must not be confused ^\ith Colonel Sir Alexander 
Gordon, who was one of Wellington's senior aides-de-camp, 
and was killed at Waterloo. This is another of the con- 
fusions between homonyms which often give trouble. If a 
diarist speaks of " Colonel Gordon " we have to find which 
of the two is meant. James Gordon, having acted as 
quartermaster-general from May, 1811, to January, 1813, 
went home, and George Murray, returning early in that 
year, worked out the remaining fifteen months of the war 
in his old position. 

Parallel with the Quartermaster-General was the other 
great departmental chief at headquarters, the Adjutant- 
General, whose sphere of activity was disciplinary and 
statistical. He was charged with all the detail of duties 
to be distributed, with the collecting and compiling for the 
use of the commander-in-chief of all returns of men and 
horses in " morning states," etc., with the supreme super- 
vision of the discipline of the army, and with much official 
correspondence that did not pass to the Military Secretary. 
Roughly speaking, the internal condition of the troops fell 
to his share, while their movement belonged to the Quarter- 
master-General. He had to aid him on the first organization 
of the army in 1809, eight assistant-adjutant-generals and six 
deputy-assistant-adjutant-generals, but (as in the Quarter- 
master-General's department) the number of subordinates 
mounted up, as the war went on, and new units were from 
time to time created, since an assistant-adjutant-general 
was attached to each division. 

The first holder of the offi9e was Major-General the Hon. 



The Adjutant-General 157 

Charles Stewart (afterwards Lord Londonderry, the earhest 
historian of the Peninsular War), who was discharging its 
functions from April, 1809, till April, 1813, just four years. 
He was then sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin, and 
Wellington offered the post to his own brother-in-law, 
Major-General Edward Pakenham, who, while in charge of 
the 3rd division, had made the decisive charge at Salamanca. 
Pakenham was adjutant-general for the last year of the 
war, April, 1813, to April, 1814, and went straight out from 
Bordeaux to command the unlucky New Orleans expedition, 
in which he lost his life. 

It will be noted that WelHngton had actually only two 
Quartermaster-Generals and two Adjutant- Generals under 
him during the five years of his Peninsular command — a 
sufficient proof that when he had found his man he stuck 
to him. Charles Stewart, who served him so long, was a 
person of some political importance, as the brother and 
confidant of Lord Castlereagh. In the early part of his 
tenure of office he seems sometimes to have made suggestions 
to his chief, but met little encouragement, for Wellington 
loved his o^^^l way, and was not to be influenced even by his 
own highest staff officers.* He did not wish to have a 
Gneisenau or a Moltke at his side : he only wanted zealous 
and competent chief clerks. 

Attached to headquarters in addition to the three great 
functionaries already named, were the heads of several other 
departments of great importance. These were — 

(1) The general officer commanding the Royal Artillery, 
who had a general supervisory charge of the batteries 
attached to the divisions, and a more specific control of 
the battering train and reserve artillery, when these came 
into existence in 1811, as well as of the ammunition columns. 
The first artillery chief was Brigadier- General E. Howarth, 
who arrived at Lisbon in 1809, about the same time as 
WelHngton himself. He was promoted major-general in 

* Stewart chafed at liis checks, and wrote bitterly to Castlereagh 
about the insignificance of his position. 



158 Okganization : Headquarters 

1811, and went home that year. The command then went 
through a rapid succession of hands. Howarth was followed 
by Major-General Borthwick, who apparently crossed 
Wellington, and went home in March, 1812, after less than 
a year's tenure of the post. Borthwick was succeeded by 
Colonel H. Framingham, and he within a few months by 
Colonel G. B. Fisher, who (like Borthwick) fell out with 
the commander-in-chief, and applied for leave to go home 
in the autumn of 1813. Wellington then appointed Colonel 
Alexander Dickson to the command in September. This 
officer had been for the last two years in charge of the 
Portuguese artillery under Beresford. He had given such 
satisfaction at Rodrigo and Badajoz that Wellington re- 
transferred him to the British service, and finished the 
campaign of 1814 with Dickson in chief charge of this 
branch. 

(2) After the artillery chief we encounter as a prominent 
figure at headquarters the commanding officer of Royal 
Engineers. He had the superintending duty over his own 
staff and the engineer officers attached to the divisions, and 
control over the " Royal Military Artificers," as the rank 
and file of the scientific corps were named till 1812, when they 
changed their title to Royal Sappers and Miners.* The 
commanding engineer had also charge over the engineers' 
park and the pontoon train. The officer who held this post 
from 1809 till he was killed at St. Sebastian in September, 
1813, was Colonel Richard Fletcher, who has left a fame 
behind him as the designer of the Lines of Torres Vedras. 
On his death the command fell to Lieut. -Colonel Elphinstone, 
who was responsible for the celebrated bridge of boats 
across the mouth of the Adour which made the siege of 
Bayonne possible in 1814. 

(3, 4) At headquarters were also to be found the officers 

commanding the Staff Corps Cavalry, and the Corps of 

Guides. The former, a small unit of some 200 men, created 

in 1812, discharged the pohce duties of the army, and were 

* See Chapter XVIII. on Sieges, p. 286. 



Minor Heads of Departments 159 

worked along with the Provost Marshal. They were occa- 
sionally also employed as orderlies, and in other confidential 
positions.* The Guides were a small body also, some 
150 or 200 strong, partly British, partly Portuguese, the 
latter preponderating. They were detached in twos or 
threes, to act as interpreters as well as guides to bodies of 
troops moving in country not known to them. For this 
reason they had to be bihngual, either Enghsh knowing 
some Portuguese, or Portuguese knowing some Enghsh, as 
they had always to be acting as intermediaries between the 
army and the peasantry, in making inquiries about roads, 
supphes, etc. The officer commanding the Guides had also 
the charge of the post office, and the transmission of letters 
to and from the front. 

(5) The Provost Marshal was also attached to head- 
quarters : he had charge of all prisoners to be tried by general 
court-martial, of deserters, and prisoners of war. He had 
powers of jurisdiction on offenders caught red-handed, but 
as Wellington remarks, '' Whatever may be the crime of 
which a soldier is guilty, the Provost Marshal has not the 
power of inflicting summary punishment for it, unless he 
should see him in the act of committing it." f Men 
arrested on evidence only, had to be tried by court-martials. 
For the better management of these last, Welhngton added a 
Judge- Advocate -General to his staff in 1812, whose duty 
was to see that trials were conducted with proper forms and 
due appreciation of the vahdity of evidence — in which the 
commander-in-chief considered that they had often failed. 
Mr. Francis Larpent, who has left an interesting diary of 
his duties and his personal adventures, discharged the 

* For special note as to the functions of the " Staff Corps of 
Cavabry " raised in March, 1813, see the General Order of that date. 
This body must be carefully distinguished from the Staff Corps, 
concerning which see Fortescue's British Army, iv. p, 881 : it was 
a kind of subsidiary corps of military artificers, independent of the 
Ordnance Office to which "Royal Military Artificers" belonged. 
This was a vicious duplication of parallel organizations. 

t General Order, Freneda, Nov. 1, 1811. 



180 OnaANizATioN : Headquarters 

function of this office from his arrival late in 1812 down t5 
the end of the war.* 

As to aides-de-camp, Wellington kept a very limited 
number of them — he only employed soilie twenty in the 
course of the war, and not more than eight or ten at once. 
They were nearly all young men of the great political 
families, t nearly half of them were Guards' officers, and 
the rest mostly belonged to the cavalry. The Prince of 
Orange served among them in 1811-12. None of them, 
save Lord Fitzroy Somerset (Lord Raglan) and Colonel 
Cadogan, came to any very great mihtary position or 
reputation. 

So much for the mihtary side of headquarters. There 
were also attached to it seven civil departments, small and 
great, of which it may be well to give a list. On one or 
two of these we shall have to speak at some length in later 
chapters — notably the Commissariat and the Medical 
department. They consisted of — 

(1) The Medical Department under an Inspector of 
Hospitals, who was in general charge of the physicians, 
surgeons, assistants, etc., attached to the various units of 
the army. There is an excellent account of the management 
of this department, and all its difficulties, in the Autobio- 
grapliy of Sir James McGrigor, chief of the Medical Staff 
in 1812-13-14. His predecessor since Wellington's first 
landing in 1809 was Dr. Frank, who was invalided in the 
autumn of 1811. 

(2) The Purveyor's Department was independent of the 
medical, though it might well have been attached to it : 
the establishment consisted of a Purveyor to the Forces, 
with deputies and assistants, who had charge of the hospitals 
and all the material and details required for them — from 

* Privaie Journal of Judge-Advocate Larpent, 1812-14, published 
London, 1853. 

t Names may suffice to show the class from which they ward 
drawn : Marquis of Worcester, Lord March, Bathurst, Bouverie, 
Burghersh, Canning, Manners, Stanhope, Fremantle, Gordon, 
de Burgh, Cadogan, Fitzroy Somerset. 



The Commissariat 161 

the drugs for the sick to the burial expenses of the 
dead. 

(3) The Paymaster-General, with his assistants, was 
responsible for the transnaission of the money received to 
the regimental paymasters of the various units. He was a 
much-worried man, generally from three to six months in 
arrears with his specie, from no fault of his own, but from 
the immense difficulty of obtaining the hard dollars, doub- 
loons, and "cruzados novos," which alone had currency in 
the Peninsula till a late period in the war. It was useless 
to issue English money to the troops, for the natives would 
not accept crowns and guineas, and refused even to look at 
the one-pound notes which were almost the sole circulating 
medium in Great Britain during this period. It was only 
in a late year of the war that the gold guinea was at last 
tariffed by the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, and 
became readily current.* 

(4) Most important of all the Civil Departments was 
the Commissariat, under the Commissary-General, who had 
under him Deputy-Commissary-Generals, Assistant and 
Deputy- Assistant-Commissaries, Commissariat Clerks, and 
many other subordinates. The department was divided 
into two branches, stores and accounts. The post of 
Commissary-General was successively held by John Murray 
(already mentioned above) from 1809 to June, 1810, by 
Kennedy from June, 1810, to September, 1811, and by 
Bisset from September, 1811, onward. An assistant com- 
missary was attached to each brigade of infantry and 
each regiment of cavalry, but a single official had to attend 
to the needs of the whole of the artillery with the army, 
and another to the needs of headquarters.! 

The whole future of the army in 1809 depended on 
whether the Commissariat Department would be able to 
rise to the height of its duties. It was absolutely neces- 
sary that Welhngton should be able to keep his army 

* See note on page 270 of chapter xvi on " Impedimenta." 
t See General Order of May 4, 1809. 

M 



162 Organization : Headquarters 

concentrated, if this small force of 20,000 or 30,000 men was 
to be of any weight in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. 
The much-cursed and criticized Commissariat succeeded in 
doing its duty, and the length of time for which the British 
army could keep concentrated was the envy of the French, 
who, living on the country, were forced to disperse whenever 
they had exhausted the resources of the particular region 
in which they were massed. In a way this fact was the 
key to the whole war. Wellington's salvation lay in the 
fact that he could hold his entire army together, while his 
adversaries could not. On this advantage he relied again 
and again : his whole strategy depended upon it. How 
the Commissariat worked we shall show in a later chapter. 

(5) The Storekeeper-General had charge of the field 
equipments, tents, and heavy baggage of the army. Often 
the heavy baggage was left at Lisbon, and all through 
1809-10-11 no tents were taken to the front. It was only 
in the Vittoria and South-French campaigns that the whole 
army regularly carried them. In the days when the 
transport trains were not fully organized, it was necessary 
to leave even valuable impedimenta behind. 

(6) To the Controller of Army Accounts all departments, 
save the Commissariat, rendered their statistics of money 
received and spent. 

(7) Last, we may name the Press, for a travelling Press 
and a small staff of military printers accompanied the 
headquarters when possible, and printed general orders, 
and other documents and forms, of which many copies 
were required. I have seen much of its work at the Record 
Office,* but have never come across an account of its organi- 
zation, or of any anecdotes of its wandering fife, in which it 
must have passed through many vicissitudes. The press 
was under the general supervision of the Adjutant-General. 

* Its most ambitious efforts were a small volume of maps printed 
at Cambray, during the occupation of France after Waterloo, with 
notes by Col. Carmichael Smith, R.E., and the General Orders for 
1815, printed at Paris, by Sergeant Buchan, 3rd Guards, head 
printer to the Army of Occupation. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE OEGANIZATION OF THE ARMY : BRIGADES AND DIVISIONS 

It will probably surprise some readers to learn that Sir 
Arthur Wellesley fought out the first campaign in which 
he held supreme command, that of Oporto in May, 1809, 
with no higher organized unit than the brigade. But this 
is the fact : the 18,000 infantry of which he could dispose 
were distributed into eight brigades of two or three battalions 
each, varying in strength from 1400 up to 2500 bayonets. 
But Wellesley was not so belated, in faihng to form divisions, 
as might be thought. They were still rather an abnormal 
than a usual unit for a British army : indeed, in the large 
majority of the expeditions in which Great Britain had 
been engaged since 1793, the numbers were so small that 
no unit above the brigade had been necessary. But it is 
notable that neither in the Duke of York's first expedition 
to the Netherlands in 1793-94, nor in his second in 1799, 
nor in Abercrombie's Egyptian Campaign of 1801 had 
divisions been formed — though in each of these cases a 
very large force had been assembled. When several 
brigades acted together, not under the immediate eye of 
the commander-in-chief, the senior brigadier present took 
temporary charge of the assemblage. In the Low Countries 
York generally speaks of his army as being divided into 
'* columns " of two or three brigades each,* but there was no 
fixity in the arrangement. Abercrombie, on the other hand, 
in the last dispatch which he wrote before his victory and 
death at Alexandria, lays down the theoretical organization 

* See, for example, York's Alkmaar dispatch of Oct. 6, 1799. 



164 Okganization : Brigades and Divisions 

that the army is to be considered as being divided into 
three " lines " — the first composed of three brigades, the 
second and third of two each. If the word division is used 
in any official documents of these campaigns, the term has 
no technical mihtary sense, but is used as a vague synonym 
for a section or part of the army.* Indeed, so far as I know, 
the first British force during the great French War which 
was formed into divisions, in the proper modem sense, was 
the army which went on the Copenhagen Expedition of 
1807, which was regularly distributed into four of such 
units, each under a lieutenant-general, and each composed 
of two, three, or four weak brigades, generally of only two 
battalions. This was a force of some 26,000 men. 

The original Peninsular Army of 1808, which landed at 
the mouth of the Mondego, and won the battle of Vimeiro, 
was not far, therefore, from being the first British force 
organized in divisions. It may be noted that they were 
rather theoretical than real, for several brigades had not 
yet landed when Vimeiro was fought, and Wellesley, while 
in temporary command, worked the incomplete army on a 
brigade system : no trace whatever of the use of the 
divisions as real units will be found in that battle. Indeed, 
even the theoretical composition of some of the brigades 
differed from that actually seen in action. No genuine 
divisions were formed in the Peninsula, till Sir John Moore 
took command of the army from which its old chiefs, Dal- 
rymple, Burrand and Wellesley himself had been removed 
and sent home. We must not, therefore, be surprised 
to find that for three months after he landed at Lisbon in 
April, 1809, Wellesley worked his 21,000 British troops in 
detached brigades, only connected in a formal and temporary 
way, under the senior brigadier, when two or more chanced 
to form a marching or fighting unit. 

But two other points concerning Wellesley's Oporto 

* E.g. in Walsh's Expedition to Holland in 1799, p. 22, the whole 
original landing force of the British, 15,000 bayonets, is called the 
" first division," but only in contrast to the troops not yet landed, 
not technically. 



The Original Four Divisions 165 

campaign deserve notice. This was the first and only 
occasion on which he tried the experiment of mixing British 
and Portuguese regiments in the same brigade.* To five of 
the eight brigades forming his infantry a Portuguese 
battaUon was attached, picked as being one of the best of 
the rather disorderly assembly which Beresford had collected 
at Abrantes and Thomar. Though the Portuguese fought 
not amiss during this short campaign, and are mentioned 
with praise in Wellesley's dispatches, yet the experiment 
was not continued, evidently because it was found not to 
work happily. The five Portuguese battalions were sent 
back to Beresford not long after the fall of Oporto. 

The other point to be noted in considering Wellesley's 
organization of his army in the Oporto campaign, is that 
already he had begun the system of strengthening his 
skirmishers by the addition to them of a rifle company per 
brigade, all taken from the 5/60th. The importance of 
this arrangement in the general scheme of his tactics has 
been already explained in an earlier chapter, f 

So much for Wellesley's first organization of his army. 
It did not endure for so much as three months, for on 
June 18, 1809, a General Order, dated from the Adjutant- 
General's office at Abrantes, gave to the army the organiza- 
tion in divisions, under which it was to win all its subsequent 
victories. In the midst of some insignificant directions as 
to forage and ammunition, appears the clause that " as 
the weather now admits of the troops hutting, and they 
can move together in large bodies, brigades can be formed 
into divisions, as follows." 

The original disposition was for four divisions only, of 
which the first consisted of four brigades, the other three 
of two brigades each. All the battahons in them were in 
the British service, no Portuguese being included. The 

* With the exception, of course, that the 1st and 3rd Capador 
battalions served all through the war in the two brigades of the 
Light Division. 

t See p. 83. 



166 Organization : Brigades and Divisions 

four line battalions of the King's German Legion were 
arranged first as one, and then as two brigades of the First 
Division. Of the ten brigades into which the infantry of 
the army were now divided, seven had two battaHons only, 
the other three three battalions each. The cavalry, which 
had recently been increased by the arrival of two regiments 
from England, was organized as a division of three brigades 
of two regiments each. The artillery, of which only five 
field batteries (or " companies " as they were then called) 
had reached the front, was not yet told off to the individual 
divisions in a permanent fashion, though certain units are 
generally found acting with the same division. 

As to the command of the divisions, Wellington con- 
templated that each should ultimately be in the charge of 
a lieutenant-general ; but as he had only three officers of 
such rank at his disposition — Hill, Sherbrooke, and the 
cavalry commander Payne — the General Order directs that 
" the senior general officers of brigades will respectively 
take the command of the division in which their brigades 
are placed, till other lieutenant-generals shall join the army." 
This placed two brigadiers, McKenzie and A. Campbell, 
in temporary charge of the 3rd and 4th divisions, Sherbrooke 
taking the 1st, and Hill the 2nd. Sherbrooke went home 
before a year was out, but Hill was to remain in command 
of the 2nd division throughout the war, except during the 
short periods when he was on leave. But during his last 
three years in the Peninsula, when he was practically acting 
as commander of an army corps, the 2nd division was, in 
fact, under the leadership of Wilham Stewart as his sub- 
stitute. The only modification caused in internal organi- 
zation by the creation of the new divisions was that an 
assistant-adjutant-general, and quartermaster-general, and a 
provost-marshal were attached to each of them, and that 
the brigadiers acting as division-commanders were authorized 
to take on some extra aides-de-camp. 

It was with this organization that WelHngton's army 
went through the Talavera campaign, and the retreat to 



Rearrangements after Talavera 167 

the Guadiana which terminated it. The whole force was 
British, no single Portuguese battalion accompanying it. 
The troops of that nation were being employed under 
Beresford during this summer, to cover the frontier of 
Beira, between the Douro and the Tagus. Long before 
the campaign was over, more British reinforcements had 
begun to arrive at Lisbon, and had been pushed forward 
some distance into the interior. One brigade, that com- 
posed of the three light battalions,* under Robert Craufurd, 
afterwards to be famous in Peninsular annals as the nucleus 
of the " Light Division," got to the front after a tremendous 
march — somewhat exaggerated by Napier and by tradition 
— only a day after the battle of Talavera. Wellesley incor- 
porated it for a movement in the 3rd division, in which it 
finished the campaign. There were seven other battahons t 
which did not get so far forward, and ultimately joined 
Beresford's Portuguese on the frontier of Spain. In 
September Wellington drew down these troops to join him 
in Estremadura, and made from them a third brigade 
each for his 2nd and 4th Divisions. But there was about 
this time a shifting about of battahons from division to 
division, which it would be tedious to give in detail. The 
net result was that at the end of 1809 WeUington had four 
much stronger divisions than he had possessed in the 
summer, the 1st counting nine battahons instead of its old 
eight, the 2nd ten instead of six, the 3rd still six, but the 
4th eight instead of five. 

The early months of 1810 were spent by Welhngton in 
an expectant attitude, behind the Portuguese frontier, as 
he waited for the inevitable French invasion under Massena, 
so long announced and so long delayed. In this time of 
long-deferred anxiety, while the Lines of Torres Vedras were 
being busily urged towards completion, Welhngton carried 
out some most important changes in the organization of 

* l/43rd, l/52nd, l/95th. 

t 2/5th, 1/1 1th, 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/39th, 2/42nd 2/50th. The 
l/40th and 2/24th joined Wellington in time for Talavera. 



168 Organization : Brigades and Divisions 

his army, which made it (except in the matter of mere 
numbers) exactly what it was to remain till the end of the 
war. 

The most notable of these changes was that he made 
up his mind to revert to his old plan of April, 1809, for 
mixing the Portuguese and British troops. It took a new 
form, however : instead of placing battalions of each 
nationality side by side in his brigades, he attached a 
Portuguese brigade of four or five battalions to most of 
his British divisions, as a distinct unit. This system was 
started with the 3rd and 4th Divisions on Feb. 22, 1810. A 
complete Portuguese brigade consisted of two line regiments 
(each of two battalions) and one caQador or rifle battalion. 
The latter was always employed for the brigade's skirmishing 
work ; when joined by the four light companies of the line 
battalions, it gave a very heavy proportion of light troops 
to the unit. This Wellington considered necessary, because 
of the untried quality of the whole Portuguese Army, 
which had not yet taken a serious part in any general 
action. In the autumn they justified Wellington's con- 
fidence in them at the battle of Bussaco, where all of them, 
and especially the two cayador battalions attached to the 
Light Division, played a most creditable part. 

The second great innovation made in the spring of 
1810 was the creation of the celebrated Light Division, 
which came into existence on Feb. 22, 1810 ; it was formed 
by taking Robert Craufurd's brigade, the l/43rd, l/52nd, 
and l/95th out of the 3rd division, and adding to them the 
above-mentioned two Portuguese caQador battalions. Well- 
ington's design was to produce for the whole army, by the 
institution of this new unit, what he had already done for 
the individual brigades when he added their rifle companies 
to them in April, 1809. The Light Division was to be, as 
it were, the protective screen for the whole army, — its 
strategical skirmishing line, thrown out far in front of the 
rest of the host, to keep off the French till the actual moment 
of battle, and to hide the dispositions of the main body. 



The Light Division 169 

At the head of this small corps of picked light troops was 
placed Robert Craufurd, whom Wellington rightly con- 
sidered his best officer for outpost and reconnaissance work. 
How well this trusted subordinate discharged the duty laid 
upon him has been told in the chapter deahng mth his 
character and exploits. All through the war Wellington 
used the Light Division as his screen, for his advanced guard 
when he was moving to the front, for his rearguard when 
he was on the retreat, and he was never betrayed by it, 
even after Craufurd's death had left its conduct in the 
hands of chiefs who were not always men of special ability. 

After the creation of the Light Division, Wellington 
had five instead of four divisions, and another was added 
to them in the summer of 1810, when in August he created 
the 5th Division, so long commanded by General Leith. 
This was formed by adding to a British brigade, newly 
arrived from England,* two of the hitherto unattached 
Portuguese brigades. A second British brigade was pro- 
\4ded in October for Leith, from troops newly come from 
Cadiz.! These having come to hand, the 5th Di\dsion 
dropped one of its Portuguese brigades, and became a unit 
of the normal shape and size, two-thirds British, one-third 
Portuguese. It did not, however, receive its ca9ador 
battahon (dra^\^l from the Lusitanian Legion) till 1811. 

During the campaign of Bussaco, therefore, Wellington 
had six divisions — the old ones numbered 1st to 4th, the 
Light Division, and the newly-created 5th. In addition to 
the Portuguese brigades which had now been absorbed into 
the divisions, there remained six more brigades of that 
nation which were stiU unattached. Of these two, under the 
Brigadiers Archibald Campbell and Fonseca, were formed 
into a division under General Hamilton, which always 
marched with Hill's 2nd Division, but was never formally 
made part of it. But since Hamilton invariably moved 

* The original British brigade of the 5th division consisted of the 
3/lst, l/9th, and 2/3 8th. 

t The 2/30th and 2/44th, to which the l/4th was subsequently 
added. 



170 Oeganization : Brigades and Divisions 

along with Hill, this pair of units, with their ten British and 
eight Portuguese battalions, practically formed a double 
division, or a small army corps, if a term which WelUngton 
never used in the Peninsula may be applied to it.* There 
remained four more independent Portuguese brigades, 
those of Pack, Alex. Campbell, Coleman, and Bradford. 
By the next year these were reduced to two, as one brigade 
Avas withdrawn to serve with the new British 7th division, 
and another with the 2nd. The surviving units continued as 
unattached brigades till the end of the war, under a series 
of commanding officers, whose succession is sometimes hard 
to follow, t They often accompanied the main army, but 
were sometimes separated from it for special duties, when 
some force less than a division was wanted, as a detachment 
for a subsidiary operation. 

The completion of the Peninsular Army in its final 
shape, which was not again to be varied, took place during 
its stay by the Lines of Torres Vedras, in the winter of 
1810-11. It was then that the two Junior divisions were 
created, the 6th in October, the 7th early in March. Their 
appearance in the field was, of course, due to the arrival of 
a considerable number of fresh battalions from England 
during the autumn and winter. But Wellington did not 
take all the new-comers and build up fresh divisions from 
them. The 6th Division was made by taking an old brigade 
(Archibald Campbell's) from the 4th Division, and uniting 
it to the extra Portuguese brigade of the 5th Division. { 
The second British brigade of the 6th division was provided 
some months later from newly-arrived troops from England. § 

* The name Army-Corps appears first in the Waterloo Campaign 
of 1815. 

t The succession of brigadiers seems to have been, in the one 
brigade, Pack followed by Wilson and Alex. Campbell ; in the other 
Bradford continued almost through the whole war, but McMahon 
was in command in part of 1811-12. In 1812-14 Ashworth's 
Brigade was regularly attached to the 2nd division. 

X Now no longer wanted, as Leith had received his second 
British brigade. 

§ 2nd, l/36th, and (added long months after) the l/32nd. 



Creation of 6th and 7th Divisions 171 

The 4th Division was compensated for the brigade it had 
given to the 6th by taking over a brigade (Pakenham's) 
from the 1st Division — Avhile the 1st Division, to replace this 
last unit, received three battalions * which had just come 
out from home. 

This was a complicated shift and transfer, intended to 
secure a level quality in the divisions by the mixture of 
recently arrived and veteran battalions. But in organizing 
his last creation, the 7th Division, Wellington was prevented 
by circumstances from carrying out the same wise plan. 
Much belated in their arrival at Lisbon by contrary winds, 
the last batch of reinforcements sent to him for the cam- 
paign of 1811, landed when the main army was already in 
pursuit of Massena, who had just started on his retreat 
from Santarem. Wellington was forced to keep them 
together, since he had no time to distribute them when the 
troops were all on the move. The 7th division was at first 
very weak, containing only one brigade in British pay, 
consisting of two Enghsh and two foreign corps, f and one 
Portuguese brigade (Coleman). Two more foreign corps 
belonging to the German Legion J formed the second brigade 
of the 7th Di^dsion, but did not join it till the summer, 
being distracted meanwhile to another field of operations. 

The 7th Division was for some time looked on as the 
" ugly duckUng," or backward child of the army. Having 
only two British to four foreign battalions, it was sometimes 
called " the Mongrels ; " its first debut in action at Fuentes 
de Onoro was not a very happy one, as it was the outljdng 
flank force that was turned and partly cut up by French 
cavalry. After this it was never seriously engaged in 
battle for more than a year. Moreover, its foreigners 
earned a bad reputation for their habit of desertion — a 

* l/50th, l/71st, and l/92nd. 

t 51st, 85th, witli the Chasseurs Britanniques and the Brunswick 
Oels Jagers. 

J 1st and 2nd Light Battalions, K.G.L., which landed very late, 
joined Beresford's army in Estremadura, and only united with their 
proper division in June. 



172 Oeganization : Brigades and Divisions 

habit not altogether unnatural, for they had been largely 
recruited from the pontoons and prison-camps in England.* 
Hence a cruel joke in the list of divisional nicknames 
given by several Peninsular diarists. The sobriquets run : 
Light Division, The Division ; no doubt the title given 
to it by its own proud members. First Division : *' The 
Gentlemen's Sons," because it contained one, and after- 
wards two, brigades of the Foot Guards. The Second 
Division is called "the Observing Division," because it was 
so often detached as a containing force against Soult, on the 
side of Estremadura and Andalusia, while the main body 
was more actively engaged on the side of Leon. So much 
was this its duty that it was only present at one general 
action, Albuera, between the autumn of 1810 and the summer 
of 1813. There were some brilliant episodes between those 
dates, such as the surprise of Arroyo dos Molinos, and 
the storming of the forts at Almaraz. The 3rd Division was 
called " the Fighting Division," its fiery leader, Picton, 
having led it into the forefront of the battle both at Bussaco 
and Fuentes de Oiioro, not to speak of smaller fights like 
Redinha or El Bodon ; it had also done the hardest of 
work at the storms of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The 
4th Division was called the "Supporting Division ; " I suppose 
because it was sent off to support the 2nd in Estremadura, 
and most effectually discharged that duty at Albuera. f The 
5th division was called " the Pioneers," a name whose 
source I cannot explain : possibly it refers to some road- 
making work done in 1810. The 6th was the " Marching 
Division," mainly, I believe, so-called because down to 
Salamanca it was accompanying all Wellington's great 
movements from north to south and south to north, yet 
never had the good fortune to get into the thick of the 
battle. At Salamanca, however, it had as much fighting 
as any man could crave. The note to the 7th Division, 
however, is very malicious, being " We have heard that 

* See notes on these battalions in the chapter on "The Auxiliaries." 
t After Albuera their nickname was changed to "the Enthusiastics." 



Rearrangement of Units 173 

there is a Seventh Division, but we have never seen it." 
The fact is; that after its mishap at Fuentes, and some 
unsuccessful siege work at the second leaguer of Badajoz, 
this unit was very Kttle engaged for two years. In 1813, 
however, it was gloriously prominent in the battles of the 
Pyrenees, and the dash at the French line, made by Barns's 
brigade, was called by Wellington about the best and most 
effective attack that he had ever seen. 

After the creation of the 7th Division in March, 1811, 
Wellington never again organized a new divisional unit. 
He received, of course, a great number of new battahons 
during the years 1811-12-13, but contented himself with 
adding them in ones or twos to existing brigades, or at 
most gave two or three of them as a fresh brigade to one of 
the old divisions. The former practice was the more usual : 
the only instances of the latter that I recall being that in 

1812 the 1st Division got a second Guards brigade, and in 

1813 a new line brigade (Lord Aylmer's) from reinforcements 
that had just come out. The increase of the total number 
of battalions at the front was not so great as might have 
been expected, because from time to time corps that had 
got thinned down almost to the point of extinction, were 
sent back to England to be recruited and reorganized. The 
number of British battalions (including the Bang's German 
Legion and two other foreign corps) with WelUngton's field 
army in March, 1811, was fifty-eight ; in March, 1814, it was 
no more than sixty-five, a gain of only seven units. There 
had been a considerable exchange of service between the 1st 
and 2nd battahon of regiments — in several cases when the 
2nd battalion had been the original unit in the Peninsular 
Army, it went home when the first battalion came out, 
returning as a mere cadre of ofi&cers and sergeants, after 
turning over its serviceable rank and file to the newly- 
arrived sister unit.* 

* This happened with the 5th, 28th, 38th, 39th, 42nd. The 2/4 th 
and 2/52nd came out for a short time, and then discharged their 
serviceable men into their 1st battalion, and went home. 



174 Oeganization : Brigades and Divisions 

There was only two more considerable rearrangements of 
the internal organization of a division. One took place in 
May, 1811, owing to the fearful losses suffered by the 
2nd Division at Albuera. Of the seven battalions forming 
the brigades of Colborne and Hoghton, which had been so 
dreadfully mauled in holding the all-important heights, 
two were sent home, and the four others shrank into a 
single brigade. To fill the place of the vanished unit a 
whole brigade (Howard's) was transferred from the 1st to 
the 2nd Division, and became part of it for the rest of the 
war. There was also a shifting about of two brigades 
from one unit to another during the winter of 1812-13, 
after the Burgos retreat. 

The normal divisional organization, however, remained 
unchanged from 1811 onwards, viz. with three exceptions, 
each division for the remaining three years of the war con- 
sisted of two British brigades and one Portuguese, the 
former having usually three battalions each, and the latter 
five. This rule worked for the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th 
divisions. The Light Division, smaller than the rest, had 
only three (or three and a half) British battalions, and two 
of Portuguese ca9adores. The 1st Division alone had no 
Portuguese attached, but one of its three (after 1813 four) 
brigades was foreign, consisting of the line battalions of the 
King's German Legion. The 2nd Division (as explained 
above) had three British brigades and no Portuguese, but 
to it was attached Hamilton's (and in 1812-14 Ashworth's) 
Portuguese, so that it did not vary from the normal 
arrangement so much as the 1st Division. 

It would not be quite accurate to say that a British 
brigade always had precisely three battalions. Several had 
four, one five, a few appeared with only two, but WelUng- 
ton generally made these last up to the three-battalion total 
as soon as he was able, save in two cases. In the Guards 
brigades of the 1st Division the two battalions were always 
so strong that between them they gave 1800 or 2000 
bayonets at the beginning of a campaign — which was as 



The Anglo-Portuguese Division 175 

much as most three-battalion brigades produced. More- 
over, there was an objection to brigading together units of 
the Guards and of the hne. In the Light Division the 
l/43rd and l/52nd were also very strong and well recruited : 
each formed the nucleus of a small brigade, of which the 
rest was composed of a Portuguese cagador battahon and 
a certain number (often six) companies of the 95th Rifles. 

Roughly speaking, then, an Anglo -Portuguese division 
usually amounted to something under 6000 men, save the 
Light Division, which numbered under 4000, and the 
1st Division, which in 1810, and again in 1813, had four 
brigades, and over 7000 men. Of the 5500 or 5800 men in 
one of the normal divisions about 3500 were British and 
2000 (or a Httle more) Portuguese. The 2nd Division, 
however, was a double-unit with 5500 British, and attached 
to it 4500 of Hamilton's Portuguese. 

The mixture of nationahties in the divisions, normal 
with the infantry, was nearly unknown in the cavalry arm. 
The very few Portuguese regiments which took the field — 
never more than seven, I beheve — often four only — were 
normally kept separate. Welhngton, for the first three years 
of the war, had so few cavalry regiments of either nation 
that there was no possibility of dividing them into divisions. 
In 1809, as has been already stated,* there were only in the 
Peninsula six British cavalry regiments, divided into three 
weak brigades. Only one more corps joined them in 1810, 
and in the spring campaigns of 1811, when he had left three 
regiments with Beresford in the south, he had only four to 
take with him for the pursuit of Massena and the battle of 
Fuentes de Oiioro — a miserable provision — 1500 sabres for 
an army of over 30,000 men, about a fourth of the proper 
proportion in those days. 

It was not till later in 1811 that Welhngton got cavalry 

reinforcements which more than doubled his mounted 

strength, bringing him up to fifteen regiments of British 

and German horse. He did then at last divide them into 

* See p. 166. 



176 Organization : Brigades and Divisions 

two divisions, one of eleven regiments, which followed his 
main army, the other of four regiments only, which he left 
with Hill in Estremadura. But no Portuguese regiments 
were put into either — though he took one brigade with 
himself (D'Urban's) for the Salamanca campaign, and left 
two brigades (or four regiments) with the southern force 
(those of Otway and Madden). 

But the organization in two cavalry divisions was 
dropped in the spring of 1813 — ^Wellington had had sicken- 
ing experience of the incapacity of General Erskine, who 
commanded the small second division, and, Erskine being 
now dead, for the rest of the war all the seven cavalry 
brigades were theoretically again made into one division, 
under Wellington's chosen cavalry leader. Sir Stapleton 
Cotton. As a matter of fact. Cotton was not allowed any 
independent command of them, and the brigades were 
moved in twos and threes under the direct orders of the 
commander-in-chief. Welhngton never used his cavalry 
in mass for any great separate manoeuvre. He employed 
them for scouting, for covering his front, and for protecting 
his flanks, sometimes (but rarely and in small units) for a 
blow in battle, such as that which Le Marchant's heavy 
dragoons gave at Salamanca, or Bock's Germans at Garcia 
Hernandez on the following day. But of this we have 
already spoken when dealing with the general character 
of Welhngton's tactics. 

The rule of the combination of British and Portuguese 
units which prevailed in the infantry, though not in the 
cavalry, was to be found in the artillery also. In 1810, 
when Wellington drafted a Portuguese brigade of foot 
into each of his divisions, he also attached to several of 
them batteries of Portuguese artillery. So small was his 
allowance of British gunners, that in 1811, when he had 
created his two last infantry divisions, he would not have 
been able to provide one field battery for each of his eight 
units, unless he had drawn largely for help on his aUies. 
At the time of Fuentes de Onoro and Albuera there were in 



Distribution of Batteries 177 

the field only three British horse artillery batteries (attached 
to the cavalry and the Light Division) and five British field 
batteries attached to infantry divisions. The 3rd and 7th 
Divisions had only Portuguese guns allotted to them. But 
by utiHzing the very efficient artillery of the allied nation, 
to the extent of eight units, Wellington was able to put 
thirteen field batteries in line, which enabled him to provide 
the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and Hamilton's Portuguese divisions 
with two batteries apiece, the 1st, 4th, and 7th with one 
each. The two nations were worked as successfully in 
unison in the artillery as in the infantry organization. 

Owing to the arrival of new batteries from home Welling- 
ton was able, in 1812, not only to allot two field batteries 
to every division except the Light (which kept its old horse 
artillery troop, that of Major Bull), but to collect a small 
reserve which belonged to the whole army and not to any 
particular division. In 1813-14 he was stronger still, 
though the mass of guns of which he could dispose was 
never so powerful in proportion to his whole army as that 
which Napoleon habitually employed. 



CHAPTER X 

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY I THE REGIMENTS 

In the year 1809, when WeUington assumed command in 
Portugal, the infantry of the British Army consisted of 
3 regiments of Foot Guards and 103 regiments of the Hne, 
beside 10 battahons of the King's German Legion, the 8 
West India regiments, the 8 Veteran Battahons, and some 
ten more miscellaneous foreign and colonial corps. Of the 
103 regiments of the line the majority, 61, had 2 battalions. 
Of the remainder one (the 60th or Royal Americans) had 7 
battahons, one (the 1st Royal Scots) 4, three (the 14th, 
27th, and 95th) 3 each, while the remaining 37 were 
single-battalion regiments.* As the 1st Foot Guards had 
3 battalions, and the Coldstream and Scots Fusiliers 2 each, 
the total number of British battalions embodied was 186. 

The reason for the curious discrepancy between the 
number of battalions in the various regiments was that 
(putting aside the Guards, the Royal Scots, and the Royal 
Americans, who had always more battalions than one, even 
in the eighteenth century) the British Army at the time of 
the rupture of the Peace of Amiens in 1803 had been com- 
posed of single-battalion regiments. On the outbreak of 
war fifty regiments in the British Isles and other home 
stations were ordered to raise second battalions, | and a 

* These thirty-seven were the 2nd, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 
20th, 22nd, 29th, 33rd, 37th, 41st, 46th, 49th, 51st, 54th, 65th, 64th, 
65th, 68th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 80th, 85th, 86th, 93rd, 94th, 
and 97th to 103rd. 

•j- Which were intended for home service only, and were called 
the " Army of Reserve." But ere long they were utilized for general 
service. 



Establishment of the Line 179 

little later the same directions were given to a few more. 
Two corps (the 14th and 27th) succeeded in raising two fresh 
battalions, as did also the Royal Scots, which was already 
a double battalion corps. But few of the regiments serving 
beyond seas were ordered to carry out the same expansion, 
owing to their remoteness from recruiting centres ; they 
remained single-battalion regiments, save that the 35th, 
47th, and 78th, though they were quartered respectively in 
Malta, Bermuda, and India, provided themselves with a 
second battalion. Seven new regiments raised in or after 
1804 (these numbered 97 to 103) remained from the first to 
the last single-battalion corps. 

A considerable number of the corps which were on 
foreign or colonial service in 1803-4 had returned to Great 
Britain since that time. But they were never, save in a 
very few cases, able to raise additional battalions, the 
number of such created after 1805 being only eight * in all. 
Hence the regiments from which Wellington's Peninsular 
Army was drawn must be divided with care into one- 
battalion corps and those which owned more than one 
battalion. 

The Estimates presented to the House of Commons in 
1809 show that there were several " establishments " of 
varying strength for regiments in Great Britain and other 
European stations. For corps absent in the East Indies 
there was a wholly different set.f 

A regiment of two battalions, with both of them on 
active service, stands on the higher establishment at either 
2250 or 2031, or thereabouts. When the senior battalion 
was sent on active service it was generally completed to 
1000 rank and file, which, with sergeants, officers, and 
musicians, should have made up a total of over 1100. Its 
less effective men were drafted into the second battalion, 

* The regiments which raised belated second battalions were the 
12th (in 1813), the 22nd (in 1814), the 37th (in 1811), the 41st (in 
1814), the 73rd (in 1809), the 86th (in 1814), the 93rd (in 1814). The 
95th (in 1809), and the 56th in 1813, raised a third battalion. 

t For all the establishments see Table in Appendix I. 



180 Organization : The Eegiments 

which, if the estabHshment was full (which was by no 
means always the case), would have left somewhat over 900 
for the second battalion. And, indeed, we find such figures 
as 906, 929, 916, etc., given for the strength of several 
second battalions whose senior sister-unit had gone overseas. 

But these 900 and odd men of all ranks now included 
not only the weak and ineffective men of the second bat- 
talion, but also those of the first. Therefore if a second 
battalion was sent out to the war, it had to leave behind 
a disproportionately large number of men unfit for active 
service, and would be lucky if it sailed for Portugal with 
700 bayonets. Many cases are on record where a far 
smaller number disembarked at Lisbon or elsewhere. 
More than 200 would often have to be left behind to form 
the depot, wherefore second battalions were usually much 
weaker than first battalions when at the front. 

For single-battalion regiments, such as the 2nd, 29th, 
51st or 97th, we find very various " estabhshments " given 
in the Army Estimates of 1809. They vary do^vn from 
1151 to 696 ; one or two exceptional corps are even smaller. 
As a rulcj it may be taken that the ideal would be to recruit 
such a corps, when it was sent on active service, up to the 
higher figure : but having to leave 200 men or so at home — 
the inefficients who were drafted off for the depot — it would 
be lucky if it landed 800 in the Peninsula. And to keep 
up the battalion the depot could not always sufiice ; it was 
full of unserviceable men, and could only send out recruits 
newly gathered. 

Single-battalion regiments not on active service are 
those which are found with the smaller establishments — of 
such figures as 716, 696, etc. Not being expected to take 
the field, they have not been brought up to the higher 
establishment, either by drafts from the militia or by 
specially vigorous recruiting. 

The three regiments of Foot Guards had much higher 
establishments than any line battalion. The three bat- 
talions of the 1st Guards mustered no less than 4619 of 



Weakness of Second Battalions 181 

all ranks, the Coldstream and Scots Fusiliers each 2887. 
Thus the former could easily send abroad two strong 
battalions of 1100 or 1200 men apiece, and the two latter 
one each, while leaving behind a battalion and a big depot 
on which to draw for recruits for the active service units. 
Therefore a Guards battalion in the Peninsula seldom fell 
under 800 men, and was sometimes up to 1000. The 
Cadiz detachment of the Guards, which fought at Barrosa, 
was made up from the home battalions as a sort of extra con- 
tribution. It consisted of six companies of the 1st Guards, 
two of the Coldstream, and three of the Scots Fusiliers. 
They are sometimes called a brigade — for which they were 
too small in reaUty — sometimes a provisional regiment. 
Their total force was about 1200 or 1300 of all ranks. 

With these figures before us, we begin to see why indi- 
vidual battalions came and went in the Peninsular Army. 
A regiment which had two battaKons, one at home and one 
in Portugal, was always able to keep up the strength of 
the service unit by regular and copious drafts from the 
home unit. Or if the original one serving in the Peninsula 
was a second battalion, the first could be sent out to relieve 
it. Second battalions were never sent out to replace first 
battalions, it being always the rule that the senior unit had a 
right to preference for active service. But occasionally both 
battalions of a regiment were absent from Great Britain, 
and in a few cases they were both in the Peninsula.* When 
this happened the second battalion was invariably sent 
home after a time, discharging its effective rank and file 
into the sister battahon, and returning to Great Britain as 
a cadre of officers and sergeants, with a few old, unservice- 
able, or nearly time-expired rank and file. 

Having laid down these general rules, we shall see how 
it came to pass that of WeUington's original army of 1809 
some battahons stopped with him for the whole war, while 
others were successively sent away and replaced by fresh 
units. 

* This was the case with the 7th, 48th, 52nd and 88th in 1811. 



182 Organization : The Eegiments 

The greater part of the British Army which had been in 
the Peninsula in 1808 went home from Corunna at the end 
of Sir John Moore's retreat. Of these units some never 
came back at all to share in WeUington's triumphs ; * 
others returned only in time to see the end of the war in 
1812, 1813, and 1814.t Only Craufurd's three famous 
Hght infantry battalions, the l/43rd, l/52nd, and l/95th 
came back, after an absence of no more than a few months, 
in the summer of 1809. 

The real nucleus of the permanent Peninsular Army was 
composed, not of the regiments which had operated under 
Moore, but of that small fragment of the original landing force 
of 1808 which had not followed Moore to Salamanca, Saha- 
gun, and Corunna, but remained behind in the Peninsula.^ 
To this mere remnant of eleven battalions and one cavalry 
regiment there were added the reinforcements which pre- 
ceded or accompanied Sir Arthur Wellesley when he came 
to take up the command in April, 1809, which amounted to 
twelve battalions more, with two regiments of cavalry. § 
The whole, when first divided into brigades and organized 
as an operating force at Coimbra on May 4, 1809, only 
amounted to 23,000 men — a modest nucleus for the army 
which was destined not only to save Portugal, but ulti- 
mately to thrust out of Spain a body of invaders which at 

* The 3rd Hussars, K.G.L., 2/14th, 2/23rd, 2/43rd, never 
returned to serve under Wellington in 1809-14. 

t In 1810 the following returned to Portugal 3/lst, l/4th, l/9th, 
l/50th, l/71st, l/79th. In 1811 the following : 2nd, l/26th, l/28th, 
l/32nd, l/36th, 51st, 2/52nd, 1st and 2nd Light K.G.L. In 1812 
the following : l/5th, l/6th, 20th, 1/3 8th, l/42nd, 2/59th, l/82nd, 
1 91st. In 1813 the 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars, the first and 
third battalions of the 1st Foot Guards, the 76th, and 2/8 1st. 

$ These were the l/3rd, 2/9th, 29th, l/40th, l/45th, 5/60th, 
97th, the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th Line Battalions of the K.G.L., and 
the 20th Light Dragoons, the last-named incomplete. 

§ The regiments which arrived with Wellesley, or before him, 
during the spring and the preceding winter of 1808-1809, were 
3/27th, 2/31st, and 14th Light Dragoons, during the winter; in 
April, 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, 2/7th, 
2/30th, 2/48th, 2/53rd, 2/66th, 2/83rd, 2/87th, l/88th, 16th Light 
Dragoons, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons. 



The Original Peninsular Regiments 183 

this moment amounted to over 200,000 men, and which, in 
1810-11 was brought up to 300,000, a figure which it 
maintained till drafts began to be made upon it for the 
Russian War in 1812.* 

Moore's host had been, as he himself wrote to Castlereagh 
in a noteworthy dispatch, not so much a British army as 
the only British army fit for the field. Since no more than 
an infinitesimal fraction of this picked force was able to 
return to the Peninsula at once, it followed that Wellesley's 
army of 1809 was composed, for its greater part, of troops 
that had been considered of secondary quahty, and less 
fit for service than the battalions which had been put hors 
de combat for a long space by the exhaustion which they had 
suffered in the terrible retreat to Corunna. Excluding the 
Guards and the King's German Legion units, Wellesley's 
Field Army in July contained eighteen British battalions, 
of which only six were first battalions of regiments of full 
strength, two (the 29th and 97th) were single-battalion 
corps, and the remaining ten were junior battalions, i.e. 
were the usually depleted home-service units of regiments 
which already had one battalion abroad, or of which the 
first battalion had just returned from Corunna unfit for 
immediate use.f It was an army whose quahty was 
notably inferior to that of the force which had marched 
into Spain under Moore six months before. And the 
second battalions were invariably under strength, because 
they had, until their unexpected embarkation for the 
front, been engaged in supplying their sister units abroad 

* Since April there had come out the 23rd Light Dragoons, 
1st Hussars, K.G.L., l/61st, l/48th, 2/24th ; but the 20th Light 
Dragoons had been deducted (sent to Sicily), while the 2/9th and 
2/30th had been sent back to Lisbon, for passage to Gibraltar. The 
net gain, therefore, between April and July was only one cavalry 
regiment. 

t To recapitulate again. 1st battalions : l/3rd, l/40th, l/45th, 
l/48th, l/61st, l/88th. 2nd battalions: 2/7th, 2/31st, 2/24th, 
2/48th, 2/53rd, 2/66th, 2/83rd, 2/87th. Other jimior battalions : 
3/27th (left at Lisbon), 5/60th. Single battalion regiments, 29th, 
97th. There were also two " Battalions of Detachments." 



184 Okganization : The Regiments 

with the necessary drafts for foreign service. Many of 
them were woefully weak in numbers, showing, instead of 
the theoretical 900 bayonets, such figures as 638, 680, 749, 
776, which, after deducting sick and men on command, 
meant under 600 for the field. Indeed, a few months 
later, at Talavera,* six of the second battahons and both 
the single-battaHon corps showed less than that number 
present, all ranks included. 

Bearing in mind the fact that a British regiment, owing 
to the difficulties of recruiting, in a time when men were 
scarce and bounties high, could not as a rule provide drafts 
to keep up to strength more than one battahon on active 
service, we can already foresee the fates that were destined 
to attend the battalions of Welhngton's original Peninsular 
Army. Nearly all the second battalions in time were worn 
down by the exhaustion of war to a figure so low that they 
could no longer be worked as regular battalion units. When 
they had reached this stage one of two things happened 
to them. If their first battahons were available, being on 
home service and fit for the field, they came out to the 
Peninsula and replaced the depleted second battalions. 
But if the first battalion of any corps was already abroad in 
India or elsewhere, the Peninsular battalion was, during 
the earlier years of the war, sent home to recruit, and its 
regimental number disappeared from Wellington's muster- 
rolls. In the later years of the war this was not so regularly 
done : for reasons which will be explained, several of the 
veteran second battalions, which had survived at the front 
till 1812, were retained with the army, but cut down to 
four companies each, and worked together in pairs to make 
a unit of serviceable size. Of the eight original second 
battalions of 1809, two were drafted into their first battaUon, 
which had come out to the Peninsula ; t one (2/87th) was 
sent away for a time to Cadiz, though it returned to the field 

* The strongest battalions at Talavera were l/3rd Foot Guards 
1019, 1st Coldstream 970, l/48th 807 ; the weakest were 2/66th 526, 
97th 502, 2/83rd 535. 

t Viz. 2/7th, 2/48th. 



Reinfokcements from Home 185 

army in 1812; four were cut down in 1811-12 to half 
battalions.* Only one, the 2/83rd, remained continuously 
in the Peninsula as a full battalion till the end of the war. 

The same fate attended the single-battalion regiments, 
which had no sister battalion at home to draw upon, but 
only a depot. Both the 29th and the 97th went home, 
reduced to skeletons, in 1811. 

But the six first-battalions present with the field army 
in May, 1809, were still at the front in fair strength at the 
termination of the war in 1814, and this, though two of them 
had been among the worst sufferers in the bloody field of 
Albuera. Indeed, there is throughout the war, I beHeve, 
only one case in which the first battalion of a complete 
regiment went out to the front, and was sent away before 
the end of the campaigning in 1814. 

The reinforcements which were sent out to Wellington 
from 1810 to 1812 may be divided into two sections, of 
which the larger was composed of the reorganized and 
recruited battalions of Moore's Corunna army. Of these, 
six battalions came out in 1810, nine in 1811, eight in 1812, 
and four in 1813-14. The greater number of them were 
first battalions, or putting aside the Guards and German 
Legion units, fifteen out of twenty-three : of these all save 
one (the l/26th) fought out the rest of the war. Of single- 
battaHon regiments there were four (2nd, 51st, 20th, 76th) ; 
of junior battalions belonging to corps which already had 
one battaUon abroad, there were also only four( 3/lst, 2/52nd 
2/59th, 2/81st). Of these last two classes the 2/52nd was 
soon sent home, after drafting its men into the l/52nd. 
The 2nd got so depleted that it was cut down to four 
companies and put into a provisional battahon in 1812 till 
the end of the war. The 76th and 2/81st were only in the 
field for a few months in 1813-14, so that they had no time 
to get worked down. The 3/lst, though a junior battalion, 
belonged to a large regiment of four battalions, and for that 

* 2/24th, 2/3 1st, 2/53rd, 2 /66th. The first battalions of three 
of these were in the East Indies, that of the fourth in Sicily. 



186 Okganization : The Regiments 

reason never shrank below its proper size, there being a sister 
unit at home to send it drafts. We may therefore say 
that, of the eight battahons which were not first battahons 
of full regiments, only three saw long service, yet survived 
unimpaired to the peace of 1814 (20th, 51st, 2/59th) ; and 
of these three two only came out in 1812, and were less 
than two years in the Peninsula. It is clear, then, that 
the same rule prevailed in the reinforcements as in the 
original 1809 army ; only first battalions could be relied 
upon not to melt. 

The battalions sent out as reinforcements to Wellington 
which had not formed part of Moore's Corunna army, 
were decidedly less numerous than the other class, amount- 
ing to only nineteen. Of these six were first battalions,* 
eight second battalions,! and five single battalion corps. J 
All of the first-named category fought out the whole war : 
but several of the other two were sent home, either when 
they had been depleted to reinforce their first battalions, 
or for other reasons. The proportion would have been 
larger but for the fact that several of them were among 
the last arrivals in the Peninsula, who only joined in the 
later autumn and winter campaigns of 1813-14, and had 
not time to get worn down.§ One second battalion (2/58th) 
was worked as a four-company unit during the last three 
years of the war. 

The net result of all the interchange of battalions, and 
of the sending home of weak units, was that in 1814, when 
the struggle with Napoleon had come to its end, out of 
fifty-six British line battalions present at the front, only 
thirteen were second battalions, and of these last five || 
were (as has been already mentioned) so depleted in numbers 
that they were being worked in pairs, being each only four 

* l/lth, 1/1 1th, l/23rd, l/37th, l/39th, l/57th. 
t 2/5th, 2/34th, 2/38th, 2/44th, 2/47th, 2/58th, 2/62nd, 2/84th. 
% 68th, 74th, 77th, 85th, 94th. . 

§ This was the case with the 2/62nd, 77th, l/37th, 2/84th. 
II The sixth of the units of the provisional battalions being a 
single battalion corps, the 2nd Foot or Queen's. 



The Walcheren Regiments 187 

companies strong, and not mustering more than 250 or 
300 men. 

That such weak half-units were detained in the Pen- 
insula was due to a resolve of Wellington's, made after 
the campaign of 1811. During the latter part of that year 
the chief of his worries was that he had been sent out 
among his reinforcements a number of corps which had 
served in the Walcheren expedition, where almost every 
man had the seeds of ague in him, from a sojourn in the 
marshes of Holland. The heat of the Portuguese summer 
and the torrential rains of the autumn at once brought 
out the latent weakness in the constitution of men who were 
little more than convalescents, and regiments which had 
landed at Lisbon in July 850 strong showed only 550 in 
the ranks in October.* So appalling was the accumulation 
of fever and ague cases in the hospitals '\ that Wellington 
wrote home to beg that not another unit which had been 
at Walcheren might be sent out to him. He now made up 
his mind to keep old regiments, even when they had dwindled 
rather low in numbers, rather than to send them home to 
recruit, and to receive new battalions in their stead. The 
reason was that it took a corps many months before it 
learnt to shift for itself, and to grow acclimatized. During 
their first few months in the Peninsula, newly arrived units 
always showed too many sick and too many stragglers. 
For men fresh from barrack life in England were at first 
prostrated by the heat of the climate and the length of the 
marches. They had still to pick up the old campaigner's 
tricks, and were very helpless. Veteran troops were so 
superior in endurance to new regiments from England, 
most of whom had been on the pestilential Walcheren 
expedition, and were still full of rickety convalescents, 

* Typical figures are 77th, landed in Jnly 859 of all ranks — 
had only 560 present in September. The 68th, landed about the 
same time, had 233 sick to 412 effective : the 51st, landed in April, 
246 sick to 251 effective ! But the 51st had lost men in the second 
siege of Badajoz. The other two regiments had not seen much service. 

t Over 14,000 men in October, 1811. 



188 Oeganization : The Regiments 

that Wellington determined to keep even remnants of old 
corps accustomed to the air of the Peninsula, rather than 
to ask for more unacclimatized battalions from home. 
Hence came the institution, in the end of 1812, of two 
of the " provisional battahons " already mentioned.* At 
an earlier period of the war they would undoubtedly have 
been sent back to England.f But now these fractions of 
depleted veteran corps were taken, with excellent results, 
all through the campaign of 1812-13-14. 

It is perhaps worth while to make a note how curious 
was Wellington's attitude in face of that rather exceptional 
occurrence the appearance of two strong battahons of the 
same regiment in his army. If the second battalion was 
weak, he soon drafted it into the first and sent it home. But 
when, from some chance, both had full ranks, it did not by 
any means always strike him as necessary to brigade them 
together. For example, the l/7th and 2/7 th were both at 
the front from October, 1810, to July, 1811 ; but for several 
months of the time one was in the 4th Division, the other in 
the 1st. A still more striking instance is that of the 48th. 
Its two battalions were both from their first arrival placed 
in the 2nd Division, but they served from June, 1809, to 
May, 181 1 , in different brigades of it. | The occasions when 
the two battalions of the same regiment served for any 

* Wellington wrote to the Secretary of War (Lord Bathurst), 
" I assure you that some of the best battalions with the army are the 
provisional battalions. I have lately seen two of these engaged, 
that formed of the 2/24th and 2/5 8th, and that formed from the 2nd 
Queen's and 2/53rd : it is impossible for any troops to behave better. 
The same arrangement could now be applied with great advantage 
to the 51st and 68th, and also to other regiments " {Dispatches^ x. 
p. 629). There was another " provisional battalion " composed of 
the 2/30th and 2/4:4th for a short time in 1812-13. 

t Probably a year later Wellington would not have allowed the 
29th and 97th, both old single battalion regiments sent home after 
Aibuera, to depart, but would have worked them together as a 
" provisional battalion." He expresses great regret in his private 
correspondence at losing two excellent vinits because they had 
fallen to about 250 men each. 

X After Aibuera, where they both suffered heavily, the 2nd was 
sent home, discharging its serviceable men into the 1st, which was 
the first connection with the sister-battalion that it had. 



PL A TE V. 




V. 




Fate of Second Battalions 189 

time in one brigade were very rare — I only know of the 
cases of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the Foot Guards in 
1813-14, of the two battalions of the 52nd between March, 
1811, and March, 1812, and of those of the 7th Fusiliers, 
who (after some service apart) had been brigaded together 
in the 4th Division six months before Albuera. In the last 
two cases the first battalion presently absorbed the second, 
which was sent home as a skeleton cadre when its strength 
at last began to run low. All other cases of juxtaposition 
were so short that it would seem that Wellington only 
brought the two battaUons together for the purpose of 
drafting the second into the first at the earliest convenient 
moment. In this way the 2/88th (long in garrison at 
Lisbon) were brought up to the front to be amalgamated 
in less than four months with the l/88th (March-July, 1811). 
The l/5th, coming out in the summer of 1812, seems to have 
served along with the 2/5th for about the same number of 
months, the latter being sent home in October. The l/38th 
similarly arrived at about the same time, and served from 
June to November beside the 2/38th, which then departed. 
These are very different cases from those of the two 
battalions of the 7th, the 48th, and the 52nd, all of which 
were present for a year or more together in the army. 

The working unit of the Peninsular Army was always 
the ten-company battalion, commanded by a Heutenant- 
colonel. When, as in the exceptional cases just named, it 
chanced that two battaUons of a regiment got together, the 
senior of the two commanding officers had no authority 
over the other. Both were directly responsible to the 
brigadier. The battalion theoretically had thirty-five officers 
and 1000 rank and file, besides sergeants and drummers. 
A pestilent practice prevailed in all British general returns, 
of giving in statistics of the larger sort only the number 
of rank and file {i.e. corporals and privates), officers, ser- 
geants, and musicians being aU omitted. To bring the 
figures up to the real general total in such a case, an allow- 
ance of about one-eighth or one-ninth has to be added to 



190 Oeganization : The Regiments 

the number given. Fortunately detailed returns of all 
ranks are always available, when absolute correctness is 
required, from the fortnightly general states at the Record 
Office. 

The theoretical establishment of about 1150 of all ranks 
for a first battalion was, of course, hardly ever seen in the 
field. Regiments which landed at Lisbon with a full 
complement soon dwindled, even before they got to the 
front, and nothing was rarer than a battalion in line of 
battle with a total strength in the four figures.* A good 
well-managed corps which had not been in action of late, 
and had not been stationed in an unhealthy cantonment, 
might keep up to 700 and even 800 men throughout a 
campaign. The Guards battalions, which had a decidedly 
larger establishment than those of the line, were frequently 
up to 900 men or more. 

On the other hand, a battalion which had seen much 
fighting, which had not received its drafts regularly, and 
had long starved on the bleak mountains of Beira, or 
sweltered in the pestilential valley of the Guadiana, often 
worked down to 450 men or less, even if it were a first 
battalion which had landed with its full 1000 rank and file. 
A second battalion under similar circumstances might 
shrink to 250 or 300. At the end of the very fatiguing 
campaign of 1811, which had included the toilsome pursuit 
of Massena, the Fuentes de Onoro fighting, and the long 
tarrying on the Caya during the unhealthy summer heats, 
of forty-six battalions present with Wellington's main 
army only nine (all save one first-battalions, and two of 
them belonging to the Guards) showed more than 700 of all 
ranks present. Sixteen more had between 500 and 700, 
ten between 400 and 500. No less than eleven were down 
to the miserable figure of under 400 men, and it is to be 
noted that of these nearly all were either second battalions 

* Such figures are, however, occasionally found, e.g. the l/dth 
at Bussaco, and the l/43rd in September, 1811, had over 1000 
of all ranks. So had the l/42nd at Salamanca. 



The Cavalry Eegiments 191 

or single-battalion regiments ; there were six of the former 
three of the latter among them. The average of the whole, 
it may be seen, was about 550 men per unit ; the extreme 
variation was between 1005 for the strongest battalion 
and 263 for the weakest.* At this time, it should be noted, 
the army was more sickly than it had ever been before, 
having over 14,000 men in hospital to 29,300 present with 
the colours. Wellington was never again so encumbered 
with sick, save for one period of a few weeks — that which 
followed the end of the retreat from Burgos to Ciudad 
Eodrigoin October-November, 1813. During the first months 
of this ^^dnter the troops, tired by incessant marching in the 
rain, and low feeding, sent into hospital a number of cases 
not less distressing than those which had been seen in 
September, 1811. But a short period of rest served to 
re-establish their health, and in 1813-14 the troops were verj^ 
healthy, even during the trying weeks when many of them 
were cantoned high among the snows of the Pyrenean 
passes. 

So much for the infantry regiments. A few words as 
regards the cavalry must be added to this chapter on 
organization. From first to last Welhngton had under 
him twenty-one regiments of British horse, besides four 
more of the light and heavy cavalry of the King's German 
Legion. But at no time had he such a force as would 
be represented by this total. He started in 1809 with 
eight regiments. Before he had been many weeks in 
command one of his units (a fractional one, composed of 
two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons) was taken 
from him and shipped off to Sicily. Before the end of the 
year another (23rd Light Dragoons), which had been badly 
cut up at Talavera, and lost half its strength there, was sent 
home to recruit. Thus he had only six regiments f on 

* These chanced to be the 1 /4:3rd and the 2/3 8th respectively. 
The two Guards battalions were each just under 900 of all ranks 
at this time. 

t 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1st and 4th Dragoons, 14th and 16th 
Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars, K.G.L. 



192 Oeganization : The Eegiments 

January 1, 1810, and as only one joined him that year,* 
seven was his total force, till he at last received large 
reinforcements in the late summer and autumn of 1811. 
But he started the campaign of 1812 with sixteen regiments,f 
which was almost the highest figure that he was to own. 
For although during the campaign of 1813 he was sent 
four new Hussar regiments, yet at the same time four 
depleted corps were sent home to be recruited and re- 
organized. This would have left his total at the same 
figure of sixteen units as in 1812, if he had not also received 
a large composite regiment (or weak brigade) composed of 
two squadrons from each of the three units of the House- 
hold Cavalry. By this addition alone did his cavalry force 
in 1813-14 exceed that which he had possessed in 1812. 
If we reckon the Household squadrons as roughly equivalent 
to two units, the total at the end of the war was eighteen 
regiments. 

Unlike the infantry, the cavalry of the British Army was 
organized without exception in isolated units, as it is to-day. 
A corps sent to the Peninsula left a depot squadron behind 
it, and there was no source except this depot from which 
it could draw recruits. Nothing resembling the sister-unit 
on which an infantry battalion depended was in existence. 
Hence if a cavalry regiment sank low in numbers, and 
exhausted the drafts which the depot squadron could send 
out, it had to return to England to recruit. During the whole 
war only one corps (the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera) 
sufEered a complete disaster, corresponding to that which 
the 2nd Infantry Division incurred at Albuera, and this 
unlucky regiment was sent home that autumn, when the 
British Army had retreated to the Portuguese frontier. But 
four others worked down so low in strength, and especially 
in horses, during the campaign of 1812, that, although 

* 13th Light Dragoons. 

t 3rd, 4th, 5th Dragoon Guards ; 1st 3rd, and 4th Dragoons ; 
9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th Light Dragoons; 1st and 2nd 
Heavy Dragoons, K.G.L. ; 1st and 2nd Hussars, K.G.L. 



Faults of Eaw Cavalry 193 

they had none of them been thinned down in a single 
action like the 23rd, they had become ineffective, and had 
to quit the Peninsula. It is most noteworthy that all of 
these four corps were comparatively recent arrivals ; they 
had come out in 1811, and in little over a single year had 
fallen into a state of inefficiency far exceeding that of the 
regiments whose service dated back to 1809, and who had 
seen two years more of hard campaigning.* The moral 
to be drawn is the same that we have noted with the 
infantry : the regiments which had served Wellington since 
his first arrival had become acclimatized, and had learnt 
the tricks of the old soldier. They could shift for them- 
selves, and (what was no less important) for their horses, 
far better than any newly-arrived corps. We find bitter 
complaints of the defective scouting and outpost work of 
the new-comers. After a petty disaster to the outlying 
pickets of two of the lately-landed regiments Wellington 
wrote : " This disagreeable circumstance tends to show 
the difference between old and new troops. The old regi- 
ments of cavalry throughout all their service, with all 
their losses put together, have not lost so many men as 
the 2nd Hussars of the Legion and the 11th Light Dragoons 
in a few days. However, we must try to make the new as 
good as the old." f This was evidently not too easy to 
accomplish ; at any rate, at the end of the next year it was 
four of the new corps J which were sent home as depleted 
units, not any of the seven old ones. All these, without 
exception, endured to the last campaign of 1814, though 
they nearly all § had to be reduced from a four-squadron 

* Tomkinson in his diary observes (p. 230) that the 11th Light 
Dragoons was not in such bad state as the other condemned regi- 
ments, but that their colonel was so senior that he stood in the way 
of the promotion of several more capable officers to command 
brigades — ^hence Wellington resolved to get him out of the country. 

t Dispatches, vii. p. 58. To Lord Liverpool. 

X 9th and 11th Light Dragoons, 4th Dragoon Guards, 2nd 
Hussars, K.G.L. 

§ Viz. the 1st Royals, 13th, 14th, and 16th Light Dragoons, and 
1st Hussars, K.G.L. See Oemral Orders, October 2, 1811. 

O 



194 Okganization : The Eegiments 

to a three-squadron establishment in the autumn of 1811, 
owing to their shrunken effective. But they never fell so 
low as the four corps condemned to return to England in 
the next year. No more regiments went home after the 
winter of 1812-13 ; the campaign of Vittoria and the 
Pyrenees did not bear heavily on the cavalry, most of whom, 
during the mountain fighting in the autumn, were comfort- 
ably cantoned in the Ebro Valley. They only moved 
forward again in the spring of 1814 for that invasion of 
France which was brought to such an abrupt end by the 
fall of Napoleon. 

The theoretical estabhshment of the regiments of 
cavalry (putting aside the Household Cavalry) was in 1809 
fixed at 905 men in nearly every case. But a large dep6t 
was always left behind in England, and if a regiment 
landed 600 sabres in Portugal, in four squadrons, it was up 
to the average strength. At the front it would seldom 
show more than 450, as horses began to die off or go sick 
the moment that they felt the Peninsular air and diet, 
A regiment which had been reduced from four squadrons 
to three might show only 300 men on parade in the middle 
of a campaign. 



PLATE VI. 





O 
O 

o 
o s 

fc z 



CHAPTER XI 

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENT : THE OFFICERS 

Hitherto we have been dealing with the regiment con- 
sidered as a whole, and mainly with its place in the brigade 
and division to which it had been allotted. We must now 
pass on to consider it not as a whole, but as an assemblage 
of parts — officers, staff, sergeants, rank and file, and 
musicians. 

To understand the mechanism of a regiment it is first 
necessary to say something about the establishment of 
officers. Battalions and cavalry regiments were normally 
commanded by a lieutenant-colonel : there were very few 
full colonels with the army, and almost the only ones who 
commanded a unit were those of the brigades of Guards, 
where every officer, having a nominal rank higher by one 
step than in the line, those who acted as majors were 
all Ueutenant-colonels, and those who acted as battalion 
commanders were full colonels. 

When the lieutenant-colonel in a battalion was dead, 
wounded, or sick, the unit was often commanded by the 
senior major — there were normally two of them — sometimes 
for many months at a time, till the absent officer returned, 
or his place was filled by promotion. Cases were known 
where; owing to great mortality or invaliding in the senior 
ranks, a captain might be found in command of the battahon 
for a certain space. I note that about the time of Bussaco 
the " morning state " of the army shows two units (both of 
the Guards) commanded by colonels, 30 by lieutenant- 
colonels, 16 by majors, one by a captain, and this, I think, 
was a fairly normal proportion. 



196 The Officers of the Regiment 

In addition to the colonel and the two majors, an 
infantry battalion at full strength would possess ten 
captains and twenty subalterns, or a trifle more, giving the 
allowance of three officers per company, with a few over. 
How many of the subalterns would be lieutenants and how 
many ensigns (called 2nd lieutenants in the rifle regiments) 
was a matter of mere chance, but the lieutenants were 
nearly always in a majority.* A glance down the morning 
state of the Bussaco army of September, 1811, shows that 
one battalion (l/45th) had no more than one ensign, another 
(the 74th) as many as eleven. It was very rare for a regi- 
ment to have its full establishment of ten captains present ; 
there were nearly always one or two companies commanded 
by their senior lieutenants. In addition to its company 
officers every battalion had its " staff," composed of the 
adjutant, paymaster, quartermaster, and the surgeon, with 
his two assistant surgeons. The adjutant was usually a 
lieutenant, but occasionally an ensign ; in the Guards 
(where all ranks counted a step higher than in the line), 
he was often a " lieutenant and captain." In addition to 
the officers regularly commissioned, a battalion had often 
with it one or two " volunteers " — young men who were 
practically probationers ; they were allowed to come out 
to an active-service battalion on the chance of being 
gazetted to it without purchase, on their own responsibility. 
They carried muskets and served in the ranks, but were 
allowed to wear uniforms of a better cloth than that given 
to the rank and file, and messed with the officers. 

The most astonishing case of devolution of acting rank 
through the death or wounding of many seniors was at the 
battle of Albuera. On the morning after that action the 
wrecks of the second brigade of the 2nd Division, temporarily 
united into one battalion because of the dreadful losses 
which had fallen on every one of the three units of which 

♦ In the Talavera army, taking the general totals, there were 
536 lieutenants to 259 ensigns ; in the Bussaco army 624 to 237 ; 
in the 1811 army (March) 739 to 323 — in each case more than two 
to one. 



Devolution of Command 197 

it consisted, were commanded by the senior captain of tlie 
l/48th regiment — and he (as it chanced) was a French 
emigre, with the somewhat lugubrious name of Cimitiere. 
The brigade had been reduced (it may be remarked) from a 
strength of 1651 to 597 in the battle, no less than 1054 
officers and men being killed, wounded, or missing, and 
the brigadier, with five lieutenant-colonels and majors 
senior to Cimitiere having been killed or wounded.* But 
the Albuera losses were, of course, the record in the way of 
heavy casualties ; there is nothing that can be compared 
to them in the annals of Wellington's army for general 
slaughter extending all through an army, though certain 
individual regiments in particular engagements suffered 
almost as heavily — e.g. in the storm of Badajoz and at 
Waterloo. 

The chances of temporary command were sometimes 
curious. The gallant Colborne, Avhom I have already had 
occasion to mention, though only a lieutenant-colonel, com- 
manded a brigade at Albuera, owing to the absence of the 
brigadier — he being the senior of four battalion com- 
manders. He then commanded his own regiment only 
during 1811-13, but succeeded as senior lieutenant-colonel 
to the charge of a brigade of the Light Division for the last 
six months of the war. Though he had thus twice com- 
manded a brigade with distinction in the Peninsula, we find 
him in the Waterloo campaign once more at the head of 
his own 52nd Foot, in Adam's brigade. It is true that 
with his single battahon he there did more than most of 
the generals, by giving the decisive stroke which wrecked 
the attack of the French Guard. 

Not only did heutenant-colonels practically become 
brigadiers, in an interim fashion, pretty frequently, but 
once at least an officer with no higher rank commanded a 
whole division for some months. This was Colonel Andrew 
Barnard, who after Craufurd fell at Ciudad Rodrigo, and 

* Viz. killed, the Brigadier -Gen. Hoghton and one major, 
wounded two lieutenant-colonels and two majors. 



198 The Officers of the Eegiment 

the only other general with the division (Vandeleur) was 
wounded, had charge of the most precious unit of Welling- 
ton's whole army for nearly five months, and headed it at 
the storm of Badajoz. There seems to have been a similar 
but a shorter phenomenon of this sort with the 3rd Division, 
after the fall of Badajoz, when, Generals Picton and Kempt 
being both disabled. Colonel Wallace of the Connaught 
Rangers commanded the division for a week or two — till 
Wellington drafted in his brother-in-law, General Paken- 
ham, to lead it, which he did with great distinction at 
Salamanca.* 

Promotion in the British Army at this period was work- 
ing in the most irregular and spasmodic fashion, there 
being Uvo separate influences operating in diametrically^ 
opposite ways. The one was the purchase system, the 
other the frequent, but not by any means sufficiently 
frequent, promotion for merit and good service in the field. 
The practice at the Horse Guards was that casualties by 
deaths in action were filled up inside the regiment, mthout 
money passing, but that for all other vacancies the purchase 
system worked. When a lieutenant-colonelcy, majority, 
or captainc}^ was vacant, the senior in the next lower rank 
had a moral right to be offered the vacancy at the regulation 
price. But there were many cases in which more than the 
regulation could be got. The officer retiring handed over the 
affair to a " commission broker," and bidding was invited. 
A poor officer at the head of those of his own rank could 
not afford to pay the often very heavy price, and might see 
three or four of his juniors buy their way over his head, 
while he vainly waited for a vacancy by death, by which 
he would obtain his step without having to pay cash. The 
sj^stem of exchanges, which prevailed on the largest scale, 
also pressed very hardly on the impecunious ; officers from 

* Picton, thoiigli wounded in the foot at Badajoz, rode with his 
division for some time after it marched from Estremadm'a for the 
Nortli, but the woimd getting inflamed he was compelled to go into 
hospital, and Wallace had his place for some weeks in June, Paken- 
liam appearing as divisional commander in July. 



The Puechase System 199 

other corps, where there was a block in promotion, managed 
for themselves a transference into battalions where there 
seemed to be a likeUhood of a more rapid change of rank, 
^y P^^ying large differences for an exchange to those who 
stood at the head of the list. But there was also a good 
deal of exchanging for other reasons — officers whose regi- 
ments were ordered to unhealthy or unpopular stationSj 
such as the West Indies or New South Wales, offered con- 
siderable sums to others who were ready to accept the 
ineUgible destination in return for hard cash. By careful 
management of this sort, a wealthy officer could procure 
himself very rapid promotion — e.g. a Heutenant might buy 
a captaincy in a West India regiment for a comparatively 
modest sum, and then, as a captain in such a corps, exchange 
on a second payment ^^dth a broken or needy captain in 
some other regiment on a European station, to whom 
money was all-important, and so get well established in his 
new rank, without ever really having quitted home, or 
served in the corps into and out of which he had rapidly 
come and gone — on paper onlj^ It is said that one young 
officer, who had the advantages of being wealthy, a peer, 
and possessed of great family influence in ParHament, was 
worked up from a lieutenancy to a Ueutenant-colonelcy in 
a single year. This, of course, was a very exceptional case, 
and happened long ere the Peninsular War began ; but it 
may be remembered that Wellington himself, was, through 
similar advantages on a smaller scale, enabled to move up 
from ensign on March 7, 1787, to lieutenant-colonel in 
September, 1793 — five steps in seven years, during which he 
had been moved through as many regiments — two of horse 
and five of foot. He was only nineteen months a captain 
and six months a major, and he had seen no war service 
whatever when he sailed for Flanders in command of the 
33rd at the age of twenty-three ! The Duke of York later 
insisted on a certain minimum service in each rank before 
promotion could be obtained. 

Contrast with such promotion that of the poor and 



200 The Officers of the Regiment 

friendless officer who, after twenty-five years of service, 
six Peninsular campaigns, and two wounds, found himself 
still a captain at the age of 43 ! * But there were plenty of 
unlucky men who at the end of the war were still only 
lieutenants after six campaigns, and were placed on half -pay 
as such, at the great disbandment of the second battalions 
which took place in 1816-17. The juxtaposition of rapid 
promotion obtainable by influence and the purchase of 
steps, with absolute stagnation in a low rank, which often 
fell on the impecunious officer, whose regiment did not 
chance to have many casualties in action, was appalling and 
monstrous. 

I take it that the most pernicious of all the disturbing 
causes which told against the right distribution of pro- 
motion was political influence. As a contemporary pamphle- 
teer wrote : " Instances are very few indeed of preferment 
being obtained by other corrupt means f compared to the 
omnipotence of Parliamentary interest. Thence originates 
the shameful practice of thrusting boys into a company 
over the heads of all the Heutenants and ensigns of the 
regiment. The Duke of York has done something to check 
it, but he can never remove the Colossus of Parliamentary 
interest, an interest that disdains solicitation, and imperi- 
. ously demands from the minister of the day that which no 
minister ever found it convenient to deny. To this species 
of influence the commander-in-chief must give way — for 
it is capable, when slighted, of removing both commander- 
in-chief and minister." % 

It was to the unscrupulous use by great men of their 
parliamentary influence upon the ministry of the day that the 

* See the bitter remarks on pp. 367-369 on Blakeney's Auto- 
biography. For a number of illustrative anecdotes see Leach's curious 
little book, Rambles on the Banks of Styx, which is full of Peninsular 
grievances. 

t The allusion is to the obscure business of influence in dis- 
tributing commissions said to have been used by the Duke of 
York's mistress, Mrs. Mary Ann Clarke. 

Z For more of this pamphlet, see Stocqueler's Personal History 
oj the Horse Guards, pp. 60-67. 



The King's Hard Bargains 201 

army owed a great proportion of its " King's hard bargains " 
in the commissioned ranks. The obscure but necessary- 
instruments of one of the great borough-mongers— Whig no 
less than Tory — were often paid by the nomination of their 
sons or other young relatives to a commission, by the influence 
of their patron : and the famiUes that did the dirty work of 
a great poHtician were not Ukely to be distinguished for 
high morals or uprightness. Sometimes the nominations 
were absolutely shameful — it is said that the son of the 
keeper of a fashionable gaming-house in St. James' was 
slid into the list of ensigns on one occasion, by a pohtician 
whom his father had obliged. Whether this be true or not, 
it is certain that there was a sprinkhng of officers who were 
not gentlemen in any sense of the term serving throughout 
the war.* Others about whose gentle blood there was no 
doubt, were undesirable in other ways — ^prominent among 
them a section of young Irish squireens with the bullying 
and duelling habits, as well as the hard-drinking, which 
were notoriously prevalent among the less civilized strata of 
society beyond St. George's Channel. I find in one memoir 
a note of a newly- joined ensign after mess addressing the 
assembled officers as follows : "By Jasus, gentlemen, I 
am conscious you must have the meanest opinion of my 
courage. Here have I been no less than six weeks with 
the regiment, and the divil of a duel have I fought yet. 
Now, Captain C, you are the senior captain, and if you 
please I will begin with you first : so name your time and 
place." As the diarist very wisely writes, " one could not 
be too guarded in one's conduct with such heroes." f 

Duels, I may remark in passing, w^ere much less frequent 
in the Peninsidar Army than might have been expected. 
Wellington (though long after he most fooHshly " went 
out " with Lord Winchelsea in 1829) set his face against 
them on active service, because he could not afford to lose 

* For an astounding story of an ensign who had been a billiard- 
marker in Dublin, and who was ultimately cashiered for theft, see 
Col. Bunbury's Reminiscences , vol. i. pp. 26-28. 

t Memoirs of Captain George EUerSy I2th Foot, p. 43. 



202 The Officers of the Regiment 

good officers on account of personal quarrels. There 
certainly were much fewer duels proportionately in the 
Peninsula than in England at the tinxe — ^not to speak of 
Ireland and India, where they were beyond all reason 
common. I have only found records of four fatal duels in 
the records of court-martials, and though non-fatal ones 
could have been (and were) hushed up, they cannot have 
been very numerous, for one may read through scores of 
memoirs and diaries without running upon the mention of 
one. It is curious to note that when they did occur, and a 
court-martial followed, that body invariably found that 
though there was no doubt that Captain A. or Lieutenant 
B. was dead, yet there was no conclusive proof that he had 
been killed by C. or D. — the mouths of the seconds being 
sealed by the fact that they were also on their trial for 
having acted in such a capacity.* The whole matter was 
clearly a solemn farce. But the fact remains that duels 
were not frequent, and that duellists had a bad mark 
against them. Good commanding officers took immense 
trouble to prevent a duel from arising over silly mess-table 
quarrels, exerting every influence to make one party, or 
both, apologize for words spoken in anger, or in liquor.f 

The body of officers of a Peninsular regiment was often 
a very odd party — there might be a lieutenant-colonel of 
twenty-six, who had risen rapidly by purchase or interest, 
and captains of fifty or even sixty ; I found a note of one 
who had attained that age in the 73rd. At the head of 
each rank there might be several impecunious and disap- 
pointed men, waiting for the promotion that could only 
come by casualties in action, since they could never hope to 
purchase their step. Nevertheless, the feuds that might 

* See the instances in General Orders for April 23, 1910, and 
July 16, 1812. 

t For a good example, see Dickson Papers, pp. 622, 623, where 
the good Dickson gets one officer to own that he was " betrayed in 
a moment of intoxication " into insulting words, and the other to 
say that the counter-charge with which he replied was made " in a 
moment of great irritation and passion." The apologies were both 
passed as satisfactory. 



Professional Training 203 

have been expected to follow such a situation do not seem 
to have been so many, or so bitter, as might have been 
expected. The grudge was set against the system rather 
than the individual, in most cases, and the sight of a mess 
cut up into cliques and coteries of enemies, though it can 
be found recorded occasionally, was quite exceptional.* 
The saving fact was that there was always the chance of 
promotion for merit, in reward of some specially gallant deed, 
and it often came — though the Duke was occasional^ 
incomprehensible in the way in which he mentioned or did 
not mention officers in dispatches. The lieutenant who 
brought down the French flag from the castle of Badajoz, 
and who was sent with it by Picton to the commander-in- 
chief, was thanked and asked to dinner, but was still a 
lieutenant years after, in spite of his general's vehement 
remonstrances. t Dozens of such instances could be 
quoted. 

Professional training for officers had perforce been non- 
existent in the early years of the French war. There was no 
institution which supplied it, and all military kno"w4edge 
had to be acquired by rule of thumb at regimental head- 
quarters. An improvement of the greatest importance was 
made by the establishment in December, 1801, of the 
" Royal Military College " at High Wycombe for the use of 
young officers, followed by the creation of its "Junior 
Department" in May, 1802, ''for the instruction of those 
who from early life are intended for the miUtary pro- 
fession." The latter, the origin of the college at Sandhurst, 
to which the department was removed in 1811, accepted 
boys as early as thirteen. Its first inspector-general was the 
French emigre Jarry, to whom we owe the " Instructions 

* A series of court-martials in one Peninsular battalion shows us 
such a pictiu-e, with the colonel on one side and the two majors on 
the other. The former prosecuted the senior major for embezzle- 
ment, while at the same moment a subaltern was " broke " for 
alleging that the junior major had shown cowardice in the field. 
The Horse-Guards finally dispersed all the officers into different 
corps, as the only way of ending the feud. 

t See pp. 121-2 of vol. ii. of Robinson's Lije of Picton, 



204 The Officers of the Regiment 

for Light Infantry in the Field " of 1804, while Colonel 
John Gaspard Le Marchant was " Lieutenant-governor and 
Superintendant General." This was the accomplished 
cavalry officer who fell in 1812, at the head of his 
brigade, in the crisis of the battle of Salamanca, when 
he had just delivered a decisive charge. The military 
college men were already numerous when the Peninsular 
War began. 

The French General, Foy, a witness whose authority 
can hardly be called in question, for he is making grudging 
admissions, says that he considered the general mass of 
the British officers excellent.* The more we study detailed 
records, the more willingly do we acknowledge that his 
praise is well deserved. The weaker brethren were very 
few — so few that an enemy did not even notice them. 
Misconduct on the field was the rarest of offences ; there 
are hardly half a dozen court-martials for suspected slack- 
ness, among the hundreds that were held for other offences. 
There were an appreciable number of officers " broke " 
for faults that came from hard drinking, " incapable when on 
duty," and so forth, or brawling, and a very few for financial 
irregularities ; but considering the unpromising material 
that was sometimes pitchforked into a regiment by the 
unscrupulous exercise of patronage at home, they were 
exceedingly few. The only class of failures who had any 
appreciable numbers, and earned a special name, were 
the " Belemites," so called from the general depot at the 
convent of Belem in the suburbs of Lisbon. This was the 
headquarters of all officers absent from the front as con- 
valescents or on leave, and the limited proportion who 
stayed there over-long, and showed an insufficient eagerness 
to return to their regiments, were nicknamed from the spot 
where they lingered beyond the bounds of discretion. Well- 
ington occasionally gave an order to Colonel Peacocke, the 
military governor of Lisbon, to rout up this coterie — there 
were always a sprinkling there who were not over-anxious 
* Letter printed in Vie MUitaire, ed, Girod de I'Ain, p. 98. 



The *'Belemites" 205 

to resume the hard hfe of campaigning, and loved too much 
the gambhng-hells and other sordid dehghts of Lisbon.* 
Occasionally the notices which appear in General Orders 
about these gentry are rather surprising — one would not 
have thought that such men could even have obtained a 
commission. Take, for example, " The commanding officer 
at Lisbon (or the commanding officer of any station at 

which Captain of the 88th may happen to be found), 

will be pleased to place that officer under arrest, and send 
him to join his regiment, he having been absent for several 
months without leave, and having been in Portugal since 
October 20th last, without reporting himself to or com- 
municating with his commanding officer." f 

Wellington in his moments of irritation sometimes 
wrote as if the majority of his officers were slack and dis- 
obedient. Such men existed ; but, as one who knew the 
Duke well observed, " by long exercise of absolute power 
he had become intolerant of the slightest provocation, and 
every breach of discipline, no matter how hmited its range, 
made him furious with the whole army. Hence frequent 
Greneral Orders, as violent as they were essentially unjust, 
wherein, because of the misdeeds of a few, all who served 
under him were denounced — the officers as ignorant of their 
duty, the rank and file as little better than a rabble." J 

But the duty-shirking officer, and still more the dis- 
reputable officer was, after all, a very rare exception. The 
atmosphere of contempt which surrounded him in his 
regiment as a rule sufficed to make him send in his papers, 
after a longer or a shorter period of endurance, in pro- 
portion as his skin was tough or thin. Opinion was not 
so hard upon the man who was merely quarrelsome and 

* See the heading " Lisbon " in the collected volume of General 
Orders, pp. 206, 207. 

t General Orders, Freneda, December 4, 1811. For anecdotes 
about this officer's shirking propensities, see pp. 27-36 of the second 
series of Grattan's Adventures with the Connaught Rangers. He was 
ultimately cashiered. 

% Gleig's Reminiscences of Wellington, p. 303. 



206 The Officers of the Eegiment 

ungentlemanly in his cups. But there were Umits 6ven 
to the boisterousness permitted to the tippler, and drunken- 
ness when in face of the enemy, or in a position of 
mihtary responsibihty, was always fatal. 

There was, throughout the war, a perceptible proportion 
of officers who had risen from the ranks. Meritorious 
service, showing good capacity as well as courage, not 
unfrequently led to the promotion of a sergeant to an 
ensigncy. A well-remembered case is that of the Sergeant 
Newman of the 43rd who raUied the stragglers during the 
march from Lugo to Betanzos, in the Corunna retreat, and 
beat off the pursuing French dragoons. Another is that of 
Sergeant Masterson of the 2/87th, who captured the eagle 
of the Sth Ligne at Barrosa. Many more might be quoted, 
though none of them is so striking as that of a man who 
did not serve in the Peninsula, but in contemporary cam- 
paigns in India, the celebrated John Shipp. He was twice 
given a commission for deeds of exceptional daring. After 
winning his first ensigncy in the storming party at the 
Siege of Bhurtpoor in 1805, he was forced to " sell out " 
a Httle later by improvident living. He enhsted as a private 
in another regiment, and was again promoted from the 
ranks for a single combat with a Nepaulese chief during 
the first Goorkha War of 1815. Conducting himself with 
more wisdom on his second chance, he served long as an 
officer, and when he went on half -pay became chief -con- 
stable of Liverpool. His autobiography is an artless and 
interesting piece of work well worth perusal. 

When a regiment had greatly distinguished itself in 
the field, Wellington not unfrequently directed its colonel 
to recommend a sergeant for a commission. This, for 
example, was done for all three battalions of the Light 
Division after their splendid exploit at Bussaco. Yet he 
did not approve of this system of promotion as anything 
but a very exceptional measure, and in his table-talk with 
Lord Stanhope we find some very harshly worded verdicts 
on old rankers, "their origin would come out, and you 



Officers from the Ranks 207 

could never perfectly trust them," * especially in the 
matter of drink. This seems to be a typical instance of 
the Duke's aristocratic prejudices — but there was some- 
thing in what he said. The position of the promoted 
sergeants was certainly difficult, and it required a man of 
exceptional character to make it good. As a rule, they 
drifted into the position of paymasters, recruiting officers, 
barrack masters, and such-hke posts. But many of them 
made useful and efficient adjutants. In command they 
were not as a rule successful,! ^nd I have only come on a 
single case of one who reached the rank of full colonel, and 
of two who were fortunate enough to obtain a majority. 
It is clear that the purchase system pressed very hardly 
upon them : with no private resources it was impossible 
for them ever to buy a step, and, after reaching the rank 
of captain, they almost invariably went upon half-pay or 
looked for employment in some civil or semi-civil capacity. 
Concerning the equipment of the officer, his baggage, 
his horses and mules, and his servants, information will 
be found in another chapter. Here we are dealing vnth. 
him as an item in the machinery of the regiment. 

* Conversations with Duke of Wellington, pp. 13 and 18. 
t See, for an instance, pp. 249-50. 






CHAPTER XII 

INTEENAIi ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENT: THE RANK 

AND FILE 

He who would make himself acquainted in detail with the 
many experiments by which British Governments, from the 
rupture of the Peace of Amiens onward, strove to keep on 
foot in full numbers the very large army that it had raised, 
must satisfy his curiosity by studying the admirable volumes 
of Mr. Fortescue. Here we are concerned only with the 
methods which prevailed from 1809 till 1814, and gave 
WeUington the invincible, though often attenuated, bat- 
talions which conquered at Talavera and Bussaco, at 
Salamanca and Toulouse. 

In the Peninsular Army the system of territorial names 
prevailed for nearly all the regiments of the Une, but in 
most cases the local designation had no very close relation 
with the actual provenance of the men. There were a 
certain number of regiments that were practically national, 
e.g. most of the Highland battalions, and nearly all of the 
Irish ones, were very predominantly Highland and Irish 
as to their rank and file : but even in the 79th or the 88th 
there was a certain sprinkling of English recruits. And 
in some nominally Scottish regiments like the 71st Highland 
Light Infantry, or the 90th Perthshire Volunteers,* the 
proportion of English and Irish was very large. Similarly 
in almost all the nominally English regiments there was a 

* When the 90th was raised in 1794, out of the 746 men 165 
were English and 56 Irish — ^not much less than a third of the whole. 
Cf . Delavoye's History of the QOth, p. 3. In the Waterloo campaign 
the 71st had 83 English and 56 Irish in its ranks. 



\ 



VOLUNTEEES FROM THE MiLITIA 209 

large sprinkling of Irish, and a few Scots. This came partly 
from the fact that, though the corps recruited in their own 
districts, yet they were often allowed to send recruiting 
parties to great centres like London, Bristol, Liverpool, 
Glasgow, or Dublin. But stiU more was it due to the fact 
that the larger half of the recruits were raised not in the 
old normal fashion, but by volunteering from the embodied 
militia, and that in this system practically no attempt was 
made to confine the choice of mihtiamen wishing to join 
the regular army to their territorial regiment. Nothing, 
for example, was more usual than to find such things as 
100 of the King's County Militia joining the 31st or Hunt- 
ingdonshire Regiment. When the 77th or East Middlesex 
Kegiment returned from India in 1808, it was completed, 
before going out to the Peninsula, from the 1st West York, 
North and South Mayo, Northampton, and South Lincoln 
Militia, but did not get a single man from the Middlesex 
MiUtia.* The Shropshire Regiment (53rd) when allowed 
in a similar case to call for volunteers, did get 99 from 
its own county militia, but 144 more from the Dorset, 
East York, and Montgomery local corps. | The 81st or 
Loyal Lincoln was filled up in 1808, before saihng for 
Portugal, from the Dubhn, King's County, South Devon, 
and Montgomery Mihtia. Instances might be multiplied 
ad nauseam. It was quite exceptional for any English 
corps to contain a preponderance of men from its owoi 
nominal district, and nearly all of them had from a fifth 
to a fourth of Irish. 

It is impossible to exaggerate the advantage to the 
Peninsular Army of the system, the invention of Castlereagh 
when War Minister, which enabled it to draw in such a 
heavy proportion on the militia for recruits. J The men 
thus obtained had all had at least twelve months' drill and 
discipline, in a corps which had been under arms for many 

* Woolwright's History of the 11th, p. 29. 
f Rogerson's History of the 53r(i, p. 35. 

X See Fortescue's History of the British Army, vi. pp. 180-183. 

V 



210 The Men of the Regiment 

years : they were trained soldiers of some little experience, 
much superior in fact to the recruits who had been pro- 
cured in other ways. The permanent militia represented 
the force raised by the counties by ballot, though substi- 
tutes rather than principals were procured by that device. 
Being forced to serve at home for a period of years, the 
mihtiamen freely volunteered into the line, from love of 
adventure, dishke of dull country quarters in England or 
Ireland,* and, it must be added, the temptation of the 
enormous bounty, running at various times from £16 up 
to £40, which was given to those changing their service. f 

It is a mistake to make a point, as some writers have 
done, of the fact that many regiments appeared in Spain 
with their ranks " full of raw militiamen, who sometimes 
still bore their old militia badges on their knapsacks." So 
far from their being inehgible recruits, they were the very 
best, for the militia of 1808-14 was not a body called out 
for short service during one month of the year, but a per- 
manent institution which practically formed a second line 
to the field army. And no man was allowed to volunteer 
into the regulars till he had served a full year in the local 
corps in which he had enlisted. A regiment must get drafts 
on active service, and these were the very best sort that 
could be obtained. Of course a corps filled up hastily 

* To quote an interesting explanatory note from the autobio- 
graphy of Morris of the 73rd. " The miHtia would be drawn up in 
line, and the officers for the regiments requiring volunteers would 
give a glowing description of their several corps, describing the 
victories they had gained, and the honours they had acquired, and 
conclude by offering the bounty. If these inducements were not 
effectual in getting men, coercive measures were adopted : the 
militia colonel would put on heavy and long drills and field exercises, 
which were so tedious and oppressive that many men would embrace 
the alternative, and volunteer for the regulars" (p. 13). 

f A canny Scot makes his explanation for volunteering in a 
fashion which combines patriotism, love of adventiu-e, and calculation. 
" In the militia I serve secure of life and limb, but with no prospect 
of future benefit for old age (pension) to which I may attain. It is 
better to hazard both abroad in the regular service, than to have 
poverty and hard-labom* accompanying me to a peaceful grave at 
home." Anton's Retrospect of a Military Life, p. 39. 



The Noemal Eecruit 211 

with a great number of them, would want a little time to 
shake down, but it would take far longer to assimilate a 
corresponding number of ordinary recruits, hurried out 
from its regimental depot — for these men would neither 
have had a whole year's drill, nor would they have been 
accustomed to the daily economy of a full regiment — depots 
seem to have been slackly administered, in many cases by 
officers and sergeants invahded and past service, or who 
had of their own desire shirked the service at the front. 

The other moiety of the recruits who came out to the 
Peninsula, to fill up the never-ending gaps in the ranks of 
a battahon at the front, were on the whole worse material 
than the militiamen. They were the usual raw stuff swept 
in by the recruiting sergeant — ^all those restless spirits 
who were caught by the attraction of the red coat, country 
lads tired of the plough, or town lads who lived on the edge 
of unemployment, and to whom a full stomach had been 
for some time a rarity. We have autobiographies of 
runaway apprentices who had bolted from a hard master,* 
and of village Lotharios who had evaded an entanglement 
by a timely evasion.f Sons of hard fathers, and stepsons 
of intolerable stepmothers drifted in, and still more fre- 
quently the rowdy spirits who were " wanted " by the 
constable for assault and battery, or for some rural practical 
joke which had set the parish in an uproar. The oddest 
cause of enlisting that I have come upon is that of a son 
of a respectable Edinburgh tradesman's family, whose 
account of the fortunes of the 71st in 1808-15 is one of the 
best written of all the soldier-biographies. A stage-struck 
youth with a little money in his pocket, he had often gone 
on (no doubt as a super) at the Theatre Koyal, carrying a 
banner or a five-word message. At last the sunmxit of his 
ambition came — a friendly manager gave him a short 
part, where he had actually some share in the action. He 

* See the amusing narrative of Lawrence of the 20th and his 
two evasions from his stone-mason employer. 

I See Stanhope's Conversations with Wellington, p. 13. 



212 The Men of the Regiment 

invited all his friends to the performance to see his glory, 
came on the boards, and was suddenly struck with stage 
fright, so that he stood gaping and silent before the audience, 
and heard the laughter and hooting begin. The poor 
wretch bolted straight away from the stage in his costume 
and paint, ran down to Leith, and enlisted with a sergeant 
of the 71st, whose party was sailing that night for the 
South. Anything was preferable to him rather than to 
face next morning the jeers of the friends to whom he 
had boasted of his histrionic powers, and who had come 
to see his debut.* 

But these were the better spirits. There was a much 
lower stratum among the recruits, drawn from the criminal 
or semi-criminal classes, whom the enormous bounty offered 
for volunteers had tempted into the service — generally with 
the purpose of getting out of it again as soon as possible. 
Not only were there poachers, smugglers, and street-corner 
roughs, who had been offered by the local authorities the 
choice between enlistment and the jail, but pickpockets, 
coiners, and footpads, who had made London or some 
other great town too hot for them, often enlisted as a ^is 
alter, intending to desert and " jump another bounty " 
when they could. But sergeants were lynx-eyed when 
they found that they had enhsted a slippery customer, and 
the evasive recruit often found himself kept under lock 
and key in a fort, and shipped off to Spain before he got 
his opportunity to abscond. The number of these " King's 
hard bargains " varied much between different regiments, 
but Colborne, a good authority, says that the battalion 
was lucky which had not its fifty irreclaimable bad cha- 
racters, drunkards, plunderers, stragglers, Kvould-be deserters, 
actual criminals " whom neither punishment nor any 
kind of discipline could restrain ; for the system of recruit- 
ing was defective and radically bad." f It was this scum, 

* Journal of T. S. of the 71st in Constable's Memorials of the 
Late War, i. p. 25. 

■|- Note by Colborne on p. 396 of his Life by Moore-Smith. 



Undesirable Recruits 213 

a small proportion of the whole, but always swimming to 
the top when there was mischief to be done — peasants to 
be plundered or churches to be pillaged — that provided the 
subject-matter for court-martials, and engrossed the majority 
of the attention of the Provost Marshal. Officers of un- 
doubted humanity, and men in the ranks who knew what 
they were talking about, unite in stating that there was a 
residuum in the Peninsular Army which could only be 
governed by the lash. 

This small percentage of irreclaimables provided the 
nucleus around which misconduct sometimes grew to a 
great scale, in moments of special privation or temptation. 
In abominable orgies hke the sack of Badajoz, or the lesser 
but still disgraceful riots at Ciudad Rodrigo and San 
Sebastian, it was the criminals who started the game, but 
the drunkards — a far more numerous class — ^who took it 
up. When the drink was in them, the mob was capable of 
any freak of wanton mischief or cruelty. Wellington more 
than once complained that the most reckless and ungovern- 
able of his rowdies were the ncAvly- joined Irish recruits. It 
seems that when in liquor they became irresponsible madmen, 
and had not undergone enough of disciphne to get them 
into a habit of obedience, which might serve as a substitute 
for moral sense. And I can well beheve this from casual 
e^ddence picked up in the diaries of his obscure subordinates. 
The account of the difficulties of officers and sergeants in 
getting a large draft of Irish recruits from Cashel to Deal, 
which I met in one soldier-diary reads Hke a nightmare * — 
or a glimpse of some primitive pagan heaven, in which all 
was objectless fighting in the intervals between frequent 
and Umitless potations. As a side-light on the national 
failing, I may quote the fact that going through the complete 
record of general court-martials for the whole period 1809-14, 
I found that after putting aside all trials of officers, non- 
combatants, and foreign auxiliaries (the last almost always 
for desertion) there was an unmistakable over-percentage 
* Rifieman Harris, pp. 10-16. 



214 The Men of the Eegiment 

of men with Irish names, just as there Avas an under- 
percentage of Scots. The offences for which the former 
were tried were generally desertion and crimes of violence, 
plundering or maltreating the peasantry.* 

The way in which the habitually criminal element 
makes itself visible in this list of court-martials is in the 
not infrequent cases of scientific and habitual burglary, 
robbery of the convoys going to the military chest, or of 
the private property of officers, and the stealing of church 
plate — all offences often punished with death, for WeUington 
rarely pardoned the professional thief, though he sometimes 
let off a deserter with a sound flogging. But the queerest 
glimpse into the lowest stratum of the army is the curious 
anecdote recorded in Napier's fifth volume. Nonplussed in 
the Avinter of 1813-14 by the refusal of the French peasantrj^ 
to accept the dollars or the guineas which were all that he 
could ojffer, Wellington determined to set up a mint of his 
own, which should melt down Spanish and Portuguese 
silver and recoin it in the form of five franc pieces. He 
sent private appeals to the colonels to find him all the 
professional coiners that they could discover in the ranks, 
collected as many as fortj^ at St. Jean de Luz, and mth 
their aid struck a large quantity of money, of which he was 
careful to see that the weight and the purity were both 
correct.f 

Occasionally the gentleman-ranker was to be found in 
a Peninsular regiment. He was generally an " undesir- 
able," who had enlisted in consequence of some disgraceful 
quarrel with a family who had refused to do anything more 
for him. Persistent drink, gambling, or dishonesty were 
the usual causes that had broken him — not undeserved 
misfortune or dire poverty. Occasionally he pulled himself 

* In the Court Martials on privates printed in General Orders, out 
of 280 trials I make out 80 certainly Irish names, and a good many- 
more probably Irish — ^while there are only 23 Scots. There wer > 
certainly not four times as many Irish as Scots in the Peninsular 
Army, though there were more than twice as many. 

'\ See also Stanhope's Conversations with Wellington, p. 6. 



The Gentleman-Ranker 215 

together, became a good soldier, and was ultimately 
promoted to a comjnission. More often he sank into a 
persistent drunkard or a criminal. Surtees of the 95th, 
in an interesting chapter, gives the biographies of the four 
privates of this class that he had known.* One conducted 
himself well for some years, became a paymaster-sergeant, 
and then broke out into a wild fit of dissipation, embezzled 
the company's money, and committed suicide on detection. 
The second was always in scrapes : finally he was caught 
deserting to the French, and was lucky to get off with penal 
servitude for life instead of death. The third, " always 
excessively wild," was once made a corporal, but was not 
fit for that or any other rank. The fourth was one of the 
exceptional cases — being a retired lieutenant without 
friends or means, who had enlisted as a private in sheer 
poverty. He was an exemplary and deserving man, who 
was soon made secretarj^ or private clerk, to his colonel, 
behaved excellently, and Avas in the end restored to his 
former rank in the army by interest made in his behalf. 

A regiment on Peninsular service depended for its 
strength on the regularity with which it was fed from its 
home-battahon or its depot. Whenever a convoy sailed 
from Spithead, it contained an immense number of small 
detachments, varying from a few scores to over a hundred 
men, under charge of officers newly gazetted to the service 
battalion, or returning from sick leave. There was often 
much wrangHng on shipboard (unless the weather reduced 
every one to the same level of nausea and helplessness), 
not only between the men but between the young officers 
in charge of them. After an angry comparison of the exact 
date of commissions, which settled seniority in the choice 
of berths, and in dealing with the transport-captain, two 
ensigns in charge of detachments would often settle down 
to a feud destined to last for the whole voyage to Lisbon. 
Their men gleefully joined in the wrangle. There are 
some absurd sidefights, in court-martials, on these frequent 
* Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade, pp. 47, 48. 



216 The Men of the Kegiment 

shipboard quarrels, which sometimes ended in affrays and 
" conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." 

When a detachment landed at Lisbon, the officer in 
charge, often a lad of sixteen, had to shepherd his flock to 
the front, perhaps over 200 miles of mountain roads. 
Neither officers nor men knew a word of Portuguese, or 
had the shghtest notion of the manners, government, 
prejudices, or food of the peasantry. They went forward 
in a perpetual haze of mistakes and misunderstandings. 
Every draft had its percentage of undesirables, or even of 
criminals. Hence the young officer, responsible for their 
safe dehvery at the front, found himself embroiled in 
constant disputes with the natives, often ending in his 
arrest on his final arrival at headquarters. We must feel 
nothing but sympathy for the unfortunate young man who 
delivered only twenty-nine out of a detachment of forty-one 
entrusted to him ; or the other who found that fourteen men 
out of twenty had privately disposed of their new blankets.* 
The only way of managing the draft was by reHance on the 
sergeant or two who formed a part of it : and if the sergeant 
was himself a sluggard or a tippler, ill fared his superior. 
Imagine the feelings of the second-Heutenant who having 
left his one non-commissioned officer behind, to hunt up 
footsore stragglers, found no one arrive at the nightly 
billet, and returning for miles to seek the lost ones, dis- 
covered his sergeant dead drunk and snoring in the middle 
of the high-road, t Abihty to conduct a draft to the battahon 
was one of the greatest tests of the character and capacity 
of a junior officer. 

The responsibihty of the non-commissioned officer 
cannot be exaggerated. It was easy to make sergeants, 
but not easy to secure them of the proper quality. Too 
often the man promoted for an act of courage or of quick 
cleverness had to be reduced to the ranks again, for some 

* Both coiirt-martialled, of course : see General Orders, vol. vii. 
t This incident occurs in the unprinted letters of F. Monro, R.A., 
lent to me by his kinsfolk of to-day. 



Concerning Sergeants 217 

hopeless failing — he was prone to drink,* or he was an 
over-harsh or an over-slack administrator of discipline. 
One of the commoner types of court-martial was that of 
the non-commissioned officer who cormived at and profited 
by the misdeeds of the men under his charge — whose 
silence was bought by a percentage, when peasants were 
plundered, or convoys Ughtened of food, shoes, or clothing. 
It was often difficult to get at him — to prove that he had 
known of what was going on, and had contrived to see 
nothing. But the numbers of reductions to the ranks 
were notable, and lashes were often added when part of 
the corpus delicti was found in the sergeant's pack. 

However, the ideal sergeant was not unfrequently found, 
and when found he was invaluable ; he had to be a steady 
man with a modicum of education and a sense of duty, 
who could be relied upon neither to connive at his men's 
graver faults, nor, on the other hand, to be perpetually 
spying on them and reporting them to their captains for 
every minute breach of discipHne. Tact was as necessary as 
the power to get orders carried out. The bullying sergeant 
would, in the end, get left in some quandary or dilemma by 
the men that he was always harrying, while the considerate 
sergeant would get the benefit of his popularity by receiving 
loyal and inteUigent service instead of mere obedience. 

Most important of all non-commissioned officers was 
the sergeant-major, concerning w^hose position I cannot 
do better than quote the homily of a Highland soldier 
more given to philosophical disquisitions than most of the 
diarists from the ranks. f 

" The sergeant-major has an arduous duty to perform ; 
in all the arrangements of regimental duty he takes, or ought 

* One of the Duke's acrid generalizations on this point was " the 
non-commissioned officers of the Guards regularly got drunk once 
a day, by eight in the evening, and got to bed soon after — but they 
always took care to do first what they were bid." — Stanhope's Con- 
versations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 18. 

t See Anton's (42nd, Black Watch) Retrospect of a Military Life, 
pp. 239, 240. 



218 The Men of the Regiment 

to take, the most active concern. He has, of course, been 
considered by his colonel a meritorious man, before he ap- 
points him to this highest step to which a non-commissioned 
officer can attain : and, as it is frequently found necessary 
to consult him on the interior economy of the regiment, if 
he is possessed of any talents they are sure to be seen and 
called forth. Fortunate is the regiment which possess a 
good sergeant-major. His rank is not such as to make him 
above associating with and advising the other non-com- 
missioned officers : his own personal example is the means 
of swaying their actions : he cautions them against unjust 
oppression, yet shrinks not from pointing out the cases 
which require coercive measures. He recommends for 
promotion those who meritoriously aspire to rise from the 
ranks. His commanding officer is seldom troubled with 
complaints, for he settles them to the satisfaction of the 
accuser and accused. No mercenary motive actuates his 
conduct in reconciling differences, and his hands are never 
soiled with the gift of an inferior. To those who are un- 
acquainted with the influence which sergeant-majors 
generally possess this may seem a hyperbole ; but to me 
it appears a fact ; I speak not of one regiment but of many. 
A sergeant-major, on the other hand, can be a little tyrant 
in the corps, without the knowledge of his colonel : his 
unnecessary acts of oppression may be made to appear to 
his superiors as laudable zeal, and his severity as merit 
deserving reward. ... If the commanding officer be of 
an easy, complying turn, or again of a repulsive, haughtj^ 
doii't-trouble-me disposition, and the adjutant (which is 
often the case) not over well informed, the sergeant-major 
is consulted on all occasions. His opinion is asked as to 
character, he can establish or injure at pleasure, for who 
will be called in to contradict him ? In short he has much 
more to say between the non-commissioned officers and 
the colonel, concerning the poor soldiers' conduct, than all 
the captains and subalterns of the regiment." * 
* Retrospect of a Military Life, pp. 57, 58. 



The Sergeant's Self-Respect 219 

The gap between the sergeant and the men in the 
ranks was necessarily a well-marked one. The non-com- 
missioned ofl&cers kept together and formed messes of their 
own. " Pride and propriety " kept them from joining in 
the carouses of the rank and file. " He who has once joined 
the company of sergeants is disincluded for any other," * 
writes one veteran proud of Avell-deserved promotions. The 
non-commissioned officer who was too familiar with his 
inferiors Avas generally one of those who profited bj^ their 
misdeeds, and would some day be convicted of sharing 
their plunder, or conniving at their excesses. 

* Memoirs of Sergeant Morley^ 5th Foot, p. 101. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE AUXILIARIES : THE GERMANS AND THE PORTUGUESE 

Of the two classes of foreign troops which assisted to 
make up the invincible divisions of the Peninsular Army, 
the one formed at the time an integral part of the British 
military establishment ; the other was the contingent of 
an aUied Power, placed at the disposition of Wellington, 
and incorporated with the units of his host, but preserving 
its own national individuality. 

We must deal with the first class before we proceed to 
explain the position of the second. Copying old British 
precedent, the governments of George III. had taken into 
pay a number of foreign corps from the very commence- 
ment of the Revolutionary War. They were the successors 
of the Hanoverians against whom the elder Pitt had railed 
so fiercely in his hot youth, and of the Hessians who had 
taken such a prominent part in the War of American 
Independence. 

The regiments raised in the early years of the great 
struggle with France had mainly been composed of Swiss, 
or of French royalist emigres. Most of these corps had 
disappeared by 1809, and of those of them which survived 
the majority were doing garrison duty in the Mediterranean 
and elsewhere.* WelUngton never had them under his 
hand. The foreign troops which came under his command 
were nearly all German, and consisted of regiments raised 
after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens. 

* The survivors in 1809 were the regiments of de Menron, Bolle, 
Dillon, and de Watte ville. 



The King's German Legion 221 

By far the largest number of them belonged to that 
admirable corps the King's German Legion, whose historj^ 
was written mth great care and enthusiasm by Ludlow 
Beamish, while the generation which fought in the Peninsula 
was still alive. They were the legitimate representatives 
of the old Electoral army of Hanover, the comrades of the 
British troops in many a fight of the War of the Austrian 
Succession and of the Seven Years' War. When in June, 
1803, Napoleon invaded Hanover, and overran it with the 
troops of Mortier, the 15,000 men who formed the standing 
army of the electorate could make no effective resistance. 
They laid down their arms in accordance with the Conven- 
tion of Lauenburg (July 5, 1803), which disbanded them, 
and permitted officers and men to go where they pleased, 
with the proviso that none of them would bear arms 
against France till they should have been exchanged 
for French officers or men in the hands of the English 
Government." 

The best and most loyal of the Hanoverian officers 
began at once to betake themselves to England, and by 
the end of the year were streaming thither by dozens and 
scores. Men soon began to follow in considerable num- 
bers, and after two provisional infantry regiments had been 
formed in August, a larger organization, to be called the 
King's German Legion, was authorized in December. It 
included Hght and line infantry, heavy and Hght cavalry, 
artillery and engineers. All through 1804 new units were 
being rapidly created, mainly from Hanoverians, but not 
entirely, for other recruits of German nationahty were 
accepted. But all the officers, nearly all the sergeants, 
and the large majority of the rank and file came from the 
old Electoral army. By January, 1805, there were in 

* This proviso was neither submitted to nor approved by the 
British Government, who refused to take notice of it. Napoleon, 
during many disputes as to the exchange of prisoners in later 
years, always found a good excuse for breaking off negociations in 
the fact that he held that 4000 or 5000 Hanoverians of the K.G.L, 
should be reckoned as men requiring exchange. 



222 The Foreign ArjxiTJARiES 

existence a dragoon and a hussar regiment, four Line and 
two Light battahons, and five batteries of artillery. 

In November, 1805, when Lord Cathcart's expedition 
sailed for the Weser, to make a diversion in favour of 
Austria, the whole German Legion went with him. For 
a few short weeks the invaders were in possession of Bremen 
and Verden, Stade, and Hanover city, before the news of 
the disastrous peace that followed Austerlitz came to hand. 
During this space immense numbers of Hanoverians flocked 
to the colours, some old soldiers, others volunteers who 
had not served before. When the army evacuated Hanover 
in February, 1806, it brought back so many recruits that 
the Legion was raised to ten battalions of infantry and . 
five regiments of horse. 

These were almost the last genuine Hanoverians that 
were raised for service in the corps, for when the electorate 
was annexed to Jerome Bonaparte's " Kingdom of West- 
phalia," it became part of the French Imperial system, 
and was subjected to the conscription for Jerome's service. 
Only a few individuals henceforth succeeded in getting to 
England and joining the Legion by circuitous ways. But 
there were some good recruits obtained at Stralsund and 
in Denmark during the Copenhagen Expedition at the 
end of 1807, when the Legion was for some weeks in the 
Baltic. 

The battalions and squadrons were still mainly Hano- 
verian, when, in 1808, the larger half of them was sent to 
the Peninsula. In that year one Hussar regiment (the 3rd), 
two Light and four Line battahons (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7), landed 
in Portugal. Of these only the two Light battalions and the 
Hussars marched with Moore, and re-embarked for England 
after his disastrous retreat. The four Line battahons 
remained in Portugal, as did two German batteries, and 
made part of Wellesley's original army of 1809. They 
were joined in the spring of that year by the 1st Hussars, 
who (as has been already mentioned) were considered the 
most efficient light cavalry regiment in Portugal, and 



Eeoruiting the K.G.L. 223 

were long the chosen comrades of Craufurd's Light 
Division. 

In the spring of 1811 the K.G.L. contingent in Portugal 
was increased by the 2nd Hussars and the two Light Batta- 
lions, who returned about two years after their departure 
in the company of Moore. In the winter of 1811-12 the 
two heavy dragoon regiments joined Wellington's army. 
Thus in the beginning of 1812 four of the five cavalry 
regiments, and five (the 7th Line battalion had gone home) 
of the ten infantry battalions were serving in Spain. But 
at the end of the year the 2nd Hussars were drafted back 
to England, owing to depleted numbers. 

It had now become impossible to keep the ranks of the 
Legion filled with the genuine Hanoverians who had been 
its original nucleus. Communication with the electorate 
was completely cut off, and German recruits of any kind 
had to be accepted. Many of them were volunteers from 
the English prison camps, where thousands of Napoleon's 
German troops were lying. Of these only a fraction were 
Hanoverians born. The large majority could not, of 
course, share in the loyalty and enthusiasm of the original 
legionaries, being subjects of all manner of sovereigns in 
the Rheinbund, who had marched at Napoleon's orders. 
The quahty of men was much worse, and many enlisted only 
to escape from prison life, and readily deserted when they 
reached the front, having no interest in the cause for which 
they were fighting. From 1811 onward desertion, not at 
all usual in the early years of the Legion, became very 
common, and plunder and misconduct (previously very 
rare) were also rife. Matters became still worse when, 
later in the war, German recruits of any sort became so 
hard to obtain that Poles, Illyrians, and miscellaneous 
foreigners of any sort * were drafted out to fill the shrinking 

* I note among the deserters from the German Legion in 1812-14 
the strange and non-Teutonic names of Gormowsky, Melofsky, 
Schilinsky, Wutgok, Prochinsky, Borofsky, Ferdinando, Panderan, 
Kowalzuch, Matteivich, etc. 



224 The FoREiaN Auxiliaries 

ranks. But the splendid Hanoverian officers still con- 
tinued to get good service out of a rank and file that was 
no longer so homogeneous or loyal as it had been when the 
war began, and the regiments of the German Legion, the 
cavalry in especial, continued to be among Wellington's 
most trusted troops. The charge of Bock's Heavy Dragoons 
at Garcia Hernandez, on the day after Salamanca, was, as 
has been already stated, considered by Foy to have been 
the most brilhant and successful cavalry attack made in 
the whole Peninsular War. After the peace of 1814 all 
the " mongrels " were discharged, and the officers and 
native-born Hanoverian rank and file became the nucleus 
on which the new Royal Army of Hanover was built up. 
The fact that the ahens had been discharged in 1814 was 
the cause of all the K.G.L. battalions appearing at 
Waterloo in the following year with very small effectives, 
in no case reaching 500 of all ranks. 

Another foreign corps which served under Wellington 
from the end of 1810 till 1814 had an origin and a history 
much resembling that of the German Legion. This was 
the Brunswick Oels Jagers, whose history starts from 
1809. The hard-fighting Frederick William, Duke of 
Brunswick, the nephew of George III., had made a gallant 
diversion in Northern Germany during the Wagram Cam- 
paign. At the head of a small body of adventurers, he had 
thrown himself into the middle of Jerome Bonaparte's 
Kingdom of Westphaha, and had stirred up an insurrection 
there, particularly in his own old hereditary states. He 
was joined by several thousands of patriotic volunteers, 
and infhcted a series of small defeats on the Westphalians. 
But surrounded in the end by overwhelming numbers of 
enemies, he cut his way to the sea, and embarked the 
remnants of his followers aboard English ships at Brake 
on the Frisian coast. The British Government at once 
offered to take the refugees into its service, and from them 
organized the Brunswick Oels Jager and Hussar regiments, 
whose black uniform reproduced that of the duke's old troops. 



The Brunswick Oels Jagers 225 

The kernel of this corps was originally excellent — the 
officers were North-Germans, largely Prussians, who had 
risked their lives by joining an insurrection contrary to 
the orders of their sovereign, and could never return to 
their homes : while the rank and file had been patriotic 
volunteers. But, like the German Legion, the Brunswick 
regiment could find no more recruits of this sort when it 
had left Germany, and soon had to depend for the con- 
tinuance of its existence on the men in the English prison 
camps, who could be induced to buy a release from confine- 
ment by enlisting in the British service. It is clear that 
the German Legion got the best of these turncoats, and 
that the worst fell to the lot of the Brunswick corps. Not 
only Germans but Poles, Swiss, Danes, Dutch, and Croats 
were drafted into it. They Avere a motley crew, much 
given to desertion — on several occasions large parties went 
off together. One great court-martial in 1811 sat on ten 
Brunswick Oels deserters in a body, and ordered four to be 
shot and the rest to be flogged. Such men had all the 
vices of the mercenary, though in time of battle they 
displayed many of the virtues. Their officers had a hard 
task to keep them together, and they could never be trusted 
at the outposts. But the regiment was full of good shots 
and bold adventurers, and furnished several of the detached 
rifle companies with which Wellington strengthened the 
light infantry of his brigades. 

There was, however, one foreign regiment which was 
even more tiresome to manage than the Black Brunswickers. 
This was the Chasseurs Britanniques, a corps formed early 
in the Revolutionary War from French royalists, but now 
recruited entirely from deserters of all sorts. It came out to 
Portugal in the spring of 1811, and fought out the war to 
the end. At deserting it was far worse than the Bruns- 
wickers — the latter were raised from many races, but at 
least they were not born Frenchmen as were the most 
important section of the Chasseurs. A glance doAvn the 
names of the rank and file of the corps seems to show that 

Q 



226 The Foreign Auxiliaries 

after Frenchmen the next most important section were 
ItaUans, and that there were a few Poles and some Swiss, 
the latter supplying the men with Teutonic names. It 
seems to have been the working rule with the officers who 
accepted volunteers from the prison-camps to draft French 
and Italians into the Chasseurs, while Germans of all sorts 
went into the Legion or the Brunswick Corps, and Swiss 
partly into the Chasseurs, partly into Watteville's old Swiss 
regiment : Poles and Croats went anywhere. Now a German 
prisoner who volunteered into the British service might 
do so from patriotic motives, and make an excellent soldier. 
A Swiss or an Italian or an lUyrian could not be very 
heavily blamed for desertion — ^he had been conscribed, and 
sent to fight for Napoleon, in a quarrrel that was not his 
own. But the French deserter was no longer an old royahst, 
like the emigre soldiers of 1794, but one of two things. 
Either he was a man who enlisted in the Chasseurs simply 
to get a chance of deserting back to his own friends, or 
else he was a mauvais sujet, a man -without patriotic feeling 
or morality, who was ready to fight against his own country- 
men for pay or plunder. Both classes were amply repre- 
sented : the former fled back to the French ranks when 
they could, often taking valuable information with them. 
The latter were the worst class of mercenaries, since they 
had no inspiring cause to keep them true to their colours, 
while individually they were for the most part bad characters 
who had been the curse of their regiments while in the 
French service. 

The unenviable task of keeping together this body of 
deserters and adventurers fell to a body of officers who 
were almost without exception furious French royaHsts, 
the second generation of the emigres. They looked upon 
the war with Bonaparte as a family feud, in which they 
fought under any colours (many of their kin were in the 
Russian or the Austrian, or the Spanish service) in order 
to avenge the death of Louis XVL, the atrocities of the 
Terror, or the Massacres of Quiberon. With old loyalty 



The Chasseurs Britanniques ^21 

to the Bourbons, and personal hatred for the new French 
regime as their inspiration, they were fierce and desperate 
fighters. They kept the miscellaneous horde committed 
to their charge under an iron discipline, and used the lash 
freely. All that their personal courage could accomplish 
was done, to make the Chasseurs an efficient fighting force. 
But they could not stop desertion, nor frequent misconduct. 
The most astonishing court-martial in the war was that 
held on October 5, 1812, upon no less than 18 Chasseurs 
who had deserted in a body, two corporals and 16 men, of 
whom aU but two bore Itahan names.* This was only 
the largest case of a constant series of defections. The 
regiment melted away whenever it came near the French 
lines, and Welhngton had a standing order that it must 
never be trusted with the outposts. Yet as a fighting 
body it had no bad record — as witness Fuentes de Onoro 
and many other fields. This was the work of the zealous 
service of its officers — and was indeed a wonderful tour de 
force. The material with which they had to work was 
detestable. 

These were the only foreign corps, strictly speaking, in 
Wellington's army, but there were two more units which 
had a large, indeed a preponderating, German element in 
them, though they were numbered in the British line. 
These were the 5/60th, the rifle battalion of the " Royal 
Americans," and the 97th, a single-battalion corps which 
started its existence as Stuart's " Minorca Regiment," but 
got a place in the British line in 1804 as the " Queen's 
Germans." Neither of these battahons were purely German 
either in officers or men : of the 5/60th the disembarkation 
roll on its original landing in Portugal shows eighteen officers 
with German and ten with British names.t The colonel, De 
Rottenbourg, was a foreigner, but the second in command, 

* The other two names are one Swiss the other Croatian. 
y t Names such as Davy, Woodgate, GaHffe, Andrews, McKenzie, 
Holmes, Linstow, Wynne, Joyce, Gilbert are immistakably British. 
See Colonel Rigaud's History oj the 5/60«/i, Appendix i. 



228 The Foreign Auxiliaries 

Davy, an Englishman. The British element was not pro- 
portionally so strong in the rank and file at the commence- 
ment of the war, but was apparently increasing as it went 
on. English and Irish recruits were drafted in, in order 
that such a fine corps might not be spoilt with the bad 
class of German recruit such as was alone procurable in 
1812 or 1813. When the corps returned from the Peninsula 
in 1814 it had only nine officers with German names and 
twelve with British, and I fancy the balance in the rank 
and file between the nationalities had changed in the same 
way. When amalgamated with the l/60th, after the end 
of the war it had certainly 400 British to something under 
300 Germans in its ranks. 

This was a most distinguished corps : the green-coated 
rifle companies which it supplied to many brigades of the 
Peninsular Army were universally praised for their cool 
courage and admirable marksmanship. The battalion had 
very few deserters save for one period in 1808-9, when it 
had received a batch of recruits from Junot's Army of 
Portugal, who proved unsatisfactory. It would be an 
absolute insult to the 5/ 60th to class them with the Bruns- 
wickers or the Chasseurs Britanniques. 

The 97th being a single-battalion corps, with nothing 
to maintain it but a dep6t which could only collect German 
recruits in the same fashion as the K.G.L., wasted down 
to a very small remnant after two years of war, and was 
sent back to England in 1811, with a handsome epitaph of 
praise by Wellington. It never got to the front again, 
remained at home on a very weak establishment, and was 
disbanded at the end of the war. Like the 5/60th it was 
not wholly German ; among the officers we find individuals 
with British names like Carter, Biscoe, Wilson, Lyon. 
Its colonel and one of its two majors were English, 
and there was a proportion of non-Germans among its 
rank and file. Its Peninsular record if short was 
distinguished. 

It remains to speak about the Portuguese, who formed 



The Portuguese Army in 1809 229 

about two -fifths of Wellington's fighting force. We have 
already had occasion to speak of the way in which they 
were distributed among the British troops, when dealing 
Avith the character of Beresford,* and the composition of 
the Peninsular divisions. f But the inner mechanism of 
the Portuguese army remains to be detailed. It consisted 
in 1809 of twenty -four regiments of infantry of the line, 
each of two battalions, save the 21st which had been cut 
up at Soult's storm of Oporto in March, and only mustered 
one. I There were also six battalions of cagadores or rifles, 
all raised in 1808-9, and twelve weak regiments of horse. 
The artillery, divided into four local regiments of unequal 
strength (those of Lisbon, Oporto, Elvas, and Algarve), 
supplied nine or ten field batteries, and a number of garrison 
companies which manned the guns of Elvas, Almeida, 
Abrantes, Peniche, and many other minor fortresses. 
There was in addition an abnormal corps, the Loyal Lusi- 
tanian Legion, raised by Sir Robert Wilson at Oporto in 
1808, which furnished three battalions of light infantry, a 
squadron of horse and an incomplete battery. This legion, 
Avhich had done very good service in 1809-10, was absorbed 
into the regular army in 1811, its three battalions becoming 
the 7th, 8th, and 9th ca9adores. At the same time Welling- 
ton ordered the raising of three new rifle battalions bearing 
the numbers 10, 11, and 12. 

The establishment of a Portuguese two-battalion line 
regiment was nominally 1540 men, that of a ca9ador 
battalion 770 men : they were each divided into six strong 
companies. The cavalry regiments, with a nominal effective 
of 590 men, seldom showed 300 apiece in the field. The 
infantry corps, with the conscription to keep their ranks full, 
could from 1809 onward generally take the field with over 
1200 of all ranks, not including men in hospital or detached, 
and very seldom shrank as low as 1000. The ca9ador 
battalions were generally somewhat weaker in proportion 

♦ See p. 120. f See pp. 168-9. 

X This corps only raised its second battalion in 1811. 



230 The Foeeign Auxiliaries 

to their nominal effective, rarely showing more than 500 
men in line. 

The organization of the Portuguese Army was made on 
a strictly local basis, each of the twenty-four line regiments 
having its proper recruiting district. Two corps were 
furnished by the province of Algarve, five by the Alemtejo, 
four by Lisbon city and its surrounding district, three by 
the rest of Portuguese Estremadura, four by the Beira, 
four by Oporto and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho, and two by 
Tras-os-Montes.* Some of the recruiting-districts being 
less populous than others, had a greater difficulty in keeping 
up their territorial regiments. This was especially the case 
with the five corps of the Alemtejo, where the waste bears 
a greater proportion to the inhabited land than in other 
provinces of Portugal. 

The ca9ador battalions were mainly raised in the better 
peopled north, which supplied not only the three (Nos. 7, 
8, 9), formed from the Lusitanian Legion (all raised in and 
about Oporto), but also numbers 3,4, 6, and after 1811 the 
additional numbers 10, 11, 12. The southern provinces 
only provided numbers 1, 2, 5. These brown and dark 
green battalions, whose sombre colours contrasted strongly 
with the bright blue and white of the Portuguese line,! 
supplied, along with the green British riflemen, the main 
skirmishing line of Wellington's army. Eight of the 
twelve were raised and commanded by British officers, only 
the remaining four by Portuguese colonels. 

Portugal is not a country abounding in horses, and 
of the twelve dragoon regiments of which its cavalry 

* Algarve, Nos. 2 (Lagos) and 14 (Tavira). Alemtejo, Nos. 
5 and 17 (1st and 2nd of Elvas), 8 (Evora), 20 (Campomayor), 22 
(Serpa). Lisbon, Nos. 1, 4, 10, 16. Estremadura, No. 7 (Setubal), 
19 (Cascaes), 11 (Peniche). Beira, Nos. 3 and 15 (raised in the 
Lamego district), 11 and 23 (1st and 2nd of Almeida). Oporto 
region, Nos. 6 and 18 (1st and 2nd of Oporto), 9 (Viana), 21 
(Valenga). Tras-os-Montes, Nos. 12 (Chaves), and 24 (Braganza). 

•\ The three Lusitanian battalions wore a uniform of ivy-green, 
the nine others a dark brown dress. The cut of both was fashioned 
in imitation of that of the British Rifle Brigade. 



Beresfoed's Woek 23J 

consisted, three (Nos. 2, 3, 12) were never put into the field 
at allj but utihzed as dismounted troops in garrison duty. 
Of the other nine corps several were mere fragments, and 
none ever took anything like its establishment of 500 sabres 
to the front. Three hundred was as much as was usually 
shown : in the 1811 campaign the two regiments which 
Wellington used in the Fuentes de Onoro campaign had 
not 450 mounted men between them. 

Beresford's conversion of the disorganized and depleted 
army of which he took the command in 1809 into a service- 
able andwell-disciplinedforcewas a remarkable achievement. 
He found it in a chaotic state — Junot had disbanded the 
whole, save a few battalions which he sent to France to 
serve Napoleon. The regiments had collected again as 
best they could, but the cadres were incomplete, and the 
corps of officers left much to be desired. The Portuguese 
army before 1808 had aU the typical faults of an army of 
the ancien regime which had rusted in a long period of peace. 
It was full of old or incapable officers put into place by court 
intrigues or family influence. Promotion was irregular and 
perfectly arbitrary ; the lower commissioned ranks of the 
regiments were choked with officers whose want of education 
and military knowledge made them unfit for higher posts. 
They had often grown grey as lieutenants, and were per- 
fectly useless in a crisis. The pay was very low, and the 
temptation to make up for the want of it by petty jobbing 
and embezzlement too strong. 

When Beresford took command, in the early spring of 
1809, he had found about 30,000 regular troops in arms 
on an estabHshment which ought to have shown nearly 
60,000. The deficiency in mere numbers could be remedied 
by a stringent use of the conscription : but the deficiencies 
of organization could not. Beresford complained that 
" Long habits of disregard of duty, and consequent laziness, 
made it not only difficult but almost impossible to induce 
many senior officers to enter into any regular and continued 
attention to the duties of their situations, and neither 



232 The Foreign Auxiliaries 

reward nor punishment would induce them to bear up 
against the fatigue." * In the lower ranks there was a 
good deal of zeal, there being great numbers of young 
officers from the higher classes, who had just accepted 
commissions from patriotic motives ; but there was also a 
heavy dead- weight of old and slack officers, and an appalling 
want of professional knowledge. 

Beresford made it a condition of accepting his post that 
he should be allowed a free hand to retain, dismiss, or 
promote, and should be permitted to introduce a certain 
amount of British officers into the army. The Regency 
granted his request, of necessity and not with enthusiasm. 
He then proceeded to use his permission with great energy. 
A vast number of old officers, both in the higher and lower 
ranks, were put on half pay : only a minority of the colonels 
and generals were retained on active service. All the 
regiments which had been cursed with notoriously inefficient 
commanders were placed in charge of British officers, of 
whom four or five were drafted into every unit. Beresford's 
system was that " since national feeling required manage- 
ment," and "he must humour and satisfy the pride of the 
nation," a sufficient number of the higher places must be 
left to natives, but each must have British officers either 
immediately over or immediately under him. Where a 
Portuguese general commanded a brigade, it was managed 
that the colonels of his two regiments should both be 
English. Where there was a Portuguese colonel, his senior 
major was English ; where an English colonel, his senior 
major was Portuguese. In addition there were two, three, 
or four British captains in each regiment, but hardly any 
subalterns. For, to encourage good officers to volunteer 
into the Portuguese service, it was provided that every 
one doing so should receive a step in promotion, lieutenants 
becoming captains, and captains majors. This system 
seems to have worked well, though friction was bound to 
occur, since the blow to Portuguese national pride, when 
* Beresford to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vi. p. 774. 



The Portuguese Officers 233 

so many high posts were given to foreigners, was a 
heavy one. 

Yet according to those who had the working of the newly 
organized army in their hands, the effect was very satis- 
factory. *' The Portuguese captains are piqued into 
activity and attention, when they see their companies 
excelled in efficiency by those under English, and do from 
emulation what a sense of duty would never, perhaps, 
bring them to. There are a variety of oblique means and 
by-paths by which the parts of a Portuguese corps are 
constantly, and almost insensibly, tending to return to their 
old habits, to which they are so much attached. To nip 
this tendency, from time to time, in the bud, it is necessary 
to be aware of it : without the constant surveillance of 
English subordinate officers (who ever mingling with the 
mass of the men cannot but be aware of what is going on) 
the commanding officer can rarely be warned in time." * 
D 'Urban, the author of this memorandum, adds that one 
of his great difficulties was to secure that the junior officers 
of the old noble families were kept up to their work. ' ' Even 
supposing a sufficient energy of character in a native officer, 
he does not, and will not, unless he be a fidalgo himself, 
exercise coercive or strong measures to oblige one of that 
class to do his duty. He is aware that by doing so he will 
make a powerful enemy, and all the habits of thought in 
which he has been educated inspire him with such a dread 
of this, that no sense of duty will urge him to encounter it. 
Wlienever a regiment is commanded by a non-fidalgo it 
never fails to suffer extremely : the noblemen are per- 
mitted to do as they please, and set a very bad example." 
The only remedy was to see that any regiment where the 
fidalgos were numerous had an EngHsh colonel. 

Such were the difficulties under which Beresford and 
the body of picked British officers whom he selected as 

* From a memorandum by Benjamin D'Urban, Beresford'a 
Quartermaster-General, or rather Chief of the Staff, in the unpublished 
D'Urban papers. 



234 The Foreign Auxiliaries 

his subordinates built up the army, which by 1811 was 
fit to take its place in battle line along with its allies, and 
in 1812-14 did some of the most brilliant service of the 
Peninsular War. Some of the exploits of the Portuguese 
brigades hardly obtain in Napier's history the prominence 
that is their due. While he acknowledges the good service 
of the Light Division ca9adores at Bussaco and elsewhere, 
there is scarcely praise enough given to Harvey's brigade at 
Albuera, who received and repulsed in line the charge of 
Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, a feat of which any British 
troops would have been proud. And the desperate resist- 
ance for many hours of Ashworth's Portuguese at St. Pierre 
near Bayonne is hardly noticed with sufficient gratitude — 
forming the centre of Hill's thin hne, pressed upon by 
overwhelming numbers, and Avith both flanks turned from 
time to time, they fought out a whole long morning of 
battle, and never gave way an inch, though their line was 
reduced to a thin chain of skirmishers scattered along a 
hedge and a coppice. The advance of the 13th and 24th 
Portuguese at the storm of St. Sebastian, across a ford 
200 yards wide and waist-deep, swept by artillery fire from 
end to end, does however receive from Napier its due meed 
of admiration. This was a great achievement — every 
wounded man was doomed to drowning : on the other side 
was the blazing breach, where the British assault had come 
to a dead stop after dreadful slaughter, but the Portuguese 
regiments won their way over the deadly water, and took 
their share in the final assault with unflinching courage. 

On the whole, the cagador battalions had the finest 
record in the Portuguese Army, the cavalry the least satis- 
factory. Some good work is recorded of them, e.g. the 
charge of Madden's squadrons saved the whole of La 
Romana's army at the combat of Fuente del Maestre in 
1810, and that of D'Urban's brigade gave efficient help to 
Pakenham's great flank attack at Salamanca in 1812. 
But there were some " untoward incidents," such as the 
general bolt at the battle of the Gebora, and the panic 



The Portuguese Militia 235 

at the combat of Majadahonda, just before Wellington's 
entry into Madrid. Of the last D'Urban writes,* " My 
poor fellows are still a most daily and uncertain sort of 
fighting people. At Salamanca they followed me into the 
enemy's ranks Hke British dragoons ; yesterday they were 
so far from doing their duty that in the first charge they 
just went far enough to land me in the enemy's ranks. In the 
second, which (having got them ralhed) I rashly attempted, 
I could not get them within 20 yards of the enemy — they 
left me alone, and vanished before the French helmets Hke 
leaves before the autumn wind. They require a Httle 
incentive of shouts, and the inspiring cheers of a British 
line advancing near them. I am afraid they will never be 
quite safe by themselves, or in silence." These are bitter 
words, but the record of Majadahonda is not a creditable 
one. 

Of the Portuguese mihtia and the irregular levies of 
the Ordenan9a it is not necessary to speak here at length. 
They formed part of Wellington's tools for carrying on the 
war, but not of his army. For, excepting in the Lines of 
Torres Vedras, he never put the militia side by side with 
the regulars, but always left them out in the open country, 
to watch frontiers or harass French lines of communication. 
They were under strict orders not to fight — orders which 
enterprising officers like Silveira and Trant sometimes 
disobeyed, to their own sorrow. Their duty was to screen 
the country-side against small French detachments, to 
make the movement of the enemy save in large bodies 
impossible, to capture convoys, or to cut off stragglers. 
Their most briUiant exploit was the capture of Massena's 
hospitals at Coimbra in 1810. More could not be expected 
from levies only intermittently under arms, not furnished 
with proper uniforms, and officered by civiHans, or by the 
inefficients weeded out of the regular army. They were a 
valuable asset in Wellington's hands, but not a real fighting 

* From a letter to his friend, J. Wilson, in the unpublished 
D'Urban Correspondence. 



236 The Foreign Auxiliaries 

force. Even far on in the war, so late as 1812, whole 
brigades of them broke up in panic in face of a very small 
force of cavalry — as at the unhappy combat of Guarda, 
where Trant and Wilson tried to do too much with these 
amateurs. 

As to the ordenanQa or levee en masse, it had not even 
the organization of the militia, and was largely armed with 
pikes for want of muskets. Its only duty was to infest 
the countryside and prevent the enemy from foraging. 
The French shot them as " brigands " whenever caught ; 
it was their natural practice to retaliate by making away 
with all stragglers and marauders who fell into their 
hands. Wellington offered a bounty for prisoners, but it 
was not very often asked for, or paid. 



CHAPTER XIV 

DISCIPLINE AND COURT-MARTIALS 

In the chapters that dealt with the officers and the men 
of the Peninsular Army, we have had occasion to speak of 
the percentage of undesirables that were to be found in 
every rank, and of their special weaknesses and crimes. It 
is necessary to explain the way in which the British miUtary 
code of the day dealt with them. 

For the officers there was a long gradation of punish- 
ments, ranging down from a simple reprimand to dis 
charge from the service with ignominy. For the non- 
commissioned officers reduction to the ranks was the most 
usual chastisement inflicted ; but in cases of a particularly 
disgraceful sort, the lash was not infrequent^ allotted as 
an additional penalty. For the rank and file flogging was 
the universal panacea ; the amount of strokes might range 
up from a minimum twenty-five strokes — which was a 
mere nothing to the habitual offender, but a serious thing 
for the good soldier who lost much of his morale when 
once he had " gone to the halberds," even for such a light 
punishment. The maximum, a very unusual one, was 
1200 strokes, an amount calculated to kill many men, and 
to permanently disable many more. But this awful tale 
of lashes was not very frequently awarded, being reserved 
for bad cases of desertion to the enemy, robbery with 
violence, or striking an officer, all of them offences which 
might have had death as their punishment. As far as I can 
count, 1200 lashes were only awarded nine or ten times by 
general court-martial during the whole six years of the war. 



238 Discipline and Court-Mabtials 

The hardly less severe sentence of 1000 lashes was given 
more frequently — over 50 cases may be reckoned up — the 
offences were the same as those which earned the still heavier 
maximum amount. During the latter years of the war, 
from 1811 onward, two additional forms of punishment for 
very serious crimes were invented. The first, mainly 
reserved for deserters who had not gone over to the enemy, 
but had simply left the colours and hidden themselves in 
the Peninsula, was long service in a colonial corps, such 
as the African or the New South Wales Regiment. The 
other, a much more severe sentence, was that of penal 
servitude, either for a term of years (seven was the usual 
period), or for life. The penal settlement to which the 
convict was sent is generally stated, and is almost invariably 
New South Wales. This sentence was generally awarded 
for cases of repeated desertion (not to the enemy) and 
habitual theft without violence. The moment that violence 
was added to robbery, the offender came within a near 
distance of the gallows or of the much-dreaded 1000 lashes — 
which often had the same meaning in the end. 

It may be interesting to give some account of the various 
causes for which an officer might incur the heaviest penalty 
that could be laid on him — to be cashiered. This sentence 
was awarded some thirty times during the war. Twice 
only was it the reward of shirking or cowardice. In three 
or four cases it was inflicted for swindling merchants ; in 
as many more for embezzling pubHc money or stores. 
Five or six were instances of insulting or openly disobeying 
a commanding officer. Three or four cashierings were the 
direct result of drink — the offender having been found 
intoxicated and incapable while on duty in a responsible 
position. The most repulsive case of the whole fist was 
one where drunkenness was the indirect, but not the actual, 
cause of disgrace. Three young officers, at the break up 
of a debauch, found the corpse of a priest lying in state 
in a room in the quarters where two of them were lodged. 
They mishandled it, and cast it forth, stripping off the 



Cashiering of Officers 239 

vestments, and breaking the candles, etc., with which it 
was laid out.* This disgusting freak, apparently caused by 
drunken resentment at finding a corpse in close proximity 
to their bedroom, drew down a commentary from Wellington 
as to the noxious effects of drink — which not only makes 
men incapable of performing their duty, but renders them 
'' unaware of the nature or effect of their actions." 

The remaining cases of cashiering were for such offences 
as public and disgraceful brawling, violently resisting 
arrest, and flagrant immorality.j There is just one case 
of dismissal from the service for tyranny — that of a colonel 
who habitually bulHed his officers and inflicted arbitrary 
and illegal punishments on his men. J Of this I shall have 
to say more in its place. 

All the thirty cashierings cited above are those of 
combatant officers. There are about an equal number of 
cases in which persons employed under the civil depart- 
ments of the army were dismissed the service — commissaries, 
purveyors, surgeons, hospital mates, etc. In the com- 
missariat department (as might have been foreseen) em- 
bezzlement Avas the snare to unscrupulous men, often far 
from the eye of their superior — it was too easy to issue 
false vouchers as to the number of men or horses rationed, 
or to make corrupt agreements with contractors or local 
authorities, certifying that a larger amount of food or forage 
had been supplied than had really been given in. Selling 
public mules or horses, and returning them as dead, was 
another profitable fraud. Two non-combatant employes 
of the army (a paymaster and a conductor of stores) were 
*' broken " for absconding from the army during the battle 
of Talavera, and spreading false reports of disaster in the 
rear. 

The medical staff, not nearly such frequent offenders 

* General Orders, Santa Marinha, March 25, 1811. 

t The case of an officer who openly cohabited with the wife of 
a private, and fought with and thrashed her not-unreasonably jealous 
husband. 

t See General Orders, July 2, 1813. 



240 Discipline and Coukt-Martials 

as the commissariat staff, are occasionally dismissed the 
service for brawling and drunkenness, which last inevitably 
resulted in the neglect of the wounded on the march or in 
hospital. 

After cashiering, the next most serious punishment 
inflicted on an officer was suspension from pay and rank for 
a term of months, six and three were the usual periods 
named. This might be inflicted for any one of a great 
variety of offences. By far the most frequent fault was 
neglect of details of duty, such as quitting the regiment or 
detachment for many hours without leave, allowing a convoy 
or a draft to straggle, permitting the rank and file to pull 
dow^ cottages for firewood, or to waste crops, or to fell 
fruit trees. Sleeping away from the company, in a rather 
distant house or village, was another frequent misdemeanour. 
We may place second in the category of offences the one 
that may be called quarrelling with native authorities. 
Owing to high-handed action on the one side, and pro- 
vocative sulkiness on the other, these wrangles were very 
common. Officers in charge of detachments fell out with 
a juiz de fora or a corregidor, or the governor of some petty 
garrison, about billets or payments due, and ended by 
insulting, occasionally by assaulting, him. This generally 
cost the offender six months* suspension, for Wellington 
was resolved that the officers of his army must not override 
lawful local authority, and sometimes, in his comments on 
a court-martial sentence, asks what would be thought of a 
lieutenant who should treat in such a fashion the mayor 
of an English borough, or the commandant of an English 
fort. 

The third list of offences which were usually visited 
with shorter or longer " suspension " may be put together 
under the general head of relations of officers to each other. 
This includes equally oppressive or insulting acts of superiors 
to inferiors, and insubordinate conduct of inferiors to 
superiors. The latter was far the more common failing, 
if the statistics of court-martials may be trusted. But no 



Wellington on Petty Quarrels 241 

doubt allowance must be made for many cases in which a 
bullied subaltern preferred to hold his tongue, rather than 
to appeal against the acts or language of his captain or 
colonel — the failure of his case would leave him in a very 
dangerous and unpleasant position for the future. In- 
temperate language, or " improper " letters from inferiors 
to superiors, are a not uncommon cause of court-martials. 
Even colonels occasionally wrote or spoke in insubordinate 
terms to generals.* But " answering back " on the part 
of subalterns to captains or majors was of course far more 
frequent. Wellington grew, on occasion, exceedingly 
wrath at reading the reports of court-martials on pett}^ 
cases of this kind. We may give a typical comment. 

" I cannot but consider the transaction which has been 
the subject of this court-martial as simply a private quarrel, 
it has as little connection with the public service or the 
discipline and subordination of the army, as any that has 
ever come under my notice. It is certainly true that the 
private quarrels of officers may be proper subjects for the 
investigation of a court-martial. But the complainant, in 
order to obtain a decision in his favour, must come wdth a 
fair case. He must not himself have been guilty of any 
breach of the general order of the army, or of discipline. 
His authority as a superior must not have been exerted 
over his inferior (of whom he complains) in order to enjoy 
the advantage of his own improper conduct. Above all, 
he must have refrained from the use of abusive or improper 
language and gestures." | 

Another comment is — 

' ' The Commander of the Forces cannot but feel that both 
his time, and that of the ofi&cers composing court-martials, 

* There is a long quarrel of this sort between Colonel Cochrane 
of the 36th and General A. Campbell, whose original cause was in 
details of mismanagement at the escape of Brennier from Almeida. 

t General Orders, Lesaca, September 20, 1813. In this case a 
lieutenant of the 5/60th had been condemned for violently resisting 
the turning out of his horses from a stable by his senior, *' using 
opprobrious and disgraceful language "and threatening to strike him. 

R 



242 Discipline and Court-Martials 

is occupied very little to the advantage of the public service, 
in considering the unbecoming and ungentlemanlike be- 
haviour of officers to each other." * 

The mildest form of punishment for officers was the 
reprimand, which varied much in shape. It might amount 
to no more than the publication of the fact that an officer 
was reprimanded in the General Orders, without any further 
publicity. Or, on the other hand, the sentence of the court- 
martial might be directed to be read out to his regiment, 
or even to his division, in the most public fashion. And 
to the sentence there might be added a caustic and scathing 
postscript by the Commander-in-Chief. Take, for example, 
" This person may think himself very fortunate that the 
sentence of the court has been so lenient. A different 
view of the evidence on the charge would have rendered 
his dismissal from the service necessary under the Articles 
of War. The Commander of the Forces hopes that he will 
take warning by what has occurred, and will in future 
conduct himself on all occasions as a gentleman should. 
This reprimand is to be read to him by the commanding 
officer at the station where he may happen to be, in presence 
of the officers and troops, paraded for that purpose." f 

Reprimands were generally the punishment for the 
smaller derelictions of duty, such as failing to report arrival 
at a station, striking a soldier who was insolent instead of 
arresting him, brawling with a civilian or a Portuguese 
miUtia officer, or boisterous and unseemly conduct in the 
streets when off duty. 

There was no court-martial on an officer for desertion 
during the whole war, and only one case of the sort in the 
commissioned ranks. This was that of an Irish lieutenant 
who passed over to the French outposts while Massena's 
army was lying behind the lines of Santarem in February, 
1811. He was discovered to be insane or suffering from 
delusions, being captured during Massena's retreat, while 

* General Orders, Garris, February 24, 1814. 
t Ibid., Freneda, February 3, 1813. 



Executions foe Deseetion 243 

wandering in an objectless way in the rear of the enemy's 
march : he was sent to a mad-house.* 

As to the punishments of the soldier, the heaviest was 
death, either by the bullets of a firing party, or by the 
Provost Marshal's gallows. Shooting was almost exclu- 
sively reserved for the military offence of desertion to the 
enemy ; but it was two or three times awarded for mutiny 
and striking an officer or sergeant, and once only (as far as 
I can make out) to a non-commissioned officer for robbing 
valuable stores which he had been set to guard, j It would 
have been more usual to hang for the latter offence, and 
I do not know why this particular case was punished with 
shooting. There seem to have been 78 men shot in all 
during the war, of whom 52 were British, and 26 foreigners. 
The disproportion, of course, is enormous, as there were 
some fifty or sixty British battalions in the army, and only 
ten foreign battalions. J Among the last the main body 
of deserters were supplied by two battalions only, the 
Clmsseurs Britanniques and Brunswick Oels Jagers, both 
of which corps were largely recruited, as has been already 
explained, from Germans, Italians, Poles, and other aliens 
from prison camps at home. They had volunteered into the 
British service in order to get the chance of escape, and took 
it at the first opportunity. The deserters from the King's 
German Legion were in proportion very few. During the 
last two years of the war many of these foreign deserters 
were not shot, but given life service in a colonial corps, 
in places such as New South Wales, from which they could 
not desert again. Some others got off with a heavy sentence 
of flogging. 

Hanging was the penalty for practically all capital 
offences except desertion to the enemy. It was not so fre- 
quent as shooting. The records of the General Court-Martials 

* See Wellington Dispatches, vol. ii., pp. 330 and 369, and for his 
recapture Stepney's Diary, p. 55. 

t Case of Corporal Hammond of the 87th, January 24, 1810. 
^ t Viz. 5/60th, 97th, 1, 2, 5, 7 Line of the K.G.L., 1 and 2 Light 
K.G.L., Brunswick Oels and Chasseurs Britanniques. 



244 Discipline and Court-Martials 

show a total of about forty executions, and a few more 
were apparently carried out by the Provost Marshal on 
criminals caught flagrante delicto murdering or wounding 
peasants. 

The punishment of hanging covered many offences. It 
is rather surprising to find that two men who killed their 
officers (one in the Buffs, one in the 42nd) were hanged 
rather than shot — but apparently each case was ruled to 
be one of private spite, and not of mutiny, and was treated 
as simple murder. There were six or eight instances of 
men who slew a comrade in the ranks, by deliberate assassi- 
nation, not in a quarrel, and were hanged for it. It may 
be noted, however, that one private who stabbed an un- 
faithful wife, at the moment of detection, was found guilty 
of manslaughter and given one year's imprisonment only. 
Far the most frequent cause for the use of the gallows, 
however, was the killing or wounding of peasants who 
attempted to defend their houses or cattle from plunder. 
This was a crime for which Wellington seldom if ever gave 
pardon ; he was as inflexible on the point in the hostile land 
of France as in the friendly Spain and Portugal. It did 
not matter whether the peasants were killed or not — the 
use of musket or bayonet against them in pursuit of plunder 
was the thing that mattered. There ai'e certainly some 
most atrocious cases in the list, where a whole family had 
been murdered or left for dead. But in others, where the 
violence had been no more than a blow with a butt-end, or 
a bayonet prod in the shoulder, the offenders seem to have 
been unlucky in not getting off with a sound flogging. 
But in Wellington's code petty stealing without violence 
was punished with the lash, but armed robbery with death. 
In an age when in England theft to the value of over 
forty shillings was still punishable in theory with death, 
(though the penalty was more often evaded than not), it is 
not surprising to find that some of the cases of hanging in 
Wellington's army were for mere stealing. But it was 
ahvaj^s for stealing on a large scale, or under aggravated 



The Punishment of Hanging 245 

circumstances. Mere petty larceny led to the lash only. 
The most notable achievement in this line was that of 
two foreigners who succeeded in breaking open the com- 
missary-general's chest and stole no less than £2000 from 
it ; others were those of a soldier-servant who absconded 
with his master's mule, baggage, and purse ; of a sentry 
over the tent of a brigadier, who took the opportunity of 
making off with the general's silver camp-equipage and 
plate ; and of a man who being on treasure-escort, suc- 
ceeded in opening a barrel and stealing some hundreds of 
dollars from it. In two or three instances large sums of 
£40 or £60, burglariously stolen from the house or tent of 
an officer, a commissary, or a sutler, brought men to the 
gallows. Finally, there was one case of hanging for the 
crime of sodomy — which was still a capital offence in 
English law for more than thirty years after the Peninsular 
War ended. 

There are one or two instances on record of rather sur- 
prising leniency in the sentences inflicted by court-martial 
for crimes which in most other cases entailed the death- 
penalty — e.g. plundering and wounding a peasant was on 
two occasions in 1814 punished with 900 and 1000 lashes 
only, and three artillerymen, who stole the watch, purse, 
and papers of the Spanish General Giron, got off with 
transportation to New South Wales, instead of suffering 
the hanging that was usual for such a serious offence. A 
dragoon convicted of rape in 1814 was lucky also in 
receiving no more than a heavy flogging. No doubt there 
was in such light sentences some consideration of previous 
good conduct and steady service on the part of the 
offenders. 

We have already spoken of the penalties which came 
next after death in the list — the terrible 1200 and 1000 
lash awards, and of the crimes which usually earned them. 
Much more frequent were the 700, 500, and 300 lash sen- 
tences, which are to be numbered by the hundred, and 
were awarded, as a rule, for casual theft without violence, 



246 Discipline and Court-Martials 

making away with necessaries {e.g. selling blankets or 
ball-cartridge to peasants), or " embargoing " carts and 
oxen, i.e. pressing transport from the countryside without 
leave, to carry baggage or knapsacks when a small party, 
without an officer in charge, was on the move. Purloining 
shoes or food from a convoy was another frequent offence, 
worth about 500 lashes to the detected culprit. The bee- 
hive stealers of the retreat from Talavera got 700 lashes 
each — a heavy sentence for such a crime. The tale con- 
cerning them is too good to be omitted. 

After the general order against plundering from the 
peasantry was issued at Jaraicejo to the half -starved army, 
Sir Arthur Wellesley, in a cross-country ride, saw a man 
of the Connaught Rangers posting along as fast as his legs 
could carry him, with his great coat wrapped around his 
head, and a bee-hive balanced upon it, with a swarm of 
furious bees buzzing around. Furious at such a flagrant 
breach of orders issued only on the previous day, the 
Commander-in-Chief called out to him, " Hullo, sir, where 
did you get that bee-hive ? " Pat could not see his inter- 
locutor, having completely shrouded his face to keep off 
stings : he did not pay sufficient heed to the tone of the 
question, which should have warned him, and answered 
in a fine Milesian brogue, " Just over the hill there, and, 
by Jasus, if ye don't make haste they'll be all gone." * The 
blind good-nature of the reply stayed the General's anger ; 
he let Pat pass, and told the story at dinner with a laugh. 
But the order was no joke to the men of the 53rd caught 
at the same game a few days after, f They got the nick- 
name of the " honeysuckers " along with their flogging. 

There is another tale of "embargoing" belonging to 
the regimental history of the Connaught Rangers, which 
may serve as a pendant to that about the bee-hives. 

Early in 1812 a commissary had pressed country carts 

* The tale comes from p. xxxi. of the Introduction to the Collected 
General Orders. 

t General Orders, September 22, 1809. 



Charles Eeilly's Excuse 247 

to go to the Douro, to bring back pipes of wine for the 
troops. On such occasions, with a hilly country and very 
tedious work, the men would often contrive, in spite of the 
vigilance of the subaltern in charge of the convoy, to let 
the driver escape mth his bullocks for a pecuniary con- 
sideration. Other carts were then illegally pressed as 
substitutes. On one of these occasions a detachment of 
the 88th regiment was sent to St. Joao da Pesqueira for 
some wine. On their return, the commissary observed 
that the two fine white bullocks, which he had sent with 
one cart, had been exchanged for two very inferior blacks. 
He made his regular complaint, and the two men in charge, 
a corporal and private, were brought to a court-martial. 
On the trial everything was proved, save the act of receiving 
money from the driver to allow the white bullocks to escape ; 
and the president, on summing up the evidence of the 
commissary, said to the prisoners, " It is quite useless deny- 
ing the fact ; it is conclusive. You started from hence 
with a pair of fine white bullocks, and you brought back 
a pair of lean blacks. What can you have to say to that ? '* 
Private Charles Reilly, noways abashed at this, which every 
one thought a poser, and ready with any excuse to save 
himself from punishment, immediately exclaimed, " Och ! 
plaise your honour, and wasn't the white beasts lazy, and 
didn't we bate them until they were black ? " The court 
was not quite satisfied of the truth of this wonderful meta- 
morphosis, and they were condemned to be punished (see 
General Order, Freneda, January 22, 1812) — the corporal to 
be broke and get 700 lashes, Reilly to get 500. But in 
consideration of the great gallantry displayed by the 88th 
at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo a few days before, the 
culprits were in the end pardoned. 

AU these cases quoted are from records of general court- 
martials. But of course the huge majority of floggings 
were infhcted by regimental courts, which had jurisdiction 
over all minor offences, such as drunkenness, disobedience, 
and petty breaches of discipline inside the regiment, but 



248 Discipline and Couet-Martials 

could not give the heavier sentences such as death or 
transportation, or the 1000 lashes. 

A glance through the records of court-martials shows 
that some battalions gave much more than their proper 
percentage of criminals, some much less. Two main causes 
governed the divergence : the first was that some corps 
got more than their share of bad recruits — ^wild Irish or 
town scum ; but I fancy that the character of the com- 
manding officer was even more important than the precise 
proportion of undesirables drafted into the ranks. A 
colonel who could make himself loved as well as feared 
could reclaim even very unpromising recruits : a tyrant 
or an incapable could turn even well-disposed men into 
bad soldiers. It is clear that an excessively easy-going 
and slack commanding officer, who winked at irregularities, 
and discouraged zeal among his officers, ruined a battalion 
as surely as the most inhuman martinet. Among the court- 
martials of the Peninsular Army there are very few on 
colonels — not half a dozen. But one chances to be on a 
tyrant, and the other on a faineant, and the evidence seems 
to show that the latter got his corps into quite as wretched 
condition as the former. Though he received over the 
regiment, as every one allowed, in excellent order, in a few 
months of slack administration and relaxed discipline, it 
became not only drunken and slovenly, but so slow on the 
march, and at the rendezvous, that the other units in the 
brigade had always to be waiting for it, and the brigadier 
complained that he could not trust it at the outposts. 
The officers, gradually coming to despise their colonel, 
treated him with contempt, and finally sent in a round- 
robin to the Horse Guards, accusing him not only of in- 
capacity but of cowardice, which last, in the court-martial 
which followed, was held to be an unfounded charge.* The 
colonel, as a result of the investigation, was reprimanded, 
and put on half -pay ; his subordinates, for grave breach of 

* See the printed report of the Long Court-Martial on Colonel 
Quentin, London, 1814, p. 272. 



A Tyrannical Colonel 249 

discipline, were all drafted into other regiments, and a new 
body of picked officers was brought together, to reorganize 
a corps which was evidently in a thoroughly demoralized 
condition; the new-comers got the nickname of the 
"Elegant Extracts." 

The reverse-picture, of a regiment ruined by arbitrary 
strictness and inhuman exaggeration of punishments, may 
be studied in the records of a court-martial held in the 
spring of 1813.* In this case a commanding officer was 
found guilty not only of " violent conduct " and " using 
intemperate and improper language to his officers, being 
in breach of good discipline, and unbecoming the character 
of an officer and a gentleman," but of infficting corporal 
punishment at large without any form of trial, when there 
were sufficient officers present to form a proper regimental 
court-martial ; of disobeying the direction of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief by piling up sentences of flogging passed 
on men on different occasions, so as to inffict several separate 
punishments at the same time, and of releasing men sen- 
tenced to punishment in order to send them into action, 
and then returning them to arrest after the battle in order 
to receive their lashes. This last was specially in conffict 
with Wellington's orders, for he held that good conduct in 
action ought to work out a sentence, pronounced but not 
infficted, and that no man convicted of a disgraceful offence 
ought to be put into line till he had expiated it by under- 
going his punishment. This officer was dismissed the 
service, but, in consideration of a good fighting record in 
the past, was allowed the value of his commission aKS 
major. 

One diary from the ranks, that of Donaldson of the 
94th, gives a very interesting and complete picture of the 
fate of a battalion which, by the invaliding of its colonel, 
had fallen into the hands of a major who had the soul of a 
tyrant. This was a case of an old ranker who knew too 

* Printed in General Orders, vol. v. 1813, the accused being Col. 
Arehdall of the l/40th. 



250 Discipline and Couet-Martials 

much of soldiers' tricks, and had a sort of system of espionage 
through men who were prepared to act as his toadies and 
secret informers. " By this eaves-dropping he knew all 
the little circumstances which another commanding officer 
would have disdained to listen to, and always made a bad 
use of his knowledge. When he got command of the 
regiment he introduced flogging for every trivial offence, 
and in addition invented disgraceful and torturing modes 
of inflicting the lash. But this was not enough — ^he ordered 
that all defaulters should have a patch of black and yellow 
cloth sewed on to the sleeve of their jacket, and a hole cut 
in it for every time they were punished. The effect was 
soon visible : as good men were liable to be punished for 
the sHghtest fault, the barrier between them and hardened 
ill-doers was broken down, and those who had lost respect 
in their own eyes became broken-hearted and inefficient 
soldiers, or else grew reckless and launched out into real 
crime. Those who were hardened and unprincipled before, 
being brought by the prevalence of punishments nearer to 
a level with the better men, seemed to glory in misconduct. 
In short, all idea of honour and character was lost, and 
listless apathy and bad conduct became the prevailing 
features of the corps. Reckless punishment changed the 
individual's conduct in two ways — ^he either became broken- 
hearted and useless, or else shameless and hardened. . . . 
The real method of accomplishing the desired end of keeping 
good discipline, is for the officers to make themselves 
acquainted with the personal character and disposition of 
each man under their command. A commanding officer 
has as good a right to make himself acquainted with the 
disposition of his men, as the medical officer with their 
constitutions." * When the colonel came back from sick 
leave he was shocked to find the men he had been so proud 
of treated in this manner. His first act was to cut off the 
yellow badge ; his second to do away with the frequent 
punishments. But though the regiment was again on a 
* Sergeant Donaldson's Eventful Life of a Soldier, pp. 145, 146. 



Good-Conduct Medals 251 

fair footing, it was long before the effect of a few months' 
ill-usage disappeared. 

What certain misguided officers tried to maintain by a 
reign of terror, was sought in other ways by wiser men. 
It is to the Peninsular War period that we owe the first 
of our " Long Service and Good Conduct " medals — all at 
first regimental, and not given by the State. Honorary 
distinctions for the well-conducted man are both a more 
humane and a more rational form of differentiation between 
good and bad than the black and yellow badge for every 
man punished for any cause, which the detestable major 
quoted above tried to introduce.* In addition some 
regiments instituted a division of the men into classes, of 
which the best behaved had graduated privileges and 
benefits. Any man after a certain period of certified good 
conduct could be moved up into a higher class, and the 
emulation not to be left among the recognized black-sheep 
had a very good effect. f But even without " classes " or 
good-conduct medals, the best could be got out of any 
regiment by wise and considerate conduct on the part of 
the officers. There were corps where the lash was practically 
unknown, t and others where it had only been felt by a very 
small minority of hopeless irreclaimables. 

On the other hand, there is a record or two of punish- 
ments in a unit, inflicted by officers who do not seem to 
have been regarded by public opinion as specially tyrannical 
or heartless, which fills the reader with astonishment. I 
have analysed the list of men noted for chastisement in 
one battery of artillery, where on an effective of 4 sergeants 
and 136 rank and file, three of the former had been " broken," 
and 57 of the latter had received punishments varying 

* There are Peninsular-period Good-Conduct medals for the 
10th and 11th Hussars (starting 1812), 5th Foot (Northumberland 
Fusiliers), 7th Fusiliers, 22nd, 38th, 52nd, 71st, 74th, 88th, 95th, 
97th, and some other corps, not to speak of others which were medals 
for special deeds of courage or for marksmanship. 

t See Hope's Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, 1808-15, pp. 459-60. 

j This is said to have been the case in the l/48th when it was 
imder Colonel Donnellan, who fell at Talavera. 



252 Discipline and Court-Martials 

downwards from 500 lashes, in the space of twelve months 
(July, 1812, to July, 1813), over which the record extends. 
Though some of the offences were serious enough, there 
were others for which the use of the cat appears altogether 
misplaced and irrational. As an observer in another corps 
wrote " the frequency of flogging at one time had the effect 
of blinding the judgment of officers who possessed both 
feeling and discrimination. I have known one who shed 
tears when his favourite horse was injured, and next day 
exulted in seeing a poor wretch flogged whose offence was 
being late in delivering an order." 

Floggings were inflicted by the drummers of the regiment, 
under the superintendence of the drum-major and the 
adjutant. The culprit was bound by his extended arms 
to two of three sergeants' halberds, planted in the ground in 
a triangle, and lashed together at the top. The strokes were 
inflicted at the tap of a drum beaten in slow time. Each 
of the wielders of the cat retired after having given twenty- 
five lashes. The surgeon was always present, to certify 
that the man's life was not in danger by the further con- 
tinuance of the punishment, and the prisoner was taken 
down the moment that the medical man declared that he 
could stand no more. Often this interference saved a culprit 
from the end of his punishment, as if the tale was fairly 
complete he might never be called upon to undergo the 
balance. But in grave cases the prisoner was merely sent 
into hospital till he was sufficiently convalescent to endure 
the payment of the remainder of his account. Inhuman 
commanding officers sometimes refused to allow of any 
abatement, even when the crime had not been a very 
serious one, and insisted that the whole sentence should be 
executed, even if the culprit had to go twice into hospital 
before it was completed. 

The autobiographical record of a flogging is rather 
rare — the diarist in the ranks was generally a steady sort 
of fellow, who did not get into the worst trouble. The 
following may serve as an example, however. It is that of 



A Memory of a Flogging 253 

William Lawrence of the l/40th, who in 1809 was a private, 
though he won his sergeant's stripes in 1813. 

" I absented myself without leave from guard for 
twenty-four hours, and when I returned I found I was in a 
fine scrape, for I was immediately put in the guard-room. 
It was my first offence, but that did not screen me much, 
and I was sentenced to 400 lashes. I found the regiment 
assembled all ready to witness my punishment : the place 
chosen for it was the square of a convent. As soon as I 
had been brought up by the guard, the sentence of the 
court-martial was read over to me by the colonel, and I was 
told to strip, which I did firmly, and without using the 
help that was offered me, as I had by that time got hardened 
to my lot. I was then lashed to the halberds, and the 
colonel gave the order for the drummers to commence, 
each one having to give me twenty-five lashes in turn. 
I bore it very well until I had received 175, Avhen I got so 
enraged mth the pain that I began pushing the halberds, 
which did not stand at all firm (being planted on stones), 
right across the square, amid the laughter of the regiment. 
The colonel, I suppose thinking then that I had had sufficient, 
' ordered the sulky rascal down ' in those very words. 
Perhaps a more true word could not have been spoken, 
for indeed I was sulky. I did not give vent to a sound the 
whole time, though the blood ran down my trousers from 
top to bottom. I was unbound, and a corporal hove my 
shirt and jacket over my shoulder, and convoyed me to 
hospital, presenting as miserable a picture as I possibty 
could. 

" Perhaps it was as good a thing for me as could then 
have happened, as it prevented me from committing 
greater crimes, which might at last have brought me to 
my ruin. But I think a good deal of that punishment might 
have been abandoned, with more credit to those who then 
ruled the army." * Yet to be absent twenty-four hours when 
on guard Avas certainly a serious crime. 

* Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence, pp. 48, 49. 



254 Discipline and Court-Maktials 

Lawrence got off with 175 lashes out of 400 ordered, 
but was in hospital nearly three weeks. But 300 or 400 
lashes were often inflicted at a time, and there were men 
who could take them without a groan. 

" Corporal punishment was going on all the year round," 
writes a veteran officer of the 34th,* " men were flogged for 
the small offences, and for the graver ones often flogged to 
death — the thousand lashes were often awarded by court- 
martial. I have seen men suffer 500 and even 700 before 
being ' taken down,' the blood running down into their 
shoes, and their backs flayed like raw red-chopped sausages. 
Some of them bore this awful punishment without flinching 
for 200 or 300 lashes, chewing a musket ball or a bit of 
leather to prevent or stifle the cry of agony : after that 
they did not seem to feel the same torture. Sometimes the 
head drooped over to one side, but the lashing still went 
on, the surgeon in attendance examining the patient from 
time to time to see what more he could bear. I did see, 
Avith horror, one prisoner receive the 700 before he was 
taken down. This was the sentence of a court-martial, 
carried into effect in the presence of the whole brigade, for 
an example.! We certainly had very bad characters sent 
out to fill the gaps in our ranks, sweepings of prisons in 
England and Ireland : but such punishments were inhuman, 
and I made up my mind that, if ever I had the chance of 
commanding a regiment, I would act on another principle. 
That time did come. I did command a gallant corps for 
eleven years, and I abolished the lash." 

But enough of such horrors. The memory of them is 
a nightmare. 

* Rough Notes, by Sir George Bell, i. p. 120. 

t Probably the case of a private of the 34th who had struck his 
captain, in a rage. This flogging (1813) was the only one of such 
severity which occurred in the regiment while Bell was serving with 
it in 1812-1814. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 

It is rare in Peninsular literature to find any general 
descriptions of the normal working of the military machine. 
In personal diaries or reminiscences the author takes for 
granted a knowledge of the daily life of the army, which 
was so famihar to himself, and only makes remarks or notes 
\A'hen something abnormal happened. Official documents, 
on the other hand, are nearly always concerned with changes 
or modifications in routine. They explain and comment 
upon the reasons why some particular detail of practice 
must be abandoned, or be more strictly enforced, but they 
do not give descriptive accounts of the whole system of 
which that detail is a part. A notion as to the methods on 
which Wellington's army was moved could be got together 
by the comparison of a great many of his " General Orders." 
But, fortunately, we are spared much trouble in the com- 
pilation of such a sketch by the fact that, for once, it is 
possible to lay one's hand on a careful detailed narrative of 
how the army marched. It is to be found in the anonymous 
introduction to the second edition of Selected General 
Orders, which Gurwood pubHshed in 1837. It was 
apparently not by the editor himself, as he states in his 
introductory note that it " was written, as a critique, at the 
suggestion of the author of a distinguished periodical 
review ; but being found too long and too professional 
for columns usually destined to literature or pohtics, it was 
not inserted." * Since authors do not review their own 

* See footnote to p. xxv. of Selected General Orders. 



256 The Army on the March 

books, it is clear that this critique was written by some 
friend, not by Garwood himself. It extends to about 
thirty-seven pages, of which nine are devoted to the long 
and interesting sketch of Wellington's army on the march, 
which is reproduced in the following paragraphs. The author, 
writing for the general public, not for the professional 
public, tells us precisely what we want to know. 

" The orders for movement from the Commander of the 
Forces were communicated by the Quarter Master General 
to the General Officers commanding divisions, who detailed 
them, through their Assistant Quarter Master Generals, to 
the Generals of brigades, who gave them out immediately 
to the battalions of their brigades, through the Brigade 
Majors. The drum, the bugle and the trumpet sounded the 
preparation for the march at a certain hour, generally one 
hour and a half before daylight, in order that the several 
battalions might be assembled on the brigade alarm-posts, 
so as to be ready to march off from the ground precisely at 
daylight. It must be observed that the alarm-post is the 
place of assembly in the event of alarm ; it was generally, 
and should always be, the place of parade. 

"It is singular to refer to these orders to see how a 
division of 6000 men, and so on in any proportion, rolled 
up in their blankets ' in the arms of Murphy,' were all 
dressed, with blankets rolled, packed, equipped, squadded, 
paraded in companies, told off in subdivisions, sections, 
and sections of threes, marched by companies to the 
regimental alarm-posts, and finally to that of the brigade, 
formed in close columns, all by sounds as familiar to the 
soldier as the clock at the Horse-Guards to a corporal of the 
Blues. Guns were paraded, baggage packed and loaded, 
Commissariat mules with the reserve biscuit, the Store- 
keeper with the spare ammunition-bullocks placed under 
charge, all assembled with the same precision and order, 
ready to march off under the direction of the Assistant 
Quarter Master General attached to the division or corps, 
who had previously assembled the guides, whom he attached 



Starting the March 257 

to the column or columns directed to be marched to the 
points or towns named in the Quarter Master General's 
instructions. In the mean time the formidable Provost 
Marshal attached to the division made his patrols. 

" The report of ' All Present ' being made in succession 
by the Brigade Majors to the Assistant Adjutant General, 
and by him to the General commanding the column, the 
word * By sections of threes, march,' was given, from the 
right or left, as directed in the Quarter Master General's 
instructions, the whole being formed either right or left in 
front, according to the views of the General in command of 
the army. The advanced guard of the column was then 
formed under the superintendence of the Brigade Major 
of the Brigade, right or left in front. This advanced guard 
consisted of one company of varying strength. The whole 
was marched off at sloped arms, with the greatest precision 
and regularity, and remained in that order until the word 
' March at ease ' was given to the leading battalion, which 
was successively taken up by the others in the rear. The 
women, in detached parties, either preceded the column or 
followed it — none were permitted to accompany it ; they 
generally remained with the baggage, excepting when their 
finances enabled them to make little speculations in bread 
and comfort in the villages or towns in the neighbourhood 
of the line of march. The Assistant Provost Marshal with 
his guard and delinquents brought up the rear of the column, 
followed by the rear guard, under an officer who took up 
all the stragglers, whom he lodged in the main guard on his 
arrival, where those who had received tickets of permission 
to fall out were directed to join their corps, non-com- 
missioned officers being in waiting to receive them. 

" The first halt was generally made at the expiration of 
half an hour from the departure, and afterwards once an 
hour ; each halt lasted at least five minutes after the men 
had piled their arms ; this might vary a httle, as the 
weather, distance, or other circumstances of the march 
might point out. The object of halting was for the purpose 

s 



258 The Army on the March 

of allowing those who had fallen out to rejoin their companies, 
which, excepting in cases of sickness, usually occurred ; 
as a man wanting to fall out was obliged to obtain a ticket 
from the officer commanding his company so to do, and to 
leave his pack and his firelock to be carried by his comrades 
of his section of threes ; he therefore lost no time to return 
to his rank, and give back his ticket. This first halt was 
generally passed in eating a piece of bread or meat set aside 
for the march — arranging the accoutrements, pack, haver- 
sack, and canteen, so as to sit well — ^in jokes about the last 
night's quarters or bivouac, or in the anticipations of the 
next. At the expiration of the halt the drum or bugle 
sounded the ' Fall-in,' and, by word of command, the 
leading battalion proceeded in the same order as in the 
beginning of the march ; the other battalions following in 
succession, always with music ; then ' March at ease ' as 
before ; but when the word ' Attention ' was given, the 
whole sloped arms and marched in the same order as at a 
field-day ; this was always done in formations previous to 
the halt. 

" When the army was not near the enemy, two officers 
preceded each battalion on its march, one of them twenty- 
four hours before the battalion, and, on his arrival at the 
station pointed out, received the necessary information 
from the Assistant Quarter Master General. The other 
officer marched the same day in charge of the camp- 
colour men of each company, so as to arrive early, and take 
over the quarters from the officer who went on the day 
before. 

"The Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General always 
preceded these officers, to make arrangements with the 
magistrates as to quarters : and the town was parcelled 
out by him, in proportion to the strength of the several 
battalions or corps, to their respective officers ; they 
divided it according to their judgment to the ten orderlies, 
who chalked on the doors the letter of the company and 
number of men to occupy, as also the officers' quarters, 



Distribution of Billets 259 

which nivariably were in the quarters of the company. 
The officer first marked off the quarters of the Commanding 
Officer, staff, orderly-room, guard-room, Quarter Master's 
stores, all in the most central position in the quarters of the 
regiment. The first officer then proceeded to the next 
station ; the second officer and the ten orderlies proceeded 
to the road by which the troops were to arrive, and accom- 
panied them to the alarm-post fixed for them : which spot 
the Assistant Quarter Master General, under the direction 
of the General in command, had pointed out, either in front 
or in rear of the town. Here they halted in column, as also 
assembled the following morning, or at any other time that 
the alarm or assembly might be sounded. The brigades, 
the battalions, and the companies each had their respective 
alarm-posts or places of formation in the most central parts 
of their quarters. The officers commanding companies 
then put their men up, and made reports to the Officer 
Commanding as to the accommodation, or the want of it, 
the officers commanding battalions to those commanding 
brigades, and the Generals of Brigades to the General of 
the Division. The Assistant Quarter Master General was 
always ready to be appealed to, in case of a battahon being 
crowded, to afford further accommodation, as there was 
generally some building or street reserved in a central 
position for this purpose, or in the event of detachments 
of other corps arriving. 

" When the column was to bivouac in huts, or, as after- 
wards, encamp in tents, there occurred less difficulty. On 
arrival on the position pointed out in the Quarter Master 
General's instructions, the General commanding chose what 
he considered the most favourable ground in accordance 
with needs as to front, communications with his flanks and 
rear, reference to wood and water, and the health of the 
ground, avoiding proximity to marshes, where the night 
damps might affect the troops. The Assistant Quarter 
Master General disposed of this ground to the several 
officers sent on in advance by the battalions for that 



260 The Army on the March 

purpose, as before described in quarters. The General then 
proceeded to the front, and indicated where he wished his 
advanced piquets to be posted, to be in communication 
with the outposts of the cavalry in front, or, if there were 
none, to cover all the approaches with detached posts and 
sentries, so that nothing should be able to arrive by any 
of them without being seen and stopped ; or if patrols or 
other movements of the enemy should take place, either 
by night or day, that the same might be made known by 
the chain of sentries to the detached posts and outlying 
piquets, and communicated to the main body, if thought 
necessary, by the Field Officer of the outlying piquets. 
Preconcerted signals of setting fire to beacons, or a certain 
number of musket shots fired, communicated the alarm 
more quickly, and allowed the troops more time to get under 
arms, until the precise cause of the alarm was ascertained. 

" The division having arrived on its ground, the out- 
lying piquets were immediately marched off to take the 
covering of the front just described. The temporary 
division-hospital, and the Commissariat magazines, being 
pointed out to the Commanding Officers, Surgeons, and 
Quarter Masters, the brigades and battalions proceeded to 
their respective alarm-posts and ground for the encamp- 
ment or bivouac, accompanied by the officers and the 
camp-colour men as before stated. The quarter and rear 
guards were then mounted, to be relieved always in two 
hours afterwards by fresh troops. The sentries from the 
quarter guards watched the communications to the front, 
and to the detached posts between the camp and the out- 
lying piquets, to communicate alarm if announced in any 
manner from the front. 

" If the troops were to encamp, the tent mules, which 
always immediately followed the column, under charge of 
an officer, preceding all other baggage, were unloaded, and 
the company's tents pitched in column on the alignment 
given to the battalion, brigade, and division. 

" If there were no tents, then the bill-hooks came 



Tents and Huts 261 

speedily into play : regular squads were formed for cutting 
branches, others for drawing them to the lines, and others 
as the architects for constructing the huts : this was an 
amusement more than a duty, and it was quite wonderful 
to see how speedily every one was under cover. It was the 
pride of each company that their officers' huts should be 
the first and the best built. The soldier became quite 
re-invigorated by the mere act of piling arms, getting off 
his accoutrements, pack, haversack, and other incum- 
brances, Avhich weigh generally about sixty pounds, and set 
to work in right earnest at the hut-building. Although the 
huts Avere not quite so speedily erected, or pitched with the 
same regularity, as the tents, yet still the order and align- 
ment were preserved when the ground permitted. This 
might not have been essential, yet still no opportunity 
should be allowed to escape in inculcating the habit of 
order and regularity in whatever is done by the soldier ; 
and, however simple the act, it should be impressed on his 
mind, that what is ordered is the easiest, and that what is 
his duty is his interest. 

" The regular fatigue parties for bread, meat, and spirits 
were regularly told off and warned, before the companies 
were dismissed to pitch tents or build huts. These parties 
consisted generally of two or three men per company, under 
a corporal, for each particular article of provisions, to be 
ready to turn out when that article was called at the 
quarter guard. A company's guard or watch, of a corporal 
and four privates, furnishing one sentry with side arms only, 
always remained in the lines of the company to repeat 
communications and preserve order. 

" The Commanding Officers made their reports through 
the Majors of brigade, that their respective battalions had 
received bread, meat, spirits, and forage, specifying the 
number of days for each ; that they had marched off one 
or more companies, of such and such strength, for the out- 
lying piquets, to the posts directed under the orders of the 
Field Officer of the outlying piquets ; and that the orderlies 



262 The Aemy on the March 

who had accompanied them had returned, knowing where 
to find them. The outlying piquets were under the Field 
Officer of the day, who again received his instructions from 
the Assistant Adjutant General of the division. The 
Commanding Officers at the same time reported the force 
of the company or inlying piquet, which were ready to turn 
out to support the outlying piquet in the event of being 
required, and were under the Field Officer of the day of the 
inlying piquets, and kept on their accoutrements, although 
in other respects, like the remaining companies, not on duty, 
and in their tents or huts. The company 'on inlying 
piquet, as also the Field Officer of the day in charge of the 
whole of the companies of the brigade, were always first 
for the outlying piquet. 

" All particular duties were taken by companies, under 
their own officers, and not by the old way of individual 
roster of so many men per company ; such were the company 
for outlying piquet ; the company for inlying piquet, which 
gave the quarter and rear guards within the lines ; the first 
company for general fatigue, from which the Quarter 
Master's fatigues were taken for ammunition, equipment, 
working parties, and all other fatigues, excepting rations ; 
all these duties were taken by the roster of companies. 

" The issue of rations was regulated by the Quarter 
Master and Commissariat, agreeably to the instructions of 
the General commanding the division or brigade, com- 
municated in orders to the battalions, and was done regi- 
mentally by individuals from all the companies, and not 
by the company on general fatigue. On the issue of any 
article, such as bread, meat, wine, or forage, the fatigue 
parties from each company, as before described, were 
summoned from the quarter guard by the Quarter Master, 
who called out the watch in the lines of each company ; 
those previously warned for each article turned out under 
their respective non-commissioned officers, and assembled 
under the officer of the inlying piquet named in the orders 
at the quarter guard. He then proceeded with the Quarter 



On Drawing Rations 263 

Master or Quarter Master Sergeant to the place of issue ; 
after the delivery he returned to the quarter guard, reported 
to the Captain of the Day, who was the captain of the in- 
lying piquet, the regularity or irregularity of the particular 
issue under his superintendence, and then dismissed the 
parties under their several non-commissioned officers to 
their respective companies, where the delivery was imme- 
diately made under the orderly Officer of each company. 
The same routine took place when in quarters ; and, 
although the recapitulation may appear tedious, still the 
whole was performed with a celerity which leaves more 
time to the soldier when in camp than in any other situation. 

"At an appointed hour the sick reports were gathered 
from the companies, and the men paraded for the inspection 
of the Surgeon ; he reported to the Staff Surgeon, who, in 
his turn, reported to the General commanding the division, 
sending his own report to the Inspector General of Hospitals. 

" The General commanding the division made his 
reports to the Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals for 
the information of the Commander of the Forces, according 
to the importance of the report and the circumstances of 
the moment. 

" When before the enemy, the issue of the provisions 
and the cooking were attended to with every consideration 
to the position of things, so that what was to be done 
should be done with speed as well as precaution ; for it 
would be bad management to throw away the soup before 
it was well made, or swallow it boiling hot, in case of 
interruption, and still worse to leave it to the enemy. All 
this is sufficiently dwelt upon in the Duke's ' Circular 
Letter,' and in the admirable orders of General Robert 
Craufurd, from whence the greater part of the foregoing 
details were learned and proved in the field.* 

" The new tin camp-kettle, carried alternately by the 

* These can be found in Fitzclarence on Outpost Duty, mentioned 
above, in which they were printed at full length. It is still easy to 
procure. 



264 The Army on the March 

men of each squad, was a great improvement upon the old 
Flanders iron cauldron, which required a whole tree, or the 
half of a church door, to make it boil ; and which, being 
carried on the camp-kettle mule (afterwards appropriated 
to carry the tents), only arrived with the baggage. This 
improvement, as the Duke truly observed in his ' October 
Minute,' left much valuable time disposable for other 
purposes. It is to be hoped that in any future wars some 
improvement will also take place in the weight and temper 
of the old bill-hook, which, in the early part of the 
Peninsular War, was immoderately heavy, and had edges 
which, on attempting to cut any wood not absolutely green, 
bent like lead : many of the men threw these away, but the 
more prudent exchanged them for the lighter and better 
tempered bill-hook used by the Portuguese in their vine- 
yards, exchange being no robbery with our fellows. 

" In the camp or bivouac, in fine weather, all went on 
merrily, but there came moments of which the mere 
remembrance even now recalls ancient twitches of rheu- 
matism, which the iron frame of the most hardy could not 
always resist. On the night previous to General Craufurd's 
affair on the Coa, on those previous to the battle of Sala- 
manca and the battle of Waterloo, and on many other less 
anxious nights, not hallowed by such recollections, deluges 
of rain not only drenched the earth, but unfortunately all 
that rested or tried to rest upon it ; the draining through 
the hut from above by some ill-placed sticks in the roof, 
like lightning conductors, conveyed the subtle fluid where 
it was the least wanted ; while the floods coursing under, 
drove away all possibility of sleep : repose was, of course, 
out of the question, when even the worms would come out 
of the earth, it being far too wet for them. ' In such a night 
as this ' it was weary work to await the lagging dawn with 
a craving stomach ; and, worse still, to find nothing but a 
bellyful of bullets for breakfast. But, on the Pyrenees, in 
the more fortunate and healthy days of tents, it was not 
unusual, when the mountain blast and torrents of rain 



The Miseries of Wet Weathee 265 

drew up the pegs of the tents, for them to fall, as nothing 
in nature falls, squash on the soldier, who lay enveloped 
and floundering in the horrible wet folds of canvas. Then 
nothing but the passing joke ' Boat a-hoy ! ' or the roars of 
laughter caused by some wag, who made this acme of misery 
into mirth, could re-animate to the exertion of scrambling 
out of these clammy winding-sheets. These are recollec- 
tions, however, which, notwithstanding the sufferings in 
the experience of them, and their legacies of rheumatism, 
still afford pleasurable feelings to the old soldier, now laid 
up by his Christmas fireside." 

To this long and lively description by an anonymous 
Peninsular veteran (probably from the Light Division) of 
the way in Avhich Wellington's army moved, we need only 
add a few words by way of caution and supplement. The 
smoothty-working regularity which it described could not 
always be secured in actual practice. There were marches 
where the system could not be carried out, by reason of 
hurry, unexpected changes of direction, and the vagaries 
of the weather. When some sudden movement of the 
French forced the Duke to throw his army on a route that 
he had not intended to take, the elaborate provision of 
officers going before to act as harbingers could not be 
carried out. When a division halted, late at night, at some 
unforeseen destination, there could be neither the selection 
of billets, nor (in the open field) the erection of huts described 
above. All had to be done more or less haphazard in the 
dark. In hot or stormy weather stragglers were numerous, 
and the " ticket " routine broke down altogether. The 
description above will do for long orderly movements hke 
the advance on Madrid in 1812, or the march to Vittoria, 
in 1813, but it fails to reproduce the impression of confusion 
and misery caused by the perusal of any good narrative 
of the Burgos retreat, or of the disorder in the hasty marches 
to intercept Soult on the eve of the battles of the Pyrenees. 
A quotation from a diarist in the ranks,* giving a picture 
* Donaldson of the 94th, pp. 179-181. 



266 The Army on the March 

of the first-named march may suffice to give the reverse of 
the shield. 

" Retreating before the enemy at any time is a grievous 
business, but in such weather as that of November, 1812, 
it was doubly so. The rain pouring down in torrents 
drenched us to the skin, the road, composed of clay soil, 
stuck to our shoes so fast that they were torn off our feet. 
The nights were dismally dark, the cold winds blew in 
heavy gusts, and the roads became gradually worse. After 
marching in this state for hours, we halted in a field by the 
roadside, piled our arms, and were allowed to dispose of 
ourselves as we best could. The moon, wading through 
dense masses of clouds, sometimes threw a momentary 
gleam on the miserable beings huddled together in every 
variety of posture, and trying to rest or to screen themselves 
from the cold. Some were lying on the wet ground rolled 
in wetter blankets, some placed their knapsack on a stone, 
and sat on it, with their blankets wrapped about them, 
their heads resting on their knees, their teeth chattering 
with cold. Long before daylight we were again ordered to 
fall in, and proceeded on our retreat. The rain still con- 
tinued to fall, the roads were now knee-deep in mud. 
Many men got fatigued and could not follow : the spring 
waggons could not hold them all ; they dropped behind to 
fall into the hands of the French cavalry. By some mis- 
management the commissary stores had been sent on ahead 
with the baggage, toward Rodrigo, and we were without 
food. The feeling of hunger was very severe : some oxen 
that had remained with the division were killed and served 
out to us, but our attempts to kindle cooking fires with wet 
wood were abortive. Sometimes we just managed to raise 
a smoke, and numbers would gather round a fire, which 
then would go out, in spite of their efforts. 

" A savage sort of desperation took possession of our 
minds : those who lived on most friendly terms with each 
other in better times now quarrelled with each other, using 
the most frightful imprecations on the slightest offence. 



The Retreat from Burgos 267 

A misanthropic spirit took possession of every breast. The 
streams from the hills were SAVoUen into rivers, which we 
had to wade, and vast numbers fell out, among them even 
officers. It was piteous to see the men, who had long 
dragged their limbs after them with a determined spirit, 
finally fall down in the mud unable to proceed further. 
The despairing looks that they gave us, when they saw us 
pass on, would have pierced the heart at an}^ other time ; 
but our feelings were steeled, and we had no power to 
assist, even had we felt the inclination. 

" At last the rain somewhat abated, but the cold was 
excessive : at the nightly halt many men threw themselves 
down in the mud, praying for death to relieve them from 
their misery. And some prayed not in vain, for next 
morning, starting in the dark, we stumbled over several 
who had died in the night. Setting my foot inadvertently 
on one, I stooped down to feel, and I shall never forget the 
sickening thrill that went to my heart, as my hand touched 
his cold, clammy face. This day we halted earlier than 
usual, and the weather being clearer, got fires lighted ; but 
there was nothing to eat save acorns from a wood in which 
we encamped — we greedily devoured them, though they 
were nauseous in the extreme. Next day's sufferings were 
of the same nature — only more aggravated, till at last we 
neared Rodrigo in the dark, halted, and heard at last the 
well-known summons of ' Turn out for biscuit,' ring in 
our ears. We had got to food at last. Instead of the 
usual orderly division each man seized what he could get, 
and began to allay the dreadful gnawing pain which had 
tormented us for four days of unexampled cold and fatigue. 



CHAPTER XVI 

impedimenta: the baggage — ^ladies at the front 

The train of Wellington's army was very heavy. In 
addition to the long droves of mules and ox-waggons which 
carried public stores, there was a very large accumulation 
of private baggage. The field equipment of officers — 
especially of officers of the higher ranks — strikes the modern 
student as very heavy, and was much commented on by 
French observers at the time. " To look at the mass of 
impedimenta and camp-followers trailing behind the 
British," says Foy, " you would think you were beholding 
the army of Darius. Only when you have met them in 
the field do you realize that you have to do with the soldiers 
of Alexander." The cause of this accumulation was partly 
a survival of the lax customs of the eighteenth century, but 
it resulted still more from the character of the country 
over which Wellington's host moved. In the interior of 
Spain or Portugal absolutely nothing was to be procured. 
The simplest small luxuries, tea, sugar, coffee, were un- 
gettable, save in the largest towns ; to renew clothing was 
equally impossible. He who required anything must carry 
it with him. It was not like campaigning in France, 
Belgium, Germany, or Italy. At the commencement of 
his term of command Wellington laid down the rule * that 
no private baggage was to be carried upon carts : " those 
who have baggage to carry, must be provided with mules 
and horses." This order is repeated again and again during 
later years. f A regular scale of the amount of horses and 

* General Order, May 23, 1809. 

t See reproofs in 1811 and 1812 in Collected General Orders, p. 20. 



The Baggage Animals 269 

mules allowed to officers of different rank was shortly 
produced. Two subalterns must share one sumpter-beast 
between them, a captain was allowed a whole mule or horse, 
and so on, in a mounting scale.* But as early as September 
1, 1809, it would seem that a more liberal allowance was 
made legal. In a " general order " of that day we get an 
elaborate table of rations of forage for all ranks, from the 
commander-in-chief downwards. While subalterns are 
allowed one ration each, the number rises enormously for 
the seniors, a captain commanding a company is set down 
for five rations, a major for seven, a lieutenant-colonel in 
charge of a battahon for ten, the Adjutant- General for 
twenty, etc., etc. This was a far too liberal allowance for 
the senior ranks, and led to an accumulation of beasts, 
both riding horses and pack-mules, far surpassing what was 
reasonable. To enable them to equip themselves for field 
service, all officers (whether staff or regimental) when 
ordered for the first time to join the army, were allowed 
to draw 200 days " bat, baggage, and forage money." This 
presumably would go towards the purchase of their animals. 
The forage allowed was 14 lbs. of hay or straw of the 
country, and 12 lbs. of oats, or 10 lbs. of barley or Indian 
com. When EngHsh hay was procurable (as at Lisbon) 
only 10 lbs. of it might be issued instead of the 14 lbs. of 
native stuff. On this system the captain would provide 
himself with a riding horse, generally a small Portuguese 
nag, and have a mule for his baggage. The subaltern 
must walk if he kept a mule : but it seems that very soon 
the juniors also took to riding. At any rate, lieutenants 
and other juniors often appear with a riding horse. Nothing 
is more common in a diary than to find, on his first arrival 
in Portugal the young officer procuring himself not one but 

* " Under the orders of Sir John Moore a horse or mule was 
allowed to each captain of a company of infantry, and a horse or 
mule in common among the subalterns. And xmder the orders of Sir 
John Cradock, which have been the rule for this army, the 
subalterns were allowed a horse or mule between them " {General 
Orders, p. 122). 



270 The Impedimenta 

two beasts, generally a nag and a mule. Sometimes lie 
brought out a horse of his own from England.* More 
usually he bought — 

" A mule for baggage, and a * bit of blood ' " t 

in the horse-market at Lisbon, of which one who had been 
through the business writes : — 

*' The only convenient opportunity to make the purchase 
was at a sort of fair held every Tuesday in the lower part 
of the town. There horses, mules, and asses were bought 
and sold, and (as in all markets) the price chiefly depended 
on the demand. The Portuguese horse-dealer has all the 
avidity of the English jockey to pick your pocket, but is 
not so au fait at the business. At this Fair you buy or sell 
your animal, the bargain is struck, the money paid, and 
the contract is indissoluble. English guineas had no attrac- 
tion : the dollar or the moidore was the medium ; but 
since the guinea has been introduced in the payment of 
the army (1813) the Portuguese begin to appreciate its 
value. It was customary for officers who wanted cash to 
give their draft on some house in London ; but it was 
purchasing money very dearly, giving at the rate of six 
and sixpence for a doUar that would only bring five shillings, 
so losing eighteen pence on every crown." % 

Good and large Spanish mules cost as much, or almost 
as much, as the small horses of the country. Eifty to 
ninety dollars was an ordinary price. Thirty to forty-five 

* I find, e.g., in diaries, that 2nd Lieut. Hough, R.A., got "two 
domestics, a country horse, and a mule " immediately on landing. 
Geo. Simmons and Harry Smith of the 95th were certainly 
habitually riding when only lieutenants. So was Grattan of the 
88th. Bell of the 34th being impecunious had *' only half a hurro 
along with another lad." Bunbury of the Buffs had half a horse and 
half a mule in conjunction with another subaltern. Hay of the 
52nd was just in the regulation with one mule to himself, on his 
first campaign, but bought a Portuguese mare before he had been 
a year in the field. 

t From that amusing piece of doggerel (strictly contemporary) 
The Military Adventures of Johnny Newcome. 

X Notes to Johnny Newcome, p. 30. 



Concerning Messes 271 

pounds was considered cheap for an English riding horse.* 
A Portuguese nag might be bought for fifteen or twenty. 

" In consequence of the difficulty of transporting 
baggage," writes one of the liveliest commentators on daity 
life at the front, " a regiment on active service could not 
keep up a regular mess, as in England. Each officer was 
obliged to manage for himself : they generally divided 
themselves into mess-parties by twos and threes. This 
greatly incommoded the subaltern : allowed only the 
carriage of half an animal [or at the most of one] it was not 
possible to admit, for the purpose of having extra eatables, 
any addition to his share of baggage. The mere ration 
was all that he got, with a camp-kettle for culinary pur- 
poses. Besides we must recollect the difficulty of getting 
extra food, and also the want of money. So the bit of beef 
and the ration of biscuit was frequent fare for perhaps 
two-thirds of the officers — with the allowance of ration-rum 
or wine (generally execrable stuff). The prime luxuries 
were a drop of brandy and a segar. With respect to articles 
of dress, the contents of a small portmanteau being all that 
could be taken about, if a subaltern wore out or lost his 
regimental jacket, he had to improvise a substitute, e.g. his 
great coat. Waistcoats were as fancy directed, black, blue, 
or green, silk or velvet." 

Nevertheless, though the officer, or at least the junior 
officer, thought himself much stinted in baggage, the private 
mules of the regiment, and in particular those of the senior 
officers, made up quite a drove — at least some thirty or 
forty. In addition there were the public mules of the corps, 
some thirteen in number — one for each company's camp 
kettles, one for entrenching tools, one for the paymaster's 
books, one for the surgeon's medical paniers. If we add 
to these the private riding horses of the senior officers and 

* Grattan of the 88th, selling his horse on leaving the Peninsula 
at the Lisbon Horse -Fair, says that he got 125 dollars for it, 
equalling at the then rate of exchange £31 5s. Boothby, R.E., 
buying a red English stallion, considers himself very lucky to get it 
for 30 guineas. A donkey fetched about 15 dollars only. 



272 The Impedimenta 

such of the juniors as could afford them, there was quite 
a cavalcade — enough to block a road or to encumber a 
ford. And unfortunately the mules and horses presupposed 
drivers and attendants. Wellington set his face against 
the withdrawal from the ranks of soldier-servants to act as 
muleteers.* Each officer, of course, had one ; but they 
were supposed to be available for service, and could only 
look to their master's business in the halts and encamp- 
ments. Hence native servants had to be hired — even 
the poorest pair of ensigns wanted a Portuguese boy to 
look after their single mule. The colonel had probably 
three or four followers. Thus to take charge of its baggage, 
private and public, each battalion had a following of twenty 
or thirty such attendants, a few English, the large majority 
Spanish or Portuguese. 

It cannot be denied that these fellows had a villainous 
reputation, and largely deserved it. Though many decent 
peasant lads were picked up in the countryside by the 
earlier comers, and made trustworthy and loyal servants, 
the majority were not satisfactory. The sort of followers 
whom the officers of a newly-landed regiment engaged at 
short notice upon the quays of Lisbon, when only two 
or three days were given them for selection, were mostly 
" undesirables." If there were a few among them who 
were merely " broken men," — ^ruined peasants seeking bread 
at any hand that would give it, — the majority were the 
scum of a great harbour city, ruffians of the lowest sort. 
The best of the Portuguese were with the army : the net of 
the conscription was making wide sweeps, and few young 
men of the decent class escaped the line or the militia. 
Personal service under an EngHsh officer, who was certainly 
an incomprehensible foreigner, and might well be a hard and 
unreasonable master, was not so attractive as to draw the 
pick of the Portuguese working classes. It did, on the 
other hand, appeal to needy rascals who wanted the chance 

* There are several court-martials on oflEicers who (disregarding 
this order) kept a soldier-servant or batman out of the ranks. 



The Camp Followers 273 

of chea.ting an employer who knew nothing of the country, 
its customs, and its prices. There was splendid opportunity 
for embezzlement. Moreover, many looked for more 
lucrative, if more dangerous gains. The diaries show that 
a very considerable proportion of the hastily -hired muleteers 
and servants absconded, after a few days, with their master's 
mule and portmanteau, and were never seen again. Those 
who did not, were looking after the plunder of the battle- 
field, the camp, and the wayside. It was they who robbed 
drunken soldiers, ill-guarded commissary stores, or lonely 
villages. They slunk out at night to make privy plunder 
in the lines of the regiments in which they were not em- 
ployed. On the battlefield they were ruthless strippers of 
the wounded — English and Portuguese no less than French 
— as well as of the dead. Unless report much mistreats 
them, they habitually knocked a wounded Frenchman on 
the head, if they were out of sight of the red-coats.* Con- 
sidering the atrocities of which the French had been guilty 
in Portugal, this might pass for not unnatural retaliation ; 
but it is certain that the British Avounded were also fre- 
quently plundered, and there is more than a suspicion 
that they were sometimes murdered. The Spanish camp- 
followers passed as being even more blood-thirsty than 
the Portuguese. Of course it was not the officers' private 
employes alone who were guilty of these misdemeanours ; 
the public muleteers of the commissariat staff, and other 
hangers-on of the army, had an equally bad reputation. 
The most daring theft of the whole war, as has been already 
mentioned, was done by two " authorized followers," who 

* One officer relates that he came upon his own mule-boy, 
aged ten or twelve, deliberately beating out the brains of a wounded 
Frenchman, at Salamanca, with a large stone. Another diarist 
speaks of making a wounded Frenchman comfortable while he 
went for a surgeon, and returning to find him stabbed and stripped. 
A third (F. Monro, R.A.) says, " I found myself among the dead 
and dying, to the shame of human nature be it said, both stripped, 
some half -naked, some wholly so, and this done principally by 
those infernal devils in mortal shape, the cruel, cowardly Portuguese 
followers, unfeeling ruffians. The Portuguese pillaged and plimdered 
our own wounded officers before they were dead ! " 

T 



274 The Impedimenta 

burglariously entered the house of the Commissary General 
in 1814, and got ofiE with no less than £2000 in gold. They 
were detected, and naturally suffered the extreme punish-' 
ment of the law. By their names one would seem to have 
been French, the other a Spaniard. There is an awful 
story, told in two diaries, of a camp follower who in a 
time of starvation sold to British soldiers as pork slices 
cut off a French corpse.* He got away before he could 
be caught and shot. But enough of these ghouls ! 

The followers of a British army were by no means 
exclusively foreign. One of the worst impediments to the 
free movement of the host came from the unhappy practice 
that then prevailed of allowing corps on foreign service 
to take with them a proportion of soldiers' wives — four or 
six per company. Forty or sixty of these women, mostly 
mounted on donkeys, formed the most unmanageable 
portion of every regimental train. They were alwaj^s 
straggUng or being left behind, because they could not 
keep up mth the long marches that the army had often 
to take. Wayside tragedies of this sort are to be found 
recorded in almost every Peninsular memoir — often of the 
most harrowing sort. In especial we may mention the 
number of these poor women who dropped in the Corunna 
retreat, and died in the snow, or fell into the hands of the 
French. The interesting little book of a married sergeant 
of the 42nd, who took his wife about with him during the 
last three years of the war, is full of curious little 
shifts and anxieties that they went through.f The best 
description of this curious stratum of the Peninsular 
Army that I know is in the autobiography of Bell of 
the 34th. t 

" The multitude of soldiers' wives stuck to the army like 
bricks : averse to all military discipline, they impeded our 
progress at times very much, particularly in retreats. They 

* See Ross Lewin's With the 32nd in the Peninsular War, p. 
205. 

t Sergeant Anton's Retrospect of a Military Life, pp. 60, 61. 
^ Rough Notes of an Old Soldier, vol. i. pp. 74, 75. 



The Soldiers' Wives 275 

became the subject of a General Order, for their own special 
guidance. They were under no control, and were always 
first mounted up and away, blocking up narrow passes 
and checking the advance of the army with their donkeys, 
after repeated orders to follow in rear of their respective 
corps, or their donkeys would be shot. On the retreat 
from Burgos I remember Mrs. Biddy Flyn remarking, ' I 
would like to see the man that wud shoot my donkey : 
faith, I'll be too early away for any of 'em to catch mc. 
Will you come wid me, girls ? ' ' Aye, indeed, every one 
of us.' And away they started at early dawn, cracking 
their jokes about divisional orders, Wellington, commanding 
officers, and their next bivouac. Alas ! the Provost Marshal 
was in advance — a man in authority, and a terror to evil 
doers : he was waiting a mile or two on, in a narrow turn 
of the road, for the ladies, with a party all loaded. He gave 
orders to shoot the first two donkeys pour exemple. There 
was a wild, fierce and furious yell struck up, with more 
^^'eeping and lamentation than one usually hears at an 
Irish funeral, mth sundrj'- prayers for the vagabone that had 
murdered the lives of the poor darling innocent crathers. 
' Bad luck to the ugly face of the Provost, the spy of the 
camp, may he niver see home till the vultures have picked 
his eyes out, the born varmint,' and so on. The victims 
picked up what they could carry, and marched along with 
the regiment, crying and lamenting their bitter fate. It 
was wonderful what they endured — but in spite of this 
warning they were foremost on the line of march next 
morning again. As Mrs. Skiddy, their leader, said, ' We 
must risk something to be in before the men, to have the 
fire and a dhrop of tay ready for them after their load and 
their labour : and sure if we went in the rare the French, 
bad luck to them, would pick me up, me and my 
donkey, and then Dan Skiddy would be lost entirely 
without me.' " 

The soldiers' wives were indeed an extraordinary com- 
munity — as hard as nails, expert plunderers, furious 



276 The Impedimenta 

partisans of the supreme excellence of their own battalion, 
much given to fighting. Many of them were widows twice 
and even thrice over — ^for when a married man was shot, 
and his wife was a capable and desirable person, she would 
receive half a dozen proposals before her husband was 
forty-eight hours in his grave. And since the alternative 
was a hazardous voyage back to relatives in England or 
Ireland, who had probably broken off with the " girl who ran 
away with a soldier," most of the widows concluded to stop 
with the battalion, with a new spouse and a new name. 
As the war dragged on many of the men picked up Portu- 
guese and Spanish helpmates, who joined the regimental 
drove, and made it strangely polyglot. At the end of the 
struggle in 1814 there was a most harrowing scene at 
Bordeaux, when the general order was issued that all these 
foreigners who could not prove that they had been legiti- 
mately married to soldiers, with the colonel's leave, were 
to be refused transport to the British Isles.* There were 
hundreds of them, and only in a few cases could the men 
find money to get them taken home in private merchantmen. 
The bulk marched back to the Peninsula in charge of a 
brigade of homeward bound Portuguese — a most melancholy 
and distressful assembly.f 

It is extraordinary to find that a sprinkling of the officers 
of the Peninsular Army were unwise enough to take their 
wives with them to the front — thereby securing a life of 
wearing anxiety for both, and of dire hardship for the poor 
ladies. One of the best known cases was that of Hill's 
senior aide-de-camp. Captain Currie, whose wife I have 
found mentioned half a dozen times as making tea for the 
second division staff, and holding a little reception whenever 
the division was settled down for a few days. Another 

* Wellington (General Order of April 26, 1814) makes the con- 
cession that colonels may permit "a few who have proved themselves 
useful and regular,'* to accompany the soldiers to whom they are 
attached " with a view to being ultimately married." 

f For details see Donaldson's Eventful Life of a Soldier, pp. 
231, 232. 



Ladies at the Front 277 

was Mrs. Dalbiac, wife of the colonel of the 4th Dragoons, 
whose adventures on the field of Salamanca are mentioned 
by Napier.* But the best chronicle of the ups and downs 
of a young married couple may be found in the breezy 
autobiography of Sir Harry Smith, then a subaltern in the 
95th Rifles. His tale is well known — ^he rescued a young 
Spanish lady among the horrors of the sack of Badajoz, 
married her two days later, and had her with him for the 
remaining three years of the war. The story of their 
Odyssey, as related by him, is one of the most touching 
narratives of loyal love, and hardship cheerfully borne, 
that any man can read. They lived together for forty 
years in storm and sunshine, and she survived to christen 
the town of Ladysmith by her name, while her husband 
was commanding the forces in South Africa. He gave 
his name to the sister town of Harrismith, less well remem- 
bered now than the long-besieged place with which the 
memory of Juana Smith is linked. 

There is a sketch in Paris by the well-known artist. 
Colonel Lejeune, who, when a prisoner at Elvas, made a 
drawing of an English military family which passed him. 
As he describes it in his diary, "The captain rode first on 
a very fine horse, warding off the sun with a parasol : then 
came his wife very prettily dressed, with a small straw hat, 
riding on a mule and carrying not only a parasol, but a Httle 
black and tan dog on her knee, while she led by a cord a 
she-goat, to supply her with milk. Beside madame walked 
her Irish nurse, carrying in a green silk wrapper a baby, 
the hope of the family. A grenadier, the captain's servant, 
came behind and occasionally poked up the long-eared 
steed of his mistress with a staff. Last in the procession 
came a donkey loaded with much miscellaneous baggage, 
which included a tea-kettle and a cage of canaries ; it was 
guarded by an English servant in livery, mounted on a 
sturdy cob and carrying a long posting-whip, with which 

* History of the Peninsular War, vol. iv. p. 276. Also mentioned 
in Tomkinson's Diary, p. 185, 



278 The Impedimenta 

he occasionally made the donkey mend its pace." * If this 
picture is not exaggerated, it certainly helps us to under- 
stand the strong objection which Wellington had for ladies 
at the front, and all forms of impedimenta. 

* Memoirs of Lejeune, vol. ii. p. 108. I am a little inclined to 
think that this may have been the household establishment of 
Hill's senior aide-de-camp, Currie, as the sight was seen by Lejeune 
in the Elvas-Olivenza direction, where the 2nd division was then 
quartered. 



CHAPTER XVII 

A NOTE ON SIEGES 

Every one knows that the record of the Peninsular Army 
in the matter of sieges is not the most briUiant page in its 
annals. It is not to the orgies that followed the storm of 
Badajoz or San Sebastian that allusion is here made, but 
to the operations that preceded them, and to the unhappy 
incidents that accompanied the luckless siege of Burgos. 
Courage enough and to spare was lavished on those bloody 
leaguers ; perseverance was shown in no small measure ; 
and to a certain extent professional skill was not lacking. 
But the tale compares miserably with the great story of the 
triumphs of Welhngton's army in the open field. Reckless 
bravery had to supply the place of the machinery and 
organization that was lacking, and too much blood was 
spilt, and sometimes spilt to no effect. 

The responsibiUty for these facts is hard to distribute. 
As is generally the case when failures are made, it is clear 
that a system was to blame rather than any individual, or 
body of individuals. Great Britain had been at war with 
France for some sixteen years ; but in all her countless 
expeditions she had never, since 1794, been compelled to 
undertake regular sieges on a large scale. The battering 
of old-fashioned native forts in India, the blockades of 
Malta or Alexandria, the bombardments of Flushing or 
Copenhagen, need hardly be mentioned. They were not 
operations such as those which Wellington had to carry 
out in 1811 or 1812. For a long time the Peninsular War 
had been considered as a purely defensive affair ; it was 



280 A Note on Sieges 

concerned with the protection of Portugal, almost (we 
might say) of Lisbon, from the French invader. The 
home Government kept sending reinforcements to Welling- 
ton, but they were under the impression that an over- 
powerful combination of the enemy's forces might some day 
force him to re-embark. He himself regarded such a 
contingency as by no means impossible. 

But in the spring of the year 1811 it became clear that a 
defensive war may have offensive episodes. After Massena's 
retreat from before the Lines of Torres Vedras, Wellington 
had to protect the frontiers of Portugal ; and to guard 
them efficiently he needed possession of Almeida, Ciudad 
Kodrigo, and Badajoz, which had all been in the hands of 
the allies in the summer of 1810, but were now French 
fortresses. To subdue these three places he required a 
large battering- train, properly equipped for movement, 
and such a thing was not at his disposition. There were a 
number of heavy guns mounted on the Lines of Torres 
Vedras, and on the ramparts of Elvas, Abrantes,andPeniche. 
There were also many companies of Portuguese gunners 
attached to those guns, and a lesser number of British com- 
panies which had been immobilized in the Lisbon Hues. 
But heavy guns and gunners combined do not complete a 
battering train. An immense amount of transport was 
required, and in the spring of 1811 it was not at Welling- 
ton's disposition. Well-nigh every available ox-cart and 
mule in Portugal was already employed in carrying the 
provisions and baggage of the field army. And water 
transport, which would have been very valuable, could 
only be used for a few miles of the lower courses of the 
Tagus and Douro. To begin a regular siege of Almeida in 
April, 1811, was absolutely impossible, not because there 
were not guns or gunners in Portugal, but because there 
were no means of moving them at the time. Wellington 
did not even attempt it, contenting himself with a mere 
blockade. On the other flank an endeavour was made 
to besiege Badajoz, but this was only possible because 



Wellington's Battering Train 281 

within a few miles of that city lay the Portuguese fortress 
of Elvas, from whose walls was borrowed the hastily 
improvised and imperfect battering-train with which the 
Spanish stronghold was attacked. 

The first two sieges of Badajoz in 1811 were lamentable 
failures, precisely because this haphazard battering- train 
was wholly inadequate for the end to which it was applied. 
Alexander Dickson, the zealous and capable officer placed 
in charge of the artillery, was set an impossible task. He 
had about 400 Portuguese and 120 Enghsh gunners, all 
equally untrained in siege duty, to work a strange collec- 
tion of antiquated and unserviceable cannon. The pieces 
borrowed from Elvas were of irregular calibre and ancient 
pattern. Almost incredible as it may appear, some of these 
long brass 24-pounders were nearly two hundred years 
old — observers noted on them the arms and cyphers not 
only of John IV. the first king of the Braganza dynasty, 
but of Phihp III. and PhiHp IV. of Spain, the contemporaries 
of our James I. and Charles I.* Even the better guns were 
of obsolete eighteenth-century types. No two had the 
same bore, nor were the shot supplied for them uniform in 
size ; it was necessary to cull and select a special heap of 
balls for each particular gun. The whole formed, indeed, 
a sort of artillery museum rather than an effective battering - 
train. The guns shot wildly and weakly, and their gunners 
were inexperienced. No wonder that their effect was poor. 

But this was not all : indeed, the inefficiency of the 
guns was perhaps the secondary rather than the primary 
cause of the failure of the two early sieges of Badajoz. 
More important still was it that Wellington was as weak 
in the engineer as in the artillery arm. The number of 
trained officers of engineers with the Peninsular Army was 
very small — ^not much over thirty; but of rank and file 
to serve under them there were practically none. Of the 
corps called the " Royal Military Artificers," the ancestors 
of the " Royal Sappers and Miners," there were actually 
* See Dickson Papers I., p. 448. 



282 A Note on Sieges 

only thirty-four attached to the army in 1810, and it was 
far on in 1811 before their numbers reached a hundred. 
Many of them were with Wellington's field army on the 
distant frontier of Beira, and before Badajoz, in May, there 
were little more than a score. For the trench- work of the 
siege untrained volunteers had to be borrowed from the 
hne battalions, and to be instructed by the engineer officers 
actually under the fire of the French guns. Their teachers 
were almost all as ignorant of practical siege operations as 
themselves ; the British Army, as has already been remarked, 
had done little work of the sort for many years. 

The ofiicers, it is true, were zealous and often clever ; 
the men were recklessly brave, if unpractised in the simplest 
elements of siegecraft. But good-will could not atone for 
want of experience, and it seems clear that in these early 
sieges the plans were often unwise, and the execution un- 
skilful. The points of attack selected at Badajoz were the 
strongest and least accessible points of the fortress, not 
those against which the French had operated in their 
earlier siege in February with success. This choice had 
been made because the British were working " against 
time " ; there were French armies collecting for the relief 
of Badajoz, and if the leaguer took many weeks, it was 
certain that an overwhelming force would be brought 
against the besiegers and compel them to depart. Hence 
the engineer officers, in both the unsuccessful sieges, tried 
to break in at points where victory would be decisive ; 
they thought it would be useless to begin by capturing 
outworks, or by making a lodgment in the lower parts of 
the city, which would leave its stronger points intact and 
capable of further defence. They battered the high-lying 
fort of San Cristobal, and the citadel on its precipitous 
height, arguing that if they could capture either of them 
the whole fortress was at their mercy. Both the points 
assailed turned out to be too strong : the stony hill of 
San Cristobal proved impossible for trench work ; desperate 
attempts to storm the fort that crowned it, by columns 



Colonel Dickson's Woek 283 

advancing across the open, were beaten off with heavy loss. 
The castle walls, after long battering, refused to crumble 
into practicable breaches. Before anything decisive had 
been accomplished, the French armies of succour came up. 
Beresford beat the first at Albuera in May and renewed the 
siege ; the second (Soult and Marmont combined) was so 
strong that Wellington dared not face it, and withdrew 
from his abandoned trenches to within the Portuguese 
frontier in July. 

A great change for the better in Wellington's position 
as regards sieges had been made by the autumn of 1811. 
He had at last received a number of good modern British 
iron guns, much superior to the old Portuguese brass 24- 
pounders. And with infinite trouble and delay he had 
at last created a battering-train that could move. This 
was the work of Alexander Dickson, already mentioned, 
who was occupied from July to November in accumulating 
at the obscure town of Villa da Ponte, behind Almeida, 
masses of waggon- transport and trains of mules and oxen, 
for the moving of the heavy cannon and the immense store 
of ammunition belonging to them. The guns were brought 
up the Douro to Lamego, where the river ceased to be 
navigable, and then dragged over the hills by oxen. Several 
companies of Portuguese and British gunners were attached 
to the park, and instructed, so far as was possible, in 
siege work. At the same time the mihtary artificers — 
still far too few in numbers — were instructing volunteers 
from the Hne in the making of a great store of gabions, plat- 
forms, fascines, and other necessaries. 

This long preparation, which was almost unsuspected 
by the French, because it was unostentatious and made at 
a great distance from the front, enabled Wellington to 
execute the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in January, 1812, 
A\ith unexampled rapidity and success. The fortress was 
not one of the first class, the garrison was rather weak, the 
battering-train was now ample for the task required of 
it, and, to the surprise and dismay of Marmont, Eodrigo 



284 A Note on Sieges 

fell after a siege of only twelve days at midwinter (January 
7-19) long before he could collect his scattered divisions 
for its relief. 

The third attack on Badajoz, in March-April, 1812, 
turned out a much less satisfactory business, though it 
ended in a triumphant success. Like the two sieges of 
the preceding year, it was conducted " against time " ; 
Wellington being fully aware that if it went on too long the 
relieving armies would be upon him. The means employed 
were more adequate than those of 1811, though only a 
part of the battering-train that had subdued Ciudad 
Rodrigo could be brought across the hills from the distant 
frontier of Beira. The remainder was composed of ship- 
guns borrowed from Lisbon. But though the artillery 
was not inadequate, and the walls were thoroughly well 
breached, both the trench-work and the storm cost over- 
many lives. Indeed, the main assault on the breaches 
failed, and the town fell because two subsidiary attacks 
by escalade, one carried out by Picton, the other by General 
Walker with a brigade of the 5th Division, were both 
triumphantly successful. Wellington laid the blame of 
the fearful loss of life upon the fact that his engineers had 
no trained sappers to help them, and were unskilled in 
siegecraft. They had attacked a point of the defences far 
more promising than those battered in 1811, and had opened 
up immense gaps in the defences, but nevertheless he was 
not satisfied with their direction. In a private letter to 
Lord Liverpool, which is not printed in either of the two 
series of his dispatches, he wrote : — 

" The capture of Badajoz affords as strong an instance 
of the gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. 
But I anxiously hope that I shall never again be the instru- 
ment of putting them to such a test as that to which they 
were put last night. I assure your lordship that it is quite 
impossible to carry fortified places by ' vive force ' without 
incurring great loss, and being exposed to the chance of 
failure, unless the army should be provided with a sufficient 



PLATE VII. 





Wellington and His Engineers 285 

trained corps of sappers and miners. . . . The consequence 
of being so unprovided mth the people necessary to approach 
a regularly fortified place are, first, that our engineers, 
though well-educated and brave, have never turned their 
minds to the mode of conducting a regular siege, as it is 
useless to think of that which it is impossible, in our ser\dce, 
to perform. They think they have done their duty when 
they have constructed a battery with a secure communica- 
tion to it, which can breach the place. Secondly, these 
breaches have to be carried by vive force, at an infinite 
sacrifice of officers and soldiers. . . . These great losses 
could be avoided, and, in my opinion, time gained in every 
siege, if we had properly trained people to carry it on. 
I declare that I have never seen breaches more practicable 
in themselves than the three in the waUs of Badajoz, and 
the fortress must have surrendered with these breaches 
open, if I had been able to ' approach ' the place. But 
when I had made the third breach on the evening of the 6th, 
I could do no more. I was then obliged either to storm or 
to give the business up, and when I ordered the assault, I 
was certain that I should lose our best officers and men. 
It is a cruel situation for any person to be placed in, and I 
earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of 
sappers and miners formed without loss of time." * 

The slaughter of Badajoz, then, in Wellington's estima- 
tion, was due partly to the fact that the British Army, 
unlike all other armies, lacked regular companies of sappers 
and miners, and partly to the inexperience of the engineer 
officers in carrying out the last stages of a siege — the 
advance towards the glacis and the ditch by scientific 
trench-work. They did not, he says, " turn their mind " 
towards such operations, because they had never been 
furnished with skilled workmen to carry them out. That 
sappers and miners did not exist as yet was not the fault 
of Wellington, nor of the ministers, but of the professional 

♦This letter, found among Lord Liverpool's papers in 1869, was 
communicated to me by Mr. F. Tiurner of Frome. 



286 A Note on Sieges 

advisers of the administration, who should long ago have 
pointed out that such a corps was wanted. That the 
Liverpool ministry was not slow to take advice was shown 
by the fact that they at once converted the already existing 
^' Mihtary Artificers " into sappers. On April 23, less than 
three weeks after Badajos fell, a warrant was issued for 
instructing the corps in military field works, and shortly 
after six companies were ordered to be sent to the Peninsula 
the moment that they should have received such training. 
On August 4 the name of the whole corps was changed 
from Royal Military Artificers to Royal Sappers and Miners.* 
It was not, of course, till very late in the year that the first 
of the new sapper companies joined Wellington, but by 
the next spring he had 300 trained men with him. 

Meanwhile they had of course arrived too late for the 
siege of Burgos, the most unhappy of all Wellington's 
leaguers, where the whole trench- work was conducted by 
volunteers from the line directed by precisely eight of the 
old artificers — of whom one was killed and the remaining 
seven wounded. The story of the Burgos operations reads 
Hke an exaggerated repetition of the first siege of Badajoz. 
The battering-train that took Badajoz had been left behind, 
and to attack Burgos (whose strength was undervalued) 
WelHngton had Avith him no proper means . Only eight guns 
were brought up — because the transport with the army 
could only provide a few spare teams, and the whole of 
Castile had been swept clear of draught-beasts. This 
ridiculously weak train proved wholly insufiicient for the 
work set it. " Had there been a siege establishment with 
the army even moderately ejBficient, so as to have admitted 
of the performance of the rudiments of the art, the attack 
(even with the inadequate artillery) might have been carried 
through," writes the historian of the Peninsular sieges. f 
But there were only five engineer officers present, just 
eight artificers, no tools save regimental picks and shovels 

* See Connolly's Royal Sappers and Miners, pp. 187-8 and 194. 
t Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, i. p. 169. 



The Failure at Burgos 287 

borrowed from line regiments, no material save wood 
requisitioned from the town of Burgos, and so little transport 
that the fire had sometimes to cease, to allow fresh ammu- 
nition to be brought up from the distant Madrid. Welling- 
ton ordered repeated assaults on the inadequately battered 
walls ; they all failed, and he finally retired after thirty-two 
days of open trenches, and with the loss of nearly 2000 men, 
from before a " bicocque," as the French called it, which 
could not have withstood a proper battering-train for a 
third of that time. 

The fact is that Wellington had undervalued the strength 
of Burgos ; he thought it would fall easily. If he had 
known that it would hold out for more than a month, he 
could have procured more guns from the captured French 
arsenal at Madrid, and might have requisitioned all the 
beasts of the army to draw them. But by the time that 
it began to be seen that Burgos was not about to yield to 
a mere demonstration, it was too late to get up the necessary 
means of reducing it. Finallj^ the French armies mustered 
for its relief, and the British had to retire. It may be 
added that the besieging troops, thoroughly disgusted with 
the inadequate means used to prepare the way for them, 
did not act with the same energy that had been shown at 
Rodrigo or Badajoz. Several of the assaults were not 
pushed well home, and the trench-work was slack. Well- 
ington wrote, in his General Orders for October 3, a stiff 
rebuke, to the effect that " the officers and soldiers of this 
army should know that to work during a siege is as much a 
part of their duty as to engage the enemy in the field ; 
and they may depend upon it that unless they perform 
the work allotted to them with due diligence, they cannot 
acquire the honour which their comrades have won in 
former sieges. . . . The Commander-in-Chief hopes he 
shall have no reason to complain in future." * 

The leaguer of San Sebastian, the last of Well- 
ington's sieges, bore a great hkeness to the last siege 
* General Orders, p. 275. 



288 A Note on Sieges 

of Badajoz. It was conducted in a time of considerable 
anxiety, while the army of Soult was making vigorous and 
repeated efforts to frustrate it. The place was strong by 
nature — a towering castle with the town at its foot joined 
to the mainland only by a narrow sandy spit ; the defences 
of this isthmus were short, and reached from sea to sea : 
they were fully commanded by the castle behind. The 
first great assault (July 25, 1813) was made while the 
trenches were still far from the walls, and while the fire of 
the besieged had not been silenced. It failed with heavy 
loss. The second assault (August 31) was successful, but 
very bloody — 2000 men were killed or wounded. The most 
authoritative commentator writes : " The operations against 
San Sebastian afford a most impressive lesson on the 
advantages of proceeding step by step, and with due atten- 
tion to science and rule. The attempt there made to 
overcome or trample on such restrictions caused a certain 
operation of t^^^enty days to extend to sixty. It bears 
strong testimony to the truth of the maxim laid down by 
Marshal Vauban : ' La precipitation dans les sieges ne 
hate point la prise des places, la retarde souvent, et en- 
sanglante toujours la scene.' " * 

There can be no doubt that siege-work was loathed by 
the rank and file, not so much for its danger — there was never 
any lack of volunteers for a forlorn hope — but for its dis- 
comfort. There was a sort of underlying feeling that en- 
trenching was not soldier's but navvy's work ; the long 
hiding under cover in cramped positions, which was abso- 
lutely necessary, was looked upon as a sort of skulking. 
With an unwise disregard for their personal safety, which 
had a touch of bravado and more than a touch of sulkiness 
in it, the men exposed themselves far more than was 
necessary. I fancy that on some occasions, notably at 
the early sieges of Badajoz and at Burgos, there was a general 
feeling that matters were not being scientifically or ade- 
quately conducted, and that too much was being asked of 
* Jones' Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 97. 



Trench Work 289 

the rank and file, when they were made to attempt a hard 
task without the proper means. It must have been clear to 
them that there were too few engineer officers, not enough 
artillery, and no proper provision of tools. Hence came 
a spirit of anger and discontent. 

At Ciudad Rodrigo, and at the third and last leaguer 
of Badajoz, the weather was so abominable that the siege- 
work was long looked back on as a perfect nightmare. 
At Rodrigo, in the high upland of Leon, the month of January 
was a combination of frost and rain ; the water accumu- 
lated in the trenches and there often froze, so that the men 
were standing ankle-deep in a mixture of ice and mud, 
and since they could not move about, because of the 
enemy's incessant fire, suffered horribly from cold. At 
Badajoz there was no frost : but incessant chilling rain was 
almost as bad during the early weeks of the siege ; the 
trenches were often two feet deep in water, and the work 
of the spade was almost useless, since the liquid mud that 
was shovelled up ran away in streams out of the gabions 
into which it was cast, and refused to pile up into parapets 
for the trenches, spreading out instead into mere broad 
accumulations of shme, which gave no cover, and had no 
resisting power against the round shot of the garrison. 
I imagine that the desperate and dirty toil in those opera- 
tions, protracted over many days of abominable discomfort 
as well as danger, accounts in great measure for the ferocious 
spirit shown by the victors both at Rodrigo and Badajoz. 
The men were in a blind rage at the misery which they had 
been enduring, and it found vent, after the storm was 
over, in misconduct far surpassing that which would have 
followed a pitched battle where the losses had been equally 
great. One observer writes : " The spirit of the soldiers 
rose to a frightful height — I say frightful because it was 
not of that sort which denoted exultation at the prospect 
of achieving an exploit which was about to hold them up 
to the admiration of the world ; there was a certain some- 
thing in their bearing which told plainly that they had 

u 



290 A Word on Sieges 

suffered fatigues of which they had not complained, and 
seen their comrades and officers slain around them without 
repining, but that they had smarted under the one and 
felt acutely for the other. They smothered both, so long 
as body and mind were employed, but now, before the 
storm, they had a momentary licence to think, and every 
fine feeling vanished — ^plunder and revenge took their 
place. ... A quiet but desperate calm replaced their 
usual buoyant spirits, and nothing was observable in their 
manner but a tiger-like expression of anxiety to seize upon 
their prey." * 

Preparation for the storm affected different men in 
different ways : some tried to make up old quarrels and 
exchanged words of forgiveness ; a good many wrote 
letters home, which were to be delivered only in the case 
of their falling. " Each arranged himself for the combat in 
such manner as his fancy would admit of : some by lowering 
their cartridge-boxes, others by turning them to the front 
for more convenient use ; others unclasped their stocks 
or opened their shirt collars ; others oiled their bayonets. 
Those who had them took leave of their wives and children 
— an affecting sight, but not so much so as might have 
been expected, because the women, from long habit, were 
accustomed to such scenes of danger." f 

One intelligent sergeant speaks of the moment of waiting 
for the order to storm as full of a stress that nothing else 
could produce : " We felt a dead weight hanging on our 
minds ; had we been brought hurriedly into action, it would 
have been quite different, but it is inconsistent with the 
nature of man not to feel as I have described. The long 
warning, the dark and silent night, the known strength 
of the fortress, the imminent danger of the attack, all 
conspired to produce this feeling. It was not the result of 
want of courage, as was shown by the calm intrepidity of 
the advance when we came in range of the French 

* Grattan's With the Connaught Rangers, pp. 193, 194. 
t Grattan, dealing with the Storm of Rodrigo,p.l45. 



Waiting for the Stoem 291 

cannon." * That the revulsion from the long waiting took 
the shape of frenzied violence, when the men were at last 
let loose, was not unnatural. A certain amount of the horrors 
which took place at Badajoz and San Sebastian may be 
ascribed to mere frenzy, if the rest was due to more 
dehberate wickedness on the part of the baser spirits of the 
army. 

* Sergeant Donaldson, p. 155 : he is speaking of the last assault 
onBadajoz. 



CHAPTER XIX 

UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS 

Without going into the niceties of regimental detail, which 
were fully developed by 1809, it is necessary to give a certain 
attention to the dress of the army — ^we might almost add, 
to its occasional want of dress. 

The Peninsular Army was fortunate in having started 
just late enough to be rid of the worst of the unpractical 
clothing — the legacy of the eighteenth century — ^which had 
afflicted the troops of the earlier years of the war. The odd 
hat, shaped something like a civilian beaver, with a shaving- 
brush at the side, which had been worn in Holland and 
Egypt, had just been superseded for the rank and file by 
a light felt shako, with brass plate in front,* and a woollen 
tuft with the regimental colours (worn sometimes in front, 
sometimes at the side), and ornamented with white loops 
and tassels.t This was a light headdress, compared with 
what had gone before, and no less with the heavy, bell- 
topped leather shakos that were to come after. Wellington 
protested against an early attempt to introduce these, 
saying that he always knew his own troops at a distance, 
even when great-coated, by the fact that their shakos were 
narrower at the crown than the base, while the French 
headgear was always bell-topped, swelling out from the 
bottom to the crown, and the distinction was useful. The 

* Instead of the brass plate with regimental badge or number, 
the Light infantry and rifles had only a bugle-horn. 

f Light infantry had a small green tuft on the front of the 
shako ; regiments of the rest of the line a larger upright plume 
fixed on the side. 



Concerning Head-Gear 293 

felt shako had a peak to protect the eyes from the sun, and 
a chin-strap. It was a serviceable head-dress, whose only 
fault was that, after long wear, and exposure to much rain, 
the felt became soft and might crease or bulge, and then 
dry into unsightly and lop-sided shapes.* 

Down to 1 81 1, officers of the line, except in rifle and 
light infantry corps, were wearing cocked hats, as had been 
the custom since the eighteenth century. The new clothing 
which came out in 1 81 2 had shakos (of a more ornamental 
sort) for officers as well as men. The very sensible reason for 
the change was that obvious difference in dress between 
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks enabled the 
enemy's marksmen to single out the officers, and to give 
them more than their fair share of bullets. The discarded 
cocked hat had been a stupid survival — a " burlesque of a 
chateau usually topped by some extraordinary-looking 
feather," says one wearer of it, while others wore it without 
any feather at all. The " cut-down " hat, exactly a span in 
height, was all the rage in the Lines of Torres Vedras during 
the winter of 1 810-1 l.j The felt shako was an enormous 
improvement in every way. After 1811, only generals and 
staff officers, engineers, doctors, commissaries, and drum- 
majors retained the cocked hat. The last case that I 
remember of its being used in the line was that of Lieutenant 
Maguire, of the 4th, who, leading the " forlorn hope " at the 
storm of San Sebastian (Aug., 1813) put on a cocked hat 
with a white feather " to make himself conspicuous and 
recognizable." Clearly this headdress was by that date 
wholly abnormal. J 

Another evil which the Peninsular Army escaped also 
belonged to the head. Pigtails and hair-powder went out 
in 1808 — an immense boon. As one who had endured them 

* Cooke of the 43rd says (in his Narrative of Events in the South 
of France f p. 67) that " distorted by alternate rain and sunshine, 
as well as by having served as pillows and nightcaps, our caps had 
assumed the most monstrous and grotesque shapes." 

t Grattan's Connaught Rangers, p. 51. 

X See Leslie's edition of the Dickson Papers, ii. p. 994. 



294 Uniforms and Weapons 

says, " The hair required to be soaped, floured, and frizzed, 
in order to be tortured into an uncouth shape, which gave 
the man acute pain, and robbed him of the power of turning 
his head easily, unless he brought his body round with it." 
The grease and flour matted the hair, and inclined towards 
all sorts of scalp diseases. Wellington, who had discarded 
hair-powder and dressing long before most officers,* must 
have been rejoiced when it became legally permissible to 
do without it in all ranks. It was not every one who agreed 
with him — a few old-fashioned men still wore pigtails and 
powder for some time in the Peninsula ; but they soon 
died out. 

In the same year, 1808, that these monstrosities vanished 
another affliction was relieved. Trousers of a blue-grey 
colour were substituted for breeches and gaiters, as service 
dress. Just before the first brigades sailed, in 1808. The 
many-buttoned gaiters to the knee had been an intolerable 
nuisance; there was every temptation not to strip them 
off at all, when it took twelve minutes to button them up 
efficiently, more if they were wet through. Hence troops 
liable to be alarmed at any moment were tempted not to 
take them off at all for many days, which led to uncleanli- 
ness and diseases in the legs. Trousers were a great im- 
provement — they were less tight, and could be easily slipped 
into and out of. Under the trousers short boots (often 
called shoes) were worn. 

The coat for all ranks in the infantry was cut short in 
front, and had fairly small tails ; it still preserved, more or 
less, the late eighteenth century cut in this respect, but 
differed from the earlier type in having the stiff upstanding 
collar supported by a leather stock, an evil device which 
constricted the neck and tended to apoplexy. On hard 
service, such as storming parties, the men unbuttoned their 

* Memoirs of Captain Ellers, p. 124 (dealing with the year 1800). 
" He never wore powder though it was the regulation to do so. His 
hair was cropped close. I have heard him say that hair powder 
was very prejudicial to the health, as impeding perspiration, and he 
was no doubt right." 



The Eegimental Coat 295 

collars and threw their stocks aside.* The most character- 
istic point that strikes the eye in pictures of the rank and 
file of the Peninsular period is the series of white stripes 
across the front of the coat, caused by the ornamental 
prolongation of the button guards. Bayonet and cartouche 
box were supported by the broad white leather cross-belts, 
ornamented with a brass plate with the regimental badge. 
The very heavy knapsack, normally of oilskin or glazed 
canvas, was supported by a separate attachment of straps 
passing under the arm-pits. The whole kit weighed some 
sixty pounds, when the canteen and haversack are taken 
into consideration. Officers had only a single leather belt 
coming from the right shoulder to the left hip, to sustain the 
sword, and wore their red silk sashes girt tight, in several 
turns around their waists. 

One of Wellington's most sensible traits was an intense 
dislike of worrying officers or men about details of uniform 
on active service. " Provided we brought our men into the 
field well appointed," says Grattan of the 88th, " with their 
sixty rounds of ammunition each, he never looked to see 
whether trousers were black, blue, or grey : and as to 
ourselves, we might be rigged out in any colour of the rain- 
bow if we fancied it. The consequence was that scarcely 
any two officers were dressed alike ! Some wore grey 
braided coats, others brown : some again liked blue; many 
(from choice, or perhaps necessity) stuck to the " old red 
rag." Some wore long-skirted frock-coats, as better 
protection to the loins than the orthodox regimental cut. 
There are some curious records of the odd clothing in which 
officers finished a campaign. One records that he did the 
Burgos retreat in a garment improvised from the cassock 
of a priest, slit up and cut short and furnished with buttons. 
Another, a captain in the 29th, landing in Great Britain in 
a braided pelisse and a fancy waistcoat with silver buttons 
of Spanish filigree work, was taken for some sort of French 

* See for example the description of the 43rd preparing to storm 
Rodrigo, in Grattan, p. 145 



296 Uniforms and Weapons 

prisoner by a worthy general, who congratulated him on 
being allowed such freedom in the place of his captivity.* 
As to the men, they wore anything that could be got: a 
quantity of French trousers found at the capture of Madrid, 
in the Retiro fort, were issued to some corps. A more rough 
expedient was that of a colonel with a very ragged regiment 
in the winter of 1813-14, were allowed blankets to be cut 
up by the regimental tailors, to make up into trousers for 
such of the men as were absolutely disreputable in appear- 
ance. The battalion made some sensation when it marched 
into Mont-de-Marsan a few days later.j 

All this did not vex Wellington's soul in the least — from 
Picton's tall beaver hat to the blanket-trousers, he saw and 
disregarded every detail. He himself was the most simply 
dressed man in the army, with his small cocked hat unorna- 
mented save by the English and Portuguese cockades, his 
blue, tight-buttoned frock-coat, and the short cloak with 
cape which has been immortalized by a score of statues and 
pictures. 

I ought, perhaps, to mention that the mnter-clothing 
for the infantry was a grey pepper-and-salt coloured great 
coat, of very thick cloth, with a cape reaching down to 
nearly the elbow, so as to give a double thickness of pro- 
tection to the shoulders. There was also an oilskin cover 
to the felt shako, which could not always be easily adjusted 
to the latter, when it had got distorted in shape from much 
wear. Plate No. 8 gives an illustration of this costume. 

When the Peninsular Army first started on its campaigns, 
the heavy dragoons were the most archaic-looking corps in 
it, for they still wore the broad and heavy cocked hats, 
which had prevailed in all armies during the middle years 
of George III., and jack boots up to the knee. This head- 
gear, which after a single campaign in the tropical rains of 
the Peninsula always became sodden and shapeless, and 
hung down limply towards the shoulders, was fortunately 

* Military Journal of Col. Leslie of Balquhain, p. 229. 
t Memoirs of Captain Cooke, ii. p. 76. 



PLATE VII I. 




Sergeant and Private of Infantry in Winter Marching Order. 

1813. 



Cavalry Uniforms 297 

abolished by a royal warrant of August, 1812, and during 
the following winter many of the heavy dragoon regiments 
received brass helmets of a classical shape, with a crest and 
plume, which, though rather heavy, were an immense 
improvement on their former shapeless hats. At the same 
time they were given instead of jack-boots (which had made 
skirmishing on foot almost impossible) grey cloth overalls, 
Avith a broad red stripe, and short boots. This was the 
dress of the heavies in 1813-14 and during the Waterloo 
campaign. 

The light dragoons had gone to the Peninsula in 1808 
with the black japanned helmet with a bearskin crest 
along its crown, which had been in use since the time 
of the American War. With it they wore blue coats 
mth white froggings, and buckskin breeches with Hessian 
boots. The general effect was handsome, and in use the 
dress was not unpractical. General Foy mentions it with 
approval in his history. The French outposts were much 
puzzled when, at the commencement of the Vittoria cam- 
paign, the English vedettes and outposts appeared in a new 
uniform, which was introduced for light cavalry at the same 
time as the changes made for heavy cavalry just mentioned 
above. It was at first suspected that new regiments had 
been joining from England. The 1813 uniform substituted, 
for the black helmet with fur, a shako with a small upright 
plume, slightly bell-topped in shape, and with ornamental 
cord and tassels. It looks as if it had been suggested by the 
head-dress of the French chasseurs a cheval, and was much 
too like it to please Wellington. At the same time the blue 
jacket barred with white lace was changed for a blue coat, 
with a very broad plastron of the colour of the regimental 
facings in front, extending from collar to waist, and the 
buckskin breeches were replaced by tight-fitting breeches 
of webbing. This was the Waterloo uniform of all Hght 
dragoon regiments. 

The large majority of the British cavalry regiments in 
the Peninsula were light dragoons : for the first three years of 



298 Uniforms and Weapons 

Wellington's command there were only three heavy dragoon 
regiments in the field, and no British hussars. Of the latter, 
a new introduction in the national Army, there was one 
brigade present in 1808 during Sir John Moore's operations,* 
and the same regiments came out in 1813, to see the last 
year of the war.f During the greater part of Wellington's 
campaigns the only hussars present with the army were 
Hanoverians, the very efficient corps belonging to the King's 
German Legion. The fantastic hussar uniform of the 
period, a development from a much simpler Hungarian 
original, is well known. Over a jacket fitting tight to the 
body, was worn the furred and braided pelisse, which was 
usually not completely put on, but flung back, so as to hang 
over the left shoulder. It flapped behind, and was a 
hindrance rather than a covering. On the legs long overalls 
were worn. The head-dress was a very large fur cap, or, as 
it would have been called later, a busby. I flnd very severe 
criticisms on this head-gear. One officer says, " These 
flimsy, muff-like appendages encumber the heads of our 
soldiers. The awkward cap, being constructed partly of 
pasteboard, soaks up a great quantity of wet during the 
violent rains of this country, and so becomes unbearably 
heavy and disagreeable, while it affords no protection to 
the wearer. At all times it can be cut down to his skull 
with the greatest ease." J The cause of its adoption seems 
to have been rather the Prince Regent's eye for splendour 
in military costume than anything else. For strength and 
protection, no less than comfort, the light helmet of the 
early dragoons was universally preferred by critics. Later 
improvements made the busby more solid and less heavy, 
but in 1808 it was evidently a most unsatisfactory head- 
dress. 

Artillery uniform may be described in a few words. 

* 7th, 10th, 15th Hussars. The 18th were still called Light 
Dragoons in 1808. 

t In April, 1813, 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars, the 7th Hussars 
followed in September of the same year. 

X Ker-Porter's Letters from Portugal and Spain, 1808-9, p. 219. 



Artillery Uniforms 299 

That of the horse artillery was a close copy of that of the 
original light dragoon — black japanned helmet with fur 
crest, blue jacket laced with gold (instead of the dragoon's 
silver) and buckskin breeches. Field artillery, on the other 
hand, were clothed almost exactly like infantry of the line, 
save that their coats were blue instead of red. Their tall 
felt shako and tuft, trousers, and coat with white stripes, 
were exactly similar to those of the linesmen. Engineer 
officers wore a dress like that of line officers before the 
shako came in, having a cocked hat down to the end of the 
war, and trousers. The rank and file of that department — 
Royal Military Artificers down to 1812,* Royal Sappers and 
Miners after — had shako and blue coat down to 1813, but 
changed the latter for a red coat, Uke that of the line, in the 
last-named year. It was braided with yellow across the 
front instead of white, the only practical difference in 
appearance. 

Doctors and commissaries down to the end of the war 
were wearing a cocked hat, like that of a general or a staff 
officer. Hence some queer mistakes, when these peaceful 
gentlemen were mistaken for combatant officers, the colour 
of their plume, the one differentiating point, failing to be 
observed in the dusk or in dirty weather. It is said that 
some young commissaries were prone to pass themselves 
off as staff officers on the Spanish and Portuguese peasantry, 
and even on local authorities. A ridiculous anecdote is 
told of Doctor Maurice Quill, the surgeon of the Connaught 
Rangers, who was the best-known humorist in the army.f 
A general, who caught a glimpse of his cocked hat behind a 

* The Royal Military Artificers were wearing in the early years 
of the century a most extraordinary and ugly head-dress, a tall 
top-hat with brim, looking more fit for civilian's wear, and having 
nothing military about it except the " shaving-brush " stuck at one 
side. It was not unlike, however, the hat of the Marines. For 
illustration of it see the plates in Connolly's History of the Royal 
Sappers and Miners, vol. i. 

t There are plenty of stories about him in Grattan's With the 
Connaught Rangers. This one, however, is from Bell's Rough Notes, 
i. 95. 



300 Uniforms and Weapons 

hedge, took him for a staff-officer shirking, and hunted him 
for some time from cover to cover, the doctor meanwhile 
shouting back to him, " I'm off ; seen plenty of fighting for 
one day." It was only when he took refuge with his mules 
and medical panniers, that his irate pursuer discovered that 
he was not a combatant officer. Other wearers of the cocked 
hat were the drum-majors of the line, who are said to have 
had much adulation paid to them by the country-folk, 
because of their enormous gold-laced head-dress and lavish 
display of braiding, which caused them to be taken for 
brigadiers at the least. 

The most distinctive infantry uniform in the whole 
army was that of the rifle battalions, whose sombre colours 
contrasted in the most marked way with the red of the 
British and the bright blue of the Portuguese line. 
The dress of the 5/60th and the two light battalions of 
the K.G.L. differed from that of the three battalions of the 
95th, in that while both wore the dark rifle-green jacket, 
the three German units had grey-blue trousers not unlike 
those of the line, while the latter were in green from head 
to foot. All wore black shakos of a high shape, like those 
of other regiments, and with a green tuft or ball at the 
front. The accoutrements were all black, in order to avoid 
the showing of light or shining points on the body, when the 
men were dispersed in skirmishing. In the head-dress of 
the officers there was a certain variety, the 5/60th and 1st 
Light battalion K.G.L. having a tall shako similar to that 
of their rank and file, while those of the 95th and the 
2nd Light battalion K.G.L. had a peculiar head-dress, 
something like that of an eighteenth-century hussar ; it was 
a tall, narrow cap, much adorned with diagonal twists of 
braid, and destitute of the peak to shade the eyes which 
formed part of the normal shako ; it had a green tuft at 
the front. The 95th officers for some time wore over their 
tight jackets a black furred and braided pelisse, in the 
hussar style — surely a most absurd and inconvenient 
encumbrance for men who were continually scrambling 



"Brown Bess" 301 

through hedges, and working among thick brushwood. 
When thrown back, as it seems generally to have been, it 
must have caught in every possible twig. The officers' 
jackets were distinguished from the plain-breasted coat of 
the rank and file by having a great quantity of narrow 
braiding across the front : they all wore falling " wings," 
instead of epaulettes. The Portuguese cagador uniform, 
save that it was brown and not bottle-green, reproduced 
very closely the cut and form of that of the 5/60 th. 

A word as to armament naturally follows on notes con- 
cerning uniform. The weapon that mainly won the 
Peninsular victories was the " Tower musket " of the line 
battalions, the famous " Brown Bess." It was a heavy 
flint-lock, fitted with a pan, and weighing about nine 
pounds. Its effective range was about 300 yards, but no 
accurate shooting could be relied upon at any range over 
100. Indeed, the man who could hit an individual at that 
distance must not only have been a good shot, but have 
possessed a firelock of over average quality. Compared 
with the rifle, already a weapon of precision, it was but a 
haphazard sort of arm. At any distance over the 100 
yards the firing-line relied upon the general effect of the 
volley that it gave, rather than on the shooting of each man. 
Nevertheless, the British musket was decidedly a stronger, 
better made and more accurate weapon than that used by 
Continental armies, and was much preferred by our Spanish 
and Portuguese allies to those of their own manufacture. 
Its calibre was sixteen, its missile was a round leaden bullet 
(a little heavier than the French ball, whose weight was 
twenty to the pound), and made up with a stout paper 
cartridge, of which each man normally carried sixty. In 
order to secure certain ignition by the snapping of the fiint, 
the butt-end of the cartridge had to be torn open by the 
teeth, before it was placed in the musket barrel, and a splash 
of powder had to be thrown into the pan to catch the 
spark and communicate it to the cartridge. The latter 



302 Uniforms and Weapons 

was driven down the barrel by an iron ramrod. Raw 
recruits in a moment of excitement, firing too fast, are said 
not infrequently to have forgotten to withdraw the ramrod 
after loading, and to have shot it away — which left them 
helpless. 

The greatest hindrance to good musketry was wet. 
Long-continued rain might penetrate the cartouch box, and 
damp all the powder, so that every cartridge missed fire. But 
even a sudden heavy squall might drench the particular 
cartridge that was being handled, and make its torn-open 
end incapable of ignition. Or it might wash the priming- 
powder out of the pan, or damp it into a paste, so that it 
could not catch fire. In either case, infantry fighting in a 
rainstorm could not count on any certain fire-effect ; not 
one shot in four might go off, and troops surprised in open 
order by cavalry would be very helpless. Their only 
chance of salvation would be to form square and trust to 
the defensive power of the bayonet. The latter weapon 
was long, triangular, and rather heavy ; its weight did not 
make accurate shooting easier, when it was fixed. 

There was a somewhat lighter and more carefully made 
weapon for light infantry battalions, called the light infantry 
musket ; except that its sights were more accurately seen 
to, and that its length was slightly less, I cannot find that 
it greatly differed from the normal Tower musket. The 
same may be said of the fusil, which was an older type of 
light musket, which had originally given its name to all 
fusiliers. The last time that it occurs in use, was when it 
was given during the latter years of the war to the experi- 
mental home battalions, into which boys under seventeen 
were drafted. To suit their short stature and younger 
muscles, fusils instead of full-sized muskets were served out 
to them. 

Quite different from all muskets were the rifles served 
out to the 5/60th, the 95th, and the Light BattaHons of the 
K.G.L. The pattern was called the Baker rifle, from 
its inventor. It was a short weapon with a barrel two and a 



The Baker Rifle 303 

half feet long, furnished with seven grooves within, which 
made a quarter-turn in the length of the barrel. Its calibre 
was a twenty bore, and it was stiff to load. An interesting 
letter from one of the majors of the 5 /60th to the assistant 
adjutant-general at Cork, written just before the battalion 
sailed for Portugal, makes a demand for 450 small mallets, 
for the purpose of forcing the bullet down the barrel. 
" They should be made of hard wood, with a handle about 
six inches long, pierced with a hole at the extremity for 
fastening a string to it." Major Davy adds that " the 
instrument is absolutely necessary," and a mallet for every 
two men should be furnished.* These tools, however, were 
in use only for a few months, were found not indispensable, 
and were finally withdrawn. But to ram the ball home was 
always a hard job, owing to the grooves. The rifleman 
carried no bayonet, his second weapon being a very short 
and curved sword, more useful for wood-chopping than 
anything else. 

Sergeants were not yet armed like the rank and file, 
except in the rifle battalions, where they carried the normal 
weapon of the " Baker " type. In the Guards and line 
alike they had a seven-foot spear with a cross-piece below 
the head, to prevent over-penetration after a thrust. f The 
names of pike and halberd were used for it indifferently, 
though the former was the more correct, the original 
halberd having been a cut-and-thrust weapon with an 
edge as weU as a point. In addition, the sergeant carried 
a brass-hilted sword at his left side. I have never found 
any mention of its being used, the halberd being always the 
preferred weapon — though in action a sergeant often picked 
up a dead man's musket, and joined in the firing. :]: But, 

♦ See the letter in General Rigaud's History of the 5/QOth. 

t See illustration in Plate 8 of a sergeant and private in winter 
marching order. 

X There is a curious anecdote in the diary (p. 28) of Cooper of 
the l/7th, of a sergeant, who, running with the point of his pike low, 
caught it in the ground, and fell forward on its butt-end, which 
went right through his body. 



304 Uniforms and Weapons 

en revanche, I have found a confession by a newly made 
sergeant of his having caught it between his legs, and had a 
nasty fall, on his first appearance with the three stripes. 
The weapon was shghtly curved, and meant for cutting 
rather than thrusting. 

On the other hand, the infantry officer's sword was quite 
straight and rather light, a thrusting weapon essentially. 
There are many complaints that it was too slight for its 
work — e.g. it had no chance against a French cavalry 
sword, which would always batter it down, when the two 
clashed in stroke and parry. I have found it called a 
" toasting-fork," and other insulting names. Many officers 
provided themselves with foreign weapons of a heavier 
make, and better adapted for cutting ; no objection was 
made to this departure from the regulations. Mounted and 
staff ofiicers carried a different sword — a curved broad- 
bladed sabre, of the type of that used by light cavalry. 
Rifle officers also used a curved sabre, of a rather short 
make, and not the straight infantry sword. 

Heavy cavalry used the broad-sword with steel hilt and 
guard, straight and very heavy. It could be used for the 
thrust as well as for the cut, but it would seem that the 
British dragoons (unlike the French cuirassiers) always 
preferred the edge to the point. The sabre of the light 
dragoon and the hussar was a markedly curved weapon, 
very broad in the blade, and only suitable for the stroke, 
though very occasionally we hear of a thrust being made.* 
From the enormous proportion of wounded to killed in 
engagements where the French and Enghsh light cavalry 
met, it is clear that the sabres of both sides were better suited 
to maim than to slay. The thrusting sword of the cuirassiers 
had a much more terrible reputation. 

The rank and file of the Royal Sappers and Miners 
carried muskets and bayonets like infantry of the line, and 

* E.g. there is a Waterloo story of a sergeant of the 18th 
Hussars, who long engaged with a cuirassier, and unable to get at 
him because of his armour and helm, ultimately killed him with a 
thrust in the mouth. I should not like to take it as certain. 



Regimental Colours 305 

their sergeants the regulation halberd. Horse artillery 
gunners had sabres of the light dragoon type; but field 
artillery only very short curved swords, like those of the 
rifle regiments. The drivers, who were organized as a 
separate corps, had no weapons at all, in order that their 
attention might not be distracted from their horses. This 
seems to have been a very doubtful expedient, leaving them 
absolutely helpless if attacked by hostile cavalry. It may 
have originated from the fact that the driver, far into the 
eighteenth century, had not been a soldier at all, but a 
" waggoner," a civilian without uniform or arms. It was 
only in 1794 that the corps of Artillery Drivers was formed 
upon this rather unpromising basis. 

This is probably the place in which mention should be 
made of the standards under which the army fought.* 
Cavalry banners or guidons had just gone out — if used at 
all in the Peninsular War, it was only in its first year. 
Reports from the later years show that all regiments had 
left them either at their depot in England, or in some cases 
at Lisbon. But infantry regiments, with few exceptions, 
took their flags into the field, as was the custom with their 
successors down to the last generation. It was only in the 
1880's that they finally ceased to be displayed on active 
service. The Rifles, always destined to fight in extended 
order, never had colours, and the regimental annals of 
some Light Infantry corps (the 68th and 71st) show that 
for similar reasons they had left their standards behind in 
England. But this was not the case with all Light Infantry : 
the famous 43rd and 52nd carried them all through the war. 
Of the two battaHon colours the one or " King's Colour " 
was a large Union Jack, with the regiment's number on a 
shield or medalHon, often encompassed with a wreath, and 
sometimes also with the badge of the corps, when such 
existed. The second or Regimental colour was of the same 
hue as the facings of the corps, and only had a small Union 

* For ample details about them see Mr. Milne's Standards and 
Colours of the Army, Leeds, 1893. 

X 



306 Uniforms and Weapons 

Jack in its upper left corner, next the pole. On the plain 
silk of the main surface of the flag were disposed the number 
of the regiment, often in a wreath, and its badges and 
battle-honours, where such existed. Since facings had 
many hues, the main effect of the two flags was very 
different, the large Union Jack of the King's Colour being 
contrasted with the yellow, green, crimson, or white, etc., 
of the Regimental Colour. 

The colours were borne in battle by the two junior 
ensigns of the battalion, who had assigned to them for 
protection several colour-sergeants. It was the duty of 
these non-commissioned officers to take charge of the flag 
if the proper bearer were slain or hurt, and in many battles 
both colours came out of action in sergeants' hands. The 
post of colour-sergeant was honourable but dangerous, for 
the enemy's fire always beat hardest about the standards 
in the centre of the battalion line. Sergeant Lawrence of 
the 40th notes, in his simple diary, that at Waterloo he was 
ordered to the colours late in the day, because both the 
ensigns and all the colour-sergeants had been hit. ' ' Though 
used to warfare as any one, this was a job I did not fike. 
There had been before me that day fourteen sergeants 
already killed or wounded around them, and both staff and 
colours were almost cut to pieces." * This was, of course, 
very exceptional carnage ; but the posts of junior ensign and 
colour-sergeant were always exceptionally dangerous. 

* Autobiography of Sergt. Lawrence, p. 239. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE COMMISSARIAT 

As I have already had occasion to remark, when deaUng 
with the central organization of the Peninsular Army, 
of all the departments which had their representatives 
at Head Quarters that which was under the charge of the 
Commissary-General was the most important.* It is not 
too much to say that, when the long struggle began, the 
whole future of the war depended on whether the hastily 
organized and inexperienced Commissariat Department 
could enable Wellington to keep his army concentrated, 
and to move it freely in any direction. 

Spain and Portugal are countries where large armies 
cannot be supphed from local resources, except in a few 
favoured districts. Any attempt to live on requisitions was 
bound to fail in the end, as the French reahzed to their 
sorrow, after a long series of endeavours to subsist on the 
countryside in the Peninsula, as they were wont to do in 
Italy or Germany. WeUington from the first forbade it, 
and resolved that the main dependence of the troops must 
be on regular stores brought up from the base of operations. 
Requisitions were only a subsidiary resource ; they could 
only be made by an authorized commissary, and must be 
paid for at once. It was his misfortune that specie was often 
not forthcoming, and the payments had to bo made by 
Treasury orders or other paper, which the peasants who 
received them found hard to negotiate. But payment in 
some form was always made. 

* See above, p. 161. 



308 The Commissariat 

At the best, requisitions were only a secondary aid, and 
the army relied for the staple of its provisions on the stores 
which the Commissary-General had to bring up from Lisbon 
or other bases. This was a hard task for him, when it is 
remembered that the cross roads of the Peninsula were 
mule-tracks, on which heavy wheeled traffic could not pass ; 
and that the army was often operating at a distance of 
150 or 200 miles from its depots. Moreover, in 1809, ^' 
the staff of the Commissariat had all their work to leam-r- 
no British army for many years had been operating in 
heavy force, and for many months on end, in a thinly- 
peopled continental theatre of war. The difficulty of 
bringing up the daily food of the troops seemed at first 
almost insuperable. At the end of the Talavera campaign 
the men were well-nigh famished, simply because the 
attempt had been made to depend more than was possible 
on local resources, to the neglect of convoys from the base. 
After this experience WelUngton resolved that he must 
live on his own stores, and this principle was remembered 
throughout the war. Hence the work which fell on the 
commissariat, in collecting and forwarding food from the 
base, was appalUng. Most of it had to be conveyed by 
brigades of pack-mules with native drivers, who were hard 
to manage and prone to desert. The rest came up on country 
carts — ox- waggons for the most part. That mistakes and 
delays occurred, that a brigade or a division was occasionally 
foodless for several days, and forced to halt in the middle 
of a critical operation, is not wonderful. But on the whole 
after much toil and trouble the Commissariat succeeded in 
doing its duty, and the length of time for which the British 
army could keep concentrated was the envy of the French, y 
who, living on the country, were forced to disperse when- 
ever they had exhausted the resources of the particular 
region in which they were massed. 

All through the years 1811-12 the central fact in the 
Peninsula was that if the French armies of Portugal and 
the North concentrated at Salamanca and Rodrigo, or 



All-Importance of Convoys 309 

if (on the other hand) those of Portugal and Andalusia 
Joined on the Guadiana, in the region of Badajoz and 
Merida, the Anglo -Portuguese were too weak to face the 
combination. Wellington had to abandon the ojffensive, 
and to seek refuge behind the Portuguese frontier. But 
when he did so, as in June, 1811, and again in September 
of the same year, he knew that the overwhelming force 
in front of him could not hold itself together for more than 
a very short period of days. Troops brought from enormous 
distances, and destitute of any adequate magazines or 
transport, could not live on the countryside for more than 
a limited period. They were forced to disperse, in order 
to feed, and so the threatening conjunction passed, and, 
when the enemy had drawn apart, the allied army could 
once more abandon the defensive, and take some positive 
project in hand. The same was the case in the late autumn 
of 1812, during the retreat from Burgos. Wellington on this 
occasion had on his hands the largest combination of French 
troops that he ever faced — the four armies of Portugal, 
the North, the Centre, and Andalusia were all pressing in 
upon him. It would have been hopeless to fight, and so 
retreat was persevered in, so long as the enemy continued 
to advance. But Wellington knew that the progress of 
the 100,000 men now pursuing him must inevitably come 
to an end, for in their rapid course they could bring no 
stores with them, and in the war-worn country between 
Salamanca and Rodrigo they could obtain nothing. Where 
his own troops, though returning toward their base and 
their depots, were hard put to it for food, the French must 
be suffering even more. Wherefore he retreated, waiting 
for the inevitable moment when the pursuit could be no 
longer urged. It mattered little whether it stopped at 
Salamanca, or a march or so beyond (as actually happened), 
or whether it might get a Httle further, as far as the Portu- 
guese frontier. It was certain, within a period of days^ 
that it must break down. Meanwhile he himself was re- 
treating on to his stores, and could depend upon them : 



310 The Commissariat 

after Rodrigo the men were getting their full rations once 
more. 

The duties of the Commissariat may be divided into 
three sections — the first was the accumulation of great 
masses of sea-borne stores at the regular bases, the second 
w^as the distribution of those stores to the troops at the 
front by an immense system of convoys ; the third and 
subsidiary task was the supplementing of these base-stores, 
by getting in what could be procured in the country-side, 
where the army was operating ; for, of course, evevyfanega 
or arroba of food-stuff that could be obtained at the front 
was helpful. It had not to be carried far, it saved convoy 
work, and it kept the magazines at the base from depletion. 
Yet, as has been already remarked, what was got in the 
countryside was always considered as the secondary source 
of supply ; the main reliance was on the food-ships, which 
poured into the base-depot of Lisbon corn sought in 
the ends of the earth, not only in such limited parts of 
Europe as could be drawn upon in the days of the 
Continental System, but in Morocco, Turkey in Asia, and 
America. 

The maintenance of the Peninsular War entirely de- 
pended on the naval predominance of Great Britain in all 
seas ; if the army of Wellington had not been able to draw 
freely on distant resources, his position would have been 
little better than that of his French enemies. Hence it 
was that, in one sense, the greatest danger that he ever 
incurred was the American War of 1812-14, w^hich turned 
loose upon his line of communications, in the North Atlantic, 
many scores of active and enterprising privateers, who 
did considerable damage among British shipping, and for 
the first time since the war began made the high seas 
insecure. But fortunately the commencement of the 
American War exactly synchronized with the beginnings 
of Napoleon's downfall, and the struggle in Europe took 
a favourable turn just as the peril on the ocean came into 
being. If the American War had broken out in 1809 or 



Water Transport 311 

1810, its significance would have been of much higher 
importance. 

The normal condition of commissariat affairs, during 
the first four years of the war, was that there were daily 
arriving in Lisbon supplies of all sorts, not only food but 
clothing, munitions, and weapons of war, which had to 
be got forward to the army as quickly as possible. In 
the winter of 1810-11, when the whole of Wellington's 
host lay concentrated behind (or later in advance of) the 
Lines of Torres Vedras, the problem was comparatively 
simple, as the troops were close to the magazines. But 
during the remainder of the years 1811-12 the British divi- 
sions were lying out at a long distance from their base — 
by Guarda, Celorico, or Almeida, or at other times near 
Merida, Campo Mayor, and Portalegre. In 1812, when 
Welhngton moved forward as far as Madrid and Burgos, 
the etajpes between the base-depot and the field army 
were even greater. 

The Commissary-General's duty was to see that convoys 
went regularly to the front, so that the army should never 
be in want. This was a hard business, since most of the 
transfer had to be made on mule-back, and the rest on ox- 
carts of primitive construction and small capacity. Water- 
carriage, which would have been comparatively easy, 
could only be utilized on a limited scale ; the Tagus was 
generally navigable to Abrantes, and when the main army 
lay in Estremadura this was a great help, since stores could 
be sent up in barges and country boats with much greater 
ease than by road. When unloaded at Abrantes, they 
had a comparatively short way to travel by mule or ox- 
cart to Elvas or Portalegre. But usually only Hill's two 
divisions were on the Estremadura frontier, and Wellington 
with the main force was somewhere on the Beira frontier, 
in the direction of Guarda, Sabugal, and the Coa. These 
regions are 150 miles or more from Lisbon, and the roads 
beyond Coimbra on the one side and Abrantes on the 
other were rugged and badly kept. It was a trying business 



312 The Commissariat 

to secure the constant and regular forwarding of the neces- 
sary convoys, and the return of beasts and men to the 
base, when they had discharged their loads at the front. 
A very slight assistance was got by using the river Douro 
as a secondary line of water carriage — but it was only navi- 
gable to Peso da Regoa near Lamego, which was so far 
from the Spanish frontier and the normal haunts of the 
army, that little was gained by sending stores to Oporto 
as a secondary base-depot. In 1811 the only large con- 
signments forwarded on that line were the heavy guns 
and ammunition, which were to form the siege-train that 
Dickson was organizing at Villa da Ponte,* which is com- 
paratively close to Lamego, though the roads between 
them were very bad. In 1812 Wellington's engineers, by 
patient blasting and dredging in the bed of the Douro, 
made it navigable as far as Castro de Alva, which is forty 
miles up-stream from Peso da Regoa, and lies not very 
remote from Almeida. After this the Douro became much 
more useful as a line of supply, and it was largely used for 
the forwarding of stores before the opening of the campaign 
of 1813. But, just as it had become available on a better 
scale, Wellington started the great march to Vittoria, 
whose success took him away for ever from Portugal. 
During the last year of the war he suddenly shifted his 
base, and made Santander and Passages his base-ports, 
so that the improvements in the navigation of the Douro 
was of no further utility. 

A great part of the Commissary-General's staff was kept 
at Lisbon, with a smaller sub-department at Oporto, 
receiving from the ships, unloading, and repacking the 
immense stores that came to hand. Every few days a 
convoy started for the front, under the charge of a deputy- 
assistant-commissary, a commissariat-clerk, or some such 
subordinate. It would usually consist of a large drove of 
hired mules, worked by their owners, who generally acted to- 
gether in gangs or parties, of which a capataz or head-driver, 
* See p. 283* 



The Mule-Train 313 

chosen by his comrades, was the chief, and did the bar- 
gaining with the commissariat authorities. The convoy 
would probably consist of the gangs of five or six capatazes, 
and would number many scores of beasts. The com- 
missariat official in charge had no easy task to make the 
muleteers get over a reasonable daily stretch of road, and 
to see that they did not steal from the stores, or (what was 
not unknown when there was a quarrel) desert with their 
beasts. When the convoy got near the front, it would 
have to be provided with an escort — generally convalescents 
returning to their battalions, or drafts newly arrived from 
England. But the escorts were not an unmixed blessing — 
they were terribly prone to picking and stealing from the 
stores, with or without the connivance of the muleteers. 
There was nearly always trouble when a small escort, 
without an officer to keep his men in hand, got associated 
with a mule train. Brawls were frequent between soldiers 
and muleteers, and the assistant-commissary in charge 
could not get the escort to obey him : sergeants looked 
upon him as a mere civilian in a cocked hat, who might be 
contemned. Nor was the task of such an unfortunate 
official rendered more easy by the fact that, owing to sheer 
want of hard cash, his muleteers were usually in long arrears 
of their stipulated hire. They naturally grumbled, but on 
the whole stuck to their service far more faithfully than 
might have been expected ; there were times when the 
whole body of them were many months unpaid, yet only 
a small proportion disappeared. Probably the fact that 
they escaped the conscription by being registered as autho- 
rized followers of the British Army had something to do with 
their long-suffering : probably also real patriotism had some 
share, for they all loyally hated the French, and were prone 
to cut the throats of their wounded, if left unshepherded 
near a recent battlefield. 

Wheeled transport was much less satisfactory than the 
mule trains for continuous movement. The British waggons 
sent out to the Peninsula turned out to be quite useless 



314 The Commissaeiat 

for Portuguese by-roads. Wellington finally gave up all 
idea of relying on them for load-carrying, and mainly 
employed them for his sick and wounded. A few of the 
" spring waggons " (as they were called to distinguish them 
from the springless Portuguese vehicles) * were attached 
to each brigade for the carriage of invalids, and the " Poyal 
Waggon Train " in the later years of the war seem to have 
been almost treated as an ambulance corps. Certainly 
the army would have been in evil case, if it had been forced 
to rely on them for the moving of its food. 

Such stores as did move upon wheels, and not upon 
mule-back, were carried on Portuguese ox-waggons, to 
which Wellington was compelled to have recourse for want 
of better vehicles. These were very primitive structures 
— the sides of wicker work, the wheels made of solid circles 
of wood bounded with iron, turning axle and all, which made 
their grinding noise almost intolerable. The excruciating 
thrills caused to the ear by a train of such carts are mentioned 
with disgust by nearly every Peninsular diarist, on his first 
introduction to life at the front. The only advantages 
of ox-waggons were that they were light, easy to repair, 
and specially built for the bad roads of the country : more- 
over, every peasant knew how to drive them, or to mend 
them at a pinch. Their weak points were that they were 
intolerably slow — two miles an hour was a full allowance — 
and that they were too small to carry much. However, 
they had to serve for want of better vehicles — and the 
army could not have lived without their service. An 
immense amount of them were employed, some on regular 
and long terms of hire, as part of the permanent transport 
of the army, others in a more temporary way, by requisition 
from the district. These last were always difficult to 
manage ; professional muleteers would not object to travel, 
but impressed peasants loathed quitting their own district, 
fearing that they might be taken far afield — perhaps into 
Spain — before they were released. They were always 
* Cf. p. 266 above. 



Desertion of Drivers 315 

trying to abscond with their precious bullocks, abandoning 
the comparatively worthless cart and its stores. A picture 
of the sort may be taken from Hennegan's lively narrative 
of a march in 1809, when he had to take an unwiUing 
train of " embargoed " waggoners across the mountains of 
Northern Beira. 

" Leaning on their oxen at nightfall, they contemplated 
in mute dismay on one side the gigantic hill which they 
had just descended, on the other the roaring torrent of the 
Douro, which in its impetuous course seemed to threaten 
with destruction the temerity that would brave its power. 
The Santa Marias of some were answered by the more 
emphatic carajos ! of others, but even these died away 
before the necessities of the moment, and unyoking the 
oxen, to afford them the shelter of trees, the drivers spread 
their large cloaks in the empty sheds, and soon in sleep 
seemed to forget their disappointment. The poor men, 
taken from their homes for our service, risked in the loss 
of their oxen the only means of support for themselves and 
families. 

" The following morning, however, presented a curious 
scene. There stood the wains, securely packed, but looking 
as if the earth had brought them forth, for no vestige 
remained of the means by which they had been brought 
to this lonely spot. The rumour of the proximity of the 
French had determined these Portuguese on sacrificing the 
wains, if only they could ensure the preservation of them- 
selves and oxen. What was now to be done ? " * 

As a matter of fact, the non-plussed guardian of the 
deserted convoy had to remain motionless for many days, 
risking the possible arrival of the French, till at last he 
procured boats on the Douro, and shipped his charge 
down to Oporto. Hennegan's peasants got away with their 
bullocks — he and his escort were evidently sleepy and un- 
suspecting : but often a good watch was kept on the teams, 
and sentries placed over them. In such cases, if the weather 
* Hennegan's Seven Years* Campaigning, i. p. 52. 



316 The Commissariat 

was bad, or the French too near, the drivers would often 
sacrifice even their loved beasts, and simply abscond 
themselves, abandoning their means of livelihood. 

It says much for the general zeal of the Commissariat 
Department that, even with such difficulties about them, 
they usually succeeded in keeping the army supplied with 
food. Occasionally there were desperate pinches of starva- 
tion, when the army had out-marched its convoys— this, 
for example, happened on the Alva in March, 1811, when 
half of the army, in pursuit of Massena, had to stop dead 
for several days, because their rapid advance had left the 
slow-moving mule-trains several marches behind. To press 
the French would have been most profitable — but if the 
troops had gone on, through the depopulated land before 
them, they must have perished of sheer want of food, and 
Wellington reluctantly halted till the convoys began to 
creep up to the front. Another period of empty stomachs 
was seen during the retreat from Burgos, from* the opposite 
cause ; forced to give back, Wellington started his train 
betimes for Ciudad Rodrigo, to get it out of the proximity 
of the oncoming enemy. Hence the rear divisions, who 
had to contain the pursuers and to move slowly, found, 
when they had eaten what was in their haversacks, that 
the convoys were all several marches ahead of them. They 
suffered terribly, and existed for two days mainly on acorns 
gleaned from the oak forests through which they were 
marching. But mischances of this kind were hardly to 
be considered the fault of the Commissariat. 

As I have already had to remark, the duty of the officers 
of this department did not merely consist in bringing up 
and distributing food forwarded from the base depots. 
They had also, as a subsidiary resource, to get what they 
could out of the countryside. A good assistant-com- 
missary was always' casting about, through the villages 
on either side of the route of the brigade to which he was 
attached, to find cattle and corn that could be bought. 
He was forced to pay for them, since Wellington strictly 



The Resources of the Country 317 

forbade requisition without value given. When the com- 
missary had dollars the matter was not so difficult, for the 
peasants were generally ready to sell. But when, as often 
happened, the miUtary chest was empty, and payment 
could only be made in vales — paper promises to pay — the 
inhabitants soon got wind of the fact, hid their com, and 
drove their oxen up into the hills. The good commissary 
was the man, who, under such circumstances could dis- 
cover and get possession of the concealed resources of the 
land. But even if there was money in hand, a good deal 
of tact was required in dealing with the natives, and it was 
not every one who would make the most of his store of 
cash or paper for the benefit of his brigade. How the 
ingenious man worked may be gathered from a note of 
Commissary Dallas, dealing with a march through Northern 
Andalusia in 1812.* 

'' Having made careful inquiries as to the properties 
and farms which lay at some distance to right or left of 
the road, our plan was to seek them, not saying a word 
of our object, but simply asking hospitality. I do not 
remember that this was ever refused, though sometimes 
we failed to gain anything. We usually began with talking 
of the horrors of the French, of which Andres had many 
terrible chapters to relate. This led to expressions of grief 
as to the ravages that the enemy had made : by degrees 
we introduced a word of rejoicing that some people had so 
well known how to hide their property from such rapacious 
robbers. It often happened that at the word esconder, to hide, 
there were indications on the countenances of some of the 
party which led to further inquiries. On many occasions 
we drew out hints from various members of the community 
which enabled us to jump to conclusions, which surprised 
other members, as to the concealment of stores of wheat, 
barley, Indian corn, etc. The difficulty was to obtain 
access to the supplies, when we had become aware of their 

* Dallas was taking care of the brigade of Skerrett, then march- 
ing (Oct., 1812) from Seville to Ai-anjuez, right across Central Spain. 



318 The Commissariat 

existence ; but I had power to give a good price, and was 
armed with plenary authority of Spanish officials to say 
that my drafts would be honoured in due course. 

" An incident or two will illustrate the manner in which 
we got supplies. At one distant solitary house of poor ap- 
pearance Andres discovered that, while everything looked 
poverty-stricken about the place, there was somewhere in 
a thick wood a barn which contained concealed stores. 
I told the mistress of the house of the very high price that 
I would give for wheat, Indian corn, or forage. In the 
grey October dawn I was awoke by her husband, who told 
me he could supply what I wanted, if I would give a certain 
price, which he named. I said that I must see the suppUes 
before I gave money. He bade me rise, and he would 
show me. He led me two miles to a thick wood, in which 
was a deep ravine ; here he brought me safely to a receptacle 
of much hidden store, which I took at his own price, and 
gave him the proper document. In one part of the Sierra 
Morena we heard of a considerable flock of sheep secreted 
in the depth of a forest. I obtained the permission of the 
owner to possess them for a certain price */ / could get them, 
for he himself could not point out the spot where they 
were to be found. After gathering what information I 
could, I set forth in the hope of finding them, and did so by 
following a track of sheep till I arrived in the middle of 
the flock. I told the two shepherds that I had purchased 
them — they were doubtful and one very refractory. But 
at last one of them drove the sheep to the open plain outside 
the forest, and then disappeared among the trees with his 
dog, leaving me to drive the flock as I could. It was no 
easy task — but I got them into an enclosure a considerable 
way off." * 

If these were the experiences of a Commissariat official 
who had been three years in Spain, and knew the language 
well, it is easy to guess how inefficient a newly landed clerk 

* Autobiography of the Rev. Alexander Dallas, London, 1871, 
pp. 59, 60. 



The Unpopular Commissaey 319 

or assistant must have been, when he was sent to sweep 
the countryside for what he could discover. It was a 
thankless task — often the seeker came back empty, to be 
frowned upon by his departmental chief and the brigadier. 
When he did discover food, it was taken for granted, and 
he was little thanked. The fighting men seem to have 
had a general prejudice against their providers — they were 
accused of being timid, arrogant, and selfish, and the 
embezzlements of certain black sheep were made to cover a 
general charge of dishonesty against the whole tribe, which 
was far from being justified. Misfeasance there certainly 
was, when an unscrupulous commissary credited a peasant 
with more fanegas than he had received, and divided the 
balance of cash with the seller. But on the whole the 
work was well done, despite of the many complaints of the 
military — ^from Wellington himself downwards. That the 
Peninsular War was successfully maintained in 1810-11-12 
was surely, at bottom, the work of the much-maligned 
commissaries, and the motley band of ill-paid and sometimes 
ruffianly muleteers and waggoners, who, through a thousand 
difiiculties,* generally got the biscuit and the rum-barrels, 
the droves of bullocks, and the packs of clothing and shoes, 
to their appointed destination. 

* For the maddening delays, caused by the impossibility of 
finding a mule-train ready to go back to the front, a good example 
may be found in the autobiography of Quartermaster Surtees of 
the 95th, stranded at Abrantes for unending weeks in the late 
autumn of 1812 with the new clothing of his battalion, which (as 
he knew) was suffering bitterly for want of it. 



CHAPTER XX. 

A NOTE ON THINGS SPIRTTUAL. 

In the first chapter of this volume I had occasion to remark 
that WeUington's army had in its ranks a considerable 
sprinkHng of men of religion, and that three or four of 
the better Peninsular memoirs were written by them. 
Some were Methodists, some Churchmen, so that both 
sides of the great spiritual movement which had started 
about the middle of the eighteenth century were represented 
in their diaries. The spiritual side of the soldier's life 
during the great war has had so little written about it, 
that a few illustrative pages on this topic must not be 
omitted. 

We may trace the existence of the admirable class of 
men who have left us these memoirs to two separate 
causes. The one, of course, was the way in which the 
movement started by the Wesleys had influenced all 
ranks of life, from the lowest upward. Its effects had 
not been confined to avowed Methodists, but had led to 
the rise of the Evangelical party within the Church of 
England, which was developing very rapidly all through 
the days of the Great War. But I think that even if the 
Wesleys had never lived, there would yet have been a 
strong reaction in favour of godly living and the open 
profession of Christianity, in consequence of the blas- 
phemous antics of the French Revolution. Nothing in 
that movement so disgusted Englishmen (even those of 
them who were not much given to practical religion) as the 
story of the " Goddess of Reason," enthroned on the high- 
altar of Notre Dame, at the time when an orgy of bloodshed 



Effects of the French Eevolution 321 

was making odious the flatulent talk about humanitarianism 
and liberty which was the staple of Revolutionary oratory. 
The peculiar combination of insult to Christianity, open 
evil living, and wholesale judicial murder, which distin- 
guished the time of the Terror, had an effect on observers 
comparable to nothing else that has been seen in modern 
times. Even men who had not hitherto taken their 
religion very seriously, began to think that a hell was 
logically necessary in the scheme of creation for beings 
like Chaumette or Hebert, Fouquier Tinville or Carrier of 
the Noyades. And, we may add, a personal devil was 
surely required, to account for the promptings of insane 
wickedness which led to the actions of such people. A 
tightening up of religious observances, such as the use of 
family prayer and regular attendance at Church, was a 
marked feature of the time. It required some time for 
the movement to spread, but its effect was soon observable. 
It naturally took shape in adhesion to Evangelical societies 
within the Church of England, or Methodist societies 
without it ; since these were the already existing nuclei 
round which those whose souls had been stirred by the 
horrors in France and the imminent peril of Great Britain 
would group themselves. 

Very soon the day was over in which " enthusiasm " 
was the dread of all normal easy-going men. Something 
more than the eighteenth century religious sentimentalism, 
and vague spiritual philosophy, was needed for a nation 
which had to fight for life and empire against the French 
Republic and all its works. Those methods of thought 
were sufficiently discredited by the fact that there was a 
touch of Rousseau in them : it was easy to look over the 
Channel, and see to what a belief in some nebulous Supreme 
Being, and in the perfectibility and essential righteousness 
of mankind at large, might lead. The God of the Old 
Testament was a much more satisfactory object of worship 
to the men who had to face the Jacobin, and Calvinism 
has always proved a good fighting creed. If ever there 



322 Spiritual Life 

was a justification for a belief that the enemy were in a 
condition of complete reprobation, and that to smite 
them was the duty of every Christian man, it was surely 
at this time. The conviction of the universahty of sin 
and the natural wickedness of the human heart was the 
exact opposite and antidote to the optimistic philosophy 
of the eighteenth century, and to its belief that man is 
essentially a benevolent being, and that if he sometimes 
breaks out into deplorable violence " tout comprendre est 
tout pardonner.'' As a working hypothesis for an enemy 
of the French Revolution the Calvinistic theory had 
everything in its favour. 

The army, like English society in general, contained an 
appreciable proportion of those whom the stress and terror 
of the times had made anxious about their souls. Some 
took their religious experience quietly, and found sufficient 
edification in accepted forms. Many, however, filled with 
a fervent belief in original sin and in the blackness of their 
own hearts, only got comfort by " conversion " in the pre- 
valent form of the day, and in subsequent reliance on 
complete Justification by Faith. 

"Conversion" was frequently a matter of dire spiritual 
agony and wrestling, often accompanied by fits of horrible 
depression, which were generally fought down, but some- 
times ended in religious mania. Sergeant Donaldson of the 
94th, whom I have often had to quote in other chapters, 
tells a terrible tale from his own regiment of a man whose 
weak point had been a violent temper, and a tendency to 
use his fists. Being under strong religious emotion, and 
having determined never again to offend in this way, he 
had the misfortune to break out once more in unjustifiable 
blows, administered to his peasant landlord in the village 
of Ustaritz. Ashamed of his backsliding he fell into a 
fit of despair, and brooding over the text " if thy right hand 
offend thee, cut it off," he resolved that this was the only 
cure for his irascibility. Whereupon he went, and without 
any display of emotion or eccentricity, very quietly 



The Agonies of Conversion 323 

borrowed a felling-axe from one of the regimental pioneers, 
placed his right hand upon a window-sill, and cut it oS 
with a single blow deUvered very dexterously with his 
left. He then went and reported his act and its reason to 
the regimental surgeon, with great calmness and lucidity.* 
Such incidents as this were rare among those who were 
undergoing the process of Conversion, but it was generally 
accompanied by long spasms of conviction of sin, when, 
as one memoir- writer records, " all the crimes of his life 
passed before him in black array, when he felt that if he 
could but bury himself in a cave or den of the earth, and 
forego all intercourse with mankind, it would be to purchase 
pardon and peace easily and cheaply. . . . Life was but 
the dreadful expectation of that fatal hour when the 
fiend would be commissioned to seize and carry off the 
guilty soul to its abode of everlasting misery." t Another 
diarist records that, as he went down toward the great 
breach of Badajoz, he was repeating to himself very forcibly, 
" You will be in hell before daylight " all the time, till he 
received a disabling wound. This rifleman, when he 
experienced conversion, received therewith an unexpected 
gift of metrical exposition. His autobiography is curiously 
sprinkled with his impromptu verses such as — 

" Then why let our minds be encumbered 
'Bout what such poor worms may befall. 
When the hairs of our head are all numbered 
By Him who reigns King over all ? " 



And again — 



' I shall go where duty calls me. 
Patient bearing what befalls me, 
Jesus Christ will bring me through ! 
Bullets, cannon balls or death 
Cannot hurt ' the better part,' 
So I'll list to what He saith 
Till He bids me home depart." | 



* See Donaldson's Eventful Life of a Soldier, pp. 219, 220. 
t Surtees's Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade^ pp. 1 73, 1 75. 
X From Travels and Adventures of Bugler William Green, late of 
the Rifle Brigade, Coventry, 1857 — a most interesting little book. 



324 Spiritual Life 

This ecstatic conMence of the converted man is very 
clearly expressed in many a little book. A Guards' sergeant, 
whose memoirs I have had occasion to quote in earHer 
chapters, mentions that, all through the hard experience of 
his brigade at Talavera, he was comforted by the thought 
that, however disastrous the day was looking, "the Lord 
can save us now." 

" Standing between the enemy and my own men, 
with the shot ploughing up the ground all about me, the 
Lord kept me from all fear, and I got back to my place in 
the line without injury and without agitation. Indeed, 
who should be so firm as the Christian soldier, who has 
the assurance in his breast that to depart and to be with 
Christ is far better than to continue toihng here below ? " * 
On another occasion this diarist, in a long waiting spell 
before a dangerous disembarkation, found Wesley's two 
hundred and twenty-seventh hymn running in his mind 
all the morning, to the inexpressible comfort of his soul 
during an anxious time. 

This kind of comfortable ecstasy did not by any means 
preclude a ready and competent employment of musket 
and bayonet. One or two of the notable personal exploits 
of the Peninsular War were done by " saints." There is 
a special mention in several diaries, regimental and general, 
of John Rae, of the 71st, a well-known Methodist, who 
at the combat of Sobral (October 14, 1810), being the 
last man of the skirmishers of his battalion to retire, was 
beset by three French tirailleurs, on whom he turned, and 
shot one and bayoneted the other two in the twinkling 
of an eye. He received a medal for his conduct from his 
brigadier, who had been an eye-witness of the affair. t 

The attitude of WeUington toward religion at large, 
and religious soldiers in particular, was very much what 

* Memoirs of John Stevenson, ^rd Foot Guards, p. 191. 

\ Recorded in Tancred's Historical Medals : for details see 
Stevenson, as also the Life of a Scottish Soldier, which is a 71st 
book (p. 118), 



Wellington's Views on Eeligion 325 

one might have expected from his peculiar blend of personal 
characteristics. He was a sincere believer in Christianity 
as presented by the Church of England, but he had not 
been in the least affected by recent evangelical developments, 
and his belief was of a rather dry and official sort ; an officer 
who took to public preaching and the forming of religious 
societies was only two or three degrees less distasteful to 
him than an officer who was foul-mouthed in his language 
and openly contemned holy things. I fancy that the 
Duke would have been inclined to regard both as " un- 
gentlemanly." Religion with him was the due recognition 
of the fact that man has a Creator, who has imposed upon 
him a code of laws and a system of morality which it is 
man's duty to remember, and so far as he may, to observe. 
He was quite ready to acknowledge that he had his own 
failings, but trusted that they were not unpardonable ones. 
The two or three Evangelical enthusiasts who had the 
courage to tackle him in his later days on the subject of 
his soul, got small profit thereby.* 

It is highly to his credit that he made from 1810 onward 
a serious attempt to organize a system of brigade chaplain- 
cies for his army, and to see that the men should not lack 
the possibility of pubHc worship. Down to that year the 
chaplains' department had been much neglected: large 
expeditions had gone out without a single clergyman 
attached, and in the first Peninsular Army of 1808 there 
had been very few — though two of them, Ormsby and 
Bradford, happen to have left interesting books behind 
them, the latter's beautifully illustrated by sketches. 
Wellington complained that the provision that he found 
in 1809 was wholly inadequate, asked for and obtained an 
additional establishment, and made arrangements for 
regular Sunday services in each brigade. 

The letter of February 6, 1811, in which he explains 

* The absurd semi -religious correspondence of the Duke and 
'Miss J.' in the 1840's, published some ten years back may bo 
remembered. 



326 Spiritual Life 

his views to the Adjutant General at the Horse Guards is 
a very characteristic document. " The army should have 
the advantage of religious instruction, from a knowledge 
that it is the greatest support and aid to military discipline 
and order." But there are not enough chaplains, and 
those that exist are not always " respectable." The 
prospects of a military chaplain are not attractive enough ; 
on retirement he is much worse off than he would have been 
" if he had followed any other line of the clerical profession 
besides the army." Hence few good men are obtained. 
For want of sufficiently numerous and influential official 
teachers, spontaneous reHgious life has broken out in the 
army. There are three Methodist meetings in the 1st 
Division alone. In the 9th regiment two officers are preach- 
ing, in despite of their colonels' dissuasions. 

" The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments to sing 
psalms, or to hear a sermon read by one of their comrades is, 
in the abstract, perfectly innocent ; it is a better way of 
spending their time than many others to which they are 
addicted. But it may become otherwise, and yet, till the 
abuse has made some progress, their commanding officer 
would have no knowledge of it, nor could he interfere." 

Official religious instruction is the proper remedy. A 
" respectable clergyman " is wanted, who " by his personal 
influence and advice, and by that of true religion, would 
moderate the zeal and enthusiasm of those people, and 
prevent meetings from becoming mischievous, even if he 
could not prevail upon them to discontinue them entirely." 
Wherefore the Adjutant General must provide for a larger 
establishment of " respectable and efficient clergymen." 

The Horse Guards complied at once : chaplains, it was 
replied, should be sent out " selected with the utmost care 
and circumspection by the first prelates of the country." 
Their pay was raised, and they were directed to conclude 
every service with a short practical sermon, suited to the 
habits and understanding of soldiers. *' Good preaching," 
adds the Adjutant General, " is more than ever required 



The Chaplains 327 

at a time peculiarly marked by the exertions and inter- 
ference of sectaries of various denominations." * 

The chaplains duly appeared. There were good men 
among them, but they were not, taken as a whole, a com- 
plete success. Perhaps the idea, equally nourished by 
Wellington and by the Horse Guards, that "respectable" 
clergymen rather than enthusiasts should be drafted out, 
was the cardinal mistake ; the sort of men that were really 
wanted at the front were precisely the enthusiasts, like that 
Rev. T. Owen (afterwards secretary of the British and 
Foreign Bible Society), of whom we are told that he was in 
days of action so far forward in the field that officers 
warned him that he would infallibly be killed. His reply 
was that his primary duty was "to be of service to those 
now departing this life." | This sort of laudable energy, 
I am bound to say, does not seem to have been the most 
common characteristic of the chaplains, if we may trust 
the diaries of the time. 

A good many of them were sent straight out from a 
country curacy to the front, had no special knowledge of 
soldiers and their ways, and were appalled at having to 
face the great facts of life and death in their crudest form 
day after day. There is one distressing picture of a young 
clergyman suddenly confronted in the guard-tent with 
five deserters who were to be shot that afternoon. They 
were all criminals who had been actually taken in the 
French ranks, fighting against their old comrades, at the 
storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The chaplain helplessly read 
prayers at them, felt that he could do no more with callous 
ruffians who had met the death-sentence with an oath, 
and followed them to the execution-place looking very 
uncomfortable, quite useless, and much ashamed of 
himself. 

It was almost as trying, if not so horrible, to be tackled 

* Sir H. Calvert, Adjutant General, to Wellington, 8th November, 
1811. 

t See Stevenson, p. 172. 



328 Spiritual Life 

by a Calvinist in the throes of conversion, who gave glowing 
pictures of hell-fire, and asked for the means of avoiding 
it, refusing to take as an answer any dole of chapters from 
the New Testament or petitions from the Prayer Book. 
Here is a picture of the situation from the point of view of 
the penitent, Quartermaster Surtees, whom I have already 
had occasion to quote. 

" From the clergyman, though a kind and sympathizing 
man, I, alas ! derived but little benefit. He did not direct 
me to the only source of a sin-sick being's hopes — the Lamb 
of God which taketh away the sins of the world. He tried 
to make my hopes centre more on good resolutions, and 
after-doings. How thankfully would I have accepted the 
true method of salvation pointed out in the gospel ; but 
already I was but too much (as the natural man always is) 
inclined to expect pardon from the acts of penitence which, 
if God spared me, I intended to perform. The kind 
gentleman wrote me out prayers, and seemed much in- 
terested in my welfare. But reading and praying seemed 
more like an irksome task than an exercise which brought 
spiritual profit. . . . Indeed the Scriptures were still at 
this time a ' sealed book ' to me ; until the grace of God 
has dispelled our darkness there is no light in anything." * 

Clearly the Quartermaster had come upon one of those 
sensible and commonplace clergy whom Wellington had 
requisitioned from the Chaplain-general's department, 
when he wanted an Evangelist who would have preached 
to him Justification by Faith in its simplest form. 

There are a good many humorous anecdotes concerning 
the race of Chaplains preserved in the Peninsular diaries, 
not for the most part imputing to them any serious moral 
failing — though several are accused of having become 
" Belemites," ]" and of shirking the front — but tending to 
prove that they often failed to rise to the occasion in their 
difficult calling. This was indeed to be expected when 

* Surtees, pp. 177-9. 

t For the " Belemites " see above, pp. 204-5. 



The Methodists 329 

most of them had not the least knowledge of military life 
and customs, and were wandering about for many months 
in a world quite new to them. Clearly only men of ex- 
perience should have been sent — but (as Wellington remarks 
in one of his letters) the pay offered was so small that only 
enthusiasts or very poor men could be expected to take 
it — and enthusiasts, for other reasons, the commander-in- 
chief did not like. The soldier seems often to have been 
struck by the helplessness of the chaplain — he let himself 
be robbed by his servants, wandered outside the picquets 
and got captured by the French, or was deceived by obvious 
hypocrites. There is one ridiculous story of a young 
clergyman who, when first brought forward to take a 
brigade Sunday service, and placed behind the big-drum, 
which was to serve him as a sort of central mark, mistook 
its function for that of a pulpit, and endeavoured to mount 
upon it, with disastrous results, and to the infinite laughter 
of the congregation. 

Not unfrequently the chaplains fell out with the 
Methodists among their flocks. They had been specially 
imported by Wellington in order that they might discourage 
the prayer meetings — " getting up little conventicles " as 
one of them called these assemblies. " The Church service 
is sufficient for the instruction of mankind," said another, 
and " the zeal for preaching " tended to self-sufficiency 
and incipient pharisaism. On the whole, however, there 
was no regular or normal opposition between Church of 
England and Methodist soldiers ; they were in such a 
minority among the godless that it would have been absurd 
for them to have quarrelled. The Methodists regularly 
received the sacrament from the chaplains along with the 
churchmen, and the latter were frequently to be found 
at the prayer meetings of the former. 

Sergeant Stevenson's memoir, a mine of useful informa- 
tion in this respect, informs us that the regular organized 
prayer meeting of the Wesleyans in the 1st Division was 
begun in a gravel-pit just outside the walls of Badajoz, in 



330 Spiritual Life 

September, 1809, and never ceased from that time forward. 
During the long sojourn behind the Lines of Torres Vedras 
it was held for many weeks in a large wine-press, holding 
more than a hundred men, behind the village of Cartaxo, 
quite close to Wellington's headquarters, where indeed 
the hymns sung could be clearly heard. There were 
similar associations in other divisions, some mainly Church 
of England, some (as in the 79th regiment) Presbyterian. 
Stevenson says that he never heard of any opposition on 
the part of commanding officers, save in the case of one 
captain, whose preaching was finally ended by a course of 
persecution on the part of his colonel. But of course the 
" saints " had to endure a good deal of ridicule from their 
comrades, more especially those of them who took occasion 
to testify against drunkenness or blasphemy. Stevenson 
gives a verse of his own, which he says that he pasted up 
in the sergeants' room of the 3rd Guards, to discourage 
profane swearing at large. 

" It chills the blood to hear the Blest Supreme 
Rashly appealed to on each trifling theme, 
Maintain yom^ rank : vulgarity despise ; 
To swear is neither brave, polite, nor wise." 

We may observe a certain canny appeal to the self- 
respect of the non-commissioned officer, in the insinuation 
that by blasphemy he lowers himself to the ranks, and is 
guilty of vulgarity and want of politeness. It is to be 
feared that these couplets might have been not inappro- 
priately hung up in the mess rooms of certain regiments 
V whose colonels were by no means choice in their language. 

Among the senior officers of the Peninsular Army 
there were a good number who were not merely like 
Wellington, conformists of an official sort, but zealous 
Christians, such were Hill, Le Marchant,* Colborne, and 

* Who " never went into action without subjecting himself to a 
strict self-examination, when after having (as he humbly hoped) 
made his peace with God, he left the result in His hands with 
perfect confidence that He will determine what is best for him." — See 
Cole's Peninsular Generals, ii. 292. 



Soldier-Parsons 331 

John Beckwith — the Light Division colonel, who devoted 
his later years to taking care of the Waldenses of Piedmont, 
among whom he settled down in the evening of his life. 
Quite a sprinkling of the younger officers took orders 
when the war was over, after the great disbandment of 
1816-17, when all the second battalions were disembodied. 
Such were three men who have left us excellent Peninsular 
diaries, Gleig of the 85th, the author of *' The Subaltern," 
and other works, afterwards Chaplain-General to the forces ; 
Dallas, who made a great name as an evangelist at Burford, 
was another soldier-parson ; Boothby, who wrote a good 
journal concerning Maida, Corunna, and Talavera, was a 
third. The type generally ran to strong Evangelicalism, 
as was natural, considering that this was the really live 
and vigorous element in the Church of that day. 

It is clear that the religious condition of regiments 
varied extremely — that in some the influence of serious 
and devout officers and men was large, in others practically 
invisible. The character of the colonel made some difference 
for good or bad, but I imagine that more depended on the 
existence or non-existence of some small knot of officers 
or sergeants who did not fear to let their views be known, 
and formed a nucleus around which steady men gathered. 
Their names are mostly forgotten, the record of their 
witnessing has perished, or emerges only in some obscure 
corner of a little-read biography or an old religious magazine. 
I could wish that some sympathetic hand could devote a 
whole book to collecting and recording that which I have 
only been able to touch upon in this short chapter. It is a 
side of the life of the Peninsular Army which well deserves 
recording, since without some notice of it the picture of 
military society during the great war is wholly incomplete. 



Establishment of British Army in 1809 333 




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338 Establishment of British Army in 1809 

A consideration of the prefixed table of " establishments " shows 
the following results. Putting aside the regiments with many 
battalions (the 1st, 14th, 27th, 60th, 95th), the remainder fall into 
two-battalion and single-battalion corps. 

Of the 61 double-battalion regiments — 

9 were at a strength of 2250 or thereabouts.* 
17 were at a strength of 2031 or thereabouts.f 
16 were at a strength of 1820 or thereabouts. J 

12 were at a strength of 1610 or thereabouts.§ 
7 were at a strength of under 1600.]! 

All the regiments on the two higher establishments (with one 
exception) had both battalions on active service in 1809, either 
one in the Indies and one in Europe, or both in Europe. Hence 
it was necessary to keep them at a very high figure. 

Those with 1820 or 1610 men were nearly all regiments which 
had one battalion on active service and one on home service, though 
a very few had both overseas (such as the 18th, 34th, 39th, 62nd) ; 
in such cases the 2nd battalion, though on service, was very weak. 

The two-battalion corps with under 1600 men were almost 
invariably regiments which had one battalion in the Indies, worked 
down to very low numbers by disease, and had failed to keep up 
its strength (the 15th, 25th, 96th in the West, the 59th, 69th in the 
East Indies). 

The 37 single-battalion regiments stood on the following 
establishments — 

6 were at a strength of 1126 or thereabouts.** 

13 were at a strength of 940 or thereabouts.ff 

15 were at a strength of 700-730 or thereabouts. J J 
3 were at a strength of under 600. §§ 

Those corps on the two higher establishments are either actually 

* 9th, 30th, 47th, 48th, 53rd, 56th, 83rd, 84th, 87th. The 83rd was far over 
this figure, 2461, a wholly exceptional strength. 

t 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th, 23rd, 24th, 28th, 31st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 52nd, 66th, 
67th, 81st, 88th, 89th. 

t 6th, 21st, 32nd, 34th, 35th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 50th, 58th, 61st, 71st, 78th, 
79th, 82nd, 92nd. 

§ 3rd, 8th, 10th, 18th, 26th, 36th, 45th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 72nd, 90th. 

II 15th, 25th, 59th, 69th, 73rd, 91st, 96th. 

** 13th, 17th, 29th, 76th, 80th, 93rd. 

tt 2nd, 12th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 33rd, 49th, 51st, 64th, 97th, 90th, 101st, 102nd. 

n 37th, 41st, 54th, 55th, 65th, 68th, 70th 74tb, 75th, 77th, 85th, 86th, 94th, 
99th, 100th. 

§§ 16th, 46th, 103rd. 



Establishment of British Army in 1809 339 

serving, or are designated for immediate service abroad, and have 
therefore their estabhshments fixed high. Those on the lower 
establishments (730 or under) fall into two classes : either they 
are regiments in the East or West Indies which have died down to 
a low figure [e.g. 16th, 37th, 46th, 54th, 55th, 65th, 68th, 70th, 
86th] or they are battalions quartered in peaceful stations and not 
expected to be sent on active service, [e.g. 41st, 99th, 100th, 103rd, 
in Canada and Bermuda] or at home [74th, 75th, 77th, 85th, 94th]. 
All the last-named five, on home service, were raised to a higher 
estabhshment and sent to the front in 1810-12. 

It will be noted that of the one hundred and three 1st battalions, 
or single-battalion regiments, a great many were not available, viz, 
twenty-one in the East Indies, twenty-one in the West Indies 
(including Bermuda), eleven in the Mediterranean Garrisons, five 
at the Cape of Good Hope, six in Canada, two in (or bound 
for) New South Wales. There were only twenty-five 1st battaUons 
at home, and of these twenty had served under Moore in the 
Corunna retreat and then went on the Walcheren expedition, so that 
in 1809 they were unavailable. Three more battalions which had 
not served under Moore had shared in the same descent on the 
Scheldt (74th, 77th, 85th). There were actually only two single- 
battalion corps which had neither gone to Corunna nor to Walcheren 
and were available at home (75th and 94th).* In the way of the 
strongly organized first battalions, therefore, there was absolutely 
nil to send to Wellington in 1809 save Craufurd's three Light 
Infantry battalions, which though they had been with Moore in 
January were back in the Peninsula by July (l/43rd, l/52nd, 
l/95th). 

It is easy to see, therefore, that there was the greatest possible 
difficulty in finding battalions with which Wellesley's Peninsular 
Army could be reinforced. Of troops which had not gone to Wal- 
cheren there were left in Great Britain only the 75th and 94th, 
with twenty-eight 2nd (or junior) battalions which had not joined in 
the expedition to the Scheldt. These were almost without exception 
very weak units, the first battalions of ten of these were in the 
Indies, then of five more already in the Peninsula, all their strength 
was used up in keeping their senior battalions full, of the remaining 
thirteen only two (2/5th 2/34th, 2/38th), were strong enough to 
be sent to Portugal. The reinforcements which Wellington was 

* The 94th went out to Cadiz m 1810 ; the 75th, not long back from India, 
was very weak and did not go on foreign service (Sicily) till 1812. 



340 Establishment of British Army in 1809 

given in the autumn of 1809 and the summer of 1810 were largely 
scraped up from foreign garrisons — ^the l/7th from Nova Scotia, 
the 1/llth from Madeira, the l/57th from Gibraltar. But in 1810 
Walcheren battalions began to come out, such as the 3/lst, l/9th, 
l/50th, l/71st, l/79th, and to load Wellington's hospitals with ague- 
stricken convalescents. For later reinforcements see Chapter VII. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF CAVALRY IN 1809. 



1st Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


2nd Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


3rd Dragoon Guards 


905 


Peninsular Field Army- 


4th Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


5th Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


6th Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


7th Dragoon Guards 


905 


Home 


1st Dragoons 


1083 


Peninsular Field Army 


2nd Dragoons 


905 


Home 


3rd Dragoons 


905 


Home [went to Walcheren] 


4th Dragoons 


905 


Peninsular Field Army 


6th Dragoons 


905 


Home 


7th Hussars 


905 


*Home 


8th Light Dragoons 


720 


East Indies 


9th Light Dragoons 


905 


Home [went to Walcheren] 


10th Hussars 


905 


*Home 


1 1th Light Dragoons 


905 


Home 


12th Light Dragoons 


905 


Home [went to Walcheren] 


13th Light Dragoons 


905 


Home 


14th Light Dragoons 


905 


Peninsular Field Army 


15th Hussars 


905 


*Home 


16th Light Dragoons 


905 


Peninsular Field Army 


17th Light Dragoons 


940 


East Indies 


18th Hussars 


905 


♦Home 


19th Light Dragoons 


905 


Home 


20th Light Dragoons 


905 


1 Sicily and | Peninsula 


21st Light Dragoons 


905 


Cape of Good Hope 


22nd Light Dragoons 


928 


East Indies 


23rd Light Dragoons 


905 


Peninsular Field Army 


24th Light Dragoons 


928 


East Indies 


25th Light Dragoons 


940 


East Indies 



N.B. — Note that there was no 5th regiment of Dragoons in 1809. The corps last 
bearing that number had been disbanded in 1799, and its successor was not 
raised till 1858. 



Establishment of Household Troops 1809 341 



ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HOUSEHOLD TROOPS IN 1809. 



1st Life Guards 


416 


Home 


2nd Life Guards 


416 


Home 


Royal Horse Guards 


654 


Home 


1st Foot Guards 


4619 


1st Batt.* Home [went to 


(3 batts.) 




Walcheren] ; 2nd Batt. 
Home ; 3rd Batt.* Home 
[went to Walcheren] 


2nd (Coldstream) Foot 


2887 


1st Batt. Peninsular Field 


Guards (2 batts.) 




Army ; 2nd Batt. Home 


3rd Foot Guards 


2887 


1st Batt. Peninsular Field 


(2 batts.) 




Army ; 2nd Batt. Home 



N.B. — The Second Batts. Coldstream and 3rd Foot Guards both sent their 
flank companies to Walcheren. The troops sent to Cadiz early in 1810 were 
detachments, viz. 4 companies of the 2/lst Guards, 3 of the 2/2nd, 3 of the 2/3rd. 



MISCELLANEOUS CORPS. 

In addition to the regular units shown in these lists, there are on 
the estimates of 1809 twelve veteran battalions, with effectives 
ranging from 693 to 1129, and eight garrison battalions, mostly with 
an establishment of 906. Most of these were at home, but a few in 
the Mediterranean garrisons. 

There were also the foreign corps of Meuron, de Roll, Watteville, 
Dillon, Chasseurs Britanniques, Royal Malta, Royal Corsicans and 
the Sicilian regiment, all in the Mediterranean, with the York Light 
Infantry, York Rangers, and Royal West India Rangers in the 
West Indies. These were all single battaHon corps ranging from 
1361 men (de Roll) to 694 (York L. L). The black regiments, eight 
West India battalions with 1125 men each, could only be used in 
their own regions. 

Of the King's German Legion there were at home the two Heavy 
Dragoon Regiments with an establishment of 694 each, and the 2nd 
and 3rd Hussars, with the same numbers. The 3rd Hussars were 
just back from the Corunna Retreat : the 2nd went to Walcheren. 
Of the ten infantry battalions, four (1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th Line) were 
with the Peninsular Field Army, as was the 1st Hussars; four (3rd, 
4th, 6th, 8th Line) were in Sicily ; 1st and 2nd Light battalions (just 
back from Corunna) were at home, and went to Walcheren. Four 
battalions had establishments of 1062, six of 902, of all ranks; 



APPENDIX II 

DIVISIONAL AND BRIGADE ORGANIZATION AND 
CHANGES. 

1809—1814. 

By C. T. Atkinson, MA., Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, 

Oxford. 

1809. 

On AprU 22, when Wellesley arrived the troops were brigaded as 

follows : — 
Cavalry. G.O.C., Cotton. 14th Light Dragoons, 16th Light 

Dragoons, 2 squadrons 20th Light Dragoons, detachment 

3rd Hussars K.G.L. : Fane's brigade (not at the Douro), 3rd 

Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons. 
Guards' Brigade (H. Campbell). 1st Coldstream, 1st 3rd 

Guards {i.e. Scots), 1 co. 5/60th. 
1st Brigade (Hill). l/3rd, 2/48th, 2/66th, 1 co. 5/60th. 
2nd Brigade (Mackenzie). 2/24th (attached), 3/27th, 2/31st, 

l/45th. 
3rd Brigade (Tilson). Headquarters and 5 cos. 5/60th, 2/87th, 

l/88th. ■' '" 

4th Brigade (Sontag). 97th, 2nd Detachments, 1 co, 5/60th. 
5th Brigade (A. Campbell). 2/7th, 2/53rd, 1 co. 5/60th. "^ ' ^ ' 
6th Brigade (R. Stewart). 29th, 1st Detachments. 
7th Brigade (Cameron). 2/9th, 2/83rd, 1 co. 5/60th. 
K.G.L. (Murray, Langwerth and Drieberg). 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 

7th Line K.G.L., detachment Light BattaHons K.G.L. 
The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Brigades each included a Portuguese 

battalion. 
[N.B. — ^The " Battalions of Detachments " were composed of 

convalescents and stragglers, left behind from the regiments 



344 Divisional and Beigade Okganization 

which had marched from Portugal under Sir John Moore in 
the preceding autumn.] 
The organization in divisions dates from June 18. It was originally 
as follows : — 

Cavalry. G.O.C., Payne. A [Fane], 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th 
Dragoons ; B [Cotton], 14th and 16th Light Dragoons ; 
Unattached, 2 squadrons 20th Light Dragoons, 23rd Light 
Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.G.L., detachment 3rd Hussars 
K.G.L. 

\st Division. G.O.C., Sherbrooke. A [H. Campbell], 1st 
Coldstream, 1st Scots; B [Cameron], 2/9th, 2/83rd ; 
C [Langwerth], 1st and 2nd Line K.G.L., detachment Light 
Battalions K.G.L. ; D [Low], 5th and 7th Lme K.G.L. 

2nd Division. G.O.C., Hill. A [Hill], l/3rd, 2/48th, 3/66th ; 
B [R. Stewart], 29th 1st Detachments. 

Zrd Division. G.O.C., Mackenzie. A [Mackenzie] 3/27th, 2/31st, 
l/45th ; B [Tilson], 5 companies 5/60th, 2/87th, l/88th. 

m Division. G.O.C., A. Campbell. A [A. Campbell], 2/7th, 
2/53rd ; B [Sontag], 97th 2nd Detachments. 

The detached companies of 5/60th at Talavera were with 
I A, I B, II A, IV A, IV B. 
Subsequent changes were as follows : — 

Cavalry. 20th Light Dragoons and detachment 3rd Hussars 
K.G.L. , left the Peninsula before the end of July. 

By June 21a new brigade, C, was added, under G. Anson, 
composed of 23rd Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars K.G.L. 

On November 1 Granby Calcroft was commanding A for 
Fane, absent. 

By November 24 1st Dragoons (who arrived at Lisbon 
in October) replaced the 16th Light Dragoons in B, now 
under Slade, as Cotton was assisting Payne in command of 
the division ; 16th Light Dragoons were transferred to 
C vice 23rd Light Dragoons, ordered home, after their 
losses at Talavera. 

\st Division. l/40th, from Seville, replaced 2/9th before June 21, 
2/9th going to Gibraltar and relieving l/61st, who joined 
before Talavera, on which l/40th were transferred to IV B. 



Changes in 1809 345 

After Talavera 2/24th and 2/42nd were added to I B, 
2/83rd being sent down to Lisbon. 

At Talavera, H. Campbell was wounded, Stopford re- 
placing him in command of the division and brigade, but 
from November 8 to December 15, Hulse had the brigade. 
Langwerth having been killed at Talavera, Beck of 1st 
Line K.G.L. succeeded to his brigade, but the two K.G.L. 
brigades were amalgamated under Low from November 1. 

2nd Division. By June 21 Tilson (from III B) had taken over 
Hill's own brigade. Before Talavera l/48th (arrived at 
Lisbon June 22, on being relieved at Gibraltar by 2/30th) 
had been added to II B. 

In September, a new brigade, C, under Catlin Craufurd, 
was added, composed of 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/39th, and about 
the same time 2/31st (from III A) was added to II A. By 
November 1, l/57th (from Gibraltar) replaced 1st Detach- 
ments in II B, the Battalions of Detachments having been 
broken up. 

From December 15 on II A was under command of 
Duckworth of 2/48th. 

^rd Division. Tilson, moving to II A, was replaced by Donkin 
(June 21). 

Before Talavera 2/24th replaced 3/27th (sent down to 
Lisbon) in III A. 

Mackenzie was killed at Talavera, and the division passed 
under the command of R. Craufurd, whose brigade, l/43rd, 
l/52nd and l/95th, arrived just too late for the battle, and 
was apparently added to the division in place of Mackenzie's 
brigade wliich was amalgamated with Donkin's. On 
September 15, 2/87th was ordered down to Lisbon for 
garrison duty, 2/24th being transferred to II B and 2/3 1st 
to II A about the same time. 

In October, Donkin gave up his brigade, Mackinnon 
obtaining command. 

Uh Division. Myers of 2/7th seems to have commanded IV A 
for A. Campbell. 

By Talavera l/40th had been added to IV B, of which 
Kemmis had taken command vice Sontag. 

At Talavera A. Campbell was wounded, and had to go 



346 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

home, the division being without a definite G.O.C. till the 
arrival of Lowry Cole in October. 

In September 1/1 1th (arrived at Lisbon from Madeira in 
August) was added to IV A. On the Battalions of Detach- 
ments being sent home (October), 3/27th, in garrison at 
Lisbon since after the Douro, replaced the 2nd BattaHon in 
IV B. 

1810. 

On January 1, the composition of the Army was as follows : — 
Cavalry. G.O.C, Payne ; Cotton, second in command. 

A [Fane], 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons ; B [Slade], 
1st Dragoons, 14th Light Dragoons ; C [G. Anson], 16th 
Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.G.L. 

1st Division. G.O.C, Sherbrooke. A [Stopford], 1st Coldstreams, 
1st Scots; B [A. Cameron], 2/24th, 2/42nd, l/61st ; C 
[Low], 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th Line, K.G.L., detachment 
Light Battalions, K.G.L. 

2nd Division. G.O.C, Hill. A [Duckworth, temporarily], 
l/3rd, 2/31st, 2/48th, 2/66th ; B [R. Stewart], 29th, l/48th, 
l/57th ; C [C Craufurd], 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/39th. 

Zrd Division. G.O.C, R. Craufurd. A [R. Craufurd], l/43rd, 
l/52nd, l/95th ; B [Mackinnon], l/45th, 5/60th, l/88th. 

'Uh Division. G.O.C, Cole. A [Myers acting for Cole], 2/7th, 
1/llth, 2/53rd; B [Kemmis] 3/27th, l/40th, 97th; C 
[Lightburne], 2/5th, 2/58th.* 
Subsequent changes were : — 

Cavalry. Payne went home before June 1, Cotton obtaining 
sole command from June 3. 

On April 1 the 13th Light Dragoons arrived at Lisbon, 
joining the army in May, and being attached to Hill's 
division, along with four regiments of Portuguese cavalry, 
the whole under Fane, who gave over his brigade to de Grey 
from May 13. Two troops of the regiment went to Cadiz, 
but rejoined the regiment in September. 

* This brigade was added to IV on January 2. 



Changes in 1810 347 

Before the end of the year Fane seems to have gone 
home ill. 

1st Division. On April 26 Cotton was posted to the command 
of the division, vice Sherbrooke, gone home ill, but gave 
place to Spencer, June 3, on gettmg the Cavalry Division. 

In the " States " of March 8 to August 1, no brigadier 
is given for I B. On August 4 Lord Blantyre (of 2/42nd) 
was appointed to command IB" during the absence of 
Brigadier- General Cameron." Cameron was back in com- 
mand from October 1, but on November 26 he was invalided 
home, Blantyre probably commanding again. 

By the Orders of September 12, l/79th (just arrived from 
Cadiz), was posted to I B vice l/61st, to be transferred to 
a new brigade to form part of the 1st Division. These orders 
were suspended from September 14, and at Bussaco l/7th 
(arrived from Halifax before end of July), and l/79th formed 
a brigade (I D) under Pakenham. 

On October 6, orders were given for the transfer of 
Pakenham's brigade to the 4th Division, the exchange 
between the l/61st and l/79th havuig been carried out 
previously, and a new brigade was added under Erskine, 
comprising l/50th (arrived September 24), l/71st (arrived 
September 26), l/92nd (arrived in October, before the 6th), 
and 1 company 3/95th. 

2nd Division. On June 20 Leith was appointed to command 
" Tilson's brigade," and to command the division " under 
Hill," but m the " State " of July 8 his name appears as com- 
manding the brigade composed of 3/lst, l/9th, and 2/38th. 
On August 8 orders were issued to W. Stewart to take 
command of Tilson's brigade and of the division under Hill. 
In November Hill went on sick leave. 

Leith's name ceases to appear in the returns as com- 
manding II A from July 8, and W. Stewart's name appears 
in his place from July 27. When Stewart commanded 
the division, Colborne of 2/66th had the brigade. C. Craufurd 
died in September, and at Bussaco Wilson of 2/39th com- 
manded II C. On September 30 Lumley was posted to 
command it. 

Before September 1 R. Stewart had gone home ill, and 



348 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

at Bussaco Inglis (of l/57th) commanded II B. On October 
8 Hoghton was posted to it. 

3rd Division. From January 8 on 5/60th no longer appear in 
the Returns as belonging to the division, and their place in the 
brigade was taken by 74th, who arrived at Lisbon February 8, 
and are mentioned in Orders on February 22, as in III B. 

On February 22 the division was reorganized, R. 
Craufurd's brigade becoming, with two battahons of Ca?a- 
dores, the Light Division. Mackinnon's brigade now became 
III A, and Lightburne's brigade was transferred from the 
4th Division and became III B. The headquarters 
and three companies 5/60th were posted to Lightburne's 
brigade, the remaining companies having been posted to 
I A, I B, II A, II B, II C, IV A, IV B. At the same 
time a Portuguese brigade composed of the 9th and 21st 
Regiments (under Harvey) was added to the division. 

At Bussaco Champlemond was in command of the Portu- 
guese brigade, by October 29 Sutton had it, Champlemond 
being wounded at Bussaco. 

On September 12 2/83rd was posted to III B, 2/88th 
having arrived from Cadiz to relieve them September 4. 
However, they had not joined their brigade by Bussaco. 
When they did join, 2/58th was detached from III B for 
garrison duty at Lisbon. 94th (arrived from Cadiz September 
20), were added to III B on October 6, and on October 10 
Colville was posted to command the brigade vice Lightburne, 
who went home. 

^th Division. On the transfer of Lightburne's brigade to the 
3rd Division the other two brigades exchanged places, 
Kemmis' becoming IV A, and being Cole's brigade, but 
under the immediate command of Kemmis. A Campbell, 
who had rejoined, took command of his old brigade. 

The 3rd and 15th Portuguese were added to the division, 
as a brigade under Collins. 

At Bussaco the Portuguese brigade consisted of the 11th 
and 23rd, the 3rd and 15th having been removed to the 
5th Division. 

On October 6 A. Campbell's brigade was removed from 
the Division to become the nucleus of the newly-formed 
6th Division, its place being taken by Pakenham's from the 



Changes in 1810 349 

1st Division, i.e. l/7th, l/61st, to which the Brunswick 
Oels Light Infantry (arrived Lisbon September 17) were 
added. 

On November 12 the Brunswick Oels were removed to 
the Light Division, but one company was posted to IV B, 
two more being detached to provide the newly-formed 5th 
Division, with extra light troops. Their place in IV B 
was taken by the newly arrived l/23rd from Halifax, Nova 
Scotia. 

On November 17 2/7th and 1/6 1st were ordered to 
exchange, IV B thus becoming the Fusilier Brigade. 

Light Division. Formed on February 22 by the removal of 
R. Craufurd's brigade from the 3rd Division, the 1st and 
3rd Portuguese Ca§adores being added to it. On August 4 
it was broken up into two brigades, as follows ; A [Beckwith 
of l/95th] l/43rd, 4 companies l/95th, 1st Cagadores ; B 
[Barclay of l/52nd] l/52nd, 4 companies l/95th, 3rd Caga- 
dores. Barclay having been wounded at Bussaco, Wynch 
of l/4th got the brigade (in Orders of November 14th). 

A company of 2/95th (from Cadiz) was added to A before 
October 1. On November 12 nine companies Brunswick Oels 
joined B. 

5th Division. Officially this division first appears in the " State " 
of August 8, when the 3/lst, l/9th, and 2/38th,* are first 
called the " Fifth Division," a Portuguese brigade, Spry's 
(i.e. 3rd and 15th Line), being added, and Leith being 
G.O.C. 

On August 4 J. S. Barns of 3/lst was appointed to 
command the British brigade, being superseded by Hay 
September 30. 

On October 6 orders were issued that Leith should com- 
mand the 5th Division, and that it should be composed 
of Brigadier- General Hay's brigade, a brigade made up of 
l/4th (from England, they first appear in the " State " of 
November 15), 2/30th (from Cadiz), and 2/44th (from Cadiz), 
and Spry's Portuguese. 

* These regiments had arrived at Lisbon in April, but having 
been at AValcheren were not at first sent into the field till July, 
since the 8th of which month they had been shown as a brigade 
under Leith. 



350 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

On November 5 Dunlop was posted to V B, hitherto 
under its senior battalion commander. 

On November 12 a company of the Brunswick Oels was 
posted to each of the British brigades. 

%th Division. Ordered to be formed October 6, by taking A. 
Campbell's brigade out of the 4th Division and adding 
Eben's Portuguese {i.e. 8th Line and Lusitanian Legion) 
to it : A. Campbell being G.O.C. 

On November 14, Hulse was posted to A. Campbell's 
brigade. 

On November 17 l/61st from IV B exchanged with 2/7th. 

In addition to the Portuguese brigades attached to the 
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions there were at least five 
others, two of which, the 4th under Archibald Campbell 
( = 4th and lOth Line), and 2nd imder Fonseca ( = 2nd and 14th 
Line) formed a Division imder Hamilton, which acted through- 
out under Hill. Wellington says that he intended to organize 
this division like the rest, but the heavy losses at Albuera 
and the consequent necessity of reforming the 2nd Division 
made it impossible for him to carry out his resolve. [Cf. 
Wellington Dispatches, viii. 111.] 

The remaining brigades were the 1st (Pack's), consisting 
of the 1st and 16th Line and 4th Ca§adores, the 5th (A. 
Campbell's), 6th and 18th Line, and 6th Cagadores ; the 6th 
(Coleman's), 7th and 19th Line and 2nd Cagadores. On 
the formation of the 7th Division in March, 1811, Coleman's 
brigade was posted to it, the other two remaining unattached. 

The 12th and 13th Line and 5th Cayadores seem to have 
formed yet another brigade under Bradford, but in October 
the 13th Line was in garrison at Abrantes. 

Spry's brigade ranked at the 3rd, Eben's as the 7th, 
Sutton's as the 8th, and Collins' as the 9th. 

1811. 

On January 1 the Army was organized as follows : — 
Cavalry. G.O.C, Cotton. A [de Grey], 3rd Dragoon Guards, 
4th Dragoons ; B. [Slade], 1st Dragoons, 14th Light Dragoons ; 
C [G. Anson], 16th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars, K.G.L. ; 
unbrigaded, 13th Light Dragoons. 



State of January 1, 1811 351 

Is^ Division. G.O.C., Spencer. A [Stopford], 1st Coldstream, 
1st Scots, 1 company 5/60th ; B [? Blantyre, acting], 2/24th, 
2/42nd, l/79th, 1 company 5/60th ; C [Low], 1st, 2nd, 5th, 
and 7th Line, K.G.L., detachment Light BattaUons, K.G.L. ; 
D [Erskine], l/50th, l/71st, l/92nd, 1 company 3/95th. 

2nd Division. G.O.C., W. Stewart. A [Colborne], l/3rd, 2/31st, 
2/48th, 2/66th, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Hoghton], 29th, 
l/48th, l/57th, 1 company 5/60th ; C [Lumley], 2/28th, 
2/34th, 2/39th, 1 company 5/60th. 

Zrd Division. G.O.C., Picton. A [Mackinnon], l/45th, l/74th, 
l/88th; B [Colville], 2/5th, 3 companies 5/60th, 2/83rd, 
94th; also Sutton's Portuguese. 

m Division. G.O.C., Cole. A. [Kemmis], 3/27th, l/40th, 97th, 
1 company 5/60th; B [Pakenham], l/7th, 2/7th, l/23rd, 
1 company Brunswick Oels ; also Collins' Portuguese. 

5th Division. G.O.C., Leith. A [Hay], 3/lst, l/9th, 2/38th, 1 

company Brunswick Oels ; B [Dunlop], l/4th, 2/30th, 

2/44th, 1 company Brunswick Oels; also Spry's Portu- 
guese. 

eth Division. G.O.C., A. Campbell. A [Hulse], 1/llth, 2/53rd, 
l/61st, 1 company 6/60th ; also Eben's Portuguese. 

Light Division. G.O.C., R. Craufurd. A [Beckwith], l/43rd, 
4 companies l/95th, 1 company 2/95th, 1st Cagadores ; 
B [Wynch], l/52nd, 4 companies l/95th, Brunswick Oels, 
3rd Ca§adores. 

Portuguese. Hamilton's Division, brigades under Fonseca (2nd) 
and Archibald Campbell (4th). Unattached brigades under 
Pack (1st), Ash worth, late A. Campbell (5th), Coleman (6th), 
and Bradford (10th). 
Subsequent changes were : — 

Cavalry. Cotton went home January 15, returning April 22; 
in his absence Slade commanded the division until March 
7, when Erskine seems to have been placed in command 
of both the Cavalry and the Light Division. While Slade 
had the division, his brigade was apparently under Hawker 
of 14th Light Dragoons, and from March 1 to May 15, G. Anson 



352 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

being absent, Arentschildt of 1st K.G.L. Hussars, com- 
manded C. 

On March 19 Long was posted to command the cavalry 
of the force usually under Hill, but commanded by Beresford 
during Hill's absence. At Albuera Lumley (of II C) was 
in command of Beresford's cavalry, Long's conduct not 
having given satisfaction to the Marshal. On May 11 Erskine 
was appointed to command " the cavalry south of the Tagus." 
On June 13 a new brigade, D, was formed under Long, 
composed of 13th Light Dragoons and 2nd Hussars K.G.L., 
two squadrons of which had landed April 8. On June 18 
the 11th Light Dragoons (arrived June 1) replaced the 13th, 
transferred to Slade's brigade. 

On June 19 a reorganization of the cavalry in two divi- 
sions was ordered, as follows : — 

1st Cavalry Division. G.O.C., Cotton. B [Slade], 1st 
Dragoons, 13th and 14th Light Dragoons; C [G.Anson], 
16th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars, K.G.L. ; also 
Madden's Portuguese. 
2nd Cavalry Division. G.O.C., Erskine. A [de Grey], 
3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons ; D [Long], 
11th Light Dragoons, 2nd Hussars, K.G.L. 
On July 19 another reorganization took place, the 
final result being as follows : — 

1st Cavalry Division. G.O.C., Cotton. B [Slade], 1st 
Dragoons, 12th Light Dragoons (arrived July 1), 
vice 13th (to C), and 14th (to D) ; C [G. Anson], 
13th and 16th Light Dragoons ; E [V. Alten, a new 
brigade], 11th Light Dragoons (from D), and 1st 
Hussars, K.G.L. (from C) ; Madden's Portuguese. 
2nd Cavalry Division. A [de Grey], 3rd Dragoon Guards, 
4th Dragoons ; D [Long], 14th Light Dragoons, 2nd 
Hussars, K.G.L. 
On August 1, 9th Light Dragoons (newly arrived) were 
posted to Long's brigade, together with 13th Light Dragoons, 
which exchanged from C with 14th. 

On August 30, a new brigade, F, was added, comprising 
4th Dragoon Guards, arrived August 15, and 3rd Dragoons, 
arrived before August 20, its commander being Le Marchant. 
By October 1, 5th Dragoon Guards had been added to this 
brigade. 



Changes in 1811 353 

On October 5 de Grey's brigade was transferred to the 1st 
Cavalry Division, to which Le Marchant's was attached by 
Orders of November 8, the Portuguese brigade being struck 
o£E that Division. 

From December 8 on the States do not give any G.O.C. 
for the 2nd Cavahy Division. 

1st Division. On January 23 Nightingale was posted to I B: 
on February 6 Howard obtained I D, when Erskine was 
transferred to the command of the 5th Division. On June 8 
H. Campbell's name is given in the " State " as in command 
of I A, Stopford being transferred to IV B (in Orders for 
this June 18). Nightingale departing to Bengal before 
June 25 his brigade had no permanent commander till 
July 28, when Stopford got it. 

Owmg to the heavy losses of the 2nd Division at Albuera 
and its consequent reconstruction, Howard's brigade was 
transferred to it on June 6, and at the same time the detach- 
ment of the Light Battalions of the K.G.L., hitherto in I C, 
rejoined those battalions, which had been posted to VII A. 

On June 26 orders were issued for the 7th Line K.G.L., 
to go home, its rank and file being drafted into the other 
three battalions. On July 21 l/26th were added to I B, 
having recently arrived from England. 

On August 9, Graham was appointed to command the 
Division, Spencer having gone home in July, he received 
leave July 25. From December 1 on^^-^ard I B appears in 
the " States " as having no G.O.C. 

2nd Division, The heavy losses at Albuera led to the re- 
organization of the division, detailed in Orders June 6. 
Howard's brigade of the 1st Division was transferred to the 
2nd Division, becoming II. A. The remainder of the 
brigades of Colborne and Hoghton (who was killed) were 
formed into a Provisional Battalion, less l/48th and 2/48th ; 
l/48th, to which the rank and file of 2/48th were drafted 
(the cadre of 2/48th going home), was transferred to IV B. 

This Provisional Battalion was placed in Lumley's 
brigade, of which Abercromby (of 2/28th) had had temporary 
command at Albuera, while Lumley was in charge of the 
cavalry. At the same time, Ashworth's Portuguese brigade 

2 A 



354 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

was definitely attached to it: this was the 5th Brigade, 
which had been under A. Campbell in October, 1810, but 
had come under Ash worth by March 11; it comprised the 
6th and 18th Line and 6th Ca9adores. Of. also Wellington 
Dispatches, viii, 566, and S. D. vii. 135. 

Before the end of May Hill returned and took over 
command of the division, as well as of the whole force com- 
manded by Beresford at Albuera. 

On July 22 l/28th newly arrived from Gibraltar, was 
posted to Lumley's brigade. 

On August 7 orders were issued for l/3rd and l/57th to 
resume their separate formations, large drafts having arrived 
from their second battalions in England. The division was 
again formed in three brigades, Howard's being II A, and 
l/3rd, l/57th, and the Provisional Battalion, [i.e. 29th 
(3 companies), 2/31st (4 companies) and 2/66th (3 companies)] 
forming II B, apparently under Inglis of l/57th, while l/28th, 
2 28th, 2/34th, and 2/39th under Lumley formed II C. 

On August 21 2/28th was drafted into l/28th, and sent 
home, and the company 3/95th, hitherto in Howard's brigade, 
were transferred to Beckwith's brigade of the Light Division, 
being replaced in II A by a company of 5/60th, there being 
three with the division. 

On September 21 Byng was posted to command II B, 
and on October 9 Wilson was appointed to command II C, 
Lumley having gone home sick early in August. 

On October 3 orders were issued for 29th to go home to 
recruit ; on October 20 l/39th, just arrived from Sicily, 
was added to II C, 2/39th being drafted into it and sent home 
by Orders issued December 17, 

3rd Division. Orders of March 5 direct the transfer of the 
headquarter companies 5/60th to III A, 2/88th, on garrison 
duty at Lisbon since September 4, 1810, being added to III B. 
OnJulylO,2/88thwas ordered to be drafted into 1 /88th, and 
the cadre sent home. 

On July 22 the 77th were added to III B. 

From July 1 to October 31 Mackinnon was absent from 
his brigade, ill, Wallace of l/88th commanding it in his 
place. 



Changes in 1811 355 

On December 22 Ck)lville was transferred to the command 
of the 4th Division, in Cole's absence on leave, J. Campbell 
of the 94th getting III B. 

The Portuguese brigade of this division was under 
Power at Fuentes d'Onoro : in September Palmeirim com- 
manded it. 



4:th Division. By February 1 the headquarters and 9 companies 
Brunswick Oels had been added to IV A, having been 
removed from the Light Division, but on the forma- 
tion of the 7th Division (March 5), they were removed 
to it. 

On January 23 Houston was appointed to IV B vice 
Pakenham, but left the brigade again March 5, on being 
appointed to command the 7th Division : Myers would 
seem to have commanded IV B till Albuera, where he was 
killed. On June 18 Stopford was appointed to command 
IV B, but was transferred to I B on July 28, Pakenham 
again getting IV B. From November 15 onwards the 
" States " do not give any brigadier for IV B, but it continued 
to be described as " Pakenham's." 

After Albuera 2/7th was drafted into l/7th, the remnants 
being sent home June 26 ; l/48th from the 2nd Division 
was added to IV B June 6. On October 3, the 97th, a single 
battalion regiment, was ordered home in consequence of its 
severe losses. 

On December 22 Colville was appointed to command 
the Division, Cole having gone home ill. 

At Albuera Harvey was in command of the Portuguese 
brigade of the division, to which 1st battalion Loyal Lusi- 
tanian Legion had been added on March 14 : by September 
this unit was renamed 7th Ca9adores, the brigade was then 
again under Collins, who at Albuera had led a provisional 
brigade from the Elvas garrison [5th Line, 5th Cagadores]. 

Zth Division, From February 1 to February 6 the division was 
without a G.O.C., Leith being absent : on February 6, 
Erskine was appomted to command it, but was transferred 
to the command of the advanced guard (the Light Division 



356 Divisional and Brigade Oeganization 

and cavalry), from March 7 to April 22. During this period 
Dunlop seems to have commanded the division, Egerton 
of 2/44th commanding V B. 

On May 11 Erskine was appointed to the 2nd Cavalry 
Division, and Dunlop again had temporary command of 
the division until October 2, when G. T. Walker was appointed 
to command his brigade. By December 1 Leith was again 
in command of the division. 

On March 14 the 2nd Battalion Loyal Lusitanian Legion 
had been added to Spry's Portuguese brigade. By September 
it had been renamed 8th Cagadores. 

Qih Division. Orders of March 5 directed the addition to the 
division of a new brigade under Burne (of l/36th), com- 
prising 2nd and l/36th. 

It seems to have been intended to put the Brunswick 
Oels into the 6th Division, but on the formation of the 
7th Division (March 5), they were put in C. Alten's brigade. 

On July 21 l/32nd, arrived at Lisbon before July 8, was 
posted to VI B. 

A. Campbell leaving for India in November, the division 
was without a definite G.O.C. till the end of the year, Burne 
commanding it temporarily. 

On March 14 the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was removed 
from the Portuguese brigade of the division, and distributed 
as Ca§ador battalions to the 4th and 5th Divisions, being 
replaced by the 12th Line, formerly in Bradford's brigade. 
At Fuentes Madden commanded the Brigade. 

Light Division. Wynch dying January 6, the 2nd Brigade was 
without a commander till February 7, when Drummond (of 
l/52nd) was appointed to it. Craufurd, having gone home 
on leave before February 8, the division had no G.O.C, 
but was under Erskine from March 7 on, together with the 
Cavalry who also were in the advanced guard. 

On March 5 2/52nd, newly arrived at Lisbon, was added 
to Drummond's brigade. 

R. Craufurd returned April 22 and took over the division 
from Erskine. 



Changes in 1811 357 

By August 1 Beckwith had been invalided home, Andrew 
Barnard of the 95th commanding the brigade in his place. 

On August 21 the headquarters and four companies of 
the 3/95th, which had gone out to Cadiz in 1810, arrived 
at Lisbon, and were added to the 1st Brigade, the company 
3/95th, hitherto with II A, being also added to the same 
brigade. 

Drummond dying before September 8, Vandeleur was 
appointed to the vacant brigade on September 30. By 
October 1 another company 2/95th had been added to the 
1st Brigade. 

1th Division. Orders were issued on March 5 for the formation 
of this division, to be composed of two British brigades 
under C. Alten and Long, and Coleman's Portuguese, i.e. 
7th and 19th Line and 2nd Cagadores. The composition of the 
British brigades is not given, but General Orders say that the 
Brunswick Oels should be in Alten's brigade, and the Chasseurs 
Britanniques (arrived at Lisbon from Cadiz, January 28) 
in Long's. The other regiments in the division were 51st 
(arrived during February), 85th (arrived March 4), which 
were in Long's brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Light BattaUons, 
K.G.L., in Alten's. These last only landed on March 21, 
and did not join the division till it came down with Welling- 
ton from Almeida to the Guadiana Valley for the second 
siege of Badajoz. Till then they had been attached to the 
force under Beresford: Schwertfeger {Geschichte der, K.O.L. 
i. 317) says the battalions formed part of the 2nd Division, but 
this does not seem accurate. As they had no casualties at 
the siege of Badajoz, in which the 7th Division suffered severely, 
one may presume that they finally joined the division after 
the siege was raised. 

Thus the British brigade (at first there was only one) was 
51st, 85th, Chasseurs Britanniques, Brunswick Oels. On 
March 31 Sontag v/as posted to it vice Long, removed to 
command Beresford's cavalry, March 19. 

On July 19 68th (just arrived) was posted to VII B. 

Houston was invahded home before August 1, Sontag 
commanding the division. By October he too was invahded 
(his A.D.C. received orders to rejoin his regiment on October 



358 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

29). Alten was in temporary command, C. Halkett com- 
manding his brigade. VII B was without a G.O.C. from 
October 15 till de Berne witz got it on December 23. 

On October 3 85th (a single-battalion regiment) was 
ordered to go home to recruit. 

The Portuguese brigade was under Doyle at Fuentes ; by 
September Coleman was back in command. 

Portuguese. No changes seem to have taken place in Hamilton's 
Division, or in Pack's brigade, but the other unattached 
brigade was under McMahon in September, and included the 
13th and 22nd Line and 5th Cagadores, the 12th Line having 
been transferred to the 6th Division. 

1812. 

On January 1 the organization of the Army was as follows :— 
Cavalry, 1st Division. G.O.C, Cotton. B [Slade], 1st Dragoons, 
12th Light Dragoons; C [no G.O.C, G. Anson absent], 
14th and 16th Light Dragoons ; E [Cummg of 11th Light 
Dragoons in absence of V. Alten], 11th Light Dragoons, 1st 
Hussars, K.G.L. ; A [no G.O.C, de Grey absent], 3rd 
Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons ; F [Le Marchant], 4th and 
5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd Dragoons. 

Cavalnj. 2nd Division. No G.O.C. ; D [Long], 9th and 13th 
Light Dragoons, 2nd Hussars, K.G.L. 

1st Division, G.O.C, Graham. A [H. Campbell], 1st Cold- 
streams, 1st Scots, 1 company 5/60th ; B [? Blantyre for 
Stopford], 2/24th, l/26th, 2/42nd, l/79th, 1 company 5/60th ; 
C [Low], 1st, 2nd, and 5th Line, K.G.L. 

2nd Division. G.O.C, Hill. A [Howard], l/50th, l/71st, l/92nd 
1 company 5/60th ; B [Byng], l/3rd, l/57th, 1st Provisional 
Battalion {i.e. 2/31st and 2/66th), 1 company 5/60th ; C 
[Wilson], l/28th, 2/34th, l/39th, 1 company 5/60th ; also 
Ashworth's Portuguese. 

^rd Division. G.O.C, Picton. A [Mackinnon], l/45th. Head- 
quarters 5/60th, 74th, l/88th ; B [J. Campbell for Colville], 
2/5th, 77th, 2/83rd, 94th ; also Palmeirim's Portuguese. 



Organization on January 1, 1812 359 

4:th Division. G.O.C., Colville (for Cole). A [Kemmis], 3/27th, 
l/40th, 1 company 5/60th ; B [? Pakenham], l/7th, l/23rd, 
l/48th, 1 company Brunswick Oels; also Collins' Portu- 
guese. 

ah Division, G.O.C., Leith. A [Hay], 3/lst, l/9th, 2/38th, 1 
company Brunswick Oels ; B [Walker], l/4th, 2/30tli, 2/44th, 
1 company Brunswick Oels ; also Spry's Portuguese. 

&th Division. No G.O.C., Burne in temporary charge, A [Hulse], 
1/1 Ith, 2/53rd, l/61st, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Bui-ne], 2nd, 
l/32nd, l/36th; also Madden's [?] Portuguese. 

Ith Division. No G.O.C., Alten in temporary charge. A [C. 
Halkett for Alten], 1st and 2nd Light Battalions, K.G.L., 
Brunswick Oels ; B [de Berne witz], 51st, 68th, Chasseurs 
Britanniques : also Coleman's Portuguese. 

Light Division. G.O.C., R. Craufurd. A [? Barnard], l/43rd, 
4 companies l/95th, 2 companies 2/95th, 5 companies 3/95th, 
1st Cagadores ; B [Vandeleur], l/52nd, 2/52nd, 4 companies 
l/95th, 3rd Cagadores. 

Portuguese. Hamilton's division, with brigades under Fonseca 
and Arch. Campbell. Unattached brigades under Pack and 
McMahon. 
Subsequent changes were : — 

Cavalry. On January 1 the 1st and 2nd Dragoons, K.G.L., under 
Bock arrived at Lisbon: they remained near there till 
March 12, joining the army at Estremoz March 23, and 
being reckoned as the 2nd Brigade (= G) of the 2nd Cavaky 
Division. 

By January 8 V. Alten was again in command of his 
brigade. 

Several changes took place under orders issued January 
29 ; the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Guards were posted to Slade's 
brigade, from which the 12th Light Dragoons were removed 
to G. Anson's, the 4th Dragoons replaced the 4th Dragoon 
Guards in Le Marchant's, and de Grey's brigade disappeared. 
F. Ponsonby of the 12th Light Dragoons took command of 
C in Anson's absence. 

By April 8 Erskine had resumed command of the 2nd 



360 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

Cavalry Division, to which Blade's brigade was transferred 
April 14, Bock's joining the 1st Division. 

On July 1, an exchange was ordered between the 11th 
and 14th Light Dragoons: G. Anson, who had resumed 
command of his brigade, having 11th, 12th and 16th Light 
Dragoons, V. Alten 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars, 
K.G.L. 

At Salamanca Cotton was wounded, and Le Marchant 
killed. While Cotton was disabled. Bock commanded the 
Cavalry, de Jonquieres having his brigade. W. Ponsonby, 
of 5th Dragoon Guards, succeeded to Le Marchant's brigade 
(by orders of July 23). Cotton rejoined before October 15, 
but had to go home again in December invalided. From 
August 1 V. Alten was absent, but rejoined by the middle 
of September. 

By Orders of October 17, 2nd Hussars, K.G.L., were 
transferred to V. Alten's brigade. 

1st Division. Stopford resumed command of I B before 
February 1, but was gone again by April 8. On May 7 
Wheatley was appointed to command the brigade until 
Stopford's return. 

l/26th, being too sickly for field service, was out of I B 
before March 8, being sent down to Lisbon, and thence to 
Gibraltar to relieve l/82nd. Their place in I B was taken 
by l/42nd, just arrived from England, and posted to I B, 
April 23. On May 19 2/42nd was ordered home, drafting 
its rank and file into l/42nd. 2/58th was posted to I B 
by Orders of April 2 ; on June 1 its transfer to V B 
was ordered, but " orders will hereafter be given as to the 
regiment joining the brigade." It seems to have remained 
with I B till after the retreat from Burgos. 

Graham going home ill July 6, H. Campbell was appointed 
to command the division, Fermor getting I A. 

Wheatley died September 1, Stirling (of l/42nd) being 
appointed to I B September 11. 

On October HE. Paget was posted to command the 
division, but he was taken prisoner November 17, his place 
being taken by W. Stewart, who had just returned to the 
Peninsula. 

After the retreat from Burgos the division was reorganized. 



Changes in 1812 361 

A new brigade of Guards was added, composed of 1/lst 
(Grenadier) Guards, who arrived at Corunna from England, 
October 1 and joined the army on the Carrion October 24, and 
3/1 st Guards, who had been at Cadiz, and came up to Madrid 
with Skerrett's column. This was ordered October 17, 
but cannot have been carried out till later. On November 
10 Howard was transferred from II A to command this 
brigade. On November 11 Stirling's brigade was ordered 
to be removed to the 6th Division, the company of 5/60th 
attached to it remaining in the 1st Division. On December 
6 the 1st and 2nd Light Battalions, K.G.L., were removed 
from VII A to the K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Division. 

2nd Division. In Orders of April 14, Tilson-Chowne (formerly 
Tilson) was appointed to command the Division, " under 
Hill," but though present at Almaraz in May does not seem 
to have been present to the end of the year. Howard being 
transferred to the 1st Division, November 10, Cadogan 
(of l/71st) took command of II A. 

Zrd Division. At Ciudad Rodrigo Mackinnon was killed (January 
19), his brigade going to Kempt — in Orders February 8. 

At Badajoz Picton and Kempt were wounded (April 6), 
Wallace taking over Kempt's brigade, and also having 
temporary command of the division when Picton was dis- 
abled : Forbes (of l/45th) then commanded III A. 

After the fall of Badajoz 77th (a single battalion regiment) 
was sent down to Lisbon, being much reduced. 

On June 28 Pakenham was appointed to command 
"Colville's brigade in the 3rd Division," Le. Ill B. At 
Salamanca he commanded the division, Picton having gone 
sick agam, Wallace and J. Campbell having the brigades. 

l/5th, which arrived in May, was posted to III B June 1, 
both battaHons were at Salamanca, but on July 27 2/5th 
was drafted into l/5th, the skeleton going home in October. 

By Orders of October 17 2/87th, which had come up 
from Cadiz with Skerrett, was posted to III B, then still 
caUed " Colville's." 

Wallace was invalided home after the retreat from Burgos. 

Pakenham was to retain command of the division till 
the return of " Colville or some other " {W, D., v. 399), his 



362 Divisional and Bbigade Organization 

ijame does not appear in the States as commanding III B 
after November 1 ; Colville apparently came back before the 
end of the year : D. N. B. says in October. 

On April 8 Power took over the Portuguese brigade, 
Champlemond, who had it wee Palmeirim by March 17, having 
been wounded at Badajoz : 12th Cagadores were added to it 
on April 8. 

Uh Division. On February 9, Bowes was appointed to command 
"the brigade late under Pakenham," i.e. IV B. In April 
Colville was wounded at Badajoz, and the division was 
without a G.O.C. till Cole returned — before July 8. 

At Salamanca (July 22), Cole was wounded, and was 
absent in consequence till October 15. In Cole's absence 
W. Anson, who was appointed to IV A April 9, would 
have commanded the division. The vacancy in IV A 
was caused by the departure of Kemmis — before April 1 : 
at Badajoz Harcourt (of l/40th) commanded IV A. 

Bowes was transferred to the 6th Division May 2, and 
it would appear that Ellis (of l/23rd) commanded IV B 
temporarily. He certainly was in charge of it at Salamanca, 
and apparently kept it tUl Skerrett took charge of it. It 
was then still described as " Pakenham's," as was also the 
case as late as November 28. Skerrett was appointed to it 
on October 17, but his force from Cadiz only joined Hill 
on October 26, and the arrangements ordered on October 17 
can hardly have been carried out at once. 

Skerrett's brigade (3/lst Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th and 2 
companies 2/95th) seems to have acted with IV after joining 
Hill's force, but was broken up when operations ceased. 

Orders of October 17 directed l/82nd, which had come 
up from Gibraltar in June, and was with the 4th Division at 
Madrid, to join IV B, but the battalion was transferred to 
VII A by Orders of November 28, the 20th which arrived 
in December being posted to IV B instead. On l/82nd 
joining, l/48th was transferred to IV A. 

On December 6 the 2nd Provisional Battalion {I.e. 2nd 
and l/53rd) was posted to IV A. 

By Salamanca Stubbs had taken over command of the 
Portuguese Brigade, which had been under Harvey by 
March 17, and at the siege of Badajoz. 



Changes in 1812 363 

5th Division. At Badajoz Walker was wounded (April 6) : 
his brigade had no regular G.O.C. till Prmgle was appohited 
to it June 28. 

On May 10 2/4th, arrived at Lisbon during April, was 
posted to V B. In June l/38th came out, and was present 
at Salamanca, apparently with V A, but it only appears as 
part of that brigade in the "States" of August 8 and 
afterwards. 

Orders of June I directed 2/58th to join V B, but the 
battalion seems to have been with I B till reorganized as 
part of the 3rd Provisional Battalion in December. 

Hay was absent from June 8, Greville of l/38th com- 
manding the brigade till July 31, when Hulse was trans- 
ferred to it. Hulse must have also commanded the division, 
as Leith was wounded at Salamanca and mvalided home. 
Hulse dying (September 6), Pringle commanded the division, 
until Oswald was appointed to it (October 25), when Pringle 
reverted to his brigade, of which Brooke (of 4th) had been 
in command. 

Orders of June 18 directed l/9th to exchange with 2/30th 
and 2/44th, but these were cancelled June 28. E. Barnes 
was in Orders to command V A October 28, but seems to 
have been with the brigade at Villa Muriel three days earlier. 
On December 6 he was transferred to VII A. Hay 
appears to have returned before December 31. 

On December 6 Orders directed the drafting 2/4th into 
l/4th and 2/38th into l/38th, the skeletons being sent home, 
also for forming 2/30th and 2/44th into a Provisional Batta- 
lion, the 4th. By Orders of October 17, 2/47th of Skerrett's 
column had been posted to V B, which was then described 
as Walker's brigade. 

6th Division. On February 9 H. Clinton was appointed to 
command the division. 

By April 1 VI B was without a brigadier : Bowes was 
appointed to it May 2, but he was killed in the attack on 
the Salamanca forts (June 24). On this Hinde, of 32nd, 
commanded the brigade, being appointed definitely to it 
September 30, but ante-dated to June. 

On Hul.'^e being transferred to V A, July 31, VI A was 



364 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

without a brigadier, Bingham, of 2/53rd, being actually 
in command, until the amalgamation of the two brigades 
by Orders of November 11. At the same time Stirling's 
brigade was transferred from the 1st Division to the 6th, 
1/9 1st, which arrived at Corunna October 8, being added 
to it by Orders of November 28 — it actually joined 
December 14. 

On December 6 orders were issued for the formation of 
2nd and 2/53rd as the 2nd Provisional Battalion, and of 2/24th, 
and 2/58th as the 3rd Provisional Battalion, and for their 
transfer to IV A and Vll A respectively. 

The Portuguese Brigade was under Eben till April 30, when 
the Conde de Rezende took command. It was joined by 9th 
Cacadores on April 10. Rezende was invalided in November, 
and succeeded by Madden. 

1th Division. On May 2 Alten was transferred to command the 
Light Division : John Hope being given command of the 
7th. Halkett of 2nd Light Battalion, K.G.L. seems to 
have commanded VII A, though in the " States " no brigadier 
is named from May 2 till December 6, when E. Barnes was 
appointed to it. 

Hope having to quit the army on account of his health 
September 23, the division had no G.O.C. till October 25, 
when Lord Dalhousie was appointed to it, having been 
put on the Stajff of the Army September 12. 

On November 28, l/6th, newly arrived from England, was 
added to VII A, then called " Colonel Halkett's," and l/82nd, 
from IV B, was added to VII B. 

Orders of December 6 directed the transfer of the Light 
Battalions, K.G.L., to the 1st Division, the 3rd Provisional 
Battalion {i.e. 2/24th and 2/58th) being added to VII A. 

The Portuguese Brigade was under Palmeirim in March : 
later it seems to have been under Doyle of the 19th Line. 

lAght Division. At Ciudad Rodrigo (January 19), Craufurd was 
killed, and Vandeleur wounded ; Barnard then took com- 
mand of the division, and Gibbs of l/52nd of the 2nd Brigade. 
By April 15 Vandeleur had resumed command, 2/52nd was 
drafted to l/52nd by Orders of February 23, the skeleton 
being sent home. 

On May 2 C. Alten received command of the division. 



Changes in 1813 365 

By May 8 l/95th had been united in the 2nd Brigade, 
but Orders of August 24 again divided it, 3 companies in 
each brigade: before the end of the year it was again 
united and placed in the 1st Brigade. 

Two more companies 2/95th came out from England in 
May, and joined those already out, the four being in the 
2nd Brigade. Two more came up from Cadiz with Skerrett, 
and joined the brigade. 

3/95th seems to have been transferred temporarily to the 
2nd Brigade, but was back in the 1st by the end of the year. 

The 20th Portuguese, which had come up with Skerrett, 
were posted to " Beckwith's brigade," October 17. 

Portuguese. In April, 1812, Power had replaced Arch. Campbell 
in command of the 4th Brigade, while Bradford had the 
11th vice McMahon : this now included the 5th Ca§adores, 
13th, and 24th Line. 

By July Power had exchanged the 4th Brigade for the 
8th, which was in the 3rd Division. A. Campbell would 
seem to have again commanded the 4th, to which on April 8 
the 10th Ca§adores were added. 

1813. 

On January 1 the Army was organized as follows : — 

Cavalry, 1st Division. No G.O.C., Cotton absent. F [W. 
Ponsonby], 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 4th Dragoons ; 
C [G. Anson], 11th, 12th, and 16th Light Dragoons; E 
[V. Alten], 14th Light Dragoons, 1st and 2nd K.G.L. 
Hussars ; G [Bock], 1st and 2nd K.G.L. Dragoons. 

Cavalry. 2nd Division. No. G.O.C. B [Slade], 3rd and 4th 
Dragoon Guards, 1st Dragoons ; D [Long], 9th and 13th 
Light Dragoons. 

\st Division. G.O.C, W. Stewart. A [Howard], 1/lst Guards, 
3/lst Guards, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Fermor], 1st Cold- 
streams, 1st Scots, 1 company 5/60th ; C. [Low], 1st, 2nd, 
and 5th Line, K.G.L., 1st and 2nd Light Battalions, K.G.L.* 

* Some accounts represent the Light Battalions as forming a 
separate brigade under Halkett. 



366 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

2nd Division. G.O.C., Hill. A [Cadogan], l/50th, l/71st, l/92nd, 
1 company 5/60th ; B [Byng], 1 /3rd, 1 /57th, 1st Provisional 
Battalion ( = 2/31st and 2/66th), 1 company 5/60th ; C 
[Wilson], l/28th, 2/34th, l/39th, 1 company 5/60tli; also 
Ashworth's Portuguese. 

3rd Division. G.O.C., ? Pakenham. A [no brigadier], l/45th, 
headquarters 5/60th, 74th, l/88th ; B [J. Campbell for 
Colville], l/5th, 2/83rd, 2/87th, 94th; also Power's 
Portuguese. 

4:th Division. G.O.C., Cole. A [W. Anson], 3/27th, l/40th, l/48th, 
2nd Provisional Battalion (= 2nd and 2/53rd), 1 company 
5/60th; B [Skerrett], l/7th, 20th, l/23rd, 1 company 
Brunswick Oels; also Stubbs' Portuguese. 

5th Dimsion. G.O.C, ? Hay, acting. A [Hay], 3/lst, l/9th, 
l/38th, 1 company Brunswick Oels ; B [Pringle], l/4th, 
2/47th, 4th Provisional Battalion (= 2/30th and 2/44th), 
1 company Brunswick Oels ; also Spry's Portuguese. 

6th Division. G.O.C, H. Clinton. A [Stirling], l/42nd, l/79th, 
l/91st, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Hinde], 1/llth, l/32nd, 
l/36th, l/61st ; also Madden's Portuguese. 

1th Division. G.O.C, Dalhousie. A [Barnes], l/6th, 3rd 
Provisional Battalion (= 2/24th and 2/58th), Headquarters 
and 9 companies Brunswick Oels ; B [de Berne witz], 51st, 
68th, l/82nd ; Chasseurs Britanniques ; also Doyle's 
Portuguese. 

Light Division. G.O.C, C Alten. A [no brigadier present : 
still called Beckwith's], l/43rd, l/95th, 3/95th, 1st Ca9adores ; 
B [Vandeleur], l/52nd, 2/95th, 3rd Cagadores, ? 20th 
Portuguese. 

Portuguese. Hamilton's division, brigades under (?) Fonseca 
and Campbell. Unattached brigades, Pack's and Bradford's. 
Subsequent changes were : — 

Cavalry. By January 25 a new brigade (H) was added, 
composed of two squadrons each of 1st and 2nd Life Guards 
and Royal Horse Guards, O'LoghHn had apparently been 
appointed to command it, but by Orders of November 28, 



Changes in 1813 367 

1812, F. S. Rebow was appointed to command it in his 
place. It ranked as 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, but was 
transferred to the 1st on February 5. In March it was 
under Sir Robert Hill, Rebow having gone home. 

Orders of March 13 directed the distribution among the 
regiments remaining in the Peninsula of the horses of 4th 
Dragoon Guards, 9th and 11th Light Dragoons, and 2nd 
K.G.L, Hussars, these regiments going home. Their place 
was taken by a new brigade (I), under Colquhoun 
Grant, of 15th Hussars, composed of the 10th, 15th 
and 18th Hussars : this first appears in the " States " on 
April 15. 

Orders were issued April 21 for the amalgamation of the 
two divisions, " under the command of Sir S. Cotton " : 
Cotton did not, however, rejoin till June 25, and in his 
absence Bock seems to have commanded the cavahy, his 
brigade being under Biilow. 

On May 20 Fane, appointed a Major- General on the Staff 
April 24, was given B vice Slade, who had been ordered 
home April 23. 

On July 2 orders were issued to transfer the 18th Hussars 
to V. Alten's brigade, vice the 14th Light Dragoons moved 
to Long's, which had been reduced to one regiment by the 
departure of the 9th Light Dragoons (out of the " States " by 
April 4). Lord E. Somerset at the same time was given 
command of the Hussar brigade vice Grant and Vande- 
leur, that of C vice G. Anson, removed to the Home 
Staff. 

On September 6 Grant was appointed to take over 
Long's brigade, Long having apparently gone home before 
the battles of the Pyrenees, as his name was not among the 
commanders of Cavalry brigades thanked by Parliament 
on November 8 for those operations. On November 24 
Hussey Vivian was appointed to take Grant's place. 

7th Hussars arrived in Spain in September, and were 
added to the Hussar brigade. They would seem to have 
been with the brigade by October 21, but were not in Orders 
till November 24. 

In October O'Loghlin seems to have taken over the 
Household Brigade, he had been placed on the Staff June 17. 



368 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

Is^ Division. In March Howard replaced W. Stewart in com- 
mand, but on May 19 Graham was appointed to command 
the division Howard acting as his assistant while Graham 
commanded the left wing of the army. On October 8 
Graham resigned command and went home ill. Sir John 
Hope * took his place : he was placed on the Staff October 
10, as from September 25. 

While Howard commanded the division, his brigade was 
under Lambert ; it missed Vittoria, being too sickly to take 
the field with the army and only joined in August. 

On July 2 Lambert was transferred to VI B, and Mait- 
land got the brigade. 

Low went home May 6, the K.G.L. being certainly 
one brigade only at Vittoria, where Halkett commanded 
them. 

Lord Aylmer's brigade (76th, 2/84th and 85th) which is 
first mentioned in Orders on July 23, and joined the 
army during August, may be reckoned as part of the 1st 
Division with which it always acted. By Orders of October 
17 2/62nd was added to it vice 2/84th transferred to V B. 
On November 24 the 77th (from Lisbon) was added to it. 

On October 20 Hiniiber was appointed to command the 
K.G.L. infantry. 

2nd Division. On March 25 W. Stewart was appointed to 
command the division "under Hill's direction." At the 
same time G. T. Walker got Howard's brigade, on the latter 
taking over the 1st Division from Stewart. 

Wilson died in January and O'Callaghan of 39th com- 
manded the brigade till July 23, when Pringle was appointed 
to it. On May 1 Wellington had written that he was keeping 
it vacant for Oswald, should Leith come out and take over 
the 5th Division. 

At Vittoria Cadogan was killed and J. Cameron of 92nd 
took over HA; he was wounded at Maya (July 25), and 
Fitzgerald of 5/60th commanded, till Walker actually joined 
in August. On November 18 Walker was transferred to 
command the 7th Division, Barnes being appointed to II A 
November 20. 

* Not the same man who commanded the 7th Division in 1812, 
but the 1st Earl of Hopetoun. 



Changes in 1813 369 

3rd Division. Pakenham was transferred to the 6th Division 
January 26, the division being under Colville who had 
returned before that date. Picton rejoined in May, Colville 
reverting to the command of his brigade. Picton was again 
absent from September 8, but returned just before the end 
of the year. Colville was in command at the Nivelle 
(November), but was transferred to command the 5th 
Division, when Picton came back in December. 

The 11th CaQadores were posted to Power's brigade before 
April 26, taking the place of the 12th. 

Brisbane, appointed to Staff of Army January 7, was 
given command of III A, vice Kempt, March 25. 

Colville being given temporary command of the 6th 
Division on August 8, Keane commanded III B, as also 
when Colville came back to the division. 

4ih Division. By Orders of July 2 Skerrett was transferred 
to the Light Division, his brigade going to Ross of 20th. 

By September 1 the Portuguese brigade was under 
Miller : at the Nivelle (November 10) Vasconcellos had it. 

5th Division. While Hay commanded the division Greville of 
38th had his brigade. In April Oswald took over the 
division and commanded it till Leith returned — August 30. 
Leith was wounded at San Sebastian on September 1, and 
Oswald again took command ; but at the Bidassoa, (October 9) 
Hay was in command, Greville having V A. On March 9 
Robinson was appointed to " Walker's brigade," i.e. V B. 

On April 12 2/59th from Cadiz was added to V B ; on 
May 10 the 4th Provisional Battalion was ordered to return 
home. On October 17 2/84th from Lord Aylmer's brigade 
was added to V B, 2/47th being transferred to V A. 
Robinson was wounded before Bayonne December 10, and his 
successor. Piper of 4th, being wounded next day, the command 
passed to Tonson of 2/84th. 

At the passage of the Bidassoa the Portuguese brigade 
was commanded by de Regoa and until the end of the year. 

Qth Division. On January 26 Pakenham was appointed to 
command the division in Clmton's absence. On June 25 
he was appointed Adjutant-General, and Clinton returned 
and resumed command. By July 22 Clinton was again 

2 B 



370 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

absent, Pack getting the division. At Sorauren (July 28) 
Pack was wounded, and Pakenham took over the division 
temporarily, giving it over to Colville before August 8, 
Colville seems to have still been in command at the passage 
of the Bidassoa (October 9), but Clinton then returned, 
Colville reverting to the 3rd Division. 

Pack had been appointed to command VI A, vice 
Stirling, July 2, Lambert at the same time getting VI B, vice 
Hinde. Stirling commanded VI A when Pack got the 
division, but went home in October. 

The Portuguese brigade was under the command of 
Madden till the autumn : Douglas of the 8th Line had it at 
the Nivelle. 

1th Division. By April 16 de Bernewitz was no longer in 
command of his brigade, to which Inglis was appointed 
May 21, though at Vittoria Grant of l/82nd commanded 
it, but Inglis took charge before the Pyrenees. 

Le Cor received command of the Portuguese brigade on 
March 9. When he was promoted in November Doyle had it. 

Dalhousie went home after the Bidassoa, October 9, 
and at the Nivelle (November 9) Le Cor was in command. 
On November 18 G. T. Walker was given command " in 
DaUiousie's absence." Le Cor would seem to have been 
transferred to command the Portuguese division formerly 
under Hamilton. 

On Barnes returning to the 2nd Division November 20, 
his brigade seems to have gone to Gardiner. 

Light Division. On March 23 Kempt was appointed to A. 
On July 2 Vandeleur was transferred to a cavalry brigade, 
Skerrett getting B. At the passage of the Bidassoa, and 
to the end of the year, Colborne of 52nd was in command 
of B, vice Skerrett, who went home in September. 

The 20th Portuguese never Joined the Division: in 
place of them on April 26 the 17th Portuguese appear 
in its " State." 

Portuguese. Hamilton had had to give up command of his 
Portuguese division in February, owing to ill-health, upon 
which it was under Silveira, the brigades being under 
Da Costa and Campbell during the battles of the Pyrenees. 



Organization on Jan. 1, 1814 371 

By the passage of the Nivelle (November 9) Hamilton was 
again in command, Buchan had Da Costa's brigade, but 
during the fighting on the Nive (December 9 — 11), Le Cor 
had the Division and Buchan and Da Costa the brigades. 
Buchan was ordered to transfer himself to the Portuguese 
Brigade of the 7th Division on Nov. 9, but this move was 
countermanded. 

When Pack was moved to a British command (July 2), his 
brigade went to Wilson, who commanded it at the Bidassoa, 
but had been replaced by A. Campbell by the Nive (December 
9), Wilson havmg been wounded, November 18. 

Bradford seems to have retained the other unattached 
brigade all the year. 

1814. 

On January 1 the organization was as follows : — 

Cavalry. G.O.C., Cotton. I [O'Loghlin], 1st and 2nd Life 
Guards, R.H.G. ; F [W. Ponsonby], 5th Dragoon Guards, 
3rd and 4th Dragoons ; C [Vandeleur], 12th and 16th Light 
Dragoons; D [Vivian], 13th and 14th Light Dragoons; 
E [V. Alten], 18th Hussars, 1st K.G.L. Hussars ; G [Bock], 
1st and 2nd K.G.L. Dragoons ; B [Fane], 3rd Dragoon Guards, 
1st Dragoons ; H [Somerset], 7th, 10th and 15th Hussars. 

\st Division. G.O.C., Hope, with Howard as assistant ; A 
[Maitland for Howard], 1/lst Guards, 3/lst Guards, 1 company 
5/60th ; B [Stopford], 1st Coldstreams, 1st Scots, 1 company 
5/60th ; C [Hiniiber], 1st, 2nd and 5th Lme, K.G.L. ; 1st 
and 2nd Light BattaUons, K.G.L. ; D [Aylmer], 2/62nd, 
76th, 77th, 85th. 

^Tid Division. G.O.C., W. Stewart. A [Barnes], l/50th, l/71st, 
l/92nd, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Byng], l/3rd, l/57th, 1st 
Provisional Battahon (2/31st and 2/66th), 1 company 5/60th ; 
C [Prmgle], l/28th, 2/34th, l/39th, 1 company 5/60th; also 
Ashworth's Portuguese. 

^rd Division. G.O.C., Picton. A [Brisbane], l/45th, Head- 
quarters 5/60th, 74th, l/88th ; B [Keane], l/5th, 2/83rd, 
2/87th, 94th; also Power's Portuguese. 

m Division. G.O.C., Cole. A [W. Anson], 3/27th, l/40th, 
l/48th, 2nd Provisional Battalion (2nd and 2/53rd], 1 



372 Divisional and Brigade Organization 

company Brunswick Oels ; B [Ross], l/7th, l/20th, l/23rd, 
1 company 5/60th; also Vasooncellos' Portuguese. 

6th Division. G.O.C., Colville. A [Hay], 3/lst, l/9tli, l/38th, 
2/47th, 1 company Brunswick Oels; B [Robinson], l/4tli, 
2/59th, 2/84th, 1 company Brunswick Oels; also deRegoa's 
Portuguese. 

m Division, G.O.C., Clinton. A [Pack], l/42nd, l/79th, 
l/91st, 1 company 5/60th ; B [Lambert], l/llth, l/32nd, 
l/36tli, l/61st, 1 company 5/60tli; also Douglas' Portu- 
guese. 

1th Division. G.O.C., Walker. A [Gardiner], l/6th, 3rd Pro- 
visional Battalion (2/24th and 2/58th), Headquarters 
Brunswick Oels; B [Inglis], 51st, 68th, I/82nd, Chasseurs 
Britanniques ; also Doyle's Portuguese. 

Light Division. G.O.C., C. Alten. A [Kempt], l/43rd, l/95th, 
3/95th, 1st CaQadores; B [Colborne], l/52nd, 2/95th, 3rd 
Cagadores, 17th Portuguese. 

Portuguese. Le Cor's division, with Da Costa and Buchan 
commanding brigades. Unattached brigades under A. 
Campbell and Bradford. 
Subsequent changes were : — 

Cavalry. By January 16 several changes had taken place : 
V. Alten had gone and Vivian had been transferred to his 
brigade. Fane having transferred from B to D (late Vivian's). 
Bock also went (he was drowned off the coast of Brittany in 
February), about the same time. 

From January 25 W. Ponsonby was absent, Lord C. 
Manners of 3rd Dragoons commanding his brigade. 

By March 25 Arentschildt (of 1st K.G.L. Hussars) had 
been given Bock's old brigade : on Vivian being wounded 
(April 8) Arentschildt was transferred to E, and Biilow got 
the " German Heavy Brigade." 

Fane's name appears in the " States," both as commanding 
B and D. According to the Regimental History of the 
lUh Hussars (by Col. H. B. Hamilton), he commanded both, 
working them practically as a division, the brigades being 



Changes in 1814 373 

respectively commanded by Clifton of the Royals (B), and 
Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons (D). 

1st Division. l/37th joined Aylmer's brigade before March 25. 
On April 14 Stopford was wounded at Bayonne and his 
division went to Guise. 

2nd Division. On February 15 Pringle was wounded, and 
O'Callaghan commanded the brigade. 

It was arranged that when Lord Dalhousie rejoined, and 
resumed command of the 7th Division, Walker should revert 
to II A and Barnes take over III B, but Walker was wounded 
at Orthez and went home, so the arrangement was never 
carried out. 

By January 16 Harding had replaced Ash worth m com- 
mand of the 5th Portuguese brigade. 

3rd Division. No changes : Brisbane was slightly wounded at 
Toulouse. 

^th Division. Ross was wounded at Orthez (February 27), and 
the brigade was without a G.O.C. 

5th Division. After February 1 Robinson was absent. 
Hay was killed before Bayonne April 14. 

6th Division. Pack was wounded at Toulouse, as was also 
Douglas. 
l/32nd missed Toulouse, bemg at San Jean de Luz refitting. 

Ith Division. Walker was wounded at Orthez, and went home : 
Dalhousie arrivuig almost immediately after the battle 
and resuming command. 

By January 16, the Portuguese brigade was under Doyle 
(he may have got it when Le Cor obtauied command of the 
Portuguese division.) 

Light Division. l/43rd and l/95th both missed Orthez, being 
away refitting. 

Portuguese. Da Costa was ordered back to Portugal before 
March 15. 



APPENDIX III. 

PENINSULAR AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, JOURNALS, 
LETTERS, ETC. 

The subjoined list, which includes all the printed autobiographies, 
diaries, journals, and series of letters utilized in this volume, makes 
no pretensions to be exhaustive. It contains, however, all the 
more important original sources of this character, as opposed to 
formal histories, controversial monographs, and biographies of 
Peninsular officers written by authors who were not themselves 
engaged in the war. But I have added to the list those later 
biographies which contain a great proportion of original and con. 
temporary letters or diaries, such as Delavoye's Life of Lord Lynedoch, 
Rait's Life of Lord Gough, Wrottesley's Life of Sir John Burgoyne^ 
and C. Vivian's Life of Lord Vivian. Much valuable first-hand 
information is imbedded in such works. 

The books are arranged under headings according to the position 
which the writer held in the Peninsular War, mainly by regiments 
but partly under departmental sections [staff, commissariat, medical 
etc.]. ' I trust that the list may be found useful for those wishing to 
compile regimental, brigade, or divisional annals of any part of 
the war. 

I. STAFF. 

[Inchidi7ig the Diaries, Memoirs, Correspondence, etc., of General 
Officers, their Aides-de-Camp, and Officers attached to Head. 
Quarters.] 

Blayney (Lord). Narrative of a Forced Journey through Spain and 
France, by Major- General Lord Blayney [The Fuengirola 
Expedition, etc.]. London, 1814. 

Burghersh (Lord). Memoir of the Early Campaign of the Duke of 
Wellington in Portugal and Spain [anon J. London, 1820. 



376 Regimental BiBLioaEAPHY 

Cotton, Sir S. Life and Correspondence of Field-Marshal Lord 

Combermere [Sir Stapleton Cotton], ed. by Viscountess Comber- 
mere and Capt. W. KnoUys. London, 1866. 
Douglas, Sir H. Life of General Sir Howard Douglas from his Notes, 

Conversation, and Letters [Campaigns of 1811-14]. London, 

1863. 
Fitzclarence, A. An Account of the British Campaign of 1809 under 

Sir A. Wellesley in Portugal and Spain by Lt.-Col. Fitzclarence 

[Earl of Munster]. London, 1831. 
Graham, Sir T. Life and Letters of Sir Thomas Graham, Lord 

Lynedoch, by Captain A. M. Delavoye. London, 1868. 
Gomm (Sir W.). His Letters and Journals from 1799 to Waterloo 

[1808-9 and 1810-14]. London, 1881. 
Larpent, F. S. The Private Journal of Judge- Advocate F. S. Larpent, 

attached to Lord Wellington's Headquarters, 1812-14. London, 

1853. 
Leith Hay, A. Narrative of the Peninsular War, by Sir Andrew 

Leith Hay [Aide-de-Camp to General Leith]. 2 vols. London, 

1879. 
Mackmnon, General Henry. Journal in Portugal and Spain, 1809-12 

[Privately Printed]. 1812. 
Moore, Sir J. The Diary of Sir John Moore, ed. by General Sir T. F. 

Maurice. 2 vols. London, 1904. 
Picton, Sir T. Memoirs and Correspondence of General Sir T. Picton, 

by H. B. Robinson. 2 vols. London, 1836. 
Porter, Sir R. K. Letters from Portugal and Spain written during 

the March of the British Troops [by Sir Robert Ker Porter], 

1808-9. London, 1809. 
Shaw-Kennedy, T. [Aide-de-Camp to General Craufurd]. Diary of 

1810, printed in Lord Fitzclarence's Manual of Outpost Duties. 

London, 1849. 
Sorell, T. S. Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9, by Lieut.-Col. T. S. 

Sorell, Aide-de-Camp to Sir D. Baird. London, 1828. 
Stewart, Sir Chas. Lives and Correspondence of the Second and Third 

Marquesses of Londonderry [the third was Chas. Stewart, 

Adjutant-General to Wellington]. 3 vols. London, 1861. 
Vere, C. B. Marches, Movements, and Operations of the 4th 

Division, m Spain and Portugal, 1810-12, by Chas. Brooke 

Vere, Assistant Quarter-Master General of the Division. Ipswich, 

1841. 



Regimental Bibliography 377 

ii. regimental reminiscences and journals. 

(a) Cavalry. 

7th Hussars. Vivian (Lord). Richard Hussey Vivian, First Baron 

Vivian, Memoir and Letters, by Hon. Claud Vivian [1808-9 

and 1813-14]. London, 1897. 
Ilth Light Dragoons. Farmer, G. " The Light Dragoon," the 

story of Geo. Farmer, 11th Light Dragoons, ed. Rev. G, R. 

Gleig [1811 and Waterloo]. London, 1844. 
14th Light Dragoons. Hawker, Peter. Journal of the Campaign 

of 1809, by Lieut.-Col. Hawker, 14th Light Dragoons. London, 

1810. 
16th Light Dragoons. Hay, W. Reminiscences under Wellington, 

1808-15, by Captain William Hay, 52nd Foot and 16th Light 

Dragoons. London, 1901. 
. Tomkinson, W. The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the 

Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 1809-15. London, 1894. 
18th Hussars. Woodberry, G. Journal of Lieutenant Woodberry 

in the Campaigns of 1813-15. Paris, 1896. 
20th Light Dragoons, Landsheit (N.). The Hussar: the story of 

Norbert Landsheit, Sergeant in the York Hussars and the 20th 

Light Dragoons, ed. Rev. G. R. Gleig. London, 1837. 
Anonymous. Jottings from my Sabretache, by a Chelsea Pensioner 

[Campaigns of 1813-14]. London, 1847. 
. Personal Narrative of Adventures in the Peninsular War, 

1812-13, by an Officer in the Staff Corps Cavalry. London, 1827. 

(6) Infantry. 

1st Foot Guards. Batty, R. The Campaign in the Pyrenees and 
Southern France, 1813-14, by Captain Robert Batty, 1st Foot 
Guards. Illustrated. London, 1823. 

2nd Foot Guards. Stepney, S. C. Leaves from the Diary of an 
Officer of the Guard, Sketches of Campaigning Life, by Lieut.- 
Col. S. Cowell Stepney, K.H., Coldstream Guards [Campaigns of 
1810-12]. London, 1854. 

3rd Foot Guards. Stevenson, J. Twenty-One Years in the British 
Foot Guards, by John Stevenson, 3rd Foot Guards, sixteen 
years a non-commissioned officer, forty years a Wesleyan class- 
leader [Campaigns of 1809-11]. London, 1830. 



378 Regimental Bibliography 

3rd Foot Guards. Stothert, W. Journal of the Campaigns of 

1809-11, by Captain William Stothert, 3rd Foot Guards. 

London, 1812. 
3rd Foot (the Buffs). Reminiscences of a Veteran, being Personal 

and MiUtary Adventures in the Peninsula, etc., by Lieut.-Gen. 

T. Bunbury [only 1808-9 in the Buffs]. London, 1861. 
5th Foot. Morley, S. Memoirs of a Sergeant of the 5th Regiment, 

by Sergeant Stephen Morley, 5th Foot [Campaigns of 1808-11]. 

Ashford, 1842. 
7th Foot. Cooper, J. S. Rough Notes of Seven Campaigns in 

Portugal, etc., by John Spenser Cooper, Sergeant 7th Royal 

Fusiliers. Carlisle, 1869. 
. Knowles, R. Letters of Lieut. Robert Knowles, 7th 

Fusiliers, during the Campaigns of 1811-13, ed. by Sir Lees 

Knowles, Bart. Bolton, 1909. 
9th Foot. Hale, J. Journal of James Hale, late Sergeant 9th 

Foot [1808-14]. Cirencester, 1826. 
20th Foot. Steevens, C. Reminiscences of Col. Chas. Steevens, 

1795-1818 [Campaigns of 1808 and 1813-14]. Winchester, 

1878. 
24th Foot. Tidy, C. Recollections of an Old Soldier, a Biographical 

Sketch of the Late Col. Tidy, C.B., 24th Regt. [1808]. London, 

1849. 
28th Foot. Cadell, C. Narrative of the Campaigns of the 28th 

Regt. from 1802 to 1832, by Col. Chas. Cadell [1809-1814]. 

London, 1835. 
. Blakeney, R. Services, Adventures, , and Experiences 

of Capt. Robert Blakeney, " A Boy in the Peninsular War," 

edited by JuHan Sturgis [1808-14]. London, 1899. 
29th Foot. Leslie. Journal during the Peninsular War, etc., of 

Colonel Leslie of Balquain [1809-14]. Aberdeen, 1887. 
. Leith-Hay, A. A Narrative of the Peninsular War, by Sir 

Andrew Leith Hay (personal adventures, first with the 29th, 

then as Aide-de-Camp to General Leith). London, 1839. 
31st Foot. L'Estrange, G. Recollections of Sir George L'Estrange, 

1812-14. London, 1873. 
32nd Foot. Ross-Lewin, H. Life of a Soldier, a Narrative of 27 

years' service in various parts of the World, by a Field 

Officer [Major H. Ross-Lewin] [1808-14]. 2 vols. London, 

1834. 



Regimental Bibliography 379 

34th Foot. Bell, G. Rough Notes by an Old Soldier, during Fifty 
Years' Service, from Ensign to Major-General. 2 vols. [Cam- 
paigns of 1811-14]. London, 1867. 

40th Foot. Lawrence, W. The Autobiography of Sergeant Wm. 
Lawrence, 40th Regt., ed. by G. N. Banks [Campaigns of 
1808-14]. London, 1901. 

42nd Foot. Anton, J. Retrospect of a Military Life, during the 
most Eventful Period of the late War, by James Anton, Quarter- 
master-Sergeant, 42nd Highlanders [1813-14]. Edinburgh, 
1841. 

. Malcolm, J. Reminiscences of the Campaign in the 

Pyrenees and the South of France in 1813-14, by John Malcolm, 
Lieut. 42nd Foot : in Constable's Memorials of the Late Wars. 
Edinburgh, 1828. 

. Anon. Personal Narrative of a Private Soldier who 

served in the 42nd Highlanders for Twelve Years [1808-9 and 
1811-14]. 1821. 

43rd Foot. Cooke, J. H. Memoir of the late War, a Personal 
Narrative of Captain J. H. Cooke, 43rd Light Infantry [Cam- 
paigns of 1811-14]. London, 1831. 

. . A Narrative of Events in the South of France and 

America, 1814-15 [continuation of the above]. London, 1835. 

. Napier, Geo. The Early Military Life of Gen. Sir Geo. 

Napier, K.C.B., written by himself. London, 1886. 

. Anon. Memoirs of a Sergeant late of the 43rd Light 

Infantry, previously to and during the Peninsular War, including 
the account of his Conversion from Popery to the Protestant 
Religion. London, 1835. 

47th Foot. Harley, J. The Veteran, or Forty Years in the British 
Service, by Capt. John Harley, late Paymaster 47th Regt. 
[Campaigns of 1811-14]. London, 1838. 

48th Foot. Moyle Sherer, G. Recollections of the Peninsula, by 
Col. G. Moyle Sherer [Campaigns of 1809-13]. London, 
1823. 

50th Foot. MacCarthy, J. The Storm of Badajoz, with a Note on 
the Battle of Corunna, by J. MacCarthy, late 50th Regt. 
London, 1836. 

. Napier, Chas. Life and Opinions of Sir Charles James 

Napier, by Sir William Napier [First vol. for the 50th at 
Corunna, etc.]. London, 1857. 



\^ 



380 Regimental Bibliography 

50th Foot. Patterson, J. Adventures of Captain John Patterson, 

with Notices of the Officers of the 50th Queen's Regiment, 

1807-21. London, 1837. 
. Patterson, J. Camp and Quarters, Scenes and Impressions 

of MiKtary Life by the same Author. London, 1843. 
51st Foot. Wheeler, W. Journal from the year 1809 to 1816 by 

William Wheeler, a Soldier of the 51st or King's Own Light 

Infantry. Corfu, 1824. 
62nd Foot. Hay, W. Reminiscences under Wellington, 1808-15, 

by Captain William Hay, 52nd Foot and 16th Light Dragoons. 

London, 1901. 
. Seaton (Lord). Life and Letters of Sir John Colborne 

[Lord Seaton], ed. by G. C. Moore-Smith. London, 1903. 
66th Foot. Henry, W. Events of a Military Life, being Recollec- 
tions of the Service in the Peninsula, etc., of Walter Henry, 

Surgeon, 66th Regt. [Campaign of 1812-14]. London, 

1843. 
68th Foot. Green, J. Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life, by John 

Green, late of the 68th Durham Light Infantry. Louth, 

1827. 
71st Foot. Anon. Vicissitudes in the Life of a Scottish Soldier, 

1808 to 1815, including some particulars of the Battle of 

Waterloo. London, 1827. 
. Anon, TS. Journal of T. S. of the 71st Highland Light 

Infantry, in Memorials of the Late Wars [ed. Constable]. 

Edmburgh, 1828. 
82nd Foot. Wood, G. The Subaltern Officer, a Narrative by 

Captain Geo. Wood of the 82nd Prince of Wales's Volunteers 

[1808 and 1813-14]. London, 1825. 
85th Foot. Gleig, G. R. The Subaltern [Campaigns in the Pyrenees 

and South of France, 1813-14], by G. R. Gleig, 85th Foot. 

London, 1823. 
87th Foot. Gough [Lord]. See Letters 1809-14 in R. S. Rait's Life 

of Lord Gough. 
88th Foot. Grattan, W. Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, 

1804-14, by Lieut. Wm. Grattan. London, 1847. 

. . Second series of Reminiscences. London, 1853. 

92nd Foot. Hope, J. Military Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, 

1809-16 [Lieut. Jas. Hope, 92nd Highlanders]. London, 

1833. 



Regimental Bibliography 381 

92nd Foot. Anon. Letters from Portugal, etc., during the Cam- 
paigns of 1811-14 by a British Officer [92nd Gordon High- 
landers]. London, 1819. 

, Robertson, D. Journal of Sergeant D. Robertson, late 

92nd Highlanders, during the Campaigns between 1797 and 1818. 
Perth, 1842. 
94th Foot. Donaldson, J. Recollection of an Eventful Life, chiefly • 
passed in the Army, by Joseph Donaldson, Sergeant 94th 
Scotch Brigade [1809-U]. London, 1825. 
95th [Rifle Brigade]. Costello, E. Memohs of Edward Costello of 
the Rifle Brigade, comprising narratives of Wellington's 
Campaigns in the Peninsula, etc. London, 1857. 

. Fernyhough, R. Military Memoirs of Four Brothers, by the 

survivor, Lieut. R. Fernyhough, Rifle Brigade. London, 
1829. 

. Green, W. A brief Outline of the Travels and Adventures 

of Wm. Green, Bugler, Rifle Brigade, during a period of ten 
years, 1802-12. Coventry, 1857. 

. Harris. Recollections of Rifleman Harris, ed. by Capt. ^7 

Curling [1808-09]. London, 1848. A 

. Kincaid, J. Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, in the 

Peninsula, France, and the Netherlands, 1810-15, by Captain 
Sir John Kincaid. London, 1830. 
. . Random Shots from a Rifleman [Miscellaneous Anec- 
dotes]. London, 1835. 

. Leach, J. Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier, 

during a service in the West Indies, the Peninsula, etc. [1808-14]. 
London, 1831. 

. . Rambles on the Banks of Styx [Peninsular 

Reminiscences], by the same author. London, 1847. 
. Simmons, G. A British Rifleman : Journals and Corre- 
spondence of Major Geo. Simmons (95th) during the Peninsular 
War, etc., ed. Col. Willoughby Verner. London, 1899. 
— — . Smith, H. The Autobiography of General Sir Harry Smith 
[vol. i. contains Peninsular Memoirs], ed. G. Moore Smith. 
London, 1901. 

. Surtees, W. Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade, by 

Wm. Surtees, Quartermaster [1808, 1811-14]. London, 
1833. 



382 Regimental Bibliography 

iii. artillery. 

Dickson, Alex. The Dickson Papers, Diaries and Correspondence 
of Major-General Sir Alexander Dickson, G.C.B. Series 1809-18. 
ed. by Major John Leslie, R.A. 2 vols. Woolwich, 1908-12. 
Frazer, A. S. Letters of Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, K.C.B., Com- 
manding Royal Horse Artillery under Wellington, written 
during the Peninsular Campaigns. London, 1859. 
[See also numerous short Journals and Series of Letters m the 
Journal of the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, in recent 
years, Swabey, Ingilby, Downman, etc.] 

IV. ENGINEERS. 

Burgoyne, J. F. Life and Correspondence of Sir John Fox Burgoyne, 
ed. Hon. Geo. Wrottesley. London, 1873. 

Boothby, C. Under England's Flag, 1804-9, Memoirs, Diary, and 
Correspondence of Captain C. Boothby, R.E. [Corunna Cam- 
paign]. London, 1900. 

. A Prisoner of France, by the same [Oporto and Talavera 

Campaigns]. London, 1898. 

Landmann, G. T. Recollections of Military Life, 1806-8 [Vimeiro 
Campaign], by Colonel Geo. Landmann, R.E. London, 1854. 

V. TRAIN AND COMMISSARIAT. 

Dallas, A. Autobiography of the Rev. Alexander Dallas, including 

his service in the Peninsula [1811-14] in the Commissariat 

Department. London, 1870. 
Chesterton, G. L. Peace, War, and Adventure, an Autobiography 

by George Laval Chesterton [vol. i. contains service in Catalonia 

1812-14]. London, 1853. 
Graham, W. Travels in Portugal and Spain, 1812-14, by William 

Graham of the Commissariat Department. London, 1820. 
Head, F. Memoirs of an Assistant-Commissary-General (in the 

Peninsular War), by Gen. F. Head. London, 1840. 
Hennegan, R. D. Seven Years in the Peninsula and the Netherlands, 

by Sir Richard D. Hennegan, of the Field Train [Campaigns of 

1808-14]. London, 1846. 

VI. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

Henry, W. Events of a Military Life, Recollections of the Peninsular 
War, etc., by Surgeon Walter Henry, 66th Regt. London, 1843. 



Regimental Bibliography 383 

McGrigor, J. The Autobiography and Services of Sir Jas. McGrigor, 
Bart., late Director General of the Medical Department 
[1812-14]. London, 1861. 

Neale, A. Letters from Portugal and Spain [Vimeiro and Corunna), 
by Adam Neale, M.D. London, 1809. 

VII. WORKS BY CHAPLAINS. 

Bradford, W. Sketches of the Country, Character, and Costume in 
Portugal and Spain, 1808-9, by Rev. Wm. Bradford, Chaplam 
of Brigade. 40 coloured plates. London, 1810. 

Ormsby, J. W. Operations of the British Army hi Portugal and 
Spain, 1808-9, by Rev. Jas. Wilmot Ormsby, with appendices, 
etc. London, 1809. 

VIII. OFFICERS IN THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION, 
Hartmann, Sir Julius, Ein Lebenskizze, 1808-15. Berlin, 1901. 
Ompteda, Baron, C. Memoir and Letters of Baron Christian Ompteda, 

Colonel in the King's German Legion [Campaigns of 1812-14]. 

London, 1894. 
Anon. Journal of an Officer of the King's German Legion, 1803-16. 

London, 1827. 

IX. WORKS BY OFFICERS IN THE PORTUGUESE SERVICE. 

Blakiston, J. Twelve Years' Mihtary Adventure, in three Quarters 

of the Globe [by Major John Blakiston], 1813-14, with the 

Portuguese Cacadores. 1829. 
Bunbury, T. Reminiscences of a Veteran, Personal and Military 

Adventures in the Peninsula, etc. [1810-14 with the 20th 

Portuguese Lme]. 1861. 
Mayne, R., and Lilhe, J. W- The Loyal Lusitanian Legion, 1808-10. 

London, 1812. 
Warre, G. Letters, 1808-12, of Sir George Warre [of the Portuguese 

Staff], ed. by Rev. E. Warre, D.D. London, 1909. 

X. OFFICERS IN THE SPANISH SERVICE. 

Whittingham, Sir S. Memoir [and Correspondence] of Lieut.-Gen. 
Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham. London, 1868. 



INDEX 



Abrantes, importance of, as a 
depot, 311 

Accursio das Neves, Jose, Portu- 
guese historian, 21 

Adjutant - General, office and 
duties of, in Wellington's 
army, 156-7 

Albuera, campaign of, strictures 
on Napier's account of, 2 ; use 
of the ordre mixte by the 
French at, 85, 86 ; Blakeney's 
account of, 86 ; W. Stewart's 
blunder at, 88 ; Beresford's 
mistakes at, 120 ; losses at, 
190 ; gallant behaviour of 
Harvey's brigade at, 234 

Americans, the Royal, or 60th 
Foot, their rifle -battalion, 75, 
227-228 ; its uniform, 300 

American War of 1775-82, use 
of light troops in, 75 

American War of 1812-14, its 
influence on the Peninsular 
War, 308 

Archives de la Guerre, French 
i military documents at, 16 

Archives Nationales, French mili- 
tary documents at, 16 

Arroyo dos Molinos, siu-prise of 
the French at, 109, 117 

Arteche, General, his History 
of the Peninsular War, 38 

Artificers, the Royal IVIilitary, 
281 ; re-organized as Sappers 
and IMiners, 285-6 ; uniform 
of, 299 

Artillery, Wellington's use of, 
113 ; distribution of, in divi- 
sions, 176 J weakness of, in 



Wellington's army, 281 ; use 
of, in sieges, 281-3 ; uniform 
of, 298 
Auxiliary troops, the German 
and Portuguese, with Welling- 
ton's army, 220-36 



Badajoz, gallant services of 
Engineers at, 47, 48 ; storm- 
ing of, 57 ; Picton at, 135 ; 
sack of, 213, 290 ; sieges of, 
281-3, 284-5, 289 

Baggage, with the British army, 
268-71 

Baird, General Sir David, his 
despatches in the Record 
Office, 15 

" Baker Rifle," the, 302-3 

Barnard, Colonel Sir Andrew, 
commands Light Division after 
Craufurd's death, 197-8 

Barquilla, combat of, 100 

Bathurst, Lieut-Col. James, 
Military Secretary to Wel- 
lington, 153 

Battalions, establishment of the 
various, in the British army, 
178-81 ; and see Appendix I 

Beamish, Major Ludlow, his 
History of the King's German 
Legion, 34 ; his description of 
combat of Garcia Hernandez, 
101, 221 

Beckwith, Colonel John, his 
dealings with the Waldenses, 
331 

" Belemites," or " Belem Ran- 
gers," the, 204, 328 

2 c 



386 



Index 



Bell, Sir George, his Rough 
Notes of Fifty Years' Ser- 
vicef 24, 254 ; his description 
of soldiers' wives, 274-5 

Bell, Sir John, his notes on 
Craufurd's march to Talavera, 
24 

Belmas, Colonel, his Journaux 
des Sieges dans la Peninsule, 
1807-13.. 21 

Bentinck, Lord W., his dis- 
patches, 15 

Beresford, William Carr, Lord, 
his strictures on Napier's 
History f 2 ; his General Orders 
for the Portuguese Army, 13 ; 
account of, by Cole, 36 ; 
Wellington's regard for, 46 ; 
his character and capacity, 
119 ; reorganizes the Portu- 
guese army, 119-20, 231-3 ; 
Wellington's confidence in, 120 

Blakeney, Captain Robert, 28th 
Foot, his Autobiography, A 
Boy in the Peninsular War, 
22, 25, 28, 29, 200 

Blakeney, Colonel T., 7th Foot, 
his account of Aibuera, 86 

Blakiston, Major John, his 
Memoirs, 35 

Blayney, Lord, his MS. at the 
Record Office, 15 

Bock, General, his mismanage- 
ment of cavalry at Venta del 
Pozo, 108 ; his exploit at 
Garcia Hernandez, 176, 224 

Boothby, Captain Charles, R.E., 
his diaries, 7, 34, 331 

Botelho, Major Texiera, his 
history of Portuguese Artil- 
lery, 35 

Borthwick, Major-General, chief 
of artillery, 158 

Brigades, the, of Wellington's 
army, their organization, 163- 
71 ; and see Appendix II 

" Brown Bess " used in Peninsu- 
lar army, 301 

Brunswick Oels, regiment, his- 
tory of, by Colonel Kortfleisch, 
35 ; used as light infantry, 
76 ; services of, in the Penin- 
sula, 224, 225, 243 



Bugeaud, Marshal, his account 
of an attack of column on line, 
90-2 

Bunbury, Colonel Thomas, Me- 
moirs of, 35 

Burgos, Wellington's retreat 
from, 58, 59 ; hardships of the 
retreat, 266, 267; siege of, 
286, 287 

Bussaco, battle of, Wellington's 
tactics at, 80, 89 ; Craufurd's 
tactics at, 145 ; Light Division 
Cagadores at, 234 



C. 



Cagadores, Portuguese rifle bat- 
talions with British army, 83, 
230 ; uniform of, 301 

Camp-followers, with the Penin- 
sular army, 272-3 

Camp-kettles, improvements in, 
263 

Campo-Mayor, cavalry charge 
at, 105 

Canning, George, his correspond- 
ence with Wellington about 
the war, 52 

Cannon, Richard, his edition of 
Regimental Histories, 32-3 

Capataz, the Portuguese, 312- 
13 

Cashiering, the punishment of, 
how earned, 238-40 

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, 
Viscount, his correspondence 
with Sir J. Moore, 15, 183; 
with Welhngton, 50 ; develops 
system of recruiting from the 
militia, 209 

Cavalry, the, Wellington's tac- 
tics, 94 ; difficulties of, in the 
Peninsula, 95-7 ; French tac- 
tics, 97-102 ; Wellington's use 
of, 102-4 ; his remarks on 
British cavalry, 104, 109 , 
shortcomings of British 
cavalry leaders, 106; Wel- 
lington's " Instructions " for, 
111, 112; strength of, in 
Wellington's army, 191-4 ; 
uniforms of, 296-8 



Index 



387 



Chaplains, army, their short- 
comings, Wellington asks for 
adequate establishment of, 
325-6 

Chasseurs Britanniques, no His- 
tory of, 35 ; services of, 76, 
86-7 ; formation and doings 
of, 225-7; desertion prevalent 
in, 243 

Cimitiere, Captain, command of 
a brigade devolved on, after 
Albuera, 196-7 

Ciudad Rodrigo, storming of, 
57 ; Craufurd slain at, 146 ; 
sack of, 213; siege of, 283, 
289 

Cocked hat, the, disused by 
regimental officers, 293-4 ; 
worn by heavy dragoons, 296 ; 
by doctors and commissaries, 
299 

" Conversion," some anecdotes 
concerning, 322-4 

Corporal punishment, Welling- 
ton on, 43 ; details of, 148, 
237-8, 251-4 

Clerc, Commandant, his account 
of Soult's Pyrenean campaign, 
38 

Coa, combat of the, 144 

Coiners in the army, 214 

Colborne, Sir John, Lord Seaton, 
Life of, by Moore Smith, 37 ; 
his remarks on Wellington's 
Waterloo dispatch, 48 ; com- 
mands brigade at Albuera, 
197 ; his remarks on the 
system of recruiting, 212 ; his 
religious character, 330 

Cole, J. W., his Memoirs of 
British Generals, 36 

Cole, General Sir LowTy, his 
controversy with Napier, 2 ; 
his achievement at Albuera, 
150 

Combermere, Lord. See Cotton 

Commissariat Department, im- 
portance of, 161 ; manage- 
ment of, in Wellington's army, 
307-19 

Commissary-Ceneral, his duties, 
161, 311-14 

Connaught Rangers, feud of, with 



Picton, 133 ; anecdotes of, 
246-7 

Connolly, T., his History of the 
Sappers and Miners, 34 

Cooper, J., Sergeant 7th Foot, 
his Seven Campaigns in Portu- 
gal, 31 

Cope, Sir W. H., his History of 
the Rifle Brigade, 33 

Costello, Edward, his Reminis- 
cences, 30 

Cotton, Sir Stapleton, Lord 
Combermere, biography of, 
36 ; Wellington's opinion of, 
46 ; his capacity as leader of 
cavalry, 103, 104, 106, 110, 176 

Court-martials, character of, 
241-8 

Craufurd, General Robert, his 
treatment by Wellington, 46 ; 
his abilities and career, 139- 
40 ; captured at Buenos 
Ayres, 141 ; commands the 
Light Division, 142-4, 167 ; 
fights the combat of the Coa, 
144 ; his relations with Wel- 
lington, 145 ; repulses Ney at 
Bussaco, 145 ; his retreat at 
Fuentes de Oiioro, 145 ; killed 
at Ciudad Rodrigo, 146 ; inci- 
dent at his funeral, 149 ; in- 
stitution of the Light Divi- 
sion, 168-9 ; his arrangements 
for marching, 263 

Crime in the army, 237-51 

Currie, Captain R., his wife with 
the army, 276, 278, note. 

D. 

Dalbiac, Mrs., her adventures at 
Salamanca, 277 

Dallas, Rev. Alexander, his 
diary, 7 ; description of his 
commissariat work, 317 ; takes 
orders, 331 

Delafosse, Lemonnier, his Sou- 
venirs Militaires, 31 

Desertion, punishment of, 243 ; 
prevalence of, in the foreign 
corps, 223, 225-6 

Dickson, Colonel Sir Alexander, 
commands artillery, 158 ; at 



388 



Index 



the sieges of Badajoz, 281-3 ; 
at Villa da Ponte, 312; his 
papers edited by Major Leslie, 
22, 34 

D'lllens, Major A., his reminis- 
cences of Soult's campaigns, 
32 

Dispatches, the Wellington, 9- 
12 ; Supplementary, 12 

Divisions, the, of Wellington's 
army, 163-77 ; sobriquets of, 
172 ; and see Appendix II 

Donaldson, Sergeant Joseph, 
94th Foot, his Reminiscences, 
30 ; anecdotes from, 249-50, 
290, 322 

Douro, river, importance of, as 
a line of supply, 312 

Dragoons, uniform of. Heavy 
and Light, 296-7 

Drill-books, the French, 63, 69 ; 
the British, 77 

Duels, in the Army, 201-2 

Dumas, Colonel, his accoimt of 
Soult's campaign in the Pyre- 
nees, 38 

Dundas, Sir David, his views on 
tactics, 77 

D'Urban, General Sir Benjamin, 
criticizes Napier, 2 ; his mem- 
orandum on the Portuguese 
army, 233 ; at Salamanca, 
234 ; his account of Majada- 
honda, 235 



E. 

El Bodon, retreat of British 
troops in square at, 100 ; 
Grattan's description of Picton 
at, 134 

Elphinstone, Lieut. -Colonel, com- 
mands Royal Engineers, 158 

Engineers, rank and file of, 
called " Royal Military Arti- 
ficers," and later ** Royal Sap- 
pers and Miners," 281, 286 ; 
weakness of Wellington's 
army in, 281 ; Wellington's 
criticism of, 284-5 

Erskine, General Sir William, 
Wellington's mention of him 



in dispatches, 47 ; his blun- 
ders at Casal Novo and Sabu- 
gal, 151 
Executions, by shooting, 243 ; 
by hanging, 244 



Fantin des Odoards, General L., 
his Memoirs, 31 

Fisher, Colonel G. B., chief of 
artillery, 158 

Flanders, British campaigns of 
1793-4 in, 4, 66, 74, 80 

" Flankers," use of, in the 
British army, 74-5 

Fletcher, Colonel Richard, re- 
marks on Wellington's omis- 
sion to mention Engineers at 
Badajoz, 48 ; Wellington's 
instructions to, for Lines of 
Torres Vedras, 53 ; command- 
ing officer of Royal Engineers, 
158 

Forage, difficulty of providing, 
112, 269 

Fortescue, Hon. J., his History 
of the British Army, 38, 208 

Foy, General M., his Guerre de 
la Peninsule, 19 ; his Life, 19 ; 
his estimate of English in- 
fantry, 20 ; remarks on Wel- 
lington's strategy at Sala- 
manca, 58 ; records Na- 
poleon's views on infantry 
tactics, 72 ; his account of 
cavalry charge at Garcia Her- 
nandez, 101 ; his testimony to 
British officers, 204 ; his de- 
scription of the impedimenta 
with the British army on the 
march, 268 ; note of, on the 
British dragoon uniform, 297 

Foz d'Arouce, Ney surprised at, 
109 

Framingham, Colonel H., chief 
of artillery, 158 

Frederic the Great, infantry 
tactics of, 62 ; followed by 
French, 63-5, 69-70; his 
cavalry tactics, 97-8 

French Revolutionary War, its 



Index 



389 



importance in English history, 
4, 5, 320-1 ; tactics of the, 
63-8 

Fuente Guinaldo, Wellington's 
tactics at, 55, 81 

Fuentes de Oiioro, Wellington's 
omission to mention artillery- 
service at, 47 ; retreat of the 
Light Division at, 100 ; cavalry 
at, 103 ; Chasseurs Britan- 
niques at, 227 

Fusil, the, 302 



G. 



Garcia Hernandez, combat of, 
101, 103, 224 

Gardyne, Colonel, his Life of a 
Begiment, 33 

" General Orders," Wellington's 
collection of, its value, 13 ; 
Beresford's for the Portuguese 
Army, 13 

" Gentlemen Rankers," notes 
on, 214-15 

German Legion, the King's, 
History of, by Major Beamish, 
34 ; by Captain Schwertfeger, 
34 ; Light Battalions of, 76 ; 
dragoons of, at Garcia Her- 
nandez, 101 ; outpost work of 
its hussars. 111 ; good man- 
agement of their horses, 112 ; 
under Craufurd, 143 ; raised 
in 1804.. 221; in the Penin- 
sula, 222-4, 242 ; imiform of, 
298, 300 

Gleig, Rev. G. R., his Diary, 7 ; 
The Subaltern, 25, 27, 331 

Gomm, Sir William, his Life, 6 ; 
journals, 17 

Gonneville, Colonel A. O., his 
Memories of the War in 
Spain, 32 

Gordon, Colonel James, Quarter- 
master General, 156 

Gough, Hugh, Lord, Life of, by 
R. S. Rait, 37 

Graham, Sir Thomas, Lord 
Lynedoch, his diary, 5-6 ; 
Life of, by Captain Delavoye, 
35 ; Wellington's confidence 



in, 46 ; his career, 122 ; com- 
mands British troops at Cadiz, 

123 ; his victory at Barrosa, 

124 ; his failure at Bergen-op- 
Zoom, 126 ; his character and 
popularity, 127 

Grattan, W., his With the 
Connaught Rangers, 27 ; 
complains of Wellington's for- 
getfulness of Peninsular ser- 
vices, 49 ; his description of 
Picton, 132, 133 ; of the 
storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
290 ; his description of the 
uniforms of the army, 293 

Guards battalions in Wellington's 
army, 179, 180, 181, 194 

Guides, Corps of, in Wellington's 
army, 158, 159 

Guingret, Captain, his reminis- 
cences of Mass^na's campaign 
in Portugal, 32 

Guidons, disuse of, by the 
cavalry, 305 

Gurwood, Colonel J., his edition 
of Wellington's Dispatches, 9- 
12, 19 

GuibertjGeneral, tactical theories 
of, 63, 64, 70 



H. 



Hair-powder, disused on active 
service, 293 ; Wellington's 
dislike for, 294 

Halberd, the, proper weapon of 
sergeants, 303 

Hamilton, Colonel H. B., his 
History of the lith Light 
Dragoons, 33 

Hardinge, Sir Henry, his con- 
troversy with Napier, 2 

Harris, Rifleman, of the 95th, 3, 
31 ; his views on Craufurd, 
147, 148 

Hawker, Colonel Peter, his 
Journal of the Talavera Cam- 
paign, 17 

Hennegan, Sir R. D., his 
Seven Years of Campaign- 
ing, 25 ; describes the march 
of a convoy, 315 



390 



Index 



Hill, Rowland, Lord, his Life by 
Sidney, 36 ; Wellington's re- 
gard for, 46 ; his success at 
Arroyo dos Molinos, 109, 117 ; 
character of, 115-116 ; his 
capacity as a leader, 116-117 ; 
Wellington's confidence in, 
117 ; his brilliant achieve- 
ment at St. Pierre, 118 ; com- 
mander-in-chief, 118 ; com- 
mands the 2nd Division, 166 ; 
religious character of, 330 

Horse Artillery, in the Penin- 
sular Army, 177 ; uniform of, 
299 

Horses, difficulty of feeding, in 
the Peninsula, 112-13 ; pri- 
vate horses of officers, 269-71 

Howarth, Brigadier-General E., 
chief of artillery in Welling- 
ton's army, 157 

Hussars, uniform of, 298 



I. 



Infantry tactics, the, of Welling- 
ton, 61-93 ; French system of, 
63 ; in Wellington's army, 
178-91 



Jones, Sir John, his Journal of 
the Sieges in Spain, in 1811- 
12..21 ; remarks on Welling- 
ton's omission to record ser- 
vices of Engineers at Badajoz, 
47 ; his note on the siege of 
St. Sebastian, 288 

Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste,MarshaIj 
his Guerre d'Eapagne, 20 



K. 



Ker-Porter, Sir Robert, his 

Journal, 1808-9.. 17 
Kincaid, Sir John, 6 note ; his 

Adventures in the Rifle 

Brigade, 28 ; his account of 

Ciudad Rodrigo, 130 



King's German Legion. See 
German Legion 



Ladies at the front, 276-8 

La Pena, General, his inactivity 
at Barrosa, 124 

Lapene, Major, his histories of 
Soult's campaigns, 20 

Larpent, Francis, his Private 
Journal, 17, 159 

Latour-Maubourg, General, de- 
feat of, by Lumley at Usagre, 
107-8 

Lawrence, W., 40th Foot, his 
flogging, 253 ; anecdote of his 
experiences at Waterloo, 306 

Leach, Col. J., his Rough 
Sketches of the Life of an Old 
Soldier, 24 

Leith, Gen. Sir James, his dis- 
patches at the Record Office, 
15 ; memoirs of, 37 ; com- 
mands 5th Division, 169 

Lejeune, General, his picture of 
An English Officer's family on 
the march, 278 

Le Marchant, General Sir John 
Gaspard, his cavalry charge at 
Salamanca, 103, 104, 176; 
head of the Military College, 
204 ; his religious convictions, 
330 

Lemonnier, Delafosse, his Sou- 
venirs Militaires, 31 

Leslie, Major John, his edition 
of the Dickson Papers, 34 

Leslie, Colonel T., of Balquhain, 
his Military Journal, 24 

Light companies, use of, 74 

Light Division, institution of, 
83, 168 ; achievements of 
under Craufurd, 142-9 ; at 
Bussaco, 145 ; at Fuentes 
de Onoro, 145; commanded 
by Alten, 146 

Line v. Column, 61-92 

Ligny, Prussian tactics at, Wel- 
lington's views on, 80-1 

Londonderry, Chas. Stewart, 
Lord, his History of the 



Index 



391 



Peninsular War, 12, 18 ; 
Adjutant-General in Welling- 
ton's Army, 156-7 

Long, Greneral, R. B., his de- 
sponding views, 41 ; weak 
operations of, 106 

Lumley, General W., at Usagre, 
103 ; at Albuera, 107 ; praise 
of, by Pieard, 107 

Lusitanian Legion, the Loyal, 
formed by Sir R. Wilson, 
84, 229 

Luz, Soriano da, his History 
of the Peninsular War, 38 

Lynedoch, Lord. See Graham, 
Sir Thomas 



M. 



Mackinnon, General H., his 
Journal, 17 

Maguilla, cavalry combat of, 105 

Maguire, Lieutenant, leads the 
" forlorn hope " at San Sebas- 
tian, 293 

Maida, battle of, the use of skir- 

; mishers at, 74 ; tactics at, 
77, 78 

Marbot, General M., uses Na- 
pier's History, 23 ; his mis- 
takes and exaggerations, 26 

March, the army on the, accoimt 
of, 255-65 ; Foy's description 
of the British, 268 

Marmont, Auguste, Marshal, his 
autobiography, 20 ; his mis- 
representations, 26 ; com- 
mands Army of Portugal, 56 

Massena, Andre, Marshal, his 
invasion of Portugal in 1809. , 
53 ; foiled by Lines of Torres 
Vedras, 53 

Masterson, Sergeant, captures 
an eagle at Barrosa, 206 

McGrigor, Sir James, his anec- 
dotes of Wellington, 44, 45 ; 
his account of the Medical 
Department in the Peninsular 
army, 160 

Medals, institution of, for good 
service in the regiments, 251 

Medical Department, the, 160 



Menil-Durand, General, his sys- 
tem of infantry tactics, 63 

Methodists, the, influence of, in 
the army, 320-31 

Military Secretary, office of the, 
at Headquarters, 152-3 

Militia, recruiting from, in Wel- 
lington's Army, 209-11 

Minorca Regiment, Stuart's, later 
97th, 227-8 

Money, current, difficulty of 
providing, in the Peninsula, 
161, 214,270, 317 

Moore, General Sir John, bio- 
graphy of, by Sir F. Maurice, 
37 ; his views on the defence 
of Portugal, 51 ; his army, 183 

Moorsom, Captain W. S., his 
History of the 52nd Oxford- 
shire Light Infantry, 33 

Mules, use of, for baggage and 
transport, 269-71, 308-9 

Muleteers, organization of, for 
the army, 312, 313 

Murray, Colonel George, Quarter- 
master-General to Welling- 
ton's army, 155-6 

Murray, John, Commissary- 
General, 156, 161 

Murray, Major-General John, 



N. 



Napier, Sir William, criticism 
of his Peninsular War by 
Beresford, Cole, Hardinge, 
D'Urban, etc., 2 ; his History, 
18; its influence on other 
publications, 23, 24, 29, 32; 
his controversy with Picton's 
biographer, 36 ; complains of 
want of recompense of Penin- 
sular veterans, 49 ; over- 
states Craufurd's march to 
Talavera, 141, 167 ; his severe 
judgment of Craufurd, 147 ; 
his failure to appreciate the 
work of the Portuguese army, 
234 

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor, 
his tactics at Marengo, 69 ; 



392 



Index 



his infantry tactics, 70 ; his 
use of cavalry, 97 ; at Water- 
loo, 102 ; his use of artillery, 
113, 177 

Naval predominance of Great 
Britain, its importance, 310-11 

Newman, Sergeant, of 43rd, his 
exploit, 206 

Nive, battle of, Wellington's 
tactics at, 59 



O. 



Officers, establishment of, in 
Wellington's army, 195 ; pro- 
motion among, 198-201 ; train- 
ing of, 203 ; discipline of, 
237-42 

Oporto, campaign of, Welling- 
ton's, 163, 164 

Ordenanga, the Portuguese, 235- 
6 

Orders, General, publication of, 
13 ; the Portuguese, 13 ; 
account of the marching of the 
army in, 255-65 

Ordre mixte, the, Napoleon's 
preference for, 70-72 

Organization, the, of Welling- 
ton's army, 153-77, and Ap- 
pendix II 

Ormsby, Rev. J. W., his Jour- 
nal of the Campaigns of 1809. . 
9, 17, 325 

Owen, Rev. T., army chaplain, 
his gallant behaviour in action, 
327 

Ox-waggons, use of, its draw- 
backs, 314-15 



P. 



Pack, Sir Denis, Life of, 37 
Paget, Lord, his ability as a 

cavalry leader, 106 
Pakenham, Major-General Ed- 
mund, commands expedition 
to New Orleans, 151 ; Ad- 
jutant-General in Welling- 
ton's army, 157 ; commands 
3rd Division at Salamanca, 198 



Parquin, Captain D., his me- 
moirs, 32 

Paymaster-General, office of, 161 

Peninsular War, history of, by 
Napier, 2, 18, 23, 24, 29, 32, 
36; by Southey, 18; by 
Toreno, 21 ; by Accursio das 
Neves, 21 ; by Arteche, 38 ; 
by Soriano da Luz, 38; by 
Balagny, 38 

Prisoners, the French, 14 ; re- 
cruiting of foreign corps from, 
225-6 

Picton, General Sir Thomas, 
Life of, by H. B. Robinson, 
36 ; his personal relations 
with Wellington, 44, 46, 137, 
138 ; character and career of, 
129-38 ; Governor of Trini- 
dad, 130 ; description of, by 
Grattan, 132, 133; at El 
Bodon, 134 ; his successful 
storm of the castle at Badajoz, 
135, 284 ; wounded at Qua- 
tre Bras, 135 ; killed at 
Waterloo, 136; estimate of 
his character and abilities, 
136-8 

Popham, Sir Home, his MS. at 
the Record Office, 15 

Portugal, defence of, Welling- 
ton's scheme for, 60 

Portuguese Army, account of, 
35 ; artillery of, by Major 
Botelho, 35 ; troops incor- 
porated in British Army, 
83, 168 ; organization of, by 
Beresford, 119-122, 231-3 ; 
its composition, 229-33 

Press, the Travelling, of Wel- 
lington's army, 162 

Promotion, system of, in British 
army, 198 ; from the ranks 
206-7 

" Provisional Battalions," his- 
tory of the, 187-8 

Purveyor's Department, the 
160 



Quartermaster - General, office 
of, in Wellington's army. 



Index 



393 



155-6 ; duties of his sub- 
ordinates, 258-9 
Quill, Doctor Maurice, surgeon 
of the Connaught Rangers, 
anecdotes of, 299 



R. 

Rae, John, 71st Foot, his exploit 

at Sobral, 324 
Raglan, Lord. See Somerset, 

Lord Fitzroy 
Record Office, Peninsular docu- 
ments in, 14 
Recruiting, notes on, 208-213 
Regiments, internal organization 

of, 208-219 
Regimental Histories, series, 

compiled by R. Cannon, 32 ; 

later histories, 33-4 
Reille, General, his mistake at 

Quatre Bras, 81 
Religion, influence of, in Penin- 
sular army, 6-7, 320-1 
Reprimands, punishment by, 

240-2 
Revolution, the French, British 

detestation of, 5, 320-1 
Reynier, Greneral J. L., at 

Maida, 77, 78 ; at Bussaco, 85 
Rifle battalions, formed in the 

British army, 75 ; use of, by 

Wellington, 83, 84 ; uniform 

of, 300-1 
Rifle, the Baker type, its cha- 
racter, 302-3 
Rifle Brigade, the 95th Foot, 75, 

305 
Rifleman Harris, 3, 23, 31 ; his 

account of Craufurd, 147-8 
Roberts, Lord, his estimate of 

Wellington's character, 49 
Rocca, Captain M., his account 

of the war in Spain, 32 
Rodrigo, Ciudad. See imder 

Ciudad Rodrigo 
Ross, General W., commands 

expedition to America, 151 
Royal IVIilitary College, the, 

203-4 
Russian War, its effect on the 

Peninsular War, 56, 59 



S. 



Sabugal, combat of, 86 

Salamanca, Wellington's sudden 
attack at, 57 ; his tactics at, 
80 ; use of cavalry at, 97, 
170 

San Sebastian, sack of, 213 ; 
siege of, 287-8; the Portu- 
guese infantry at, 234 

Sappers and Miners, the Royal, 
286 ; imiform of, 299 ; wea- 
pons of, 304-5 

Saxe, Marshal, infantry tactics 
of, 62, 63, 65 

Schepeler, Colonel K., his History 
of the Peninsular War, 20 

Scouts, Wellington's, 53 

Seaton, Lord. See Colborne 

Sergeants, status of, in the 
Peninsiilar army, 216-19 ; 
their halberds, 303 

Shako, introduction of, in the 
British army, 292-3 

Shaw-Kennedy, T., aide -de- 
camp to Craufurd, his de- 
scription of Craufurd, 143 

Sherbrooke, General J. _ C., 
commands the 1st Division, 
166 

Sherer, Captain Moyle, his Re- 
collections oj the Peninsula, 
27 

Shipp, John, his autobiography, 
3 ; his romantic career, 206 

Siege train, Wellington's, organ- 
ized by Alex. Dickson, 281-3 

Sieges, the, of the Peninsular 
War, 279 ; of Badajoz, 281- 
6 ; of Ciudad Rodrigo, 283 ; 
of Burgos, 286-7; of San 
Sebastian, 288 

Silveira, General, commands Por- 
tuguese Militia, 235 

Simmons, George, 95th Foot, 
his Journal, 17 

Slade, General J., his rash charge 
at Maguilla, 105 ; Welling- 
ton's remarks on, 106 ; esti- 
mate of his capacity, 151 

Smith, Sir Harry, his Autobi- 
ography, 28 ; romantic story 
of his marriage, 277 



394 



Index 



Somerset, Lord Fitzroy (after- 
wards Lord Raglan), Military 
Secretary to Wellington, 153 ; 
aide-de-camp to Wellington, 
160 

Sorauren, battle of, Wellington's 
tactics at, 54, 81 

Soult, Nicolas, Marshal, at So- 
rauren, 54, 55 ; at St. Pierre, 
118 ; at San Sebastian, 288 

Southey, Robert, his History of 
the Peninsular War, 18 

Spain, geography of, 93-7 

Spencer, Sir Brent, Wellington's 
confidence in, 46 ; his limita- 
tions, 151 

" Spring Waggons," the, 314 

Spriinglin, Colonel, his auto- 
biography, 22, 32 

St. Chamans, Colonel, his Me- 
moirs, 31, 32 

St. Cyr, Gouvion, Marshal, his 
History of the War, 20 

St. Pierre, Hill at the battle of, 
118 ; gallant conduct of Ash- 
worth's Portuguese at, 234 

Staff Corps Cavalry, duties of 
the, 150 

Standards, types of, used in 
Wellington's army, 305-6 

Stevenson, Sergeant, J., his me- 
moirs, 4 ; his religious con- 
victions, 324 ; description of 
the Methodist meetings at 
Badajoz, 329-30 

Stewart, Sir Charles. See 
Londonderry 

Store-keeper General, office of, 
162 

Stothert, Captain W., his Diary 
of 1809-11.. 17 

Suchet, Marshal Louis Gabriel, 
his account of the war in 
Catalonia, 20 

Surtees, Sergeant W., his reli- 
gious experiences, 7 ; his re- 
miniscences, 30, 216; his re- 
marks on army chaplains, 
328 

" Suspension," punishment of, 
240-1 

Swords, types of, used by 
Peninsular army, 303-4 



T. S. of the 71st Foot, his auto- 
biography, 30 ; why he joined 
the army, 211-12 

Tactics, infantry, French, 63- 
73 ; British, 74-91 

Talavera, battle of, Wellington's 
tactics at, 80, 82 ; charge of 
23rd Light Dragoons at, 105 

Tarleton, Colonel B., his History 
of the War in Carolina, 3 ; his 
" Legion " of light troops, 
75 

Tents, advantages and disad- 
vantages of, 259-60, 264-5 

Thiebault, General Dieudonn^, 
his account of the war in 
Portugal, 20 ; of the combat 
of Aldea da Ponte, 26 

Tirailleurs, employed in French 
army, 65-7, 69 

Tomkinson, Colonel W., his 
Diary, 17, 106 ; his Notes on 
British Cavalry Regiments, 
110, 193 

Torres Vedras, Lines of, Welling- 
ton orders their construction 
in 1809.. 52-3 

Toreno, Conde de, his History 
of the Peninsular War, 21 

Trant, Colonel N., leads Portu- 
guese militia, 235 

Trousers, introduced in the 
British army, 294-6 



U. 



Uniforms, the, in the Peninsular 

army, 292 
Usagre, cavalry combat of, 105 



Vaughan, Sir Charles, his dis- 
patches, 15 ; his MSS., 16 

Venta del Pozo, cavalry combat 
of, 103, 108 

Victor, Claude Perrin, Marshal, 
defeated at Barrosa, 124 

Vigo-Roussillon, Colonel, his 



Index 



395 



account of Barrosa, 32 ; his 

appreciation of Graham, 127 
Vimeiro, battle of, Wellington's 

tactics at, 80 
Vivian, Hussey, Lord, 6; Life 

of, 37 
*' Volunteers," their status, 196 



W. 

Walcheren, expedition, the, dis- 
astrous effects of on health of 
regiments, 187 

Wallace, Colonel W., commands 
3rd Division after fall of 
Badajoz, 198 

Warre, Sir Greorge, his Letters of 
1808-12.. 17 

Waterloo, battle of, Wellington's 
tactics at, 80, 87 

Wellesley, Henry, diplomatist, 
his dispatches at the Record 
Office, 15, 106 

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 
Duke of, his dispatch con- 
cerning preaching officers, 7 ; 
Gurwood's edition of his Dis- 
patches, 9-12 ; the Supple- 
mentary Dispatches, 12 ; his 
General Orders, 13 ; views on 
publication of historical in- 
formation, 9 ; his story of a 
visit to Bliicher before Water- 
loo, 25 ; his early career, 39- 
41 ; his relations with his 
troops, 41-3 ; with his officers, 
43 ; autocratic temper, 46 ; 
his dispatches, 47 ; Lord 
Roberts' estimate of him, 
49 ; extraordinary prescience 
of the course of the war, 50-3 ; 
his long-sighted calculation, 
53-5 ; his strategy, 55 ; in 
offensive warfare, 57-80 ; his 
infantry tactics, 61, 73-93 ; 
his views on French tactics, 
78 ; his tactics at Vimeiro, 



Bussaco, Salamanca, Water- 
loo, 80 ; remarks on the 
triumph of line over column, 
86 ; his cavalry tactics, 94- 
102, 104 ; remarks on British 
cavalry, 104-109 ; " Instruc- 
tions for Cavalry," 111, 112; 
his confidence in Hill, 117 ; 
in Beresford, 120 ; in Graham, 
125 ; his relations with Crau- 
furd, 144 ; his estimate of 
Erskine, 151 ; his organiza- 
tion of the army, 154 ; his 
rapid early promotion, 199 ; 
remarks on promotion from 
the ranks, 206-7 ; adventure 
with the plunderer of bee- 
hives, 246 ; his orders for the 
army on the march, 255, 263 ; 
his remarks on the third siege 
of Badajoz, 284 ; at the siege 
of Burgos, 287 ; his attitude 
toward religion, 324-5 ; re- 
quisitions chaplains for the 
army, 325-7 

Wellington, Arthur Richard 
Wellesley, second Duke of, his 
publication of the Supple- 
mentary Dispatches, 9, 12 

Wesleys, the, influence of, 320 

Whinyates, Colonel F. A., his 
history From Corunna to 
Sebastopol, 33 

Windham, William, his appre- 
ciation of Craufiu^d, 140 

Wives, the soldiers', at the front, 
274-6 

Woodberry, Lieutenant G., 18th 
Hussars, his Diary, 6 



Y. 

York, Frederick, Duke of, his 
campaign in Flanders, 66, 74 ; 
his views on infantry tactics 
77 ; on promotion in the army 
199-200 



THE END 



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